ALL16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

ALL16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 419

Appeal from: ALL16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 2067
File number: NSD 1728 of 2017
Judge: GLEESON J
Date of judgment: 12 March 2018
Date of publication of reasons: 27 March 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application pursuant to s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) for review of judgment of Federal Circuit Court of Australia (“FCCA”) – whether FCCA judge fell into jurisdictional error in refusing extension of time application pursuant to s 477(2) of the Migration Act 1948 (Cth) – whether FCCA judge denied applicant procedural fairness  
Legislation:

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5AA, 46A, 477

Cases cited:

AUK15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2016] HCA Trans 036

Brisbane South v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541

Caason Investments Pty Ltd v Cao[2015] FCAFC 94

Craig v South Australia [1995] HCA 58; (1995) 184 CLR 163

MZZGC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 842

SZRIQ v Federal Magistrates Court [2013] FCA 1284; (2013) 236 FCR 442

SZTRY v Minister for Immigration [2015] FCAFC 86

SZTUT v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2016] HCATrans 150

SZUWX v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 77; [2016] 238 FCR 456

Date of hearing: 12 March 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 38
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr J Williams
Solicitor for the Respondents: Mr A Markus of Australian Government Solicitor
Table of Corrections
7 November 2018 The last paragraph of the quote in [23] has been deleted and is now [24].

ORDERS

NSD 1728 of 2017
BETWEEN:

ALL16

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Third Respondent

JUDGE:

GLEESON J

DATE OF ORDER:

12 MARCH 2018, AS VARIED ON 27 MARCH 2018   

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicant be granted leave to file electronically the amended originating application for relief under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) by 5 pm today.

2.The applicant be granted leave to rely on the amended originating application for relief under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) in relation to ground 1 and no other ground.

3.The amended originating application be dismissed.

4.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the application.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Revised from transcript)

GLEESON J:

  1. This is an application pursuant to s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) (“Judiciary Act”) for judicial review of a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (“FCCA”): ALL v Minister for Immigration [2017] FCCA 2067. In that judgment, the FCCA refused the applicant’s application for an extension of time pursuant…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 419
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of ALL16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved an Iranian national, who arrived in Australia as an unauthorised maritime arrival, appealing against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA) that dismissed his application for an extension of time to appeal a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal refusing his application for a protection visa. The applicant sought relief under section 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and leave to rely on an amended application. The central legal issues were whether the FCCA judge had erred in refusing the extension of time application and whether the FCCA judge had denied the applicant procedural fairness.

The court considered the application for an extension of time under section 477(2) of the Migration Act 1948 (Cth) and evaluated the delay, the explanation for the delay, the prejudice to the other party, and whether the application was sufficiently arguable. The FCCA judge found the delay to be significant, noted no prejudice asserted by the Minister, found no adequate explanation for the delay, and concluded that the applicant's grounds were not sufficiently arguable to warrant an extension of time. The court concluded that the FCCA judge did not commit any jurisdictional error or deny procedural fairness in reaching these findings. The applicant's argument that the FCCA judge misconceived the nature of the function in deciding the extension of time application was rejected as unsupported by the terms of the judgment. The court found no error of law in the FCCA judge's consideration of the grounds for review of the Tribunal's decision.

The court dismissed the application, holding that none of the applicant's grounds indicated any jurisdictional error or denial of procedural fairness by the FCCA judge. The assessment of the merits of the proposed grounds of review was within the FCCA's jurisdiction. The applicant was granted leave to file an amended originating application and to rely on the amended application in relation to one ground but the amended application was dismissed. The applicant was ordered to pay the Minister's costs of the application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant be granted leave to file electronically the amended originating application for relief under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) by 5 pm today.

2. The applicant be granted leave to rely on the amended originating application for relief under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) in relation to ground 1 and no other ground.

3. The amended originating application be dismissed.

4. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the application.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

