Aluboodi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Aluboodi v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1498

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 476

Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Thiyagarajah (1998) 80 FCR 543, followed

Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Thiyagarajah [2000] HCA 9, referred to

Curragh Queensland Mining Ltd v Daniel (1992) 34 FCR 212, referred to
Szelagowicz v Stocker (1994) 35 ALD 16, cited
Chen v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 43, cited
Yilan v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 854, cited
Al-Amidi v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1081, distinguished
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611, followed

JAMAL ABDULALI ALUBOODI v THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
W 71 of 2000

R D NICHOLSON J
26 OCTOBER 2000
PERTH (heard in Sydney)


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

W71 of 2000

BETWEEN:

JAMAL ABDULALI ALUBOODI
APPLICANT

AND:

THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

R D NICHOLSON J

DATE OF ORDER:

26 OCTOBER 2000

WHERE MADE:

PERTH

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

W71 of 2000

BETWEEN:

JAMAL ABDULALI ALUBOODI
APPLICANT

AND:

THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

R D NICHOLSON J

DATE:

26 OCTOBER 2000

PLACE:

PERTH

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an application for review brought in reliance upon s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”). The application seeks a review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) made on 18 April 2000 whereby the Tribunal affirmed the decision of a delegate of the respondent not to grant to the applicant a protection visa.

  2. The applicant, who is a citizen of Iraq, arrived in Australia on 13 June 1999. On 4 November 1999 he lodged an application for a protection (class XA) visa under the Act. The delegate refused the application on 6 January 2000.

    The relevant legislative provisions

  3. Under s 36(2) of the Act a non- citizen in Australia is eligible for a protection visa if that person is someone: “… to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol.” The Refugees Convention is the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951 and the Refugees Protocol is the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 1967. The expression “Convention” will be used to mean the Convention as amended by the Protocol.

  4. Article 1a(2) of the Convention defines a “refugee” to be any person who:

    “…owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing…

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Details
Case
[2000] FCA 1498
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Aluboodi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the applicant, Aluboodi, sought to challenge a decision by the Tribunal affirming the delegate’s decision to refuse his application for a protection visa. The applicant contended that the Tribunal erred in its interpretation and application of Article 33 of the Convention, and that the decision was not supported by any evidence or material. The Federal Court was tasked with determining whether the Tribunal had erred in its interpretation and application of Article 33 of the Convention, and whether the decision was supported by evidence or material.

The court examined whether the Tribunal had made any error of law in interpreting and applying Article 33 of the Convention. It found that the Tribunal’s interpretation and application of the Convention was not erroneous. The court also considered whether the Tribunal’s decision was supported by evidence or material. It held that even if there was no evidence to support the Tribunal's conclusion that the applicant could re-enter Syria, this would not make out the ground in the absence of proof by admissible evidence that the applicant could not re-enter Syria. The court found that the applicant had not identified any error of law in the reasoning of the Tribunal, and therefore, could not succeed in his intention to attain refugee status in Australia.

The court dismissed the application for review and ordered that the applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application. The court found that the Tribunal’s decision was not based on any error of law, and that the applicant had not established that the decision was not supported by evidence or material. The court also noted that the applicant’s submissions were largely focused on the merits of the Tribunal’s decision, which was not permissible under the relevant legislation. The court held that the applicant could not succeed in his application for review, and dismissed the application with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In my opinion the manner in which the Tribunal interpreted and applied Article 33 of the Convention does not disclose any error of law.Whether no evidence for decisions in relation to Iraq and Syria The second ground raised in the addendum is that by affirming the decision made by the delegate that the applicant can go back to Iraq and also in deciding that the applicant can re-enter Syria, the Tribunal’s decision was not supported by any evidence or material. It is said the Tribunal failed to consider the United Nations Procedure and Criteria which stipulates that the “examiner must assess the validity of any evidence and the credibility of the applicant’s statements” before the decision making. The relevant portion of this decision in the light of the decision of the Tribunal is the claim that there was no evidence to justify the Tribunal’s conclusion that the applicant could re-enter Syria. It is apparent from the findings of the Tribunal previously set out that it is not the case there was no evidence or material to support its finding. Even if there were no evidence for this conclusion that would not make out the ground in the absence of proof by admissible evidence that the applicant cannot re-enter Syria. This is because s 476(1)(g) must be applied in accordance with s 476(4)(b). That provides that the no evidence ground cannot be made out unless (relevantly) the person who made the decision based the decision on the existence of a particular fact and that fact did not exist: cf Curragh Queensland Mining Ltd v Daniel (1992) 34 FCR 212 (FC) at 220-221; Szelagowicz v Stocker (1994) 35 ALD 16 (FCA/FC) at 22; Chen v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 43 (FC) at [41]; Yilan v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 854 (FC) at [52-58] and cases there cited. The no evidence ground does not allow an applicant to reargue the merits of the findings on the evidence before the Tribunal, so that arguments to that end cannot avail the applicant.Conclusion In submissions for the applicant reference was made to the decision in Al-Amidi v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1081. That was a decision dealing with the issue of relocation. That is a different issue to the question of effective protection raised in the applicant’s case. An allegation that the Tribunal’s decision breached s 420 of the Act was not pursued, counsel for the applicant accepting the effect of the decision in Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611. Nevertheless the effect of many of the submissions for the applicant was to argue in terms of the merits of the Tribunal’s decision. A particular feature of the applicant’s case is that three of the applicant’s brothers reside in Australia, having been granted humanitarian visas in 1995 while living in Saudi Arabia. However, the applicant not having identified any error of law in the reasoning of the Tribunal, cannot succeed in his intention to attain refugee status for himself in Australia.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Even if there were no evidence for this conclusion that would not make out the ground in the absence of proof by admissible evidence that the applicant cannot re-enter Syria. This is because s 476(1)(g) must be applied in accordance with s 476(4)(b). That provides that the no evidence ground cannot be made out unless (relevantly) the person who made the decision based the decision on the existence of a particular fact and that fact did not exist: cf Curragh Queensland Mining Ltd v Daniel (1992) 34 FCR 212 (FC) at 220-221; Szelagowicz v Stocker (1994) 35 ALD 16 (FCA/FC) at 22; Chen v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 43 (FC) at [41]; Yilan v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 854 (FC) at [52-58] and cases there cited. The no evidence ground does not allow an applicant to reargue the merits of the findings on the evidence before the Tribunal, so that arguments to that end cannot avail the applicant.Conclusion In submissions for the applicant reference was made to the decision in Al-Amidi v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1081. That was a decision dealing with the issue of relocation. That is a different issue to the question of effective protection raised in the applicant’s case. An allegation that the Tribunal’s decision breached s 420 of the Act was not pursued, counsel for the applicant accepting the effect of the decision in Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611. Nevertheless the effect of many of the submissions for the applicant was to argue in terms of the merits of the Tribunal’s decision. A particular feature of the applicant’s case is that three of the applicant’s brothers reside in Australia, having been granted humanitarian visas in 1995 while living in Saudi Arabia. However, the applicant not having identified any error of law in the reasoning of the Tribunal, cannot succeed in his intention to attain refugee status for himself in Australia. For these reasons the application for review will be dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established