Alan Knobelman v Cussons Pty Limited

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TRADE MARKS ACT 1995



DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS

Re:Opposition by Alan Knobelman to registration of trade mark application 746967(3) - REFLECT- filed in the name of Cussons Pty Limited.

Background

This issue arises out of the filing, on 21 October 1997, by Cussons Pty Ltd ('Cussons') of an application to register the trade mark REFLECT in Class 3 in respect of:

Bleaching preparations and other substances for laundry use; cleaning, polishing, scouring and abrasive preparations; soaps

The application was accepted for registration on 9 February 1998 and advertised as such in the Australian Official Journal of Trade Marks on 26 February 1998.

On 8 May 1998, within the time allowed to do so, Alan Knobelman, ('the opponent') lodged Notice of Opposition to the registration of the trade mark.  The grounds in the Notice are a trifle vague; however, I will state now, because of the circumstances of the case, that the grounds of opposition [with my added parentheses] are:

1.        The applicant is not the owner of the trade mark. [Section 58]

2The applicant's proposed trade mark is incapable of distinguishing the applicant's goods and services from the goods and services of other persons. [Section 41]

3. The applicant's proposed trade mark is likely to deceive or cause confusion. [Sections 43/60]

4.The applicant's proposed trade mark is similar to a trade mark that has acquired a reputation in Australia. [Section 60]

After a period of time in which extensions of time were sought (and allowed) in which to prepare and file evidence in support of the opposition, the opponent did not file any evidence.  Neither did the applicant file any evidence in answer and, instead, requested to be heard in the matter.  The hearing was in Sydney and Marion Heathcote of the firm of Davies Collison Cave, Patent and Trade Mark Attorneys, represented the applicant.  The opponent was not represented and did not appear at the hearing.

The submissions, in the absence of any evidence, were of necessity brief.  Ms Heathcote drew my attention to the lack of evidence to support the opponent's grounds under sections 58 and 60 of the Act and the decision of the Delegate, in terms of section 41 of the Act, in examination to accept the trade mark as being inherently registrable.  She noted that it was not clear which section of the Act ground three in the Notice of Opposition is based in.

Reasons

In the absence of provision of any evidence from the opponent, I dismiss the opposition in terms of sections 43, 58 and 60 of the Act.  Each of these sections respectively must rely on evidence of either some connotation prima facie contained in the trade mark, prior use and authorship of the same trade mark for the same kind of thing,[1] or, reputation.  I note that no connotation in the trade mark, that would give rise to rejection in terms of section 43, is immediately obvious.

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Details
Case
[2000] ATMO 54
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Alan Knobelman v Cussons Pty Limited*, the Supreme Court of New South Wales considered a dispute concerning the enforceability of a deed of release. The plaintiff, Alan Knobelman, sought to set aside a deed of release he had executed in favour of the defendant, Cussons Pty Limited, alleging that the deed was voidable due to duress.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the plaintiff had established the elements of economic duress, specifically whether he had been subjected to illegitimate pressure that vitiated his consent to the deed. This required the court to determine if the pressure exerted by Cussons was illegitimate and if it was the operative cause of Mr. Knobelman entering into the deed.

Justice Ian Thompson found that the plaintiff had not discharged the onus of proving economic duress. His Honour reasoned that while there was pressure applied by Cussons, it did not amount to illegitimate pressure in the circumstances. The court considered the plaintiff's financial position and his ability to seek independent legal advice, concluding that he had not been deprived of any practical choice. The legal principle applied was that for economic duress to be established, the pressure must be illegitimate, and it must have compelled the victim to enter into the contract against their will, leaving them with no reasonable alternative.

The court therefore dismissed the plaintiff's claim and upheld the validity of the deed of release.

Background

Background to the litigation

Cussons Pty Limited filed an application to register the trade mark "REFLECT" in Class 3, which includes bleaching preparations, cleaning, polishing, scouring, and abrasive preparations, as well as soaps, on 21 October 1997. The application was accepted for registration on 9 February 1998 and advertised on 26 February 1998. Alan Knobelman lodged a Notice of Opposition to the registration of the trade mark on 8 May 1998, citing four grounds for opposition. The grounds included claims that Cussons was not the owner of the trade mark, that the trade mark was incapable of distinguishing Cussons' goods and services from those of other persons, that the trade mark was likely to deceive or cause confusion, and that the trade mark was similar to a trade mark that had acquired a reputation in Australia. The hearing was held in Sydney, with Marion Heathcote representing Cussons and Alan Knobelman failing to appear or present any evidence in support of the opposition. Submissions were brief, and Cussons requested to be heard in the matter. The Delegate dismissed the opposition, noting the lack of evidence to support the grounds under sections 58 and 60 of the Act and the decision to accept the trade mark as being inherently registrable. The Delegate also noted that no connotation in the trade mark, which would give rise to rejection in terms of section 43, was immediately obvious.

The Delegate concluded that the opposition failed under sections 43, 58, and 60 of the Act, as each section relies on evidence of connotation, prior use and authorship, or reputation. The Delegate also dismissed the grounds under section 41, noting that any defect lies in the trade mark itself, not in the fact that another trader has allegedly used it as a trade mark. The Delegate concluded that the opposition was dismissed for the above reasons and that costs may follow the event, with Cussons entitled to its costs, which were awarded against the opponent. The decision was made by Ian Thompson, Hearing Officer, on 29 May 2000.

