Akg16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AKG16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1576

Appeal from: Application for extension of time: AKG16 v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2016] FCCA 1656
File number: NSD 1407 of 2016
Judge: MCKERRACHER J
Date of judgment: 23 December 2016
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – whether adequate consideration of ‘reasonably foreseeable future’ in assessing fear of persecution – whether reasoning of the Tribunal unreasonable, illogical and/or irrational

Held: Application dismissed

Legislation: Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 36.03, 36.05(1)
Cases cited:

Hanna v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 282

Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 334

MZYXR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 252

NABC of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 1426

NADQ v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 483

Pannu v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (No 2) [2013] FCA 1406

Date of hearing: 25 November 2016
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 34
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms C Symons
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submits to any order of the Court, save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 1407 of 2016
BETWEEN:

AKG16

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MCKERRACHER J

DATE OF ORDER:

23 DECEMBER 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for an extension of time be refused.

2.The applicant pay the costs of the first respondent, to be assessed if not agreed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MCKERRACHER J:

INTRODUCTION

  1. The applicant applies pursuant to r 36.05(1) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) for an extension of time within which to file a notice of appeal from a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia delivered on 4 July 2016.  The applicant filed the application for an extension on 23 August 2016.  Rule 36.03 of the Rules requires a notice of appeal to be filed within 21 days after the date of the judgment subject of the appeal.  The extension sought, therefore, is a period of 29 days.

  2. The draft grounds of appeal are these:

    (1)       There is a jurisdictional error in the Federal Circuit Court decision.

    (2)The reasons provided by the [Administrative Appeals Tribunal] to the [Minister for Immigration and Border Protection] in support of the [Tribunal’s] recommendation that the [applicant] was not a person to whom Australia had protection obligations were neither logical nor rational.

    (3)Further grounds of appeal will be provided once the applicant has legal representation and the review of the written reasons for the decision has been completed.

    LATE DEVELOPMENTS

  3. A day and a half before the hearing of the application,…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 1576
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Akg16, an Afghan national, sought a Protection (Class XA) visa based on claims of persecution due to his ethnicity and religion. The applicant claimed to be a Hazara Shia Muslim and feared harm from the Taliban and Al Qaida. He also claimed to be at risk as a member of a particular social group, specifically a failed asylum seeker. The application for the visa was ultimately declined by the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. The applicant sought judicial review of the decision, arguing that the Tribunal's assessment of his fear of persecution in the reasonably foreseeable future was unreasonable, illogical, or irrational. The central legal issues were whether the Tribunal adequately considered the reasonably foreseeable future in assessing the applicant's fear of persecution and whether the Tribunal's reasoning was unreasonable, illogical, or irrational.

The Federal Court found that the Tribunal had correctly considered the reasonably foreseeable future in its assessment. The Court noted that the Tribunal had explicitly grappled with this concept at multiple points in its decision, and its analysis was informed by a careful engagement with relevant country information. The Court distinguished this case from MZYXR, where the Tribunal's approach had been found wanting. The Court held that the Tribunal was well aware of the need to look to the reasonably foreseeable future, adopted clear wording to indicate a forward-looking approach, carefully engaged with relevant country information, and reached conclusions based on dispositive findings. The Court further held that there was no discernible error in the Tribunal's approach, nor any jurisdictional error by misapplying the relevant test or failing to address the applicant's claims. The primary judge's assessment of the Tribunal's approach on judicial review was correct.

The Court dismissed the application for an extension of time, finding that the best grounds of appeal which could be envisaged would not enjoy a reasonable prospect of success. The Court concluded that there was no constructive failure to exercise the Tribunal's jurisdiction and no jurisdictional error. Consequently, the application for an extension of time was refused, and the applicant was ordered to pay the costs of the first respondent, to be assessed if not agreed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for an extension of time be refused.

2. The applicant pay the costs of the first respondent, to be assessed if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

