AJX17 v Minister for Immigration
[2020] FCCA 357
•24 February 2020
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| AJX17 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2020] FCCA 357 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application for review of decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) – allegation of an apprehension of bias or actual bias on the part of the Tribunal member – whether the applicant was given a fair and meaningful opportunity to present his evidence – whether the Tribunal put the applicant on notice of concerns about his evidence – whether the Tribunal’s findings regarding credibility were reasonably made with cogent and intelligible reasons – impermissible merits review – grounds not made out – no jurisdictional error revealed – application dismissed. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.425, 438, 476 |
| Cases cited: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng [2001] HCA 17; (2001) 205 CLR 507; (2001) 75 ALJR 679; (2001) 178 ALR 421; (2001) 65 ALD 1 |
| Applicant: | AJX17 |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS |
| Second Respondent: | ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 278 of 2017 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Nicholls |
| Hearing date: | 14 February 2020 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 14 February 2020 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 24 February 2020 |
REPRESENTATION
| Applicant: | In person |
| Legal Representative for the Respondents: | Ms J. Strugnell |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Minter Ellison Lawyers |
ORDERS
The application made on 31 January 2017 is dismissed.
The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs set in the amount of $5600.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 278 of 2017
| AJX17 |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS |
First Respondent
| ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is an application made pursuant to s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) on 31 January 2017 seeking review of the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) made on 10 January 2017, which affirmed the decision of the Minister’s delegate (“the delegate”) not to grant the applicant a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa (“SHEV”) (“protection visa”) (“the visa”).
The evidence before the Court is contained in a bundle of relevant documents filed and tendered by the Minister (“the Court Book” – “CB” – “RE1”), and documents tendered during the hearing by the Minister, which should have been included in the Court Book, given their relevance to these proceedings.
Background
The applicant is a citizen of China (item 12 at CB 5). He arrived in Australia on 14 February 2014 (item 29 at CB 14). The applicant applied for a protection visa on 9 May 2014 (CB 1 – CB 35) with the assistance of a registered migration agent (CB 25 – CB 27), whose migration agent registration was subsequently cancelled on 26 June 2015 (CB 105.4).
The applicant’s claims to fear harm were included in his protection visa application, and in a Statutory Declaration dated 6 December 2016 (CB 150 – CB 152).
Given the evidence before the Court, the applicant’s claims to fear harm have been summarised succinctly, and fairly, by the Minister in his written submissions (at [8] – [10]):
“8. The applicant claimed that he and a relative were assaulted in China on 18 December 2013 by a local criminal and his associates because they either refused to lend money or they refused to pay protection money to the criminals. His relative was badly and permanently injured as a result, and the applicant paid money to the relative for his medical expenses and compensation in two instalments, on 19 December 2013 and 16 April 2014.
9. The applicant claimed that the police did not take action against the attackers because the principal attacker, Ye, was related to the deputy president of the PSB [Public Security Bureau] in Fuqing. The applicant sought to confront the deputy president directly during an official visit to police stations in the applicant's home region to complain about the lack of action in relation to the assault. He was detained for disturbing the peace, imprisoned and tortured to elicit a confession. He was released on bail on 10 February 2014 after his brother paid a bribe. He departed China on 13 February 2014, after his brother paid another bribe enabling him to leave China.
10. The applicant occupied some positions in his brother's company on paper only, and was not really involved in these companies.”
The applicant was invited to attend an interview with the delegate on 20 February 2015 (CB 52 – CB 59). On 26 February 2015 the delegate refused to grant the applicant a protection visa (CB 61.4 and CB 72 – CB 85).
The Tribunal
On 16 March 2015 the applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision (CB 87 – CB 94).
The applicant was invited by email dated 12 October 2016 to a hearing before the Tribunal on 15 November 2016 (CB 116 – CB 118). He attended the hearing before the Tribunal, accompanied by his representative, and was assisted by an interpreter in the Mandarin language (CB 143 – CB 145).
