Alternative Engine Technologies Pty Limited v Kruger Ventures Pty Limited (No 2)

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil: Application)

ALTERNATIVE ENGINE TECHNOLOGIES PTY LTD v KRUGER VENTURES PTY LTD (No 2)

[2010] SASC 60

Reasons of Judge Lunn a Master of the Supreme Court

18 March 2010

CORPORATIONS

Application to wind up for presumed insolvency based on non compliance with statutory demand - evidence of both due posting but non receipt of statutory demand - held proof of due service by virtue of statutory presumption - held Magistrates Court judgment existing at time of service of demand was proper basis for the demand even though it was subsequently set aside - s 459S of Corporations Act operated to prevent defendant from relying on the subsequent setting aside of the judgment - held defendant had not displaced the presumption of its insolvency as it had not put before the Court all of its financial affairs relating to a trust of which it was the trustee - order for winding up.

ALTERNATIVE ENGINE TECHNOLOGIES PTY LTD v KRUGER VENTURES PTY LTD (No 2)
[2010] SASC 60

Reasons on contested winding up application.

  1. JUDGE LUNN:

    Background.

  2. The plaintiff, Alternative Engine Technologies Pty Ltd (“Alternative”), is a company of which Benjamin Hodgson (“Mr Hodgson”) is the director.  The defendant, Kruger Ventures Pty Ltd (“Kruger”), is a company of which Martina Kruger (“Mrs Kruger”) is a director and shareholder.  There is a long history of complicated dealings between the parties, but these reasons are confined to those relevant to what I have to decide in this action.

    Kruger’s statutory demand.

  3. On 4 May 2009 Kruger served on Alternative a statutory demand under s 459E of the Corporations Act 2001 (“the Act”) for $485,000.  It claimed the balance of moneys due under a loan agreement.  On 22 May 2009 Alternative instituted action no 786/09 in this Court seeking to set aside that statutory demand.  On 10 August 2009 I set aside that demand on the grounds that there was a genuine dispute about the debt and/or that Alternative had an offsetting claim against Kruger.  As a condition of this order, Alternative gave an undertaking to prosecute diligently an action in the District Court concerning this dispute and offsetting claim.  I reserved the question of costs.  On 26 November 2009 an appeal by Kruger against my order was dismissed with costs.

  4. On 6 July 2009 Alternative had instituted an action, 1212/09, against Kruger in the District Court claiming damages for misrepresentation and breach of contract.  On 16 July 2009 Kruger applied in that action for an order for security for its costs of $53,600.  On 15 January 2010 Master Norman in that action ordered that Alternative provide security of $30,000 within 28 days.  In assessing the amount of the security at $30,000 Master Norman took into account that Kruger was liable to Alternative for costs ordered in the Supreme Court action, 768/09.  Those costs had not been quantified, but Master Norman in effect gave a credit for them of $15,000.  Alternative had not complied with this order for security…

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Details
Case
[2010] SASC 60
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Alternative Engine Technologies Pty Limited v Kruger Ventures Pty Limited (No 2) involved a dispute over a statutory demand for payment and the solvency of Kruger Ventures Pty Limited. The plaintiff, Alternative Engine Technologies, sought to wind up Kruger based on its presumed insolvency under the Corporations Act 2001. The statutory demand, served by Kruger, claimed a debt of $485,000, which Alternative contested, leading to the demand being set aside initially. However, Alternative subsequently served a statutory demand on Kruger, which Kruger sought to have set aside as well. The central legal issues were whether the statutory demand was properly served, whether the judgment in a Magistrates Court action could be considered a debt under the Corporations Act, and whether Kruger had discharged its burden to prove solvency.

The court determined that the statutory demand was duly served, as evidenced by the statutory presumption of delivery and the lack of evidence to the contrary from Kruger. It further held that the Magistrates Court judgment, even though subsequently set aside, was a valid judgment debt during the period the statutory demand was in effect and could not be used by Kruger to argue against the winding-up application. Under the Corporations Act, Kruger was precluded from relying on the setting aside of the judgment as a defense. Lastly, the court found that Kruger had not adequately discharged the onus to prove solvency, as it failed to present a complete picture of its financial affairs, including its role as a trustee of a relevant trust. The court concluded that Kruger had not disproven the presumption of insolvency, leading to the order for winding up.

The final order of the court was for the winding up of Kruger Ventures Pty Limited, given the failure to disprove the presumption of insolvency and the validity of the statutory demand. This decision underscores the stringent requirements for companies to demonstrate their solvency and the implications of not adequately addressing statutory demands and judgments in insolvency proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

