Alyse Morena Tarbotton v City of Gosnells
[2022] FWC 13
•5 JANUARY 2022
| [2022] FWC 13 |
| FAIR WORK COMMISSION |
| DECISION |
Fair Work Act 2009
s.394—Unfair dismissal
Alyse Morena Tarbotton
v
City Of Gosnells
(U2021/10942)
| DEPUTY PRESIDENT BEAUMONT | PERTH, 5 JANUARY 2022 |
Application for unfair dismissal remedy
Introduction
Ms Tarbotton (the Applicant) applied for an unfair dismissal remedy, having been purportedly dismissed from the City of Gosnells (the Respondent) on 28 September 2021. The Respondent objected to the application on the grounds that the application was filed outside the 21-day period prescribed by s 394(2) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (the Act) and the Applicant had not been dismissed.
The Applicant concedes that her application was filed on 30 November 2021 and was therefore submitted some 42 days after the statutory deadline. However, she attributes the delay in filing her application on an error of her representative. That same representative had advised her to make an unfair dismissal application in the Western Australian Industrial Relations Commission (WAIRC). Further, at the time the Applicant made the unfair dismissal application in the Commission, things were somewhat complicated by the Applicant still having the WAIRC application on foot.
The Commission must now consider several matters which include whether the Applicant:
(a) was precluded from making her unfair dismissal application because of the proceedings in the WAIRC;
(b) should be granted an extension of time in which to make the unfair dismissal application; and
(c) was dismissed.
However, before embarking on such consideration it is timely to provide the broader context and events leading to the purported conclusion of the employment and the making of the unfair dismissal application.
Background
The Applicant was offered employment with the Respondent on or around 28 December 2020 as a Swim School Teacher. She was employed on a casual basis and the terms and conditions of her employment were said to be governed by the City of Gosnells Leisure World Enterprise Agreement 2019 (the Agreement).[1]
The Applicant reported working predominately two shifts a week. However, the rosters provided by the Respondent showed that over the course of 2021 the Applicant worked anywhere between one to four days a week, and at times had no work in several weeks. From in or around the mid- July 2021, the Applicant appeared to have been allocated a Saturday shift.
On 28 September 2021 the Applicant received from the Respondent an email which read:
…
Due to programming demands Leisure World is unable to continue to offer you a [sic] regular shifts on Friday and Saturday mornings. We thank you for your help during the year, staff have learnt a lot from your training sessions.We are aware that you have advised you would not be continuing working for Leisure World Swim School at the end of Term 4 due to other work commitments.
If you are able to help cover shifts for the Swim School we would appreciate the support.
The Applicant gave evidence that she considered the email dated 28 September 2021 to be the notification of her dismissal and that she considered that her dismissal took effect on that same day.
The Applicant stated that on 6 October 2021 she had a 30-minute discussion with a solicitor from the Michael Law Group (Michael Law). That session had been facilitated through the Commission’s Workplace Advisory Service – a service that seeks to assist litigants by providing access to pro-bono legal advice.
The Applicant said that she was advised by the solicitor from Michael Law that jurisdictional issues were complex in Western Australia but as she was employed by a local government, it was likely that she was a state system employee and that she should make an application (presumedly for unfair dismissal) with the Western Australian Industrial Relations Commission (WAIRC).
The Applicant subsequently made an application for unfair dismissal in the WAIRC on 26 October 2021. When questioned why the Applicant had waited 20 days after the receipt of legal advice to file her application, she explained that the lawyers had seemed a bit confused about the jurisdictional issue and that she was also just deciding whether she wanted to go through with the process.
The Applicant added that she was, in addition, waiting to see whether she was allocated any cover shifts – as had been indicated by the Respondent. By 26 October 2021, the Respondent had not allocated to the Applicant any cover shifts, so the Applicant made an application within the 28-day time limit for unfair dismissal in that jurisdiction.
On the point of jurisdiction, the Applicant stated that she was contacted by a representative of the Fair Work Commission, who did not identify themselves as a legal practitioner, who said words to the effect they were unsure as to what jurisdiction her application fell under.
When asked at hearing what steps she had taken to ascertain whether she was covered by state or federal workplace laws, the Applicant conceded that from 6 October 2021 until 26 October 2021 she had simply relied upon the legal advice. The Applicant confirmed that she had not checked her employment contract and could not recall seeing a Fair Work Information Statement that had purportedly been provided to her on commencement with the Respondent.