The Minister’s written submissions provide a fair summary of the Tribunal’s reasoning and findings (at [11] – [12]):
“11. While the Tribunal was prepared to accept that the applicant and his relative were involved in 'an altercation' (CB 188: [57]) and that the applicant occupied positions in his brother's company on paper only (CB 185: [49]), it rejected the remainder of the applicant's claims on the basis that he was not a credible witness (CB 188: [56]). The Tribunal made the following relevant findings:
(a) the applicant's evidence about the assault and Ye was vague and inconsistent, and the Tribunal was not prepared to accept that the altercation related to an attempt to extort money (CB 185: [50]);
(b) it did not accept that the applicant paid money to the relative in relation to the claimed assault because it did not consider it was plausible or credible that the applicant would make the payment on 19 December 2013, the day after the assault and before any police investigation would have concluded, and because of country information which indicated the prevalence of document fraud in relation to visa applications (CB 186: [50]);
(c) the applicant's evidence regarding the Deputy Minister and the claimed detention was vague and implausible such that the Tribunal did not consider it credible, and did not accept, that he was detained and imprisoned and tortured as claimed (CB 186: [51], CB 188: [57]);
(d) it did not accept that the applicant's brother paid a bribe to enable the applicant to leave China (CB 186: [53], CB188: [57]);
(e) the applicant's explanation for the delay in applying for protection in Australia was inadequate and the delay inconsistent with his claim to fear harm (CB 187: [54]);
(f) the applicant was not a credible witness and many of his claims were not credible (CB 188: [56]); and
(g) it did not accept the applicant's claims about the circumstances of the 'altercation' or that it involved an attempt to extort money from the applicant (CB 189: [58]).
12. For these reasons, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant met the refugee criterion in paragraph 36(2)(aa) (CB 189: [58], CB 190: [62]). For the same reasons, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant met the complementary protection criterion (CB 189: [59]–[61], CB 190: [63]).”
Before the Court
On 11 May 2017 a Registrar of the Court, with the consent of both parties, made orders for the conduct of this case. Amongst those orders the applicant was given the opportunity to file an amended application by 6 July 2017. No amended application has been filed. The applicant was also to file and serve any affidavit containing additional evidence to be relied upon, including any transcript of a Tribunal hearing, by 6 July 2017. No further affidavit evidence has been filed by the applicant.
At directions on 21 October 2019, orders were made setting the matter down for final hearing on 14 February 2020. The applicant and the Minister were to file written submissions seven and fourteen days, respectively, before the final hearing. No submissions were filed by the applicant.
The Grounds of the Application to the Court
At the directions listing on 21 October 2019, the applicant stated that he had written the grounds of the application himself. The grounds of the application are in the following terms:
“1. I do not believe that the Tribunal member is genuinely willing to assess my application impartially and correctly, I believe that the arranged hearing was procedural formalities and I was not given a genuine opportunity to present my arguments. At the hearing, I was requested to present evidence to support my claims and I did so in a reasonable amount of time. However, my evidence were dismissed under the Tribunal member’s suspicion that it could have been fake due to country information reporting fraud to be very common in China. I was dissatisfied with the Tribunal’s dismissal of my evidence before any confirmation they were indeed fraudulent. This can only lead me to believe that the Tribunal member had a predetermined judgement regarding the details to my case.
2. According to the Tribunal’s decision after the hearing, I was notified in writing that many details of my claims were not communicated with clarity and when asked about by the Tribunal member, my responses were vague. Personally I do not agree with this statement as I believe I had addressed all the questions appropriately and sufficiently. I accept the Tribunal member may have been unclear with my responses or may have interpreted my responses differently than what I intended but, I believe, the tribunal member should have pressed on with further questions or requested further detailing if I had not provided a sufficient explanation from their perspective. Instead, I was asked questions regarding different matters and my responses were not addressed further. I understood this as the Tribunal member being satisfied with my response and thus proceeded into other matters. I was not informed I had not provided enough information at the time and I believe it is unfair to deem my responses as too vague after the hearing.
