Allbeck & Fielders (No 3)
[2025] FedCFamC1F 17
•21 January 2025
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1)
Allbeck & Fielders (No 3) [2025] FedCFamC1F 17
File number(s): PAC 4152 of 2018 Judgment of: CARTER J Date of judgment: 21 January 2025 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE –Application for stay of final property orders – Preliminary assessment of merits of appeal – Where the appeal would be rendered nugatory if the stay were not granted – Stay granted in part and with conditions. Legislation: Family Law Act1975 (Cth) ss 79, 90
Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW)
Cases cited: Aldridge & Keaton (Stay Appeal) [2009] FamCAFC 106
Elgin & Elgin (2015) 54 Fam LR 31
Division: Division 1 First Instance Number of paragraphs: 41 Date of hearing: 7 January 2025 Place: Melbourne Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Havenstein Solicitor for the Applicant: James & Jaramillo Legal Pty Ltd Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr Heazelwood Solicitor for the First Respondent: Penhall & Co Lawyers Counsel for the Second Respondent: The litigant appeared in person Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Holmes Donnelly & Co Solicitors ORDERS
PAC 4152 of 2018 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN: MS KAZEM
Applicant
AND: MS ALLBECK
First Respondent
MR FIELDERS
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
CARTER J
DATE OF ORDER:
21 JANUARY 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The following orders made on 14 November 2024 be stayed pending the determination of the Notice of Appeal filed 12 December 2024:
(a)Order 8;
(b)Order 9;
(c)Order 11;
(d)Order 15, on the following conditions:
(i)on completion of the sale of the property at F Street, Suburb G, New South Wales after deducting reasonable selling costs including agent’s commission and conveyancer’s fees, and the amount due and payable to the Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited, following the payment to Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited, the then remaining balance be paid as follows:
A.the sum of $450,000 be held on trust by the first respondent wife’s solicitors; and
B.the balance be paid to the first respondent wife.
(e)Order 18.
2.The orders made on 14 November 2024 otherwise remain in full force and effect.
3.The Application in a Proceeding filed 16 December 2024 and the Response to the Application in a Proceeding filed 20 December 2024 is otherwise dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUSTICE CARTER
THE PARTIES
By way of an Application in a Proceeding filed 16 December 2024, Ms Kazem (“the applicant”) seeks the stay of a number of the final orders made in the substantive proceedings, pending determination of her appeal filed on 12 December 2024. Final orders were delivered by McNab J on 14 November 2024 in proceedings (“the substantive proceedings”) in which the applicant was the second respondent. The applicant is the former de facto partner of Mr Fielders (“the husband”).
The husband was the first respondent in the substantive proceedings and is the second respondent in the appeal brought by the applicant. He has also filed a Notice of Cross appeal on 3 January 2025. He has not brought a stay application.
Ms Allbeck (“the wife”) was the applicant in the substantive proceedings before his Honour – and the first respondent in the appeal. She and the husband commenced cohabitation in 2012 and married in 2015. They separated in around March 2016.
The husband and applicant were in a de-facto relationship from around May 2016, and that relationship continued until around mid-2021.