Having lodged the unfair dismissal application in the WAIRC, the Applicant was contacted on 15 November 2021 by Mr Tom Hastings, Manager of Organisational Performance for the Respondent. Mr Hastings advised the Applicant that the Respondent would be raising a jurisdictional objection to her unfair dismissal application on the basis that the Respondent was a ‘national system employer’.[2] Mr Hastings noted that the Respondent had become aware of the application in the WAIRC on 9 November 2021.[3]
During the hearing, the Applicant was asked whether she took any steps to confirm her status as a national system employee after having been notified that the Respondent was going to lodge a jurisdictional objection. The Applicant expressed that she did not. This was because it was her preference, said the Applicant, to await formal notification from the Respondent and thereafter make an application to the Commission.
On 26 November 2021, the Respondent lodged a Form 2A – Employer Response to Unfair Dismissal Application in relation to the WAIRC matter (Form 2A).
The Applicant gave evidence that upon receiving and accepting the Respondent’s jurisdictional objection on 26 November 2021, she lodged an application with the Fair Work Commission on 29 November 2021.
On 29 November 2021, the Applicant and Respondent were advised by email that the matter had been allocated to a Member of the WAIRC.[4]
On the evening of 29 November 2021, the Applicant sent an email to the WAIRC stating that she was withdrawing her application in favour of making an application to the Commission as a ‘national system employee’.[5]
On 1 December 2021, the Respondent received correspondence from the Commission stating that the Commission had received the Applicant’s unfair dismissal application on 29 November 2021, but that more information was required from the Applicant.[6]
On 2 December 2021, the Respondent received further correspondence from the Commission that the Applicant had lodged an unfair dismissal application with the Commission on 30 November 2021.[7]
On 10 December 2021, the WAIRC sent correspondence to both Applicant and Respondent asking the Applicant to file a Form F1A – Multipurpose Form to discontinue matter U91/2021 in the WAIRC.
As of 22 December 2021, it appeared the WAIRC had not received the completed Form F1A and hence a further request was made by the WAIRC to file the relevant form.
The Applicant confirmed that as of 29 December 2021, she had filed the Form F1A and had discontinued the unfair dismissal matter before the WAIRC.
Operation of s 725 of the Act
The Act provides a set of legislative rules relating to applications for remedies under it. These legislative rules extend to preventing multiple applications or complaints in relation to the same conduct.[8] In respect of unfair dismissal applications the ‘general rule’ is set out in s 725:
A person who has been dismissed must not make an application or complaint of a kind referred to in any one of sections 726 to 732 in relation to the dismissal if any of those sections applies.
Section 732 deals with applications and complaints under other laws and reads as follows:
(1) [Application]
This section applies if:
(a) an application or complaint under another law has been made by, or on behalf of, the person in relation to the dismissal; and
(b) the application or complaint has not:(i) been withdrawn by the person who made the application; or
(ii) failed for want of jurisdiction;
(2) [Meaning of application of complaint under another law]
(a) a law of the Commonwealth (other than this Act); or
(b) a law of a State or Territory.
The effect of the general rule in s 725 is that if s 732 applies then the person is precluded from making an unfair dismissal application.[9]
It follows, that as the Applicant had made an unfair dismissal application under the Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA) (IR Act), she had made an application ‘under another law… in relation to the dismissal’. The unfair dismissal application before the WAIRC, which had been made under the IR Act, had not been discontinued (or withdrawn)[10] in the manner prescribed by the WAIRC, at the time the unfair dismissal application under s 394(1) of the Act was made.
It is evident from the WAIRC’s correspondence to the Applicant dated 10 December 2021, that the WAIRC did not consider that the unfair dismissal application before it had been discontinued – notwithstanding the Applicant’s email to the WAIRC on 29 November 2021. This can perhaps be explained in part by regulation 16 of the Industrial Relations Commission Regulations 2005 (WA) which, in short provides, that to discontinue a matter a notice must be filed in the ‘approved form’. The WAIRC’s email to the Applicant on 10 December 2021 provide a website link to that ‘approved form’.
Effectively, the Applicant was precluded from bringing the unfair dismissal application by operation of s 725 of the Act. On that basis I consider that the application before me now should be dismissed under s 587(1)(a) of the Act – it having not been made in accordance with the Act. However, out of an abundance of caution the remaining issues are considered.