3. I am a real refugee. If I return to China.
I must suffer from significant harm.”
[Errors in the Original.]
Before the Court
At the hearing the applicant appeared in person. He was assisted by an interpreter in the Mandarin language. He explained that the grounds of the application had been drafted by him and translated into English by a student who read the grounds back to him.
When asked to make submissions on each of his grounds, the applicant stated he could not remember what had been written. Each ground was then translated for him by the interpreter. He stated he wished to rely on what was written in the grounds and had nothing further to add.
The applicant then read from a prepared statement which he said he had written in his own language. In essence, this statement contained a series of complaints and grievances about the Tribunal’s decision, as follows.
Consideration: The Applicant’s Submissions
One, that the Tribunal’s “assessment” was unfair and “completely wrong”. (See further below).
Two, the Tribunal asked him at the hearing whether he had any evidence to support his claims. When he tried to provide written submissions the Tribunal refused to take these: “…into consideration or regard it as evidence”.
Despite opportunity to do so, the applicant has not provided any evidence by way of affidavit annexing a transcript of the Tribunal hearing. The only evidence before the Court of what occurred at the hearing is the extensive report contained in the Tribunal’s decision record ([19] – [41] at CB 176 to CB 184).
This relevantly reveals that the applicant did ask for an opportunity to provide further documents or submissions to the Tribunal after the hearing. Contrary to the applicant’s assertion now, the Tribunal gave him further time for this purpose (see [25] at CB 178 – CB 179 and see [38] at CB 182 – CB 183).
The applicant did provide further documents and a statutory declaration, which, given its contents, appears to be the applicant’s submissions about his documents, some matters raised at the hearing, and matters that were before the delegate.
The Tribunal considered these ([39] – [41] at CB 183 to CB 184). The fact that these were not sufficient to satisfy the Tribunal that the applicant met either of the criteria for the grant of the visa does not of itself indicate, let alone reveal, jurisdictional error. The Tribunal’s findings in this regard were reasonably open to it on what was before it, and for which it gave cogent and intelligible reasons.
Three, for the remainder, the applicant explained that the Tribunal’s decision was unfair because what he had told the Tribunal was true, yet the Tribunal did not accept this. At best, the applicant sought impermissible merits review by this submission (see also further below).
Consideration: The Grounds of the Application
As is clear, the applicant’s grounds of his application are in the form of a narrative of a series of complaints about the Tribunal’s reasoning and findings. In his submissions the Minister has sought to give some structure to this narrative, which seeks to discern some recognisable assertions of jurisdictional error.
Ground one, as the Minister submits, possibly, raises a number of issues.
One, it may be that the applicant seeks to assert actual bias on the part of the Tribunal member, or the apprehension of bias. The test for actual bias is that the decision maker did not bring an open mind to the proceedings, and the apprehension of bias being that the well informed lay observer might reasonably apprehended that the decision maker might not have brought an open mind to the proceedings (Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng [2001] HCA 17 (“Jia”), VFAB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 872 and Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H [2001] HCA 28; (2001) 179 ALR 425).
On the evidence before the Court the applicant has not discharged the requirement that a claim of actual bias must be: “…distinctly made and clearly proved” by the person making such an assertion (Jia at [69]).
Further, it is difficult to make out bias simply with reference to the Tribunal’s decision record alone (SCAA v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 668 at [38]). In all I cannot see, on the evidence, how any assertion of bias can be made out.
For the applicant’s benefit I note that simply because the Tribunal did not accept some of his evidence, and did not find favourably for him, does not of itself make the Tribunal’s decision legally “unfair” or reveal bias.
