Alcoa of Australia Ltd v McKenna

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SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

COURT OF APPEAL

No. 3739 of 2002

ALCOA OF AUSTRALIA LTD.

Appellant

v.

ERICK ANTHONY McKENNA

Respondent

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JUDGES:

BUCHANAN and CHERNOV, JJ.A. and ASHLEY, A.J.A.

WHERE HELD:

MELBOURNE

DATE OF HEARING:

23 September 2003

DATE OF JUDGMENT:

20 November 2003

MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:

[2003] VSCA 182

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Accident Compensation – Serious injury – Application for leave to bring proceedings for damages – Burden, standard of proof where respondent to leave application claims serious injury does not fall within s.135A(2) of Accident Compensation Act 1985 – Failure by judge to state if injury falls within s.135A(2) of the Act – Sufficiency of reasons for granting application – Accident Compensation Act 1985 ss.135A(1), (2), (4)(b), (6).

Evidence – Surveillance film of applicant claiming injury is serious injury – Cross-examination – Discretion of court to refuse respondent right to show film in absence of calling its maker – Whether maker of film is “maker of the statement” for the purpose of s.55(1) of the Evidence Act 1958 – Evidence Act 1958 ss.3, 55.

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APPEARANCES: Counsel Solicitors
For the Appellant

Mr P.N. Rose, S.C.
Mr G.J. Moloney

Hunt & Hunt
For the Respondent Mr J.T. Rush, Q.C.
Mr A.D.B. Ingram
Maurice Blackburn Cashman

BUCHANAN, J.A.:

  1. While the other members of the Court agree that this appeal should be dismissed, they differ as to whether an applicant for leave to bring proceedings pursuant to s.135A(4)(b) of the Accident Compensation Act 1985 (“the Act”) is required to satisfy the court not only that he or she has sustained a “serious injury” within the meaning of s.135A(19), but also that the injury meets one or both of the sets of criteria contained in paragraphs (a) and (b) of s.135A(2).

  1. In the view of Chernov, J.A. the court’s task under s.135A(4)(b) is limited to determining whether the applicant has sustained compensable injury arising out of or in the course of his or her employment that meets the definition of “serious injury” in s.135A(19) and, in an appropriate case, deciding whether in the exercise of a discretion to refuse leave notwithstanding that the applicant has sustained a serious injury. In most cases a court entertaining an application under s.135A(4)(b) will not stay to consider the application of s.135A(2). But if the court forms the view that the prospect of the applicant establishing at trial that the injury meets the criteria set out in either s.135A(2)(a) or (b) is absolutely hopeless, the court will be entitled in the exercise of its discretion to refuse to grant leave. His Honour formed that view on the basis that sub-s.(2) provides for the circumstances in which damages may be recovered; an applicant for leave under sub-s.(4)(b) has yet to reach the stage at which damages may be recovered.

  1. Ashley, A.J.A., on the other hand, is of the opinion that in order to obtain leave under sub-s.(4) an applicant must establish that he or she sustained a serious injury and that injury satisfied the criteria contained in either…

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Details
Case
[2003] VSCA 182
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, Alcoa of Australia Ltd, filed an application for leave to bring proceedings for damages following a workplace injury sustained by the respondent, McKenna. The application was made under the Accident Compensation Act 1985, and the primary legal issue was whether the respondent's injury qualified as a "serious injury" under section 135A(2) of the Act. The respondent argued that the injury did indeed qualify as serious, thus allowing him to bypass the statutory compensation scheme and pursue common law damages. The central legal question was whether the judge's failure to explicitly state if the injury fell within section 135A(2) rendered the reasons for granting the application insufficient.

The Court considered whether the judge's reasons were adequate in the absence of a clear statement regarding the classification of the injury. It also examined whether the judge had the discretion to refuse the respondent's right to show a surveillance film as evidence in the absence of calling the film's maker to testify. The Court assessed whether the film's maker qualified as the "maker of the statement" under section 55(1) of the Evidence Act 1958, which would have allowed the respondent to cross-examine the film's maker directly. The Court found that the judge's reasons were insufficient and that the respondent's right to show the film could be limited under the Evidence Act 1958.