At the hearing of the application, the applicant sought leave to rely on a proposed amended application. After hearing submissions, I decided to consider whether that leave should be granted at the same time as the appeal. A party seeking leave to amend bears an onus of satisfying the Court that grounds exist for exercising the discretion in his or her favour: Brisbane South v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541 at 547. Leave to amend will be refused where it would be futile: Caason Investments Pty Ltd v Cao [2015] FCAFC 94 at [21].BACKGROUND The following background facts are taken from the Minister’s submissions, which were not relevantly disputed. The applicant claims to be a citizen of Iran, of Ghashghai (Turkish) ethnicity and a Shia Muslim. He arrived in Australia at Christmas Island without valid travel documents on 1 August 2012 and is therefore an ‘unauthorised maritime arrival’ within the meaning of s 5AA of the Migration Act On 18 October 2012, the Minister lifted the bar imposed by s 46A(1) of the Migration Act, allowing the applicant to lodge a protection visa application. The applicant did so on or about 22 November 2012. In essence, the applicant claimed to fear harm if he were to return to Iran by reason of a long-standing (five-year) relationship with a girl of Arabic ethnicity (Sara), whose father was a high ranking officer of the Sepâh who discovered the relationship and who, the applicant claimed, would harm him if he returned to Iran. He claimed that, while in Indonesia, Sara informed him that she was pregnant, and had to arrange for an abortion as her father will kill her if he finds out. He later produced a document which was said to be a summons (apparently emailed to him by his brother some four months before his protection visa interview) that ordered him to appear on a rape charge and to expect two more summonses. The applicant also made statements to the effect that:(1)he was studying heating and cooling mechanics in college, but had a disagreement with a teacher about Islam and the government, following which he repeatedly failed his studies, took four years to complete his course, and this affected his ability to obtain work; and(2)in March 2012 he was stopped by the Basiji, who found alcohol on him, and took him in for questioning; he was released after paying some money. At the interview before the delegate, held on 28 March 2013, the applicant also produced a baptism certificate from the Liberty Baptist Church at North Ryde, but stated he did not wish to rely on his baptism for the purposes of his protection claims. On 21 August 2013, the Minister’s delegate refused the applicant’s protection visa application, essentially on credibility grounds. The applicant sought review of the delegate’s decision by the Tribunal on 27 August 2013, and his (new) migration agent provided written submissions on his behalf on 1 December 2014. In those submissions, it was stated that the applicant claimed persecution on the following Convention-related grounds:(1)imputed political opinion;(2)religion; and(3)membership of particular social groups: “failed asylum seekers from western countries” and “Iranians having illegitimate relationships outside marriage”.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The evidence given by the applicant at the hearing is summarised in the Tribunal’s reasons for decision under various headings at paras 24-36 (“Relationship with Sara”), 51-58 (“Converted to Christianity”) and 76 (“Failed asylum seeker from a western country”). The Tribunal found that the applicant was not a credible witness and, at [90], rejected all his claims and was not satisfied that he has a well-founded fear of refugee Convention-related persecution for any of the reasons put forward by him. At para 91, the Tribunal concluded that the applicant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason. At para 98, the Tribunal was not satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia and returned to Iran, there is a real risk that he will suffer significant harm.FCCA JUDGMENT Following a brief summary of the procedural background, the FCCA judge turned to consider the extension of time application. The consideration of the issues arising under s 477(2) of the Migration Act commences at [7] of the FCCA judgment, where his Honour correctly referred to the legislative requirements imposed by that provision. At [8] of the judgment below, his Honour referred to the relevant principles applying to such extension of time applications, referencing SZRIQ v Federal Magistrates Court [2013] FCA 1284; (2013) 236 FCR 442 at [46]-[48], and SZTRY v Minister for Immigration [2015] FCAFC 86 at [6]. His Honour to noted that these authorities identify the extent of the delay, the explanation for the delay, the prejudice to the other party, and whether the application is sufficiently arguable to justify the extension of time as relevant factors when considering whether it is in the interest of the administration of justice to make such an order. His Honour then proceeds to make a number of findings respecting these issues, including that:(1)the delay was significant (at [9]);(2)no prejudice is asserted by the Minister (at [10]);(3)there is no adequate explanation for the delay (at [10]-[13]); and(4)the grounds sought to be raised by the applicant were not sufficiently arguable to warrant an extension of time granted (at [14]). In particular, [10]-[14] of the FCCA judge’s reasons state:10.The Minister does not assert any prejudice that would be suffered by the granting of an extension of time. The Minister, however, submits that there is no adequate explanation by the applicant for his delay in coming to court. I agree.11.The applicant stated in support of his original application that his reason for filing out of time was that “I did not know that I only had 35 days to file my application.”12.In his affidavit made on 15 August 2017, the applicant repeats that he was unaware of the time limit, and that he was directed to his current legal representative in February 2016 by a Justice of the Peace. He refers to having financial hardship and could not afford formal legal advice. I note, however, that the applicant was represented by migration agents during his protection visa application process and that a migration agent assisted him before the Tribunal. 13.The applicant’s explanation for his delay is not adequate. The applicant’s circumstances are the same as those confronting most, if not all, of applicants in this jurisdiction. 14.Notwithstanding these difficulties, counsel for the applicant strenuously sought to persuade me of the merit of the amended application. I am not persuaded by those submissions.APPLICATION TO THIS COURT

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Minister submitted that:(1)While ground 1 asserts to the effect that the FCCA misapplied, misunderstood or misconstrued the applicable law by finding that it was not in the interests of justice to grant the applicant an extension of time pursuant to s 477(2)(b), the particulars supporting this ground and the applicant’s written submissions do not support that contention but seek to challenge the actual exercise of the discretion in refusing the application for extension of time.(2)To the extent that under this ground the applicant seeks to argue that the FCCA judge in this case misconceived the nature of the function he was performing in deciding whether or not to make an order for an extension of time, that proposition is not supported by the terms of the judgment below.(3)In any event, for more abundant caution, while the FCCA judge, correctly, dealt with the grounds of the amended application before it at a ‘reasonably impressionistic level’, there is no error of law, let alone jurisdictional error, in its consideration of any of those grounds and, for the reasons he gave, his Honour correctly held that those grounds were not sufficiently arguable to warrant the exercise of the discretion in the applicant’s favour.Consideration None of the matters raised by the applicant indicate any jurisdictional error on the part of the FCCA judge. In particular, they do not indicate any denial of procedural fairness. The criticism that the FCCA judge engaged with only two of the relevant factors is unfounded: his Honour also both considered the extent of the delay, finding it to be significant (at [9]), and noted that the Minister did not assert any relevant prejudice (at [10]). As appears from the passage set out above, Mortimer J’s observations in MZZGC were in the context of a conclusion that there is merit in a ground of review. In this case, the FCCA judge did not detect any merit, let alone “a clear jurisdictional error by the decision maker under review” as posited by the applicant. Although he disagreed with the finding, counsel for the applicant, Mr Williams, did not suggest that the FCCA judge was not entitled to find that the explanation for the applicant’s delay was unsatisfactory. The absence of prejudice was identified by the FCCA judge. Finally, I have listened to Mr Williams detailed submissions concerning the alleged arguable errors made by the Tribunal. I have read the Tribunal’s decision. I do not detect any reason to doubt the FCCA judge’s assessment of the merits of the proposed grounds of review of the Tribunal’s decision. In any event, any such assessment was squarely within the jurisdiction of the FCCA.CONCLUSION The application must be dismissed. Costs should follow the event.