JUDGE LUNN:Background. The plaintiff, Alternative Engine Technologies Pty Ltd (“Alternative”), is a company of which Benjamin Hodgson (“Mr Hodgson”) is the director. The defendant, Kruger Ventures Pty Ltd (“Kruger”), is a company of which Martina Kruger (“Mrs Kruger”) is a director and shareholder. There is a long history of complicated dealings between the parties, but these reasons are confined to those relevant to what I have to decide in this action.Kruger’s statutory demand. On 4 May 2009 Kruger served on Alternative a statutory demand under s 459E of the Corporations Act 2001 (“the Act”) for $485,000. It claimed the balance of moneys due under a loan agreement. On 22 May 2009 Alternative instituted action no 786/09 in this Court seeking to set aside that statutory demand. On 10 August 2009 I set aside that demand on the grounds that there was a genuine dispute about the debt and/or that Alternative had an offsetting claim against Kruger. As a condition of this order, Alternative gave an undertaking to prosecute diligently an action in the District Court concerning this dispute and offsetting claim. I reserved the question of costs. On 26 November 2009 an appeal by Kruger against my order was dismissed with costs. On 6 July 2009 Alternative had instituted an action, 1212/09, against Kruger in the District Court claiming damages for misrepresentation and breach of contract. On 16 July 2009 Kruger applied in that action for an order for security for its costs of $53,600. On 15 January 2010 Master Norman in that action ordered that Alternative provide security of $30,000 within 28 days. In assessing the amount of the security at $30,000 Master Norman took into account that Kruger was liable to Alternative for costs ordered in the Supreme Court action, 768/09. Those costs had not been quantified, but Master Norman in effect gave a credit for them of $15,000. Alternative had not complied with this order for security as at the last hearing before me on 23 February 2010. Kruger had not applied to stay or strike out the District Court proceedings for such non compliance.Magistrates Court action. On 2 July 2009, and before the District Court action had been instituted, Mr Hodgson, on behalf of Alternative, had instituted an action in the Adelaide Magistrates Court, 4322/09, against Kruger claiming $18,330.10 relating to an engine supplied by Kruger to Alternative which “blew up” and which was “not fit for its purpose”. Until recently neither party has been legally represented in this Magistrates Court action and that has probably been the cause of a number of the difficulties which have arisen. On 28 September 2009 Mr Gumpl SM entered a default judgment for Alternative in that action for $18,549. On 9 December 2009, Mr Gumpl SM set aside that judgment and gave leave to Kruger to file a defence within 14 days. Kruger did not file a defence and on 22 January 2010 Mr Gumpl SM again entered judgment for Alternative for $18,549 plus costs. Subsequently, Kruger has applied to set aside this judgment and Mr Gumpl SM has reserved his decision on this application.Statutory demand by Alternative.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

On the evidence, and by virtue of the presumption from s 29(1) of the Acts Interpretation Act, Alternative has established delivery of its statutory demand to Kruger’s registered office shortly after 28 September 2009. Mrs Kruger’s affidavit says that it was not received. However, mere evidence of non receipt is not sufficient to displace the evidence of delivery and the presumption in s 29(1) of the Act: Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Meredith (2007) 245 ALR 150; Perpetual Nominees Ltd v Masri Apartments Pty Ltd (2004) 49 ACSR 714. Thus, Alternative has established the due service of the statutory demand.Effect of the Magistrates Court judgment being set aside. Under s 459E(1) of the Act the subject matter of a statutory demand has to be a debt. “Debt” is not defined in the Act. The claim of Alternative as pleaded in the Magistrates Court was probably unliquidated, but once it was quantified by the judgment of the Magistrates Court on 28 September 2009 it became a judgment debt which is a debt for the purposes of s 459E(1): Pearl Bay Corp Pty ltd v Lodur Pty Ltd (2001) 19 ACLC 982. It remained a judgment debt until after the statutory demand had expired. The fact that the judgment was subsequently set aside did not operate retrospectively to mean that there was no judgment debt during the period of the operation of the statutory demand: Moore v De Biasi (1975) 10 SASR 128. Kruger also argued that the claim in the Magistrates Court action duplicated part of the claim in the District Court action. This would not invalidate the judgment in the Magistrates Court. It would merely mean that Alternative would be put to its election to have that claim stayed in one or other of the Courts: Caloundra Boat Yard Pty Ltd v The Almonta [1968][ SASR 325. If Kruger had applied to set aside the demand doubtless one of the grounds relied upon would have been that there was no debt within s 459E(1) of the Act. This in turn would have raised whether there was a judgment debt. The usual practice would have been to have adjourned the application to set aside the demand for the Magistrates Court to deal with an application to set aside the judgment. Under s459S(1)(b) of the Act Kruger is precluded from now relying upon such a ground which it could have relied upon if it had made an application to set aside the demand. It did not seek leave under s 459S(1) to rely on such a ground. Hence any subsequent setting aside of the judgment cannot be relied upon by Kruger in answer to the winding up application.Insolvency. There is a presumption under s 459C(2)(a) of the Act that Kruger is insolvent. Under s 459C(3) of the Act the onus is on Kruger to prove that it is solvent. The authorities place a high onus on a company to produce all relevant evidence on matters relevant to its solvency: Ace Contractors Ltd v Westgarth Developments Pty Ltd, Weinberg J, Federal Court of Australia, [1999] FCA 728; Expile Pty Ltd v Jabb’s Excavations Pty Ltd (2003) 45 ACSR 711. The only evidence put forward by Kruger as to its solvency were the two affidavits of Mrs Kruger. To the first of those affidavits she exhibited unaudited financial statements for Kruger for the year ended 30 June 2009 prepared by its professional accountants, but containing riders that they were prepared on information provided by the directors and that the accountants did not accept responsibility for the contents of the report to any persons other than the directors or the members of Kruger. During the first hearing counsel for Alternative pointed out that these accounts, and the first affidavit of Mrs Kruger, did not refer to the loan of $485,000 which had been the subject of the statutory demand served by Kruger on Alternative or to Kruger’s contingent liability for costs ordered against it in action 768/09. I granted an adjournment to Kruger to file a further affidavit on these matters.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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