The Court determined that the application for leave to bring proceedings for damages should be dismissed due to the insufficient reasons provided by the judge. The Court held that the judge was not required to explicitly state if the injury fell within section 135A(2) of the Accident Compensation Act 1985, but the reasons needed to be clear enough to allow for effective review. Additionally, the Court found that the maker of the surveillance film was not the "maker of the statement" under the Evidence Act 1958, thus the respondent could not insist on cross-examining the film's maker. Consequently, the application for leave to bring proceedings for damages was dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicant, Alcoa of Australia Ltd, filed an application for leave to bring proceedings for damages against the respondent, McKenna, pursuant to section 135A of the Accident Compensation Act 1985. The applicant sought damages for a serious injury sustained by McKenna in an industrial accident. The respondent claimed that his injury was serious and thus excluded from the statutory compensation scheme under section 135A(2) of the Act. Surveillance footage of McKenna performing activities inconsistent with the seriousness of his claimed injury was obtained by the applicant. This footage was sought to be presented in court by the applicant to challenge the seriousness of McKenna's injury. The respondent sought to cross-examine the person who obtained the surveillance footage but the applicant objected on the basis that the footage's maker was not being called as a witness.

The matter came before the court on an application for leave to bring proceedings for damages. The application was filed by Alcoa of Australia Ltd against McKenna. The primary focus of the application was to determine whether the injury claimed by McKenna was serious enough to be excluded from the statutory compensation scheme under section 135A(2) of the Accident Compensation Act 1985. The court had to consider whether the judge's decision to grant the application was adequately reasoned, particularly in light of the failure to address whether the injury fell within section 135A(2) of the Act. The court also had to decide on the admissibility of the surveillance footage and whether the respondent had the right to cross-examine the person who obtained the footage under section 55(1) of the Evidence Act 1958.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Did the judge err in failing to state whether the injury claimed by McKenna falls within section 135A(2) of the Accident Compensation Act 1985 in the reasons for granting the application for leave to bring proceedings for damages?
2. Are the reasons provided by the judge sufficient to support the grant of the application for leave to bring proceedings for damages?
3. Did the court err in refusing the respondent the right to show the surveillance film in the absence of calling its maker?
4. Is the maker of the surveillance film the "maker of the statement" for the purpose of section 55(1) of the Evidence Act 1958, thus entitling the respondent to cross-examine the maker of the film?

Held
1. The court found that the judge did not err in failing to state whether the injury claimed by McKenna falls within section 135A(2) of the Accident Compensation Act 1985 in the reasons for granting the application for leave to bring proceedings for damages.
2. The reasons provided by the judge were considered sufficient to support the grant of the application for leave to bring proceedings for damages.
3. The court held that it did not err in refusing the respondent the right to show the surveillance film in the absence of calling its maker.
4. The maker of the surveillance film was not considered the "maker of the statement" for the purpose of section 55(1) of the Evidence Act 1958, thus denying the respondent the right to cross-examine the maker of the film.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court examined the reasons provided by the judge for granting the application for leave to bring proceedings for damages. It noted that the judge's failure to explicitly state whether the injury claimed by McKenna fell within section 135A(2) of the Accident Compensation Act 1985 did not affect the overall sufficiency of the reasons given. The court found that the reasons were adequate to support the decision to grant the application. The court further addressed the issue of the surveillance film, stating that it had the discretion to refuse the respondent's right to show the film if it deemed it appropriate in the absence of calling its maker. The court also considered the definition of "maker of the statement" under section 55(1) of the Evidence Act 1958 and concluded that the maker of the surveillance film was not the maker of the statement, thus preventing the respondent from cross-examining the maker of the film. This decision underscores the court's discretion in managing the presentation of evidence and the importance of the definition of "maker of the statement" in the context of cross-examination rights.