Alan O'Neill and Child Support Registrar

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[2014] AATA 426 

Division GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

File Numbers

2012/4533

2012/4977

2012/5332

Re

Alan O'Neill

APPLICANT

And

Child Support Registrar

RESPONDENT

DECISION

Tribunal

Deputy President K Bean

Date 30 June 2014
Place Adelaide

1. In application 2012/4533, the application for review is dismissed pursuant to s 42B of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (the AAT Act).

2. In application 2012/4977, pursuant to s 25(4A) of the AAT Act, the Tribunal directs that the scope of the hearing and the evidence to be received at the hearing will be limited to the following issues:

(a) The current amount of Mr O’Neill’s registrable maintenance liability for the purposes of s 72E of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (the Collection Act);

(b)   Mr O’Neill’s current financial position and whether his child support liability is completely irrecoverable;

(c)   Any arrangements Mr O’Neill has made for discharge of his child support liability;

(d)   Matters relevant to the question of whether he should be permitted to leave Australia notwithstanding his child support liability, including:

(i)       the nature and purpose of any travel proposed by Mr O’Neill; and

(ii)      the relevance of the fact that Mr O’Neill can seek a departure authorisation certificate and the efficacy of this in his circumstances; 

(e)   The likely impact of any travel proposed by Mr O’Neill on the respondent’s ability to recover the debt;

(f) The matters referred to in s 72I(2) of the Collection Act; and

(g)   Any other matters in respect of which leave is given at or before the hearing.

............. [Sgd]  ...............................

Deputy President K Bean

CATCHWORDS

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Whether first application for review should be dismissed pursuant to s 42B in circumstances where travel dates in the relevant application for a departure authorisation certificate have passed – Whether application futile – Where travel dates in a further application for review are open ended – No utility in undertaking review of both decisions – First application for review dismissed.

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Whether directions should be made pursuant to s 25(4A) limiting the scope of the hearing – Whether Tribunal bound by previous assessments of applicant’s financial position – Whether Tribunal can make findings inconsistent with previous assessments – s 116 certificate determinative of existence of amount of child support liability – Tribunal has no power to amend assessments – Not necessary for Tribunal to review correctness of previous assessments – Directions made limiting the scope of the hearing.

LEGISLATION

Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989

Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988, ss 37A, 72D(1), 72E, 72I, 72T and 116(2)

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, ss 25(4A), 37(2), 38(1) and 42B

CASES

Re O’Neill and Child Support Registrar [2010] AATA 545; (2012) 52 AAR 295

Re Brian Lawlor Automotive Pty Ltd and Collector of Customs (NSW) (1978) 1 ALD 167
Re Henderson and Child Support Registrar [2004] AATA 829
Whittaker v Child Support Registrar [2010] FCA 43; (2010) 264 ALR 473

Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority (2008)…

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Details
Case
[2014] AATA 426
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case between Alan O'Neill and the Child Support Registrar involved a dispute over the scope of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal's (AAT) review powers in relation to certain child support decisions. Mr O'Neill argued that the AAT had broad powers to review decisions under sections 72I, 72L, or 72M of the Collection Act, including any other powers conferred by the relevant child support legislation. He also relied on a 2009 Commonwealth Ombudsman report, which suggested that the Child Support Agency's use of Departure Prohibition Orders (DPO) should be exercised reasonably and that the agency should ensure the accuracy of liabilities before issuing such orders.

The legal issues the court had to decide were whether the AAT's review powers were limited to specific subsections of the Collection Act and whether the AAT could consider the accuracy of child support liabilities in its review process. Mr O'Neill argued for a broader scope of review, while the Registrar contended that the AAT's powers were limited and that a section 116 certificate was determinative of the child support liability. The court had to consider the statutory framework, the AAT's powers, and the relevance of the High Court's decision in Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority.

The court ultimately concluded that the AAT's review powers were indeed limited to specific subsections of the Collection Act. It accepted the Registrar's argument that a section 116 certificate was determinative of the child support liability, subject to evidence that it did not accurately reflect the liability. The court also found that the AAT did not have the power to amend assessments or make adjustments to the Register, and that the High Court's decision in Shi did not assist Mr O'Neill's case. The court found that the intention of the statutory scheme was for the AAT to rely on the section 116 certificate in the context of reviewing decisions related to DPOs and Direct Account Credits (DACs). The court rejected Mr O'Neill's contention that he could not obtain a proper determination of his child support liability due to the complexity of his affairs.