Extension of time
Before proceeding to examine whether an extension of time should be granted, I note that I have presumed the date of dismissal to be 28 September 2021 – as purported by the Applicant. However, more is said on this point at paragraphs [59]-[65].
Under s 394(2) of the Act, the Commission has the power to extend the time within which an application for unfair dismissal can be made if it is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances.
The meaning of this term was considered by a Full Bench in Nulty v Blue Star Group Pty Ltd (Nulty).[11] In order to be exceptional, the circumstances must be out of the ordinary course, or unusual, or special, or uncommon, although they need not be unique or unprecedented. Exceptional circumstances can include a single exceptional matter, a combination of exceptional factors, or a combination of ordinary factors which, although individually of no significance, when taken together, can be considered exceptional.
In the decision of Periklis Stogiannidis v Victorian Frozen Foods Distributors Pty Ltd t/as Richmond Oysters,[12] the Full Bench provided clarification regarding the assessment of exceptional circumstances. While the Full Bench considered s 366(1), the observation remains relevant:
As we have mentioned, the assessment of whether exceptional circumstances exist requires a consideration of all the relevant circumstances. No one factor (such as the reason for the delay) need be found to be exceptional in order to enliven the discretion to extend time. This is so because even though no one factor may be exceptional, in combination with other factors the circumstances may be such as to be regarded as exceptional.[13]
At the commencement of the hearing, the parties were referred to s 394(3) of the Act, and the meaning of ‘exceptional circumstances’. Both were invited to make further submissions in relation to the question of whether there were ‘exceptional circumstances’ by reference to the factors at s 394(3). Each of these factors are considered below.
4.1Reason for the delay
The Act does not specify what reason for delay might tell in favour of granting an extension. However, decisions of the Commission have referred to an acceptable or reasonable explanation.[14] The absence of any explanation for any part of the delay will usually weigh against an applicant in the assessment of whether there are exceptional circumstances. A credible explanation for the entirety of the delay will usually weigh in the applicant’s favour however, all of the circumstances must be considered.[15]
The relevant period required to be considered under s 394(3)(a) is the period after the 21-day timeframe for lodging the application.[16] However, the circumstances from the time of the dismissal are considered to determine whether there is a reason for the delay beyond the 21-day period and, ultimately, whether that reason constitutes exceptional circumstances.[17]
Representative error
Where a representative error is a factor said to have contributed to the delay in making the application, it is accepted that the conduct of the applicant nevertheless is to be examined.[18] In Patrick Morgan McConnell v A & PM Fornataro T/A Tony’s Plumbing Service,[19] a Full Bench decision that considered an out of time application under s 365 of the Act, but which is relevant for present purposes, it was said by the majority:
Even if representational error was accepted, we consider that the application of the approach set out in Clark v Ringwood Private Hospital (Clark) remains apposite. We have adopted that approach in so far as it was summarised by a Full Bench of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission in Davidson v Aboriginal and Islander Child Care Agency in the following terms:
“(i) Depending on the particular circumstances, representative error may be a sufficient reason to extend the time within which an application for relief is to be lodged.
(ii) A distinction should be drawn between delay properly apportioned to an applicant’s representative where the applicant is blameless and delay occasioned by the conduct of the applicant.
(iii) The conduct of the applicant is a central consideration in deciding whether representative error provides an acceptable explanation for the delay in filing the application. For example it would generally not be unfair to refuse to accept an application which is some months out of time in circumstances where the applicant left the matter in the hands of their representative and took no steps to inquire as to the status of their claim. A different situation exits where an applicant gives clear instructions to their representative to lodge an application and the representative fails to carry out those instructions, through no fault of the applicant and despite the applicant’s efforts to ensure that the claim is lodged.
(iv) Error by an applicant’s representatives is only one of a number of factors to be considered in deciding whether or not an out of time application should be accepted.”[20]
I respectfully adopt the approach by the Full Bench in Nulty in relation to the meaning of exceptional circumstances and the decision in Clark regarding representative error.
The Applicant has argued that her application was filed late with the Commission, due to issues in establishing the correct jurisdiction for an employee of a local government in Western Australia. The Applicant submitted that the initial legal advice she received indicated she was a state system employee, and therefore she initially pursued her claim within the framework required by law for the WAIRC.