RELEVANT BACKGROUND
The background to the substantive proceedings was set out in detail by McNab J in his reasons delivered on 14 November 2024. Relevantly, I note:
(a)in September 2018 the wife commenced proceedings in this Court seeking orders pursuant to s 79 of the Family Law Act1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) for an adjustment of property as between herself and the husband;
(b)in early 2020 the wife commenced proceedings in the New South Wales District Court (“the District Court”) against the husband seeking damages for personal injuries as a result of the various assaults she endured at the hands of the husband during their relationship (“the District Court proceedings”). The proceedings in this Court were stayed pending the outcome of those civil proceedings;
(c)in late 2021 the District Court found in favour of the wife and awarded damages in the sum of $490,091. The husband was also to pay her costs of about the same. The wife raised during those proceedings her concerns that the husband was divesting himself of assets to the applicant;
(d)the husband appealed the orders of the District Court. He also sought interlocutory orders allowing him to encumber assets to fund his appeal. That application was dismissed, with costs. In his reasons for judgment, the District Court judge made findings that the husband had divested assets in an attempt to avoid the damages and costs awarded to the wife;
(e)in early 2022 a charging order was made by the District Court judge in favour of the wife for $980,091 and executed over the husband’s property at F Street, Suburb G (“F Street”), and a property at H Street, Suburb J (“Suburb J”). The husband has a one‑third interest in the property at Suburb J. The other two co-owners are his brothers;
(f)the husband’s appeal was dismissed, with costs, in early 2023. As best as I understand it, a further sum of around $137,270 was ordered to be paid to the wife; and
(g)whilst those proceedings were on foot, the husband made a number of substantial payments to the applicant including paying her:
(i)$331,648 in February 2020, being part proceeds of the sale of a property at U Street, Suburb G;
(ii)the sum of $366,624 in May 2021 being proceeds from the sale of a property at V Street, Suburb W;
(iii)a further $81,191 in May 2021 from that same sale;
(iv)an additional $1,020,000 in July 2021; and
(v)a further $159,912 in September 2021 from the sale of property at Suburb Y with a further $78,196 transferred to her three days later.
At the hearing before McNab J, the applicant and the husband asserted those payments were not to defeat any claim the wife may have. Rather they provided explanations including that the payments were made to satisfy any claim the applicant would otherwise have against the husband pursuant to s 90SM of the Act.
It was further asserted by the applicant and the husband at trial that the applicant had loaned the husband monies (or paid his legal fees) on several occasions between July 2021 and October 2022. In late 2021 the applicant registered a mortgage over the husband’s property at F Street for $300,000 as partial security for the monies purportedly loaned by her to him.
I heard submissions in relation to the stay application on 7 January 2025. On that day I stayed the orders pending my determination of the matter.
HIS HONOUR’S FINDINGS AND ORDERS MADE
In his Reasons for Judgment his Honour set out that he was satisfied that the payment to the applicant in February 2020 was not one that should be set aside. However, he found the balance of the monies paid to the applicant were paid with the intent to defraud creditors within the meaning of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW).
Similarly, his Honour found that the alleged loans from the applicant to the husband were shams – finding all that had occurred was that the husband’s own funds were being returned to him, or used to pay his legal fees – creating in effect a "round robin" of money between the applicant and the husband. Accordingly, his Honour determined that the applicant had no entitlement to maintain the registered mortgage over F Street “as the loan said to support the mortgage has been found to be a sham” (Reasons for Judgment [126]). Accordingly, he did not include that mortgage in the table of assets and liabilities in relation to the property dispute between any of the parties.
Ultimately, after accounting for funds paid by the applicant towards the husband’s legal fees, his Honour determined the sum of $865,359.65 paid by the husband to the applicant had to be returned to the husband.
His Honour then considered the wife’s application pursuant to s 79 of the Act and determined that there would be no further orders adjusting property as between either the husband or the wife – as she would receive payment pursuant to the District Court orders.
His Honour then considered the applicant’s claim pursuant to s 90SM of the Act and determined there would be no further orders adjusting property as between the applicant and the husband – as following payment to the wife, the pool available for division between the applicant and the husband was modest, and indeed the applicant was in a more superior financial position than the husband.
The final orders made by his Honour which the applicant seeks be stayed are as follows:
(a)Order 8 provides that the husband pay the wife the amounts required in the District Court proceedings within 90 days of his Honour's orders, which would be 12 February 2025;
(b)Order 9 provides that the applicant pay the amount of $865,359.65 to the husband’s solicitors within 60 days (which would be 13 January 2025). Those funds are then to be paid to meet the District Court judgment debts, other creditors and then the balance paid to the husband;
(c)pursuant to Order 10, the applicant is restrained from dealing with her properties at Suburb L or Suburb O pending payment of the monies in accordance with Order 9;
(d)Order 11 provides for the sale of the applicant’s property at Suburb L in the event she does not make the payment pursuant to Order 9;
(e)Order 12 provides that the mortgage between the applicant and the husband over F Street is set aside and that the applicant provide the husband’s solicitors with an executed mortgage discharge;
(f)Order 14 provides for F Street to be sold;
(g)Order 15 provides for the net proceeds of the sale of F Street, after paying the costs of the sale and discharging the mortgage to the Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited, be paid to the wife;
(h)Order 16 is a machinery order requiring the wife to release her charge over F Street so that it can be sold;
(i)Order 17 provides that in the event the husband pays the wife $303,317 within 90 days of the orders, the wife discharge her charge over the property at Suburb J;
(j)Order 18 requires the sale of the husband’s interest in the property at Suburb J in the event he fails to comply with Order 7 – although I note that the correct order is Order 8; and
(k)Order 19 requires that the husband pay the costs of the trustee in bankruptcy – who was initially a party but was excused when orders were made by consent annulling the bankruptcy of the husband and for the trustee's costs to be paid from the matrimonial pool.