It is necessary however, to turn to the application as made.BACKGROUND The applicant is a male citizen of Afghanistan who, on 28 November 2012, applied for a Protection (Class XA) visa. He claimed to fear harm on the basis of his ethnicity and religion. As a Hazara Shia Muslim he feared harm from the Taliban and Al Qaida. He also claimed to fear harm as a member of a particular social group, namely, as a failed asylum seeker. In light of the applicant’s particular sensitivity I will use pseudonyms for the particular locations referred to below. The applicant claimed that in 1973 he was born in location A, in Afghanistan. In 1980 he and his family moved to location B due to attacks from Kuchi nomads on Hazaras in his region. In 1991, he and his family moved to Iran as they were worried the applicant would be forcibly recruited into the army. In 1999, he went to live in location C in Pakistan. In 2003, he returned to location B and worked as a taxi driver. However he returned to location C in Pakistan due to stories of taxi drivers being abducted and explosions around location B. In January 2012, he left location C in Pakistan for Australia as the security situation for Hazaras was deteriorating. By a decision made on 4 July 2013, the Minister, through his delegate, declined to grant the visa sought by the applicant.RELEVANT PRINCIPLES The question of whether a court should grant an extension of time requires an exercise of discretion in which the following factors would ordinarily be considered:(a)the length of, and any explanation for, the delay;(b)the merits of the appeal; and(c)whether there is any prejudice to the respondent albeit that the mere absence of prejudice is not in itself sufficient to justify the grant of an extension of time.See Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 334 per Wilcox J (at 348-349). The delay in the present situation was not substantial; however, it is explained only by reference to matters which do not distinguish the applicant’s situation from that of many other persons seeking relief. In essence, he refers to his lack of legal assistance and lack of education in a statutory declaration made on 18 August 2016 in support of the application. Nonetheless, the question of delay can be put to one side for the time being so that there can be focus on the merits of the proposed appeal and the question of whether it would have reasonable prospects of success.THE HISTORY The applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision on 6 August 2013. On 17 July 2015, the Tribunal wrote to the applicant inviting him to appear before it to give evidence and present arguments. The hearing was later postponed and a new invitation to attend the hearing was issued. The applicant duly appeared before the Tribunal on 22 January 2016 assisted by an interpreter. He was represented in relation to the review by his registered migration agent who also provided written submission on his behalf at the outset on 4 November 2013.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

This can be contrasted to MZYXR and the analysis by North J at [19]-[21].CONCLUSION As there is no discernible error in approach taking by the Tribunal or indeed in the careful assessment of that approach made by the primary judge on judicial review, the best grounds of appeal which can presently be envisaged would not enjoy a reasonable prospect of success. In those circumstances the application for an extension of time should be refused with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

His Honour decided there was no constructive failure to exercise the Tribunal’s jurisdiction and no jurisdictional error by misapplying the relevant test or failing to address the applicant’s claims.CONSIDERATION OF THE PROPOSED GROUNDS As indicated, the two essential grounds advanced by the applicant without any elucidation are jurisdictional error and illogical or irrational conclusions. The generality of these grounds makes it difficult to identify precisely the alleged deficiency other than a complaint with the conclusion itself. In the absence of any other obviously arguable grounds, it may be reasonable to proceed on the basis that the applicant may seek to advance the same grounds argued before the primary judge by counsel on his behalf. In relation to those grounds however, the Minister contends for the reasons identified in the primary judge’s decision that such challenge to the decision of the Tribunal could not succeed. In my view, the primary judge was correct to conclude that the Tribunal had not failed to address the issue of the reasonably foreseeable future in determining the applicant’s fear of persecution and that it was correct in concluding that the decision of MZYXR was distinguishable from the present case. The Tribunal’s consciousness of its obligation to look at the ‘reasonably foreseeable future’ was reflected throughout its decision where it expressly grappled with this concept in [25], [30], [36] and [37] of its decision record. This in turn followed from the Tribunal’s express identification (at [15]) that its assessment ‘requires a consideration of the matter in relation to the reasonably foreseeable future’. Although the applicant was critical of the failure of the Tribunal to deal with particular extracts of country information, it is clear that such extracts referred to the security situation in Afghanistan generally, and were contrary in some cases to those that dealt specifically with the applicant’s home area of location B. For example, whilst the 2015 DFAT report included a statement to the effect that the security situation in Afghanistan was fluid and had deteriorated, such statement was qualified by the observation that ‘the security situation is better in areas where the government forces maintain strong control, such as major urban areas like location B’. The Tribunal summarised that statement in [29] of its decision record, set out at [21(c)] above. In all these circumstances I consider that the Tribunal:(a)was well aware of the need to look to the reasonably foreseeable future;(b)adopted wording which made it clear that it was taking a forward-looking approach to its consideration of this issue;(c)carefully engaged with relevant country information in the process of its analysis; and(d)reached conclusions based on findings that were dispositive. The applicant’s case can be distinguished from MZYXR because in that case the Tribunal had extracted a large body of country information in a separate part of the decision and then engaged with the individual paragraphs of the information in a section containing its reasoning (see the observations of North J IN MZYXR at [11]-[13] and [17]).