While the Applicant has asserted that she was advised to make her application in the WAIRC, the evidence adduced to support such proposition is scant. Tendered into evidence was a text message received by the Applicant, purportedly on 4 October 2021, which spoke of confirming the Applicant’s identity to enable an appointment to be scheduled with Michael Law. A telephone call log was also tendered which was said to show that a telephone discussion had taken place with a solicitor from Michael Law on 6 October 2021 for a period of 31 minutes and 28 seconds. However, the direct evidence does not illuminate the advice imparted to the Applicant or the instructions given.
Briefly stated, there is insufficient evidence before me to conclude that the Applicant was incorrectly advised based upon the information she provided to the legal representative.
Further, while the Applicant stated she received advice on 6 October 2021 from Michael Law and that the advice given was for her to make an unfair dismissal application in the WAIRC, the Applicant did not do so until 26 October 2021.
The Applicant reasoned that the delay in making the application in the WAIRC was occasioned by a couple of factors. One of those factors included the Applicant’s contemplation about whether she wanted to pursue an unfair dismissal application. The Applicant notes that she was waiting to see whether she was allocated any cover shifts prior to making the unfair dismissal application in the WAIRC. It follows that there appears to have been no sense of urgency to have addressed the making of the application in the WAIRC, and whilst the application made in that jurisdiction was made within time, had an unfair dismissal application been made within this Commission in that same period, it would have been made outside of the prescribed statutory timeframe.
Clearly the Applicant was able to identify who employed her. That much was clear. However, it was evident that there was purported consternation as to the correct jurisdiction for bringing an unfair dismissal application. While not determinative of jurisdiction, the Respondent raises the salient point that the Applicant’s employment contract stipulated that her terms and conditions of employment were governed by the Agreement and when the Applicant commenced work with the Respondent, she would have received a Fair Work Information Statement.
The Applicant had effectively been informed that she was covered by the Agreement on employment commencement and yet there is no evidence that she raised this point with Michael Law or considered the point further regarding the lodgement of an unfair dismissal application in the Commission – which was open to her to do.
Come 15 November 2021, the Applicant had been placed on notice that the Respondent disagreed that the WAIRC had jurisdiction to entertain the unfair dismissal application. However, the Applicant adduced no evidence to suggest that at this point she sought further advice as to the jurisdictional objection or researched the point further herself. In fact, the Applicant admitted that she took no additional steps to confirm her status as a national system employee as she preferred to await formal notification from the Respondent.
The Applicant gave evidence that upon receiving and accepting the Respondent’s jurisdictional objection on 26 November 2021, she lodged an application with the Fair Work Commission on 29 November 2021. It is evident that two days had passed from the time of receiving and accepting the Respondent’s jurisdictional objection on 26 November 2021 until the time of making the application in the Commission on 29 November 2021.
If wrong regarding my conclusion about representative error, it is not the case that the Applicant is blameless in her conduct. There was information before the Applicant that at least suggested that she was a ‘national system employee’. In this respect, I refer to the Applicant’s employment contract and its reference to the Agreement. Whilst I accept the Applicant’s evidence that she could not recall the provision a Fair Work Information Statement, I consider that it would have proved unproblematic for the Applicant to have checked the document that governed the terms and conditions of her employment. That same document, the Agreement, which can be located on the Fair Work Commission website, refers to the Act, the Commission and to the National Employment Standards - all of which are indicators that the Commission would likely have been the first port of call. However, it must again be reiterated that while indicative of a first port of call – such indicators are not determinative in and of themselves, of jurisdiction.
Whilst unconvinced that Michael Law fell into representative error, even if there was, I consider that the Applicant is not blameless given the lack of urgency to address the making of her unfair dismissal application in the WAIRC and in this Commission. The Applicant delayed making the application in the WAIRC, in part, because she was simply contemplating whether she wanted to go ahead with the application. Furthermore, the Applicant appeared to have made no attempts to clarify for herself the correct jurisdiction for an unfair dismissal application despite having been informed by the Respondent come 15 November 2021, that it would be challenging this point.
It has previously been expressed by this Commission that there is nothing exceptional about lodging an unfair dismissal application in the WAIRC when the application should have been lodged in the Commission.[21] However, the statement should not be read as a carte blanche proposition that all applications mistakenly lodged in the WAIRC are by their nature unexceptional. Much will turn on the facts of the matter, as was the case cited to me by the Respondent.[22]
I have considered the delay as the period beyond the 21-day period. However, regard has been had to the circumstances from the date the dismissal took effect. I am not satisfied that the Applicant has made out an acceptable or reasonable explanation for the whole period of the delay in lodging her unfair dismissal application. This weighs against a finding that there are exceptional circumstances.