The test for apprehended bias is well established (Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H [2001] HCA 28; (2001) 179 ALR 425 at [27] – [28]):
“27. The test for apprehended bias in relation to curial proceedings is whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question to be decided[7]. That formulation owes much to the fact that court proceedings are held in public. There is some incongruity in formulating a test in terms of "a fair-minded lay observer" when, as is the case with the Tribunal, proceedings are held in private.
28. Perhaps it would be better, in the case of administrative proceedings held in private, to formulate the test for apprehended bias by reference to a hypothetical fair-minded lay person who is properly informed as to the nature of the proceedings, the matters in issue and the conduct which is said to give rise to an apprehension of bias. Whether or not that be the appropriate formulation, there is, in our view, no reason to depart from the objective test of possibility, as distinct from probability, as to what will be done or what might have been done. To do otherwise, would be to risk confusion of apprehended bias with actual bias by requiring substantially the same proof.”
[Footnote Omitted.]
See also ALA15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 30 at [35] and [36] and Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63 at [6] - [8].
I cannot see on the evidence before the Court that the fair minded and well informed lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the Tribunal member might not have brought an open mind to the conduct of the review. As set out elsewhere in this judgment, the applicant was given a fair and meaningful opportunity to provide his evidence and arguments to explain his claims both during the hearing, and after. At the hearing the Tribunal made clear to the applicant the concerns that it had with his evidence. The Tribunal’s findings were explained by reasoning which was probative of the evidence before it.
In all, I agree with the Minister that, in the circumstances presented, the applicant’s complaint is no more than an expression of grievance and disagreement with the Tribunal’s decision.
Two, the ground complains that the applicant was not given a genuine opportunity to present his evidence at the hearing with the Tribunal.
The Tribunal’s relevant obligation is governed by s.425 of the Act, which required the Tribunal to invite the applicant to a hearing to give his evidence and make his arguments in relation to the issues in the review (SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 63; (2006) 231 ALR 592; (2006) 81 ALJR 515 (“SZBEL”)). Such a hearing must be a meaningful opportunity (SZBEL).
The evidence reveals that the Tribunal did invite the applicant to a hearing, which he attended with his representative. He gave his evidence and his arguments with the assistance of an interpreter in the Mandarin language. The applicant raises no complaint now about the interpretation provided at the Tribunal hearing.
As set out above, the applicant has not put a transcript of the Tribunal hearing before the Court. The Tribunal’s extensive account of what occurred reveals that all of the applicant’s claims, and the issues in the review, were discussed, and the applicant was given the opportunity he now says he was denied.
It is also of note that the delegate’s decision, a copy of which the applicant gave to the Tribunal, reveals that he would have been on notice as a result of the delegate’s decision that the credibility of his key claims was at issue.
Ultimately it is for the applicant to provide sufficient material so as to satisfy the Tribunal that the visa must be granted. Further: “…the Tribunal does not need to possess rebutting evidence before holding that a particular factual assertion is not made out” (see CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 146 at [65] (“CQG15”)).
The evidence reveals that the applicant was given a real and meaningful opportunity to do this. This included that he was given the opportunity to provide further documents after the hearing and make submissions. Again the applicant’s complaint, on the evidence, does not rise above an expression of grievance with the Tribunal’s decision and, thereby, seeks impermissible merits review.
Three, although not entirely clear, it appears that the applicant may be seeking to complain that the Tribunal should have conducted some further investigation into his evidence before finding that some of the documents he had provided were not genuine.
If that is the case, then, as the Minister submits, the Tribunal was under no general duty to make any further enquiry (Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI [2009] HCA 39 (“SZIAI”) at [25], Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB [2004] HCA 32; (2004) 207 ALR 12 (“SGLB”) at [43] and Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZGUR [2011] HCA 1 at [20], [74]) (“SZGUR”)). Nor can I see that the circumstances of this case required the Tribunal to make an “obvious inquiry” in the limited circumstances explained by the High Court in SZIAI (at [25]).
