Ajok v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Ajok v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 633

Citation: Ajok v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 633
Parties: ELIZABETH AJOK v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
File number: NSD 597 of 2010
Judge: FOSTER J
Date of judgment: 21 June 2010
Legislation: Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)
Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth)
Federal Court Rules, O 52 r 15   
Cases cited: Ajok v Minister for Immigration [2010] FMCA 331 related
Jess v Scott (1986) 12 FCR 187 applied
Parker v The Queen [2002] FCAFC 133 applied
SZMFI v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 386 cited
Vu v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 101 ALD 211 applied
Date of hearing: 17 June 2010
Date of orders: 17 June 2010
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: No Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 21
Solicitor for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person by telephone
Solicitor for the Respondent: Ms D Watson of Australian Government Solicitor

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 597 of 2010

BETWEEN:

ELIZABETH AJOK
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
Respondent

JUDGE:

FOSTER J

DATE OF ORDER:

17 JUNE 2010

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT:

1.ORDERS that the Application made by the applicant for an order extending the time within which she might file a Notice of Appeal from the judgment of Smith FM delivered on 5 May 2010 (Ajok v Minister for Immigration [2010] FMCA 331) be dismissed.

2.NOTES that the respondent does not seek an Order for costs.

3.ORDERS that the proceeding be listed for publication of Reasons on Monday 21 June 2010 at 10.15 am.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using Federal Law Search on the Court’s website.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 597 of 2010

BETWEEN:

ELIZABETH AJOK
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
Respondent

JUDGE:

FOSTER J

DATE:

21 JUNE 2010

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. On 17 June 2010, I dismissed the applicant’s Application for an extension of time within which to file and serve a Notice of Appeal from the judgment of Smith FM given on 5 May 2010 (Ajok v Minister for Immigration [2010] FMCA 331). The applicant appeared before me on that day via telephone with the assistance of an interpreter. When I dismissed the applicant’s Application, I indicated to the parties that I would publish reasons for that dismissal. These are those Reasons.

    THE DECISION OF THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATE

  2. The case which the applicant sought to present to the Federal Magistrate was and still is far from clear.  The causes of action relied upon were and are obscure.  The Federal Magistrate did his best to outline the circumstances in which the case was brought and to describe the way in which the case…

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Details
Case
[2010] FCA 633
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Ajok v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship involved an applicant who sought an extension of time to file a Notice of Appeal from a Federal Magistrate's judgment. The applicant appeared before the court via telephone with the assistance of an interpreter. The Federal Magistrate dismissed the application and indicated that reasons would be published for that dismissal.

The legal issue before the court was whether the applicant's Application for an extension of time should be granted. The applicant's case was unclear, and the causes of action relied upon were obscure. The Federal Magistrate outlined the circumstances in which the case was brought and described the way in which the case was put. The applicant's application was filed two days outside the time limited by the Federal Court Rules for the filing of an appeal from a Federal Magistrate.

The court considered the relevant rule of court, which required the applicant to satisfy certain conditions to be granted leave to file a Notice of Appeal. The court noted that a special reason was required to justify an extension of time, and that the expression "special reasons" was intended to distinguish the case from the usual course according to which the time was twenty-one days. The court concluded that the applicant had not provided sufficient grounds to justify a departure from the ordinary rule in the particular circumstances.

The court dismissed the applicant's Application for an order extending the time within which she might file a Notice of Appeal from the judgment of the Federal Magistrate. The respondent did not seek an Order for costs, and the proceeding was listed for publication of Reasons on a specified date.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. ORDERS that the Application made by the applicant for an order extending the time within which she might file a Notice of Appeal from the judgment of Smith FM delivered on 5 May 2010 (Ajok v Minister for Immigration [2010] FMCA 331) be dismissed.