4.2Whether the person first became aware of the dismissal after it had taken effect
At all material times the Applicant appeared to have accepted that she had been notified of her dismissal on 28 September 2021 and it had taken effect on that same day. Whilst the Applicant spoke of waiting until 26 October 2021 to see whether she would be assigned any cover shifts and thereafter considering herself dismissed when no such shifts were allocated, it is evident from the totality of the Applicant’s evidence that she considered herself dismissed as of 28 September 2021.
4.3Action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal
Action taken by the employee to contest the dismissal, other than lodging an unfair dismissal application, may favour granting an extension of time.[23] I have considered all submissions and the evidence in this respect and note that the Applicant simply asked by email on 28 September 2021 whether her dismissal was to have immediate effect. It follows that there is no evidence before me to suggest that the Applicant challenged her purported dismissal. This therefore weighs against a finding of exceptional circumstances.
4.4Prejudice to the employer
I consider that the factor of ‘prejudice’ is a neutral consideration in all the circumstances.
4.5Merits of the application
In Kornicki v Telstra-Network Technology Group,[24] the Full Bench of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission considered the principles applicable to the extension of time discretion under the former s 170CE(8) of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth). In that case the Full Bench said in respect to the merits of an application:
If the application has no merit, then it would not be unfair to refuse to extend the time period for lodgement. However we wish to emphasise that a consideration of the merits of the substantive application for relief in the context of an extension of time application does not require a detailed analysis of the substantive merits. It would be sufficient for the applicant to establish that the substantive application was not without merit.[25]
Evidence on the merits is rarely called at an extension of time hearing. As a result, the Commission ‘should not embark on a detailed consideration of the substantive case’ for the purpose of determining whether to grant an extension of time to an applicant to lodge her or his application.[26] The merits of the application more generally would need to be scrutinised. This of course, would include consideration of the circumstances of the dismissal if an extension of time were granted and the matter proceeded.
However, one of the pressing points that has arisen is whether the Applicant was dismissed. It is self-explanatory that to be protected from unfair dismissal a ‘dismissal’ must have taken place. The meaning of word is detailed in s 386 of the Act. Having reviewed the materials submitted by the parties, I am unconvinced that the Applicant had been dismissed as of 28 September 2021.
The Applicant considered herself dismissed when she received notification of the loss of the ‘regular’ Friday and Saturday shift. However, whilst the Respondent’s email dated 28 September 2021 refers to the word ‘regular’, the rosters provided by the Respondent show that the working arrangements on the Friday and Saturday mornings had been in-situ for a limited period – seemingly from mid-August 2021; albeit Saturday shifts had been allocated from late mid to late July 2021.
However, it should not be understood that the abovementioned period was the entirety of the Applicant’s rostered shifts over the course of 2021. For the period of early March 2021 until September 2021, the Applicant had been allocated shifts on Tuesdays for eighteen weeks and had worked each week with the exception of five weeks where no work was allocated. For a period, the Applicant also received Monday shifts for sixteen weeks, and on Thursdays for 14 weeks.
By further remail dated 28 September 2021, the Respondent informed the Applicant that there would be ‘plenty of cover shifts for you we just need to keep some continuity with classes’. The Applicant reports not receiving any cover shifts after 28 September 2021 – in effect the Applicant states she was left with no shifts at all.
However, the Respondent led evidence, which was not contested, as to how cover shifts were allocated or rostered and whether the Applicant had provided availability for particular shifts. It was noted that the Applicant had not responded to any of the cover shifts that had been posted on Facebook, the usual platform adopted by the Respondent to ascertain availability for cover shifts. It appears more likely than not from the evidence presented that if the Applicant sought further shifts, she was to have made known her availability for the shifts offered via Facebook. She did not do so.
From the rosters provided and the other evidence given regarding shift allocation, I am not satisfied that the Applicant was dismissed.
It is for these reasons that I have concluded that this factor weighs against there being circumstances that are exceptional.
