JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CHAMBERS
CITATION: ALLISON -v- MURFETT LEGAL PTY LTD [2021] WASC 359
CORAM: MASTER SANDERSON
HEARD: 22 SEPTEMBER 2021
DELIVERED : 22 OCTOBER 2021
FILE NO/S: LPA 12 of 2021
BETWEEN: GREG ALLISON
Applicant
AND
MURFETT LEGAL PTY LTD
Respondent
Catchwords:
Costs agreement - Application by plaintiff to set aside costs agreement with defendant - Turns on own facts
Legislation:
Legal Professions Act 2008 (WA)
Result:
Application dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
| Applicant | : | In Person |
| Respondent | : | K Parker |
Solicitors:
| Applicant | : | In Person |
| Respondent | : | Murfett Legal Pty Ltd |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Crescendo Management Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1998) 19 NSWLR 40
Frigger v Shepherd [2014] WASC 477
Moleirinho v Talbot and Olivier Lawyers Pty Ltd [2014] WASCA 65
MASTER SANDERSON:
This is the plaintiff's application to set aside a Costs Agreement dated 12 August 2020. The Costs Agreement comprises four documents which were sent to the plaintiff on 12 August 2020. They are Murfett Legal's letter dated 12 August 2020, a document entitled 'Checklist for Explanation to Client before entering Costs Agreement', a document headed 'Costs Agreement' and a document headed 'Statutory Disclosure to Clients'.
The plaintiff says the Costs Agreement should be set aside on one of six separate grounds. They are:
1.The Costs Agreement is not fair or reasonable;
2.Fraud or misrepresentation of the defendant or of a representative of the defendant;
3.Failure of the defendant to make the required disclosures within a practical time;
4.The Costs Agreement included a party who was not a client;
5.The plaintiff entering into the Costs Agreement under duress; and
6.The defendant breaching its fiduciary duties to the plaintiff.
Two points can be made at the outset. First, the plaintiff did not actually sign the Costs Agreement and return it to the defendant. The defendant does not allege his failure to sign the document in some way eviscerates the Cost Agreement. Second, the defendant does not allege the plaintiff's partner Ms Lara Bardwell is not a party to the Costs Agreement. This eliminates the fifth of the sixth complaints. Before dealing with the specifics of each complaint I should set out the relevant undisputed factual background.
The plaintiff was for a time employed as a teacher at John Septimus Roe Anglican Community School teaching science and mathematics. On 7 September 2018 he was made redundant. In December 2018 the plaintiff instructed the law firm of Jackson McDonald in relation to his redundancy. Ms Kate Walawski was at that stage special counsel in the employment and workplace relations division of Jackson McDonald. She had conduct of the plaintiff's matter. Ms Walawski appeared for the plaintiff at a hearing in the Fair Work Commission and she prepared an application which was filed in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia.
The plaintiff's instructions to Jackson McDonald were limited to drafting the Federal Circuit Court application and a statement of claim. For reasons…
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- Case
- [2021] WASC 359
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to determine whether the plaintiff had demonstrated that the defendant applied illegitimate pressure that led him to enter into the Costs Agreement. The plaintiff referenced several authorities to support his argument, including Crescendo Management Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation, which outlined the legal test for duress. The court assessed whether the pressure exerted by the defendant, particularly in providing cost estimates and disclosures, could be considered illegitimate. It was noted that while the plaintiff was indeed under considerable pressure due to the litigation circumstances, this did not equate to illegitimate pressure. The court found that the defendant's actions were reasonable and within their commercial rights, and did not constitute duress.
The court concluded that the plaintiff had not proven that the defendant applied illegitimate pressure that forced him to enter into the Costs Agreement. The evidence did not support the plaintiff's claim of duress, and the defendant had fulfilled its obligations under the Legal Profession Act to provide cost disclosures. The court found that the defendant's conduct, while possibly inconvenient for the plaintiff, did not amount to duress. The court also found that the defendant had adequately disclosed costs as required by law, and there was no evidence of inadequate disclosure.
The final orders of the court dismissed the plaintiff's claim for relief against Murfett Legal Pty Ltd. The court ruled that the plaintiff had not demonstrated that the Costs Agreement was entered into under duress, and therefore the agreement remained valid. The court also found that the defendant had appropriately fulfilled its disclosure obligations under the Legal Profession Act.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
To make good his claim he entered into the Costs Agreement under duress, the plaintiff needs to show the defendant applied pressure which lead to him accepting and entering into the Costs Agreement. In his written submissions the plaintiff refers to a number of authorities including Crescendo Management Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1998) 19 NSWLR 40 [45] - [46]. The defendant accepted that case set out the relevant test. As I understand the plaintiff's position, he submits the defendant's conduct in complying with its statutory obligation to give revised cost estimates and cost disclosure led to him feeling pressured to enter into the Costs Agreement. Further, the plaintiff suggests the conduct of the defendant was unreasonable and amounted to duress because he was forced to consider costs and forced to make a decision between accepting a settlement offer and proceeding to trial. It is important to distinguish between the pressures every party to litigation is under and duress. As McHugh J said in Crescendo it is illegitimate pressure which is the key aspect of duress. Illegitimate pressure does not need to be the sole reason why a party entered into an agreement, but it is an essential element of the remedy. On the evidence on this case it is not possible to identify any illegitimate pressure which the defendant applied to the plaintiff. Looking at the facts it is clear the plaintiff was under considerable pressure. The respondent in the Federal Circuit Court proceedings had withdrawn admissions which no doubt significantly altered the plaintiff's case and imposed upon him legal and evidentiary burdens he had to discharge if he was to succeed in his action. An adjournment was refused, meaning Ms Walawski and the plaintiff had to prepare the case within a limited time frame. The plaintiff was faced with a three day trial and an expected cost of $60,000. But in recounting those facts and looking at the evidence generally it is not possible to identify any illegitimate pressure which Ms Walawski or the defendant applied to the plaintiff. They were entitled to have the plaintiff enter into a Costs Agreement. They were entitled to ask for money on account of those costs. It is true that if the plaintiff had not entered into the Costs Agreement the defendant would not represent him at trial. But that is not illegitimate pressure. That is commercial realty. I can see nothing in the evidence in this case which would amount to duress. Division 3 of the LPA require a law practice to make disclosures to a client as to costs. A failure to provide one or more of the disclosure does not necessarily mean a Costs Agreement will be set aside. The significance of the non-disclosure or the consequences flowing from it must be assessed with reference to the relationship between the client and the practitioner. Appearing as Schedule A to the written submissions filed on behalf of the defendant is an analysis of the requirements for disclosure under a particular sections of the LPA and what the defendant says its disclosure was in this case. I have attached Schedule A as an appendix to these reasons. As can be seen, counsel's analysis was thorough and, in my view, in all respects fair. There is nothing in the plaintiff's submissions which when set against the defendant's arguments could lead to a conclusion there had been inadequate disclosure.