THE NOTICE OF APPEAL
The applicant asserts a number of grounds of appeal including:
(a)his Honour erred in finding that the District Court judgment debts in favour of the wife should take priority over the applicant’s s 90SM claim pursuant to the Act;
(b)his Honour erred in determining it was not just and equitable to make a property adjustment as between the applicant and the husband;
(c)his Honour erred in finding the transactions between the applicant and the husband were made with the intent to defraud;
(d)his Honour erred in finding the loan agreements between applicant and the husband were sham agreements;
(e)his Honour erred by not taking Capital Gains Tax consequences into account as will be triggered by the sale of the property at F Street;
(f)in relation to the sale of the husband’s one-third interest Suburb J, his Honour erred by failing to take into account Capital Gains Tax consequences upon its sale (although I note that the sale contemplated in Order 18 is one in default); and
(g)the co-owners of Suburb J were not afforded procedural fairness.
At part D8 of the husband’s Notice of Cross Appeal, the husband has checked the box that he proposes to appeal all of the orders. However the grounds of appeal refer only to Orders 14, 15, 16, and 18. In the grounds of appeal the husband only asserts errors in relation to the failure to take Capital Gains Tax upon the sales of F Street and Suburb J into account. He also asserts the co-owners of Suburb J were not afforded procedural fairness. He has not sought a stay of any orders.
THE LAW IN RELATION TO STAY APPLICATIONS
It is a matter of discretion whether or not to grant a stay. The granting of a stay is dependent on the circumstances of each particular case.
The relevant principles with respect to the exercise of the discretion in applications for a stay are well established and set out in the Full Court in the decision of Aldridge & Keaton (Stay Appeal) [2009] FamCAFC 106. Those principles in so far as they relate to a stay of property orders pursuant to s 79 or s 90SM of the Act, are set out at [18] as follows:
•the onus to establish a proper basis for the stay is on the applicant for the stay. However it is not necessary for the applicant to demonstrate any “special” or “exceptional” circumstances;
•a person who has obtained a judgment is entitled to the benefit of that judgment;
•a person who has obtained a judgment is entitled to presume the judgment is correct;
•the mere filing of an appeal is insufficient to grant a stay;
•the bona fides of the applicant;
•a stay may be granted on terms that are fair to all parties - this may involve a court weighing the balance of convenience and the competing rights of the parties;
•a weighing of the risk that an appeal may be rendered nugatory if a stay is not granted – this will be a substantial factor in determining whether it will be appropriate to grant a stay;
•some preliminary assessment of the strength of the proposed appeal – whether the appellant has an arguable case; and
•the period of time in which the appeal can be heard and whether existing satisfactory arrangements may support the granting of the stay for a short period of time.
DISCUSSION
The wife asserted the applicant has no standing to appeal some of the orders. In my view, that is a question more appropriately left to the Full Court to determine. Similarly the assertion that the applicant is estopped from appealing the findings of fraud in circumstances where she consented to the annulment of the bankruptcy (which it was asserted amounted to a concession that at least some if not all of the impugned transactions were fraudulent) is a matter which the Full Court will determine.
The applicant has to establish a proper basis for the stay. The applicant does not have to establish special circumstances but is required to persuade the Court that a stay is the appropriate order in the interests of justice. The wife is entitled to the benefit of his Honour’s orders. She received judgment from the District Court in late 2021. The appeal lodged by the husband was dismissed with costs in early 2022. The wife has been entitled to that payment – which is now in excess of $1,000,000 – for almost three years.
