[2016] QDC 266
DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
JUDGE DORNEY QC
Appeal No 168 of 2016
ODAY KAMIL NAIM ALFARAJY Appellant
v.
QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE Respondent
SOUTHPORT
12.20 PM, MONDAY, 24 OCTOBER 2016
JUDGMENT
HIS HONOUR: This is an appeal under s 222 of the Justices Act 1886. The appellant was convicted on the 10th of June 2016 with respect to an offence committed on the 16th of March 2016. The offence of which he was convicted was using a carriage service to menace, harass or cause offence. That is an offence created by section 474.17(1) of the Commonwealth Criminal Code. The appellant was convicted after entering a plea of guilty to that offence and was fined a sum of $1500.
The ground for the appeal, as relevantly argued, is that the sentence was manifestly excessive in all of the circumstances. And it was included, as part of that argument, that it could alternatively be argued that identified errors had occurred in her Honour’s reasoning at the first instance. The second ground is not persisted with. It simply alleged an error in not allowing the defendant to call evidence to support the submissions in mitigation.
The appellant was born on the 14th of June 1983. He is now 33 years old and was 32 at the time of the offence and sentence. The circumstances of the offending were set out in considerable detail in the outline of submissions filed on behalf of the appellant. There is no issue raised by the respondent that those facts and circumstances, set out at paragraphs [7] to [14], are accurately stated. I do not intend to go through them in detail but I will refer to some other particular matters.
The contact which was initiated by the appellant was by phone. It was to his partner. The words which were used, besides those making demands with respect to assets and money, are set out in paragraph [9] of the appellant’s outline. They include words such as:
I’m going to destroy you. Eff your mum. Eff you and your bitch sister. I will eff you of everything. I will destroy everything. You know what you need to do tomorrow.
And then later on:
I will go to your work and talk to your boss and destroy you. I will go to Anna and tell her bad things about you. You will never meet your son alive again.
It’s also not disputed that the appellant then tried to call his partner a further 15 times. She did not answer.
It was also led at the sentencing proceeding that, on the following day, the appellant’s partner went to the police to report the incident. During that time the appellant again contacted her by texting her first and saying: “I am on the Gold Coast. Ha-ha.” and later calling and saying words to the effect: “Where are you, you’re not at your work, you need to come to your house and I will…
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- Case
- [2016] QDC 266
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive and if there were any errors in the reasoning of the learned Magistrate. The court considered the principles of sentencing discretion and whether the learned Magistrate had properly exercised her discretion in determining the sentence. The court also examined the factors that the learned Magistrate considered, such as the nature and circumstances of the offence, the character and antecedents of the appellant, and the principles of general and specific deterrence.
The court found that the learned Magistrate had properly exercised her discretion in determining the sentence. The court considered that the offence was not trivial, was not committed under extenuating circumstances, and the appellant's character and antecedents did not negate the need for punishment. The court also found that the sentence was not manifestly excessive, considering the maximum penalty for the offence and the actual nature and circumstances of the offence. The court dismissed the appeal and made no further orders.
Background
Background to the litigation
Alfarajy pleaded guilty to the offence and was fined $1500. He appealed the sentence on the grounds that it was manifestly excessive and that there were errors in the magistrate's reasoning. Alfarajy argued that the offence was trivial and committed under extenuating circumstances due to his belief that his partner was unfaithful and the pressure he was experiencing from business negotiations. The court found that it was open to the magistrate to determine that the offence was not trivial and was not committed under extenuating circumstances. The court also found that the sentence was not manifestly excessive, considering the nature of the offence and the maximum penalty for the crime.
The appeal in Alfarajy v Queensland Police Service came before the District Court of Queensland in its appellate jurisdiction. The appellant, Oday Kamil Naim Alfarajy, sought to appeal his conviction and sentence for using a carriage service to menace, harass, or cause offence under section 474.17(1) of the Commonwealth Criminal Code. Alfarajy was fined $1500 after pleading guilty to the offence. The grounds for appeal included the argument that the sentence was manifestly excessive and that there may have been errors in the sentencing magistrate's reasoning. The appellant also suggested that he should have been allowed to call evidence to support his mitigation submissions, though this ground was not persisted with. The matter was heard on 24 October 2016, with submissions from both parties, and the court ultimately found that the sentence was not manifestly excessive, dismissing the appeal.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Was the sentence imposed by the Magistrate manifestly excessive in all of the circumstances?