4.6Fairness as between the person and other persons in a similar position
The criterion of ‘fairness as between the person and other persons in a similar position’, was considered by the Deputy President in Morphett v Pearcedale Egg Farm,[27] where it was said:
[C]ases of this kind will generally turn on their own facts. However, this consideration is concerned with the importance of an application of consistent principles in cases of this kind, thus ensuring fairness as between the Applicant and other persons in a similar position, and that consideration may relate to matters currently before the Commission or matters which had been previously decided by the Commission.[28]
The Applicant drew attention to the decision of Matthew Palmer v RCR Engineering Pty Ltd (Palmer), [29] where the Deputy President allowed an extension of time in circumstances where an unfair dismissal application was initially brought in the WAIRC. However, unlike the circumstances in Palmer where the applicant submitted his unfair dismissal application in the WAIRC within three days of termination of employment, the Applicant lodged her application seven days outside of the statutory period set in s 394(2) of the Act – albeit it was within time for the purpose of the application in the WAIRC.
By 15 November 2021, the Respondent had placed the Applicant on notice of its intent to object to the application on the basis that it was a national system employer. The Applicant took no steps to seek further advice or undertake her own research on this jurisdictional point. In Palmer, the applicant was not forewarned of the jurisdictional objection but simply received the objection when the employer response was filed in the WAIRC. On receipt of that response, the applicant in Palmer made an unfair dismissal application in the Commission within a couple of days. Whilst the Applicant similarly made an unfair dismissal application on receipt of the Form 2A, she took no steps prior to that time although the opportunity was there for her to do so.
It is further observed that in Palmer the respondent lodged the jurisdictional objection in the WAIRC beyond the time allowed for the applicant to lodge an application in the Commission.[30] The Deputy President in Palmer expressed that had the employer response been lodged more expeditiously, the applicant most likely would have lodged an application with the Commission within the time allowed.[31] The circumstances before me are markedly different. The feasibility of the Applicant making her unfair dismissal application with this Commission on time, passed when she vacillated about whether to make an unfair dismissal application or not.
I am not satisfied that the criteria of fairness between the Applicant and other persons in a similar position weighs strongly in favour of either party based on the submissions filed and as such I consider it a neutral consideration.
Conclusion
The test of exceptional circumstances in s 394(3) of the Act is a stringent one. Having considered each of the statutory criteria and all the circumstances of the matter, I am not satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances that support an extension of time and I consider that it is not fair and equitable to grant the extension. The factors considered either do not weigh in favour of granting an extension or are otherwise neutral – neither weighing for nor against.
It follows that the Applicant’s application for an unfair dismissal remedy is dismissed. An Order[32] will be issued with this decision.
DEPUTY PRESIDENT
Appearances:
Ms A Tarbotton for herself;
Mr T Hastings for the Respondent.
Hearing details:
Perth (by telephone).
December 30 2021.
[1] [2019] FWCA 5076; AE504542.
[2] Witness Statement of Mr Tom Hastings (Hastings Statement).
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid; Correspondence – Email from Ms Tarbotton to WAIRC.
[6] Hastings Statement.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) pt 6-1 div 3.
[9] Chandra Gupta Narayan v MW Engineers Pty Ltd [2013] FWCFB 2530 [17].
[10] Ibid.
[11] [2011] 203 IR 1 (Nulty).
[12] [2018] FWCFB 901.
[13] Ibid [38].
[14] Ibid [17].
[15] Ibid [39].
[16] Long v Keolis Downer T/A Yarra Trams[2018] FWCFB 4109 [40].
[17] Mr KeMitchell Shaw v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited T/A ANZ Bank [2015] FWCFB 287 [12].
[18] Patrick Morgan McConnell v A & PM Fornataro T/A Tony’s Plumbing Service[2011] FWAFB 466.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid [35].
[21] Ms Tomica Robertson v Zeugma Electrical & Communication Services Pty Ltd[2010] FWA 4525 [12].
[22] Ibid.
[23] Brodie-Hanns v MTV Publishing Ltd (1995) 67 IR 298, 299-300.
[24] Print P3168, 22 July 1997 (Ross VP, Watson SDP, Gay C).
[25] Ibid.
[26] Kyvelos v Champion Socks Pty Ltd, Print T2421 [14]; Collier v Saltwater Freshwater Arts Alliance Aboriginal Corporation[2016] FWC 2899 [38].
[27] [2015] FWC 8885.
[28] Ibid [29].
[29] [2009] FWA 1431.
[30] [2009] FWA 1431 [9].
[31] [2009] FWA 1431 [9].
[32] PR737294.
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