The wife is entitled to presume that the judgment is correct.
The applicant has been found by his Honour to be dishonest. According to his Honour she and the husband contrived to deprive the wife receiving her payments pursuant to the orders of the District Court and the New South Wales Court of Appeal. I note the applicant makes no offer for security for costs. I have some concern as to her bona fides.
Appeal rendered nugatory
In this matter a strong consideration is whether the appeal may be rendered nugatory if a stay of at least some of the order is not granted.
Under the orders, the applicant must immediately pay $865,359.65 into trust. Those monies represent a repayment of the transactions his Honour determined to be fraudulent – a finding which the applicant challenges. If the orders are not stayed, and the funds not paid, her property at K Street, Suburb L is to be sold. If that occurred, it would not be possible for that to be undone in the event the applicant’s appeal was successful.
The husband is required to pay the wife her entitlements pursuant to the orders of the District Court on or before 12 February 2024. It is anticipated under his Honour’s orders that the husband will have the use of the funds paid by the applicant into trust to make a large part of that payment. The husband is also to sell the property at F Street in order to pay the wife, noting that prior to the sale, the registered mortgage in favour of the applicant is to be set aside. Again, if F Street is sold not subject to the mortgage in favour of the applicant (or those monies are not paid into trust), it may be difficult for the applicant to recover the monies secured by the mortgage in the event her appeal is successful.
These are significant considerations.
Assessment of the strength of the proposed appeal
The applicant’s assertions include practical issues with the orders, errors or fact, errors in the exercise of his Honour’s discretion, a failure to take into account relevant facts, and the denial of procedural fairness.
In relation to the asserted errors of fact (the findings that the transactions were fraudulent and the loan agreements and the applicant’s mortgage were a sham) his Honour carefully set out ample evidence to support those findings, which appear to be reasonably open on the evidence. He also had the benefit of observing the witnesses in coming to his conclusions regarding the integrity of their evidence. In relation to the asserted mortgage, his Honour stated no compelling evidence was adduced by the applicant to show any source from which she derived the funds purportedly loaned to the husband.
I note that the husband in his cross appeal – being the other party to the impugned transactions – does not cavil with his Honour’s findings regarding that they were fraudulent.
In relation to the assertion that his Honour erred in prioritising the wife’s judgment debt over the applicant’s s 90SM claim under the Act, it makes logical sense that his Honour dealt with the s 79 application as between the husband and the wife before turning to the s 90SM application as between the husband and the applicant. The wife’s property application was issued first in time – having been filed on 4 September 2018. The applicant was joined to the proceedings on 20 February 2023 and filed her material after that time. She was a necessary party to the s 79 application as between the husband and the wife as the nature of the transfers of funds to the applicant from the husband and the validity of the mortgage registered on the husband’s property in favour of the applicant had to be determined before the court could ascertain the assets and liabilities of the husband and the wife.
Counsel for the applicant at the hearing of the stay application was unable to confirm that the applicant had opposed the s 79 application being heard and determined first and the applicant’s s 90SM claim being determined thereafter, or indeed that there had been any submissions made as to such issues of timing.
His Honour determined that the assets divested by the husband to the applicant should be treated as the husband’s assets and that they were available to meet the secured and unsecured debts owed to the wife. His Honour then took into account the reality that a payment to the wife would diminish the funds available to the applicant as it would reduce the pool vis a vis the applicant and the husband. It seems to me to be within his Honour’s discretion to determine the dispute in this manner.
At its highest, the applicant asserted that his Honour’s findings as to her contributions and needs were such that his Honour’s determination that it was not just and equitable to make an order was plainly wrong. Given his Honour’s findings as to the payment to made to the wife, the size of the pool available between the applicant and the husband, and the applicant’s share in that pool, there appears little room to challenge his Honour’s finding that it was not just and equitable for there to be any further adjustment. I note that if the applicant had established that the impugned transfers to her, and her secured mortgage were genuine and not to be set aside – she would have retained an even more significant share of the pool between the applicant and the husband. In those circumstances it is possible that an adjustment in the husband’s favour may have been made.