2. NOTES that the respondent does not seek an Order for costs.

3. ORDERS that the proceeding be listed for publication of Reasons on Monday 21 June 2010 at 10.15 am.

Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 17 June 2010, I dismissed the applicant’s Application for an extension of time within which to file and serve a Notice of Appeal from the judgment of Smith FM given on 5 May 2010 (Ajok v Minister for Immigration [2010] FMCA 331). The applicant appeared before me on that day via telephone with the assistance of an interpreter. When I dismissed the applicant’s Application, I indicated to the parties that I would publish reasons for that dismissal. These are those Reasons. THE DECISION OF THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATE The case which the applicant sought to present to the Federal Magistrate was and still is far from clear. The causes of action relied upon were and are obscure. The Federal Magistrate did his best to outline the circumstances in which the case was brought and to describe the way in which the case was put. At [1]–[12] of his Reasons for Judgment, the Federal Magistrate said:1.This application was filed on 12 February 2010. In it Ms Ajok seeks relief in relation to actions of the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship and officers of his Department. Although Ms Ajok has concerns about the actions of other people, she has not made them respondents to the present court case. 2.Her central concerns relate to the documents which facilitated her travel to Australia in 2002. She was, in July 2002, given approval to travel and enter Australia with her four children on a humanitarian visa issued in response to an application made while she was in the Kakuma Refugee Camp in Africa. Her application was processed by the Australian High Commission in Nairobi. Following a favourable visa decision, the High Commission issued a single document entitled “Document for travel to Australia”, which covered Ms Ajok and her four children. They were identified on the document with their personal details and photographs. It was stamped at its bottom with the visa allowing entry to Australia of all five people. The document stated: “this document is good for single travel to Australia only”. 3.Ms Ajok was also given a single page document issued by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. This also attached the personal details and photographs of Ms Ajok and her four children. It certified that they were registered as refugees. It referred to their travel for resettlement to Australia, and requested that assistance be given “in accordance with travel authorisation issued by the District Officer Kakuma”. That document also stated on its face that it had limited validity from 27 August to 7 September 2002. 4.Copies of these two travel documents are currently found on a file in the possession of the Department of Immigration, but searches for the originals have not revealed their presence in any of the records of the Department. The file shows that Ms Ajok and her four children did travel to Australia by air, and arrived in September 2002 in Sydney on a flight via Johannesburg. On the day after their arrival, they were flown to Wagga Wagga. Reference is made in the documents to their travel being assisted by an agency known as the “International Organisation for Migration (IOM)”, which is not an agency of any Australian government, but appears to be an international organisation engaged in assisting the travel of refugees. 5.Ms Ajok tells me that on arrival in Sydney, the originals of her travel documents were taken into their possession by one of the people who met her family, and that these people included at least one officer from the Department of Immigration, one officer from the IOM, and also other people in community organisations which were involved in assisting the family’s resettlement in Wagga Wagga. Her present efforts, of which this application is one example, are directed at discovering and recovering the original travel documents. 6.Unfortunately, it seems that resettlement of the family has not been an easy process. Their history since 2002 is only glimpsed in the documents before me, but these suggest that difficulties were encountered by Ms Ajok in Wagga Wagga, and then in Brisbane, and then in Sydney where she now lives. This has led to the intervention of child care agencies and other people, in circumstances which are not shown in the evidence. 7.Ms Ajok is now firmly convinced that the originals of the family’s travel documents are still in existence and are being misused. She thinks that they were misused by people who have been responsible for her losing care of her children, and that they are also being used fraudulently by other people in relation to immigration matters. 8.I accept that she has a firm belief about these matters, although she has not presented any evidence to give them substance. As I shall explain, it is not the task of the Court in the present proceedings to investigate the loss of the documents for itself. Her belief does, however, explain her efforts over very many years shown in the documents before me, to track down the originals of her travel documents. 9.Before filing her present application, Ms Ajok raised her broad concerns in proceedings commenced in the District Court of New South Wales. It was to that Court that she appears first to have presented a letter she wrote dated 22 July 2009, addressed “To the Federal Court of Australia”. It appears to raise concerns about the actions of two people who had been involved in her life in 2004 and 2007, and are unrelated to the Minister for Immigration and his Department. Her concerns were addressed by Gibson DCJ in a judgment published as Ajok v Mares [2010] NSWDC 62. Her letter is extracted in that judgment, and I shall not repeat its contents. Her Honour was not able to find a cause of action which could continue in that court. 10.Ms Ajok’s present application was supported by the same letter, however, it identifies the Minister of Immigration and his Department as its respondents. Ms Ajok used the form of application in relation to this Court’s general federal law jurisdictions, and completed it as follows: Final orders sought by applicant/s (state precisely each order sought by way of final relief) 1.I need Immigration and IOM to return my children special documents passport and visas of the United Nation Geneva. 2.I need my children to be return in my care from DOCS. 3.I need Court to investigate privacy policy between DIAC, DOCS, Doctor Sarah Meras regarding the Reference No xxxxxxxxx xx in Commonwealth Bank. Grounds of application (state briefly the grounds of the application) 1.My documents and my children’s documents were taken by Immigration and IOM Agency at the Sydney International Customs clearance section at the airport and not return me. After clearance. Passport (Green, blue, red) passport & visa. 2.Due to the above problems my children and I are suffering in Australia community. Interlocutory, interim or procedural orders sought by applicant/s (complete only if interlocutory, interim or procedural orders are sought) 1.I needs children’s to return to me in my carer their mother. 2.I need all my children’s documents and my documents to be return to me for my children’s and the family. 3.I needs my children’s and family power to be return to me in my responsibility both financially and wealth of my children and my family at large. 11.In support of the application, Ms Ajok has presented numerous documents concerning her efforts to have her travel documents traced and her other concerns. These include correspondence relating to her applications to the Department of Immigration under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth). The Court has also been assisted by the solicitor for the Minister, by being presented with additional correspondence concerning Ms Ajok’s freedom of information requests. 12.The correspondence shows that requests for access to her files overseas and in Australia were first made in 2003, and that Ms Ajok was given access at that time to almost the whole of a file received from Nairobi. One page referring to the personal details of other people was withheld in part. Ms Ajok made further requests in 2005, and in 2008 she made a request for the amendment of her records.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

