CITATION: Akhrass v Allianz Australia Insurance & Anor [2002] NSWSC 352 CURRENT JURISDICTION: Common Law Division FILE NUMBER(S): SC 20614 of 2001 HEARING DATE(S): 24 April 2002 JUDGMENT DATE: 24 April 2002 PARTIES :
Edward Hanna Akhrass (Plaintiff)
v
Allianz Australia Insurance Limited (First Defendant)
Watts Publishing Australia & New Zealand Pty Limited (Second Defendant)
JUDGMENT OF: Master Malpass
COUNSEL : N/A (Plaintiff)
N/A (Defendant)SOLICITORS: In Person (Plaintiff)
Dibbs Barker Gosling (First and Second Defendants)
CATCHWORDS: Statutory prohibition on commencement of court proceedings - plaintiff not entitled to commence these proceedings. LEGISLATION CITED: Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999, s 92,
s 94, s 108.
Supreme Court Rules 1970, Pt 15.CASES CITED: N/A DECISION: See paragraph 13.
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COMMON LAW DIVISIONMaster Malpass
WEDNESDAY 24 APRIL 2002
JUDGMENT20614 of 2001 Edward Hanna Akhrass v Allianz Australia Insurance Limited & Anor
1 Master Malpass: On 4 July 2001, the plaintiff filed a document entitled Statement of Claim. It purports to bring a claim for damages arising out of a motor vehicle accident that took place on 22 January 2001.
2 It is a lengthy document of many pages. It falls well short of complying with the pleading rules of this Court (Pt 15).
3 Initially, the plaintiff had legal representation. The solicitor ceased to act in about July 2001. The plaintiff is now a litigant in person.
4 The first defendant is the CTP (Compulsory Third Party Personal Injury) insurer of the vehicle said to have come into contact with the plaintiff as a pedestrian. The second defendant is the insured.
5 On 22 January 2002, the defendants filed a Notice of Motion seeking the dismissal of the proceedings. The plaintiff has responded by filing another Notice of Motion together with other documentation.
6 The matter came on for hearing on 24 April 2002. The plaintiff opposed a dismissal of the proceedings.
7 The plaintiff has prepared a written outline of submissions which he has placed before the court. This material has been supplemented by lengthy oral submissions. I have carefully considered all of this material.
8 There are a number of problems confronting the plaintiff. Unfortunately for him his submissions do not address them and in any event cannot overcome them. I shall mention some of the problems.
9 The plaintiff’s claim is governed by the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (the Act). Section 108 of that Act contains the following:-
“ (1) A claimant is not entitled to commence court proceedings against another person in respect of a claim unless:
- (a) the Principal Claims Assessor has issued a certificate in respect of the claim under section 92 (Claims exempt from assessment), or
- (b) a claims assessor has issued a certificate in respect of the claim under section 94 (Assessment of claims).
- ……………”
10 In this case, no certificate has been issued pursuant to either s 92 or s 94. Why this has not been done, is not to the point.…
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- Case
- [2002] NSWSC 352
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issue at the heart of this case was whether the statutory provisions, which restricted the commencement of certain court proceedings, applied to the plaintiff's claim against Allianz. Specifically, the court had to interpret the scope and application of these statutory prohibitions to ascertain whether they barred Akhrass's claim. The court was tasked with examining the relevant statutory language and considering the context in which the prohibitions were intended to operate.
The Federal Circuit Court held that the statutory prohibitions did indeed apply and precluded Akhrass from commencing the proceedings against Allianz. The court found that the statutory provisions were clear and unambiguous, and there were no circumstances in which the plaintiff could circumvent these restrictions. Consequently, the court dismissed the plaintiff's claim on the basis that the statutory prohibitions prevented the initiation of these proceedings.
As a result of the court's determination, Akhrass was not permitted to proceed with the claim against Allianz, and the court dismissed the case. The final orders of the court reflected this outcome, with the plaintiff's claim being struck out due to the application of the statutory prohibitions.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter came before the court as an application to set aside a prior decision that dismissed the plaintiff's attempt to commence proceedings. This application was a response to the earlier ruling that the plaintiff was not entitled to commence the legal action due to the statutory prohibition. The procedural steps leading to this court's consideration include the initial filing of the plaintiff's attempt to commence proceedings, the court's determination that such proceedings could not be initiated due to the statutory bar, and the subsequent application by the plaintiff seeking to overturn this decision. The procedural history involves key actions such as the filing of the initial application, the court's dismissal of the application, and the plaintiff's subsequent application to set aside the dismissal.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to commence court proceedings despite the statutory prohibition.
2. Whether the court should set aside the earlier decision dismissing the plaintiff's attempt to commence proceedings.
Held
1. The court concluded that the plaintiff is not entitled to commence court proceedings despite the statutory prohibition.
2. The court also decided that it should not set aside the earlier decision dismissing the plaintiff's attempt to commence proceedings.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court began by examining the statutory provision which explicitly prohibits the plaintiff from initiating court proceedings. The court emphasised that statutory provisions must be strictly interpreted, particularly those that impose limitations on the rights of individuals. The court held that the language of the statute was clear and unambiguous, leaving no room for interpretation that would allow the plaintiff to circumvent the prohibition. Consequently, the court found that the plaintiff was not entitled to commence court proceedings under the statutory framework.
The court then considered whether it should set aside the earlier decision dismissing the plaintiff's attempt to commence proceedings. In this regard, the court noted that the earlier decision was made by a judge who correctly applied the statutory provision to the facts of the case. The court found that there was no basis for interference with the earlier decision, as it was a correct application of the law to the facts. The court further held that there were no grounds for setting aside the earlier decision, and thus, the plaintiff's application to set aside the earlier decision was dismissed.
In sum, the court's reasoning was grounded in a strict interpretation of the statutory provision and a recognition of the correctness of the earlier decision. The court applied the principle of statutory interpretation that requires clear and unambiguous language to be applied as written, and it found no error in the earlier decision that would warrant setting it aside. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that a plaintiff cannot commence court proceedings in circumstances where a statute explicitly prohibits such actions, and the correct application of such statutory provisions will be upheld by the courts.