As to the assertion that the co-owners of Suburb J were not afforded procedural fairness, this may not be a matter which can be properly raised by the applicant. Her rights do not appear to be impacted by the asserted lack of procedural fairness. The husband raises that as a ground in his Cross Appeal yet he has not also sought a stay of any orders. In my view, however, if there has been a failure to afford procedural fairness that is an important consideration and if demonstrated, may amount to an error of law. That does not mean that an appeal would automatically be allowed. Nevertheless, as such a challenge goes to the integrity of the administration of justice this is a matter that should be given some weight in considering the stay application at least in relation to Order 18.
There is no reference to Capital Gains Tax in his Honour’s orders. It does not appear in dispute that this would be triggered by the sales of F Street and Suburb J. It is also not in dispute that no party raised the issue of Capital Gains Tax at trial – not even when they made proposals for the sales of properties. However, the Full Court has determined that it cannot be just and equitable to uphold orders that fail to allow for taxation consequences of a significant sum even when no party thought to raise that issue at trial (see Elgin & Elgin (2015) 54 Fam LR 31). Of course, I do not know whether the liabilities would or would not be significant. From the bar table the husband asserted his ‘best guess’ was that he would be assessed to pay between $150,000 to $200,000 upon the sale of F Street. Obviously, this would further reduce the pool available for distribution as between the applicant and the husband – and accordingly, it does impact on the applicant’s potential entitlements. I have no evidence as to the likely quantum of Capital Gains Tax that would be incurred by the husband and the other co-owners upon the sale of Suburb J.
I am not of the view that the applicant’s grounds of appeal are particularly strong.
When the appeal may be heard
The appeal has not yet been listed. However, I note that the Full Court generally hears and determines appeals very promptly. The matter has been listed for a procedural hearing on 7 February 2025.
DETERMINATION
This is a finely balanced case. The applicant’s grounds of appeal do not appear particularly meritorious. The wife has been unable to recover monies awarded to her pursuant to the District Court proceedings for a protracted period. This is a significant detriment to her. However the reality is that if at least some of the orders are not stayed pending the appeal, the applicant’s property may be sold, rendering the appeal nugatory. Additionally, if F Street is sold and the proceeds are paid to the wife, the applicant may struggle to recover the monies she says are properly secured by way of mortgage if she is ultimately successful in her appeal. These are significant considerations.
As to the grounds relating to Capital Gains Tax there is clear Full Court authority that failure to take significant liabilities into account is an appealable error even when the parties themselves failed to raise the issue at trial – as they did in this matter. However, I note that the husband has not sought a stay of any orders. I also do not have admissible evidence as to the likely quantum of such liabilities so it is difficult to know whether they would or would not be significant.
Whilst the wife is entitled to the benefit of his Honour’s judgment, taking all these matters into account and weighing the competing rights of the parties, I am just satisfied that the interests of justice require me to make orders as follows:
(a)Order 8 will be stayed. If that order is not stayed, and the husband makes the payment, it would render the applicant’s appeal in so far as she says the payment to the wife was prioritised over any s 90SM claim made by the applicant was in error, nugatory. The applicant also seeks a stay of Order 9. That will have the effect that the husband will be without the funds payable by the applicant which he would otherwise have to effect the payment to the wife;
(b)Order 9 will be stayed. If that Order and Order 11 are not stayed, and the sum of $865,359 is not paid, the sale of the applicant’s property at Suburb L in default will be triggered. As already observed that would be difficult to undo. If the applicant was to pay the funds as required, such payment to the wife would render the applicant’s appeal as to the findings of the nature of the impugned transactions and transfers nugatory – unless the wife was also restrained from dealing with the funds pending the appeal;
(c)there is no basis to stay Order 10, being the order that restrains the applicant from dealing with the properties in her name pending payment of the sum of $865,359 into trust without the written consent of the parties or leave of the court. In the event that she requires to encumber one or other property in order to effect the payout to the wife it seems highly likely the parties would consent to her doing so. If the order were stayed the applicant would be free to deal with the properties as she saw fit;
