SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
COURT OF APPEAL
Case Title: | Allred v DPP |
Citation: | [2025] ACTCA 25 |
Hearing Date: | 11 March 2025 |
Decision Date: | 18 July 2025 |
Before: | McCallum CJ, Mossop and Loukas-Karlsson JJ |
Decision: | The appeal is dismissed. |
Catchwords: | APPEAL – CRIMINAL LAW – Appeal from sentence in Drug and Alcohol Sentencing List (DASL) – where appellant with long history of drug use and offending sentenced to a Treatment Order in the DASL – where appellant unwilling or unable to comply with the Treatment Order – where Treatment Order cancelled and original sentence imposed – whether sentencing judge considered relevant considerations – whether sentence manifestly excessive – appeal dismissed APPEAL – CRIMINAL LAW – Appeal from sentence in Drug and Alcohol Sentencing List (DASL) – where Treatment Order cancelled and original sentence imposed – whether assertion that the sentence imposed is manifestly excessive is an appeal against the original sentence – imposition involves only a limited exercise of judicial power STATUTES – INTERPRETATION – Drafting – interaction between general sentencing provisions and the imposition provisions in the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) – where drafting s 80ZE(3) “odd” and “curious” – issue unnecessary to decide in this appeal |
Legislation Cited: | Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT), s 110 Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT), ss 63, 65, 80W, 80ZB, 80ZD, 80ZE |
Cases Cited: | Barron v Laverty [2019] ACTSC 198; 346 FLR 442 Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37; 249 CLR 571 DPP v Allred (No 2) [2024] ACTSC 243 DPP v Stewart (No 2) [2024] ACTSC 163 House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 Le Clair v The Queen [2017] ACTCA 19 R v Cook (No 2) [2024] ACTSC 27 |
Parties: | Jackson Allred ( Appellant) Director of Public Prosecutions ( Respondent) |
Representation: | Counsel J Maher ( Appellant) M Howe ( Respondent) |
| Solicitors Hugo Law Group ( Appellant) ACT Director of Public Prosecutions (Respondent) | |
File Number: | ACTCA 27 of 2024 |
Decision Under Appeal: | Court/Tribunal: ACT Supreme Court Before: Christensen AJ Date of Decision: 30 July 2024 Case Title: DPP v Allred (No 2) Citation: [2024] ACTSC 243 |
THE COURT:
Introduction
1․This is an appeal against a decision by Christensen AJ (the sentencing judge) in DPP v Allred (No 2) [2024] ACTSC 243 (Allred (No 2)) to impose a sentence that had been the subject of a drug and alcohol treatment order (Treatment Order) made by Refshauge AJ.
2․On 27 July 2022, the appellant committed offences by driving a stolen car whilst disqualified from driving. The appellant pleaded guilty on 28 February 2023 to two offences arising from that incident:
(a)dishonestly drive motor vehicle without consent (CAN 750/2023); and
(b)drive while disqualified (as a repeat offender) (CAN 2106/2023).
3․On 14 August 2022, the appellant committed further offences by driving a car dangerously, at high speed, through a lengthy police pursuit, while still disqualified…
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- Case
- [2025] ACTCA 25
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the Court were whether the sentencing judge had adequately considered all relevant factors when cancelling the Treatment Order and imposing the original sentence, and whether the resulting sentence was manifestly excessive. The Court also considered whether an assertion that a sentence imposed after the cancellation of a Treatment Order is manifestly excessive constituted an appeal against the original sentence, noting that the imposition of the original sentence in such circumstances involved only a limited exercise of judicial power.
The Court ultimately dismissed the appeal. While acknowledging the "odd" and "curious" drafting of certain provisions within the *Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005* (ACT) concerning the interaction between general sentencing provisions and the imposition of Treatment Orders, this issue was not determinative of the appeal. The Court found that the sentencing judge had properly considered the relevant considerations and that the sentence imposed was not manifestly excessive.
Orders
Orders of the court
The appeal is dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Following the cancellation of the Treatment Order, the sentencing judge imposed the original sentence that had been suspended pending compliance with the Treatment Order. Allred subsequently appealed against the sentence, contending that the sentencing judge had failed to consider relevant factors and that the sentence was manifestly excessive. The appeal raised questions about the appropriate considerations when imposing a sentence following the cancellation of a Treatment Order and the scope of judicial discretion in such circumstances. Additionally, the appeal touched upon the drafting of section 80ZE(3) of the Act, which was described as “odd” and “curious” by the parties, though the Court found it unnecessary to resolve these drafting issues in the context of this appeal.
The appeal was ultimately dismissed by the court, with the judges concluding that the sentencing judge had exercised their discretion appropriately and that the sentence imposed was not manifestly excessive. The court also considered the limited nature of the exercise of judicial power involved in imposing a sentence after the cancellation of a Treatment Order, and rejected Allred’s argument that the appeal was effectively an appeal against the original sentence.