As the Tribunal identified, a core aspect of the applicant’s claim to fear harm ([47] at CB 185) was that the applicant and a relative had been threatened and assaulted by, principally, a person called “Ye” who was politically well connected and who had sought to, in effect, extort money from the applicant. The applicant’s relative was injured by Ye and others. The applicant claimed to have paid for medical expenses.
After the Tribunal hearing the applicant provided certain bank documentation, and receipts, in support of his claim as to the payment of monies. (See [40] – [41] at CB 183 – CB 184 and [50] at CB 185 – CB 186). The Tribunal considered the applicant’s own evidence to it in relation to the matter and found that the applicant’s evidence was vague and not credible.
On the evidence, this was reasonably open to the Tribunal on what was before it. The Tribunal provided cogent and intelligible reasons for these findings. No legal error is revealed in this regard.
In its consideration of this matter, the Tribunal also had regard to country information which indicated that fraudulent documents, including bank statements, were easily obtained in China, and were of common usage in visa applications of this type ([36] at CB 181 – CB 182).
Importantly, this information, amongst other information, was “noted” at the hearing with the applicant (see [36] at CB 182.3). No jurisdictional error is revealed in the circumstances. The choice of, and weight, to be attributed to country information is a matter for the Tribunal, of course acting reasonably (NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10, Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd [1986] HCA 40, Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6, SZUFQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 15 at [62], Lee v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 464 at [27] and Aporo v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCAFC 123 at [45]).
In all, ground one does not reveal jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision, even when viewed liberally.
Ground two appears to be a complaint, and an expression of grievance by the applicant, as to the Tribunal’s finding that he had not communicated his claims clearly, and that his responses at the hearing were vague.
The applicant asserts that he accepts that the Tribunal member “may have been unclear with my responses”, but in that case should have “pressed on with further questions”, or sought more detail. That is, the Tribunal should have sought, and given him the opportunity, to clarify his evidence. There are a number of elements to the applicant’s ground.
One, as set out above, the applicant was given a meaningful opportunity to explain himself. He makes no complaint now, or then, about the level of interpretation at the Tribunal hearing. In the circumstances, the evidence reveals that the Tribunal’s findings as to the vague and unclear evidence was explained by the Tribunal with reference to the evidence given by the applicant.
Two, contrary to the applicant’s assertion now, it is not for the Tribunal to provide him with endless opportunities to explain himself in circumstances where a fair and meaningful opportunity had been provided. Ultimately it is for the applicant to provide sufficient detail in his evidence so as to satisfy the Tribunal that either of the criteria for the grant of the visa are made out (Abebe v Commonwealth [1999] HCA 14; (1999) 197 CLR 510).
Three, the ground asserts that, in effect, the Tribunal did not put him on notice of the concerns it had about his evidence (“I was not informed…”).
This complaint is baseless. On the evidence available to the Court, the Tribunal made it plain that it had concerns about his evidence. For example, the Tribunal reports that it: “…noted that the applicant on occasions appeared very vague in responding to Tribunal questions and claimed to have difficulty recalling dates and details” ([31] at CB 180).
The applicant responded that he was taking medication that relatives had sent him from China. He did not see a doctor in Australia for his headaches because he could not speak English. The Tribunal told him: “…there were many Chinese speaking doctors in Australia” ([31] at CB 180). The applicant did not directly respond to this other than to confirm he had not seen a doctor in Australia.
Further, the applicant’s complaint overlooks that the Tribunal gave him the opportunity to make submissions and provide evidence after the hearing. This was at the request of the applicant’s representative ([38] at CB 182) after the Tribunal had: “…also raised concerns that the applicant on occasions was vague in responding to Tribunal questions in relation to his claims” ([37] at CB 182).