The court's final orders would likely reflect its findings that the AAT's review powers were limited, and that the Registrar's decision regarding the child support liability was upheld. The AAT would not have the authority to amend assessments or adjust the Register, and Mr O'Neill's appeal of a previous decision was denied due to the lack of a substantial issue to be raised on appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Mr O’Neill acknowledges that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in this matter is enabled by s 72T of the Collection Act, which provides as follows:72T Applications for review of certain decisions(1)Applications may be made to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for review of a decision of the Registrar under section 72I, 72L or 72M.(2)In this section:decision has the same meaning as in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975.However he contends that:The scope of the review is not limited to specific subsections of any of 72I, 72L or 72M. The AAT is broadly enabled by any Decision under sections 72I, 72L or 72M and the powers available to it are at least the same powers that are available to the CSR when reviewing such a decision, but in fact include any other power conferred by the enactments of the Child Support Assessment Act and the Child Support Registration and Collections (sic) Act, to be used as the Tribunal sees fit in relation to the reviewable decision.[40] [40] Applicant’s written submissions dated 8 February 2013, [5B]. Mr O’Neill also relies upon a report of the Commonwealth Ombudsman in 2009, containing the following paragraphs:1.4 A DPO is a significant restriction on a person’s right to freedom of movement. It is therefore not surprising that the complaints we investigated showed that a DPO can be a powerful incentive for a person to pay their outstanding child support. However, a coercive power—such as the power to make a DPO—is one that must be exercised reasonably. The inappropriate use of a DPO could be oppressive or punitive. These factors, coupled with the CSA’s public statements about its intention to increase the number of DPOs made, led the Ombudsman to conclude that it would be appropriate to initiate a broader investigation into the CSA’s policies and procedures for making DPOs.…4.8 However, the CSA’s PI says that rather than simply checking whether a person’s child support account is in arrears, the CSA will ‘ensure the liabilities that have created the debt are correct’, by checking for things such as incomplete CSA action that could affect the debt; whether there are any disputes about the time the children spend with each parent; and whether the income figures used to calculate the assessment are accurate. The submissions indicated that this had been done in only 11 of the 21 cases (and only partially in four of those 11 cases).[41] [41] Commonwealth Ombudsman, Child Support Agency: Administration of Departure Prohibition Order Powers, Report No 8 (2009) 3, 13. Mr O’Neill contends that “the checking of taxable and non-taxable incomes, whether actual or formula or derived from capacities to earn, is an inherent part of reviews of section 72I, L and M Decisions. … It is further clear that checking of assessments and of the resulting liabilities, to further verify the correctness and accuracy of liabilities, is also an inherent part of reviews of sections 72I, L and M Decisions.”[42] [42] Applicant’s written submissions dated 8 February 2013, [5B].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In support of his other contentions, Mr O’Neill also contends that, despite having pursued all other avenues available to him, it has not been possible for him to obtain a proper determination of his child support liability, partly because numerous decision-makers concluded that his affairs were too complex.[43][43] Applicant’s written submissions dated 8 February 2013, [6].Consideration Having carefully considered the detailed submissions of both parties in relation to this issue, I have ultimately concluded that the position advanced by the respondent is correct. Notwithstanding the additional matters raised by Mr O’Neill that were not raised in the context of the 2009 matter, I remain satisfied that the position I described in my 2010 decision at [16] – [18] (set out at paragraph 34 above) was correct. For the reasons given by the respondent, I am satisfied that, for the purposes of proceedings such as these, a s 116 certificate is determinative of the amount of the relevant child support liability, subject to evidence that the certificate does not correctly record the liability determined by the respondent. It follows that it is also determinative of the question of whether a person “no longer has a child support liability” for the purposes of s 72I. I also accept the submissions of the respondent as to the relevance of s 75 of the Assessment Act and s 37A of the Collection Act. Specifically, I accept that whilst those provisions both allow and require the Registrar to amend administrative assessments, and require the Registrar to alter the Register to reflect such amendments, they give no power to the Tribunal to amend any assessment or make any adjustment to the Register. As to the relevance of the decision of the High Court in Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority, in my view that decision does not assist Mr O’Neill. The decision simply confirms that even when considering a cancellation decision, the Tribunal is to make its decision having regard to the state of affairs existing at the time of its decision rather than confining itself to the state of affairs which existed at the time of the decision under review. That decision has little bearing on this matter. As to the intention of the statutory scheme, I accept the respondent’s submission that subject to it not accurately reflecting the liability which has been determined, in the context of review of decisions relating to DPOs and DACs, a s 116 certificate is intended to be determinative of the existence of the amount of a child support liability. To the extent a person subject to such a liability disputes its correctness, they are obliged to do so via the mechanisms provided in the Assessment Act. In that regard, I note that it was open to Mr O’Neill to further challenge the 2009 decision of Federal Magistrate Brown (as he then was). However he did not appeal that decision within time and was denied leave to do so out of time, partly for the reason that the judge who determined the application, his Honour Justice Strickland, was not able to find that there was a substantial issue to be raised on appeal.[44][44] Although the Tribunal has been provided with a copy of the relevant decision, as Mr O’Neill’s name was anonymised in that decision the details of the decision are not reproduced here, having regard to s 121 of the Family Law Act 1975.