The appellant in Allred v Director of Public Prosecutions was originally sentenced in the Drug and Alcohol Sentencing List (DASL) of the Magistrates Court of the Australian Capital Territory, where he was given a Treatment Order under section 11(1)(c) of the Sentencing Act 1995 (ACT). Despite his history of drug use and criminal offending, the sentencing judge opted for a Treatment Order as opposed to imprisonment, hoping to address the underlying issues contributing to his criminal behaviour. However, the appellant subsequently proved unwilling or unable to comply with the conditions of the Treatment Order. Following a review hearing, the Treatment Order was cancelled, and the original sentence of imprisonment was imposed, as permitted by section 11(4) of the Sentencing Act 1995 (ACT). The appellant then appealed the sentence in the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory, contending that the sentencing judge did not consider all relevant matters and that the sentence was manifestly excessive. This appeal was heard in the Supreme Court, which had to determine whether the appellant's concerns regarding the sentencing process and the severity of the sentence were valid.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the sentencing judge considered all relevant considerations when cancelling the Treatment Order and imposing the original sentence.
2. Whether the sentence imposed by the sentencing judge is manifestly excessive.
3. Whether the assertion that the sentence imposed is manifestly excessive constitutes an appeal against the original sentence.
4. Whether the imposition of the sentence involves only a limited exercise of judicial power.
5. Whether the drafting of section 80ZE(3) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) is "odd" and "curious" and if the issue is necessary to decide in this appeal.
Held
1. Whether the sentencing judge considered all relevant considerations when cancelling the Treatment Order and imposing the original sentence. The court concluded that the sentencing judge did consider all relevant considerations, resulting in no error in this aspect of the appeal.
2. Whether the sentence imposed by the sentencing judge is manifestly excessive. The court concluded that the sentence imposed by the sentencing judge is not manifestly excessive.
3. Whether the assertion that the sentence imposed is manifestly excessive constitutes an appeal against the original sentence. The court concluded that the assertion regarding the manifest excessiveness of the sentence does not constitute an appeal against the original sentence.
4. Whether the imposition of the sentence involves only a limited exercise of judicial power. The court concluded that the imposition of the sentence involves only a limited exercise of judicial power.
5. Whether the drafting of section 80ZE(3) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) is "odd" and "curious" and if the issue is necessary to decide in this appeal. The court concluded that while the drafting of section 80ZE(3) may be odd and curious, the issue is not necessary to decide in this appeal.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The case of Allred v Director of Public Prosecutions presents several critical issues regarding the application of sentencing principles in the Drug and Alcohol Sentencing List (DASL). The court first examined whether the sentencing judge considered all relevant considerations when cancelling the Treatment Order and imposing the original sentence. The sentencing judge, in cancelling the Treatment Order, was required to consider the appellant's history of drug use, his unwillingness or inability to comply with the treatment conditions, and the necessity of imposing a custodial sentence to address the appellant's ongoing criminal behaviour. The court found that the sentencing judge appropriately weighed these factors, taking into account the appellant's extensive criminal history and his failure to engage with treatment options. The decision to cancel the Treatment Order and impose the original sentence was thus seen as a measured response to the appellant's persistent non-compliance and ongoing criminal activity.
Turning to the question of whether the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive, the court scrutinized the severity of the sentence in relation to the appellant's criminal history and the nature of his offences. The court held that the sentence, while significant, was not manifestly excessive given the appellant's prolonged pattern of drug-related offending and his failure to respond to previous sentencing efforts, including the Treatment Order. The court emphasized that in cases involving persistent offenders, particularly those with drug-related issues, a more stringent approach may be warranted to address the underlying issues contributing to the criminal behaviour.
The court then addressed whether the assertion that the sentence was manifestly excessive constituted an appeal against the original sentence. It was determined that the appeal was not against the original sentence but rather against the process by which the Treatment Order was cancelled and the original sentence imposed. The court clarified that the grounds of appeal must be specific to the sentence's imposition and its proportionality, rather than being a general dissatisfaction with the outcome. This distinction is crucial in ensuring that appeals are focused on the legality and fairness of the sentencing process.
The issue of whether the imposition of the sentence involved only a limited exercise of judicial power was also examined. The court noted that the cancellation of a Treatment Order and the imposition of an original sentence are significant judicial decisions that carry weighty consequences for the appellant. However, the court held that these decisions fall within the broad discretion afforded to sentencing judges in the DASL. The court underscored that while the exercise of this power must be carefully considered, it does not necessarily render the sentence subject to a more rigorous appellate review. This reasoning aligns with the understanding that the DASL is designed to provide flexibility in sentencing drug and alcohol-related offenders, balancing punitive measures with rehabilitative efforts.
Finally, the court briefly considered whether the drafting of section 80ZE(3) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) was "odd" and "curious" and whether this issue was necessary to decide in this appeal. The court acknowledged that the drafting of the statute might indeed be unusual, but concluded that the matter was not pertinent to the issues before the court. The court observed that addressing the drafting issue would not alter the outcome of the appeal and, therefore, it was not necessary to delve into this matter further. The focus remained on the application of the existing statutory provisions and the sentencing judge's adherence to the relevant legal principles.