Four, the ground appears to take issue with the Tribunal’s findings as to the credibility of his claims. As set out above, the Tribunal concluded that the applicant was not a credible witness in relation to key aspects of his claims. The Tribunal’s conclusion, and the findings that informed it, were all reasonably open to the Tribunal on what was before it. The Tribunal gave cogent and intelligible reasons for each of these findings. There is nothing in the evidence to indicate any legal error in what it has done (CQG15 at [36] – [38]).
In all, ground two is not made out.
Ground three is reflective of, and consequential upon, much of the applicant’s submissions before the Court. It is simply a statement that he is a “real refugee” and would suffer “significant harm” on return to China.
In all the circumstances this is no more than an emphatic disagreement with the Tribunal’s decision. The Tribunal considered all of the applicant’s claims to fear harm. It gave him a meaningful opportunity to explain those claims and give his evidence and arguments. In that regard also, the applicant would have been on notice after the delegate’s decision that the credibility of his claims was at issue. The Tribunal’s findings were all reasonably open to it. The applicant’s disagreement with what the Tribunal has done does not reveal jurisdictional error. It simply seeks impermissible merits review. Ground three is not made out.
The Certificate
In evidence before the Court is a certificate issued by an officer of the Minister’s department on 26 February 2015 and said to have been made pursuant to s.438 of the Act (CB 86).
The certificate seeks to restrict disclosure of documents identified at folios 39 - 43 on the departmental file relating to the applicant. Copies of these documents are in evidence before the Court. They appear to relate to an application for a visitor visa in 2013.
The certificate asserts that the disclosure of this information would be contrary to the public interest, apparently because they were said to be internal working documents.
Before the Court the Minister agreed that the certificate was invalid, as the stated reason for the non-disclosure did not relate to the purposes of s.438 of the Act, which is directed to public interest immunity.
In the current case, however, it appears that the Tribunal understood this, because the evidence reveals that it raised this information with the applicant at the hearing. That is, it properly disregarded the notice which purported to restrict disclosure of the documents on the departmental file.
The Tribunal reports at [35] (CB 181):
“35. The Tribunal referred to a claim by the Department pursuant to a section 438 certificate that was on the Department file in relation to nondisclosure of certain documents. The Tribunal told the applicant in general terms that the nondisclosure related to information associated with his applications for visas. The Tribunal referred to the applicant’s evidence that he had been unaware of the details surrounding the issue of visas to him and the Tribunal indicated that it was prepared to accept the applicant’s claims in relation to the Visa application which had been refused in September 2013. The Tribunal told the applicant that it was not relying on the documents subject to a privilege claim by the Department and did not believe that the documents were relevant to the Tribunal’s assessment of the applicant’s claims. The applicant was invited to comment on the Tribunal’s comments in relation to the certificate and he told the Tribunal that he had nothing to say.”
As is evident, the Tribunal accepted the applicant’s claim that he was unaware of the details surrounding the issuing of the visitor visa to him. There is no reason, given the Tribunal’s analysis in its decision record, not to accept, as it told the applicant, that it was not relying on this information.
In all, the certificate and the contents of the documents to which it was said to relate were disclosed to the applicant, and he was given an opportunity to comment on it. In essence, the Tribunal proceeded on the basis that the certificate and the documents to which it related were not relevant to the disposition of the applicant’s claims to protection.
In the circumstances the applicant did not suffer any practical injustice as a result of the certificate, nor was the certificate or the documents to which it related material to the outcome of the Tribunal’s analysis (Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA; CQZ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection; BEG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] HCA 3; (2019) 363 ALR 599 (“SZMTA”)).
Conclusion
In all, none of the applicant’s grounds reveal jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision. Nor is there any other indication that the Tribunal’s decision is affected by jurisdictional error. It is appropriate to dismiss the application. I will make that order.
I certify that the preceding sixty-eight (68) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Nicholls
Associate:
Date: 24 February 2020
Key Legal Topics
Areas of Law
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Administrative Law
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Immigration
Legal Concepts
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Judicial Review
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Natural Justice
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Procedural Fairness
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Jurisdiction
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