2. Did the Magistrate properly exercise her discretion under section 19B of the Crimes Act 1914 in determining the sentence?
3. Was the offence committed under extenuating circumstances as per section 19B(1)(b) of the Crimes Act 1914?
4. Was the offence of a trivial nature as per section 19B(1)(b) of the Crimes Act 1914?
5. Did the Magistrate take into account the character, antecedents, age, health, or mental condition of the appellant in exercising her sentencing discretion under section 19B of the Crimes Act 1914?
Held
1. The sentence imposed by the Magistrate was not manifestly excessive in all of the circumstances; appeal dismissed.
2. The Magistrate properly exercised her discretion under section 19B of the Crimes Act 1914 in determining the sentence; appeal dismissed.
3. The offence was not committed under extenuating circumstances as per section 19B(1)(b) of the Crimes Act 1914; appeal dismissed.
4. The offence was not of a trivial nature as per section 19B(1)(b) of the Crimes Act 1914; appeal dismissed.
5. The Magistrate took into account the character, antecedents, age, health, or mental condition of the appellant in exercising her sentencing discretion under section 19B of the Crimes Act 1914; appeal dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court examined whether the sentence imposed by the Magistrate was manifestly excessive in all of the circumstances. It was noted that the appellant had been fined $1500 for using a carriage service to menace, harass, or cause offence, an offence under section 474.17(1) of the Commonwealth Criminal Code. The court considered the principles established in The Queen v Hooper; ex parte the Commonwealth DPP [2008] QCA 308, which emphasized that where a case is borderline, there is scope for minds to genuinely differ as to the appropriate outcome. The court found that the Magistrate had properly exercised her discretion under section 19B of the Crimes Act 1914, as the sentence was not manifestly excessive, considering the nature and context of the offence.
The court further examined if the Magistrate properly exercised her discretion under section 19B of the Crimes Act 1914. It was noted that the Magistrate considered various factors, including the appellant's state of mind, the nature of the threats, and the impact on the victim. The court found that the Magistrate had taken into account relevant factors and correctly applied the law, as outlined in Commissioner of Taxation v Baffsky (2001) 192 ALR 92. The Magistrate's reasoning met the two-stage requirement of identifying factors under section 19B(1)(b) and determining whether it was inexpedient to inflict any punishment.
Regarding whether the offence was committed under extenuating circumstances, the court found that it was not. The court noted that the threats made by the appellant were severe and consistent with the actions taken the next day, which did not lessen the gravity of the offence. The court relied on the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal's decision in Sable v The Queen; The Queen v Sable (2014) 242 Aust Crim Reports, which held that additional facts could impact the determination of whether an offence was of a trivial nature or committed under extenuating circumstances.
The court also addressed whether the offence was of a trivial nature, concluding that it was not. The Magistrate considered the appellant's threats to his partner, her family members, and the financial demands, as well as the actions taken the next day. The court found that it was open to the Magistrate to conclude that the offence was not trivial, as the threats were significant and the actions taken were consistent with those threats.
In examining whether the Magistrate took into account the character, antecedents, age, health, or mental condition of the appellant, the court found that the Magistrate had appropriately considered these factors. The court noted that the Magistrate had referred to the appellant's state of mind, which included his belief that his partner had been unfaithful to him and the pressure he was under due to business negotiations. The court found that the Magistrate's consideration of these factors was adequate and in line with the requirements of section 19B of the Crimes Act 1914.
In conclusion, the court found that the Magistrate did not err in her exercise of discretion and that the sentence was not manifestly excessive. The court upheld the Magistrate's decision, emphasizing the importance of considering all relevant factors in sentencing. The ratio decidendi of this case is that when sentencing for an offence under section 474.17(1) of the Commonwealth Criminal Code, a Magistrate must properly exercise her discretion under section 19B of the Crimes Act 1914 by considering factors such as the nature of the offence, extenuating circumstances, and the character and antecedents of the offender, and ensure that the sentence is not manifestly excessive.