FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Ajok v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 633
Citation: Ajok v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 633 Parties: ELIZABETH AJOK v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP File number: NSD 597 of 2010 Judge: FOSTER J Date of judgment: 21 June 2010 Legislation: Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)
Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth)
Federal Court Rules, O 52 r 15Cases cited: Ajok v Minister for Immigration [2010] FMCA 331 related
Jess v Scott (1986) 12 FCR 187 applied
Parker v The Queen [2002] FCAFC 133 applied
SZMFI v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 386 cited
Vu v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 101 ALD 211 appliedDate of hearing: 17 June 2010 Date of orders: 17 June 2010 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: No Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 21 Solicitor for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person by telephone Solicitor for the Respondent: Ms D Watson of Australian Government Solicitor
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 597 of 2010
BETWEEN: ELIZABETH AJOK
ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
Respondent
JUDGE:
FOSTER J
DATE OF ORDER:
17 JUNE 2010
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT:
1.ORDERS that the Application made by the applicant for an order extending the time within which she might file a Notice of Appeal from the judgment of Smith FM delivered on 5 May 2010 (Ajok v Minister for Immigration [2010] FMCA 331) be dismissed.
2.NOTES that the respondent does not seek an Order for costs.
3.ORDERS that the proceeding be listed for publication of Reasons on Monday 21 June 2010 at 10.15 am.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using Federal Law Search on the Court’s website.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 597 of 2010
BETWEEN: ELIZABETH AJOK
ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
Respondent
JUDGE:
FOSTER J
DATE:
21 JUNE 2010
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
On 17 June 2010, I dismissed the applicant’s Application for an extension of time within which to file and serve a Notice of Appeal from the judgment of Smith FM given on 5 May 2010 (Ajok v Minister for Immigration [2010] FMCA 331). The applicant appeared before me on that day via telephone with the assistance of an interpreter. When I dismissed the applicant’s Application, I indicated to the parties that I would publish reasons for that dismissal. These are those Reasons.
THE DECISION OF THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATE
The case which the applicant sought to present to the Federal Magistrate was and still is far from clear. The causes of action relied upon were and are obscure. The Federal Magistrate did his best to outline the circumstances in which the case was brought and to describe the way in which the case…
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- Case
- [2010] FCA 633
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issue before the court was whether the applicant's Application for an extension of time should be granted. The applicant's case was unclear, and the causes of action relied upon were obscure. The Federal Magistrate outlined the circumstances in which the case was brought and described the way in which the case was put. The applicant's application was filed two days outside the time limited by the Federal Court Rules for the filing of an appeal from a Federal Magistrate.
The court considered the relevant rule of court, which required the applicant to satisfy certain conditions to be granted leave to file a Notice of Appeal. The court noted that a special reason was required to justify an extension of time, and that the expression "special reasons" was intended to distinguish the case from the usual course according to which the time was twenty-one days. The court concluded that the applicant had not provided sufficient grounds to justify a departure from the ordinary rule in the particular circumstances.
The court dismissed the applicant's Application for an order extending the time within which she might file a Notice of Appeal from the judgment of the Federal Magistrate. The respondent did not seek an Order for costs, and the proceeding was listed for publication of Reasons on a specified date.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. ORDERS that the Application made by the applicant for an order extending the time within which she might file a Notice of Appeal from the judgment of Smith FM delivered on 5 May 2010 (Ajok v Minister for Immigration [2010] FMCA 331) be dismissed.