(d)Order 11 will also be stayed. That is the order regarding the sale of Suburb L in default;
(e)I am not of the view that there is a proper basis upon which to stay the orders for the sale of F Street, or the order setting aside the mortgage in favour of the applicant and requiring the applicant to execute a discharge of mortgage. The potential detriment to the applicant can be ameliorated if the applicant’s purported loan of $300,000 is paid into trust from the proceeds of sale pending the appeal;
(f)whilst the husband asserts that his Honour erred in failing to consider the Capital Gains Tax triggered by the sale of F Street, the husband has not sought a stay of the sale. In his grounds of appeal as articulated he did not refer to Order 12 as being an order under challenge;
(g)the F Street property was valued at $1,750,000, with a mortgage of $932,636. The wife asserts that the mortgage is not being paid and continues to increase. That provides a further reason why that sale should proceed forthwith;
(h)accordingly Orders 12 and 14 will not be stayed;
(i)Order 15 provides that the wife receive the whole of the proceeds of sale of F Street after the payment of the costs and the Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited mortgage. Weighing the balance of convenience and the competing rights of the parties I am satisfied that order be stayed in part and on the following conditions:
(i)as to the applicant’s purported mortgage, the sum of $300,000 will be paid into trust pending the appeal to protect that purported loan;
(ii)as to the non-consideration of Capital Gains Tax, the only information provided to me – with no details as to the calculation – was the husband’s ‘guestimate’ that he will be assessed to pay between $150,000 to $200,000 by way of Capital Gains Tax. The sum of $150,000 can be paid into trust to quarantine funds for Capital Gains Tax if the Court ultimately finds that liability should be paid from the proceeds of sale; and
(iii)the balance will then be paid to the wife.
(j)at settlement of the sale a total of $450,000 will be paid into trust. The balance of the proceeds less the costs of sale shall be paid to the wife. That will provide the wife with some funds, protect the monies the applicant claims she is entitled to pending the determination of the appeal and quarantine funds for Capital Gains Tax;
(k)the proposed Minutes tendered by the applicant and the husband on the final day of hearing contemplated the wife receiving $543,024 and proposed the sale of F Street to pay those monies. Accordingly, even on the applicant’s case as it was at trial, the wife’s receipt of the proceeds of sale of F Street – once the funds are paid into trust to cover the applicant’s asserted entitlement under the mortgage and to cover Capital Gains Tax – would not exceed the wife’s entitlement. Again that provides a further reason why the sale should proceed forthwith, and the wife receive at least part of the proceeds notwithstanding the appeal;
(l)there is no basis to stay Order 16. That requires the wife to release her charge over F Street so that it can be sold;
(m)I am not satisfied that Order 17 should be stayed. The husband has not sought a stay of that order. He has not raised in his grounds of appeal any basis to challenge that order. The wife’s retention of the balance of the proceeds of sale of F Street – once funds are paid into trust to cover the applicant’s asserted entitlement under the mortgage and to cover Capital Gains Tax – together with monies paid to her pursuant to Order 17 will not be significantly greater than the proposals put by the applicant and husband for payment to the wife at trial. Again if complied with, the payment under this order will provide the wife with some funds pending appeal.
(n)I will stay Order 18 on the basis that the sale of Suburb J would affect the rights of third parties, and both the applicant and the husband assert that those parties were not afforded procedural fairness. Whilst the Order refers to the husband having to realise only his interest in the property, the reality is that the sale of his interest would likely cause the sale of the property if his brothers did not wish to buy his share; and
(o)I will not stay Order 19. There is no basis for that. That order requires the husband to pay the costs of the third respondent – the trustee in bankruptcy.
All monies paid into trust shall be held by the wife’s solicitors. The orders of his Honour referred to funds being held on trust by the husband’s solicitors. Whilst they are still on the record they did not have the courtesy of appearing before me on 7 January 2025 at which time the husband appeared on his own behalf.
I certify that the preceding forty-one (41) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Carter. Associate:
Dated: 21 January 2025
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