FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AIX20 v Director-General of Security (No 2) [2024] FCA 1130
File number(s): VID 711 of 2022 Judgment of: DOWLING J Date of judgment: 26 September 2024 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – public interest immunity claim – restricted counsel procedure – national security information – public interest in national security – public interest in administration of justice – whether Court has power to implement restricted counsel procedure – whether Court should exercise its discretion to implement restricted counsel procedure – application for restricted counsel procedure dismissed – public interest immunity claim upheld Legislation: Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) ss 39A, 39B
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth)
Cases cited: A & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56; [2005] 2 AC 68
Al Rawi v Security Service [2012] 1 AC 531
Alister v The Queen (1984) 154 CLR 404
Assistant Commissioner Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd [2013] HCA 7; 252 CLR 38
Church of Scientology v Woodward (1980) 154 CLR 25
Commissioner of Police v Attorney-General for New South Wales [2022] NSWSC 595
HT v The Queen [2019] HCA 40; 269 CLR 403
Leghaei v Director-General of Security [2007] FCAFC 37; 241 ALR 141
New South Wales v Public Transport Ticketing Corporation (No 3) [2011] NSWCA 200; 81 NSWLR 394
R v Collaery (No 11) [2022] ACTSC 40; 364 FLR 418
Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1
SDCV v Director-General of Security [2022] HCA 32; 277 CLR 241
Thomson Australian Holdings Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1981) 148 CLR 150
Division: General Division Registry: Victoria National Practice Area: Other Federal Jurisdiction Number of paragraphs: 64 Date of hearing: 2 August 2024 Counsel for the Applicant Mr E Nekvapil SC and Ms E Brumby Solicitor for the Applicant Victoria Legal Aid Counsel for the First Respondent Mr P Herzfeld SC and Ms C Ernst Solicitor for the First Respondent Australian Government Solicitor Counsel for the Second Respondent The Second Respondent did not appear ORDERS
VID 711 of 2022 BETWEEN: AIX20
Applicant
AND: DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF SECURITY
First Respondent
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
DOWLING J
DATE OF ORDER:
26 SEPTEMBER 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The applicant’s application for production of certain discovered documents under a restricted counsel procedure is dismissed.
2.The first respondent’s public interest immunity claims are upheld.
3.Costs are reserved.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
DOWLING J
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
This application concerns a claim for public interest immunity made by the first respondent, the Director-General of Security, over certain discovered documents. The Director-General claims public interest immunity on the basis that the disclosure of the documents would prejudice the public interest in national security. The application also concerns the applicant’s proposal that those documents be disclosed only to named security cleared counsel, subject to an…
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- Case
- [2024] FCA 1130
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues at hand were primarily centred on the balance between the public interest in national security and the public interest in the administration of justice. The Court had to weigh the potential harm caused by the disclosure of the documents against the importance of the documents for the applicant in the substantive proceeding. The Court also had to consider the adequacy of the restricted counsel procedure as a safeguard against the risks of inadvertent disclosure and the potential for a 'mosaic analysis' to reveal otherwise protected information.
In reaching its decision, the Court found that the restricted counsel procedure would not adequately protect against the risks of inadvertent disclosure. The Court determined that the procedure did not sufficiently mitigate the potential for the documents and their contents to become known to persons other than those permitted to attend closed court. The Court also noted that the use of a restricted counsel procedure could increase the risk of 'hostile actors' targeting those procedures. Ultimately, the Court refused to exercise its discretion to order the disclosure of the documents under the restricted counsel procedure.
The Court's orders were as follows: the applicant's application for production of certain discovered documents under a restricted counsel procedure was dismissed; the Director-General of Security's public interest immunity claims were upheld; and costs were reserved. The Court's decision highlights the importance of balancing the public interest in national security with the public interest in the administration of justice, and the need for adequate safeguards to prevent the inadvertent disclosure of sensitive information.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The applicant’s application for production of certain discovered documents under a restricted counsel procedure is dismissed.
2. The first respondent’s public interest immunity claims are upheld.
3. Costs are reserved.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
As to the third the Director-General submits that the evidence of the Deputy Director-General demonstrates that there is a compelling public interest against disclosure of the documents. The restricted counsel procedure does not adequately protect against the risks of the documents and their contents becoming known to persons other than those permitted to attend closed court. There is a risk of inadvertent disclosure in the course of taking instructions from the applicant. Highly sensitive material will be canvassed in court proceedings when otherwise it would not be. Ongoing access to the documents increases the risk of inadvertent disclosure, including by a ‘mosaic analysis’ (namely, combining different, sometimes seemingly innocuous sources of information to create a mosaic, or picture, of otherwise protected information). Further, public knowledge about the use of a restricted counsel procedure increases the risk that ‘hostile actors’ could target those procedures.QUESTIONS FOR DETERMINATION AND CONSIDERATION As I set out above, I was provided with access to copies of all those documents over which partial and full public interest immunity was claimed. I have reviewed each of those documents. In assessing the claims I have weighed the competing aspects of public interest; the public interest harmed by the production of the documents against the public interest in the impairment of the administration of justice if the information is withheld. I have endeavoured to balance the injury which the nation would likely suffer with the evidentiary value and importance of the documents for the applicant in the substantive proceeding. However, as discussed below, in assessing the evidentiary value and importance of the documents I note: first, that the opposition to the claim for public interest immunity was not brought by reference to particular documents, so my assessment of the evidentiary value is necessarily broad; second, the security cleared counsel procedure has the potential to undermine the value of the documents where there are limits on the use to which the documents may be put. I accept that a tailored procedure, as proposed by the applicant is a matter that may be taken into account in the balancing exercise. I accept that the public interest in the national security will seldom yield to the public interest in the administration of civil justice: Church of Scientology at 76. I also accept that the Deputy Director-General has given genuine consideration to the question of disclosure of the documents. Such genuine consideration, in the absence of countervailing evidence, may result in the balance being struck on the side of non-disclosure: Leghaei at [65]. I consider that the relevant questions for determination are:(a)Does the Court have power to implement the restricted counsel procedure?(b)Should the Court exercise its discretion to implement the restricted counsel procedure?(c)Would the restricted counsel procedure be an adequate safeguard?For the reasons set out below I answer the second and third questions by refusing to exercise my discretion to order disclosure of the documents under the restricted counsel procedure (whether the Court has the power to do so or not). In those circumstances it is not necessary for me to determine the question of the Court’s power.The restricted counsel procedure would not be an adequate safeguard