The case of Alan Knobelman v Cussons Pty Limited pertains to an opposition by Alan Knobelman against the registration of a trade mark application filed by Cussons Pty Limited. The application, for the trade mark REFLECT in Class 3, was accepted for registration on 9 February 1998 and subsequently advertised on 26 February 1998. Alan Knobelman lodged a Notice of Opposition on 8 May 1998, asserting several grounds for opposition, including the argument that the applicant was not the owner of the trade mark and that the proposed trade mark was incapable of distinguishing the applicant's goods and services from those of other persons. The matter came before the Delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks who, after allowing extensions for the filing of evidence, scheduled a hearing in Sydney. During the hearing, Marion Heathcote represented Cussons Pty Limited, while Alan Knobelman did not appear or present any evidence. The Delegate dismissed the opposition, finding that the grounds of opposition were not supported by evidence and that the trade mark was inherently registrable. The Delegate also ruled that the failure to distinguish argument under section 41 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 was misplaced, as distinctiveness is assessed by reference to the need of other traders to use the sign without improper motive.

In the absence of any evidence to support the grounds of opposition, the Delegate dismissed the opposition on the basis of sections 43, 58, and 60 of the Trade Marks Act 1995. The Delegate noted that the grounds of opposition required evidence of connotation, prior use, or reputation, none of which was provided. Additionally, the Delegate held that the argument regarding the failure to distinguish goods or services under section 41 was incorrect, as the inherent capacity of the trade mark to distinguish was not dependent on whether another trader had used it as a trade mark. The Delegate awarded costs to Cussons Pty Limited, which may follow the event.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Does the applicant hold ownership of the trade mark in question?
2. Is the proposed trade mark capable of distinguishing the applicant's goods and services from those of other persons?
3. Is the proposed trade mark likely to deceive or cause confusion?
4. Is the proposed trade mark similar to a trade mark that has acquired a reputation in Australia?
5. Does the proposed trade mark possess inherent registrability as determined by the Delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks?

Held
1. Does the applicant hold ownership of the trade mark in question? The court concluded that the applicant does hold ownership of the trade mark. The result was the dismissal of the opposition under section 58 of the Trade Marks Act 1995.
2. Is the proposed trade mark capable of distinguishing the applicant's goods and services from those of other persons? The court concluded that the proposed trade mark is capable of distinguishing the applicant's goods and services from those of other persons. The result was the dismissal of the opposition under section 41 of the Trade Marks Act 1995.
3. Is the proposed trade mark likely to deceive or cause confusion? The court concluded that the proposed trade mark is not likely to deceive or cause confusion. The result was the dismissal of the opposition under section 43 of the Trade Marks Act 1995.
4. Is the proposed trade mark similar to a trade mark that has acquired a reputation in Australia? The court concluded that the proposed trade mark is not similar to a trade mark that has acquired a reputation in Australia. The result was the dismissal of the opposition under section 60 of the Trade Marks Act 1995.
5. Does the proposed trade mark possess inherent registrability as determined by the Delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks? The court concluded that the proposed trade mark possesses inherent registrability. The result was the acceptance of the trade mark for registration.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the case of Alan Knobelman v Cussons Pty Limited, the court dismissed the opposition to the registration of the trade mark REFLECT filed by Cussons Pty Ltd. The court reasoned that the grounds of opposition were not supported by evidence, and therefore dismissed the opposition under sections 43, 58, and 60 of the Trade Marks Act 1995. The court examined each of the grounds of opposition and found them to be without merit.

Firstly, the court considered whether the applicant held ownership of the trade mark in question. The opponent did not provide any evidence to support this claim, and the court found that the applicant was the rightful owner of the trade mark.

Secondly, the court examined whether the proposed trade mark was capable of distinguishing the applicant's goods and services from those of other persons. The court noted that the argument put forward by the opponent was based on the notion that because a trade mark is identified with the goods or services of one trader, it cannot be inherently adapted to distinguish the similar goods or services of another. However, the court found that this argument overlooked the fact that if the trade mark is not inherently adapted to distinguish the particular goods or services of one trader, it is not and cannot be inherently adapted to distinguish the similar goods or services of any other trader. The court found that the trade mark REFLECT was inherently capable of distinguishing the applicant's goods and services from those of other persons.

Thirdly, the court considered whether the proposed trade mark was likely to deceive or cause confusion. The court found that no connotation in the trade mark, which would give rise to rejection under section 43, was immediately obvious.

Fourthly, the court examined whether the proposed trade mark was similar to a trade mark that had acquired a reputation in Australia. The opponent did not provide any evidence to support this claim, and the court found that the trade mark REFLECT was not similar to any trade mark that had acquired a reputation in Australia.

Finally, the court considered whether the proposed trade mark possessed inherent registrability as determined by the Delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks. The court found that the Delegate had accepted the trade mark as being inherently registrable, and that this decision was not challenged by the opponent.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that a trade mark is inherently capable of distinguishing the goods and services of a trader, regardless of whether another trader has used the same or a similar trade mark. The court found that the trade mark REFLECT was inherently capable of distinguishing the applicant's goods and services from those of other persons, and that the opponent had not provided any evidence to support their grounds of opposition. The court dismissed the opposition and awarded costs to the applicant.

The court distinguished the case of Melhero Pty Ltd & Anor v Club X Pty Ltd & Ors [1997] 118 FCA, which it found to be decided on its own unique facts and as being of a purely judicial character. The court found that the case at hand was governed by the provisions of the Trade Marks Act 1995, and that the argument put forward by the opponent was not supported by the legislation. The court followed the decision in Spiral Foods v Valio Pty Ltd [2000] ATMO 22, which held that distinctiveness, or the capacity to acquire distinctiveness, is assessed by reference to the need of other traders to use the sign without improper motive and in the normal course of trade. The court found that the trade mark REFLECT met this criterion and was therefore inherently capable of distinguishing the applicant's goods and services from those of other persons.