2. NOTES that the respondent does not seek an Order for costs.
3. ORDERS that the proceeding be listed for publication of Reasons on Monday 21 June 2010 at 10.15 am.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
At [25]–[30], the Federal Magistrate dealt with the applicant’s claim in respect of the Commonwealth Bank account and for the return of her children.DECISION AND CONSIDERATION The Application before me was filed on 28 May 2010. It was, therefore, filed two days outside the time limited by the Federal Court Rules for the filing of an appeal from a Federal Magistrate. The relevant part of the Rules of Court is O 52 r 15 which is in the following terms:15 Time for filing and serving notice of appeal(1)The notice of appeal shall be filed and served:(a) within 21 days after:(i)the date when the judgment appealed from was pronounced;(ii)the date when leave to appeal was granted; or(iii)any later date fixed for that purpose by the court appealed from; or(b)within such further time as is allowed by the Court or a Judge upon application made by motion upon notice filed within the period of 21 days referred to in the last preceding paragraph.(2)Notwithstanding anything in the preceding subrule, the Court or a Judge for special reasons may at any time give leave to file and serve a notice of appeal.(3)An application for leave under subrule (2) must:(a)be in accordance with Form 54A; and(b)include a statement indicating whether the applicant wishes to have the application dealt with without an oral hearing; and(c)be accompanied by an affidavit setting out:(i)the nature of the matter; and(ii)the factual and legal issues in dispute; and(iii)the reasons why leave should be given.(4)If a respondent objects to an application being dealt with without an oral hearing, the respondent must:(a)file a notice to this effect; and(b)serve a copy of the notice on each other party to the application. The applicant in the present case must satisfy subrule (2) and subrule (3) of O 52 r 15. The Full Court has held that a special reason within the meaning of O 15 r 15(2) of the Federal Court Rules is a circumstance which takes the case out of the ordinary run of cases in which an appeal should be filed within 21 days (Vu v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 101 ALD 211 at [5] per Jessup J, with whom Gyles and Besanko JJ agreed). In Jess v Scott (1986) 12 FCR 187 at 195, the Full Court said:It is useful to consider the meaning and application of r 15(2) against a background of an understanding of how other courts have applied corresponding rules. But in the end, this Court must construe and apply the terms of its own rule. The question is what that rule means, and how it is to be applied to the circumstances of the case. It is clear that the rule reflects the same general structure exemplified by the various decisions we have discussed -- the provision of a time for lodgment of an appeal, but the provision also of a discretion to permit an appeal out of time where it is shown that the circumstances warrant the exercise of that discretion. As Lord Guest, speaking for the Privy Council, put it in Ratnam v Cumarasamy [1965] 1 WLR 8 at 12: “The rules of court must prima facie be obeyed and in order to justify a court in extending the time during which some step in procedure requires to be taken, there must be some material on which the court can exercise its discretion. If the law were otherwise, a party in breach would have an unqualified right to an extension of time which would defeat the purpose of the rules which is to provide a time table for the conduct of litigation.” What is needed to justify an extension of time is indicated in r 15(2) by the words “for special reasons”. It is that there be shown a special reason why the appeal should be permitted to proceed, though filed after the expiry of twenty-one days. In that context, the expression “special reasons” is intended to distinguish the case from the usual course according to which the time is twenty-one days. But it may be so distinguished (not necessarily will, for the rule gives a discretion) wherever the Court sees a ground which does justify departure from the general rule in the particular case. Such a ground is a special reason because it takes the case out of the ordinary. We do not think the use of the expression “for special reasons” implies something narrower than this. The proposition cannot be accepted that r 15(2) was intended to constrict the broad measure of justice for the individual case which the Court could award upon the principle of Gatti v Shoosmith. No return was contemplated to the old law by which the discretion of the Court to waive the rules was itself fettered by further rules. We agree with the dictum of Davies J cited earlier in these reasons, and we think the construction of the rule we have adopted is in line with the decisions in Ex parte Mehta, the Palata Investments case and Avery’s case. It should not be overlooked that r 15(2) enables leave to be given “at any time”; the “special reasons” relevant to such a power cannot but describe an elastic test, suitable for application across a range of situations, from an oversight of a day to a neglect persisted in during a prolonged period. It would require something very persuasive indeed to justify a grant of leave after, for example, a year; equally, it may be said, something much less significant might justify leave where a party is a few days late. “Special reasons” must be understood in a sense capable of accommodating both types of situation. It is an expression describing a flexible discretionary power, but one requiring a case to be made upon grounds sufficient to justify a departure, in the particular circumstances, from the ordinary rule prescribing a period within which an appeal must be filed and served.