At [25]–[30], the Federal Magistrate dealt with the applicant’s claim in respect of the Commonwealth Bank account and for the return of her children.DECISION AND CONSIDERATION The Application before me was filed on 28 May 2010. It was, therefore, filed two days outside the time limited by the Federal Court Rules for the filing of an appeal from a Federal Magistrate. The relevant part of the Rules of Court is O 52 r 15 which is in the following terms:15 Time for filing and serving notice of appeal(1)The notice of appeal shall be filed and served:(a) within 21 days after:(i)the date when the judgment appealed from was pronounced;(ii)the date when leave to appeal was granted; or(iii)any later date fixed for that purpose by the court appealed from; or(b)within such further time as is allowed by the Court or a Judge upon application made by motion upon notice filed within the period of 21 days referred to in the last preceding paragraph.(2)Notwithstanding anything in the preceding subrule, the Court or a Judge for special reasons may at any time give leave to file and serve a notice of appeal.(3)An application for leave under subrule (2) must:(a)be in accordance with Form 54A; and(b)include a statement indicating whether the applicant wishes to have the application dealt with without an oral hearing; and(c)be accompanied by an affidavit setting out:(i)the nature of the matter; and(ii)the factual and legal issues in dispute; and(iii)the reasons why leave should be given.(4)If a respondent objects to an application being dealt with without an oral hearing, the respondent must:(a)file a notice to this effect; and(b)serve a copy of the notice on each other party to the application. The applicant in the present case must satisfy subrule (2) and subrule (3) of O 52 r 15. The Full Court has held that a special reason within the meaning of O 15 r 15(2) of the Federal Court Rules is a circumstance which takes the case out of the ordinary run of cases in which an appeal should be filed within 21 days (Vu v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 101 ALD 211 at [5] per Jessup J, with whom Gyles and Besanko JJ agreed). In Jess v Scott (1986) 12 FCR 187 at 195, the Full Court said:It is useful to consider the meaning and application of r 15(2) against a background of an understanding of how other courts have applied corresponding rules. But in the end, this Court must construe and apply the terms of its own rule. The question is what that rule means, and how it is to be applied to the circumstances of the case. It is clear that the rule reflects the same general structure exemplified by the various decisions we have discussed -- the provision of a time for lodgment of an appeal, but the provision also of a discretion to permit an appeal out of time where it is shown that the circumstances warrant the exercise of that discretion. As Lord Guest, speaking for the Privy Council, put it in Ratnam v Cumarasamy [1965] 1 WLR 8 at 12: “The rules of court must prima facie be obeyed and in order to justify a court in extending the time during which some step in procedure requires to be taken, there must be some material on which the court can exercise its discretion. If the law were otherwise, a party in breach would have an unqualified right to an extension of time which would defeat the purpose of the rules which is to provide a time table for the conduct of litigation.” What is needed to justify an extension of time is indicated in r 15(2) by the words “for special reasons”. It is that there be shown a special reason why the appeal should be permitted to proceed, though filed after the expiry of twenty-one days. In that context, the expression “special reasons” is intended to distinguish the case from the usual course according to which the time is twenty-one days. But it may be so distinguished (not necessarily will, for the rule gives a discretion) wherever the Court sees a ground which does justify departure from the general rule in the particular case. Such a ground is a special reason because it takes the case out of the ordinary. We do not think the use of the expression “for special reasons” implies something narrower than this. The proposition cannot be accepted that r 15(2) was intended to constrict the broad measure of justice for the individual case which the Court could award upon the principle of Gatti v Shoosmith. No return was contemplated to the old law by which the discretion of the Court to waive the rules was itself fettered by further rules. We agree with the dictum of Davies J cited earlier in these reasons, and we think the construction of the rule we have adopted is in line with the decisions in Ex parte Mehta, the Palata Investments case and Avery’s case. It should not be overlooked that r 15(2) enables leave to be given “at any time”; the “special reasons” relevant to such a power cannot but describe an elastic test, suitable for application across a range of situations, from an oversight of a day to a neglect persisted in during a prolonged period. It would require something very persuasive indeed to justify a grant of leave after, for example, a year; equally, it may be said, something much less significant might justify leave where a party is a few days late. “Special reasons” must be understood in a sense capable of accommodating both types of situation. It is an expression describing a flexible discretionary power, but one requiring a case to be made upon grounds sufficient to justify a departure, in the particular circumstances, from the ordinary rule prescribing a period within which an appeal must be filed and served.