AITKEN & GLADSTONE

[2020] FCCA 966

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AITKEN & GLADSTONE [2020] FCCA 966

Catchwords:
FAMILY LAW – Interim hearing – long term dispute in respect of six year old child – two previous trials in this jurisdiction – three year involvement in State Court proceedings – parties and Department now bow to jurisdiction of this Court – family violence – necessity for and availability of supervision of father’s time with child.

Legislation:

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), ss.60CA, 60CC

Cases cited:

Re Andrew (1996) FLC 92-692

Goode & Goode [2006] FamCA 1346

Applicant: MR AITKEN

Respondent: MS GLADSTONE

File Number: MLC 9995 of 2013

Judgment of: Judge McGuire

Hearing date: 16 April 2020

Date of Last Submission: 16 April 2020

Delivered at: Launceston

Delivered on: 8 May 2020

REPRESENTATION

Applicant appeared in person:

Counsel for the Respondent: Ms McGregor

Solicitors for the Respondent:	Fiona McGregor Family Lawyer Pty Ltd
Counsel for the Department Health & Human Services:	Mr Foo as Amicus Curiae

ORDERS UNTIL FURTHER ORDER

(1)That until further Order the mother have sole parental responsibility for all medical decisions for the child X born in 2013 (“X”) provided that:

(a)She prudently keep the father advised of all attendances by X on medical practitioners and any recommended therapies or medications for X; and

(b)That in any event within forty-eight (48) hours of the date of these Orders the mother give the father notice by email of any medical practitioners currently seen by X or providing ongoing treatment or therapy for X.

(2)That X live with the mother.

(3)That X spend time with the father as follows:

(a)In Town A on each second weekend on the Saturday between 9.00a.m. and 5.00 p.m. and on the Sunday between 9.00 a.m. and 1.00 p.m. to commence Saturday 16 May 2020 or otherwise on the first Saturday after the discharge of any relevant State Court Orders in respect of X;

(b)Such other times or variations of the above as may be agreed between the parties from time to time in writing; and

(c)That within forty-eight (48) hours of the mother complying with Order 1(b) hereof, the father make appointments, as soon as such are available, to see each such medical practitioner and then strictly comply with the recommendations of each as to any practices to undertake or not to be undertaken by the father with X during the father’s time-with X and that the father at all times conduct any meetings with X’s medical practitioners or therapists in a respectful and civil manner noting, however, that Order 3(a) is not conditional upon its commencement on this Order.

(4)That for the purposes of X spending time with the father, the father is to collect X from and return X to a point in Town A nominated by the mother to the father by email within forty-eight (48) hours of these Orders and that the mother have leave to use an agent for the changeovers provided that person be a responsible adult and that the mother insist on that person not engaging with the father other than for reasons strictly necessary for the changeovers.

(5)That each of the parents by themselves and/or their servants or agents be and is hereby restrained from denigrating the other parent to or in the presence or hearing of X.

FURTHER COURT ORDERS

(6)That pursuant to Section 68L(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 the child, X born in 2013 be independently represented AND IT IS REQUESTED that Victoria Legal Aid arrange such independent representation but that each party have leave to make submissions that such appointment not be made.

(7)That forthwith upon appointment by Victoria Legal Aid or otherwise the Independent Children’s Lawyer (“the ICL”) file a Notice of Address for Service.

(8)That within 48 hours of notification of such appointment the parties or their solicitors must provide to the independent children’s lawyer copies of all relevant documents relied upon.

(9)That upon their appointment, and after filing of an Notice of Address for Service, the Independent Children’s Lawyer (ICL) may INSPECT and COPY all documents previously produced to the court in response to a subpoena issued in the proceedings and released to the parties. The ICL may provide a copy of any such material to any expert, person or agency who is preparing a report or treating the parties or children, for the purposes of assisting them to do so, whether by court order or the agreement of the parties EXCEPT for material produced under subpoena to the Department of Health and Human Services.

(10)That the matter is listed on Wednesday 3 June 2020 at 9.30 a.m. by telephone hook-up, unless otherwise advised, for consideration of a Family Report and allocation of a trial date on a date to be advised after the appointment of the Independent Children’s Lawyer and any considerations pursuant to s.102NA of the Family Law Act 1975.

NOTATION:

(A)That the Court asks for the appointment of an Independent Children’s Lawyer to be expedited and that this is a matter where there are long-standing State Court Intervention Orders between the parties and ongoing and unresolved allegations of family violence together with one of the parties being self-represented.

(B)That it is noted that these Orders will become operable only by reason of the discharge or expiration of any current State Court Orders in respect of the child X.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Aitken & Gladstone is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT LAUNCESTON

MLC 9995 of 2013

MR AITKEN

Applicant

And

MS GLADSTONE

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Applications

1.These are interim parenting proceedings in respect of the parties’ one child, X born in 2013 (aged six years) but in circumstances where such orders would become operable only upon the discharge of current State Court orders.

2.The applicant is the father. He seeks orders in the interim whereby X spend time with him as follows:

a)each second weekend on a 4 weekly (or monthy?) cycle on the Saturday between 9.00 a.m. and 5.00 p.m and on the Sunday between 9.00 a.m. and 1.00 p.m. such to take place at Town A; and

b)on either of the second or fourth weekends in the cycle in Melbourne on the Saturday from 9.00 a.m. until 4.00 p.m. and on the Sunday from 9.00 a.m. until 1.00 p.m.

3.The father asks for an order for equal shared parental responsibility consistent with previous final orders.

4.Mr Aitken asks for various other orders including in respect of changeovers; the non-denigration orders; and particular orders as to the parents keeping each other advised as to medical matters for X.

5.The mother argues for an order in the interim for sole parental responsibility of X in respect of medical matters.  She asks for time for X with the father to be professionally supervised at the father's expense and to take place in Town A each week on each of the Friday, Saturday and Sunday for two hours on each of those days.

6.The Department of Health and Human Services, Victoria participated in this hearing as Amicus Curie after a lengthy involvement by the Department as applicant in State Court child protection proceedings.  Indeed, the Department either instigated or agreed to the interim parenting application being heard in this Court whilst State Court orders remain on foot in respect of X.  In this sense, I take it that the Department and each of the primary parties bow to the jurisdiction of this Court in that it is anticipated that the State Court orders will be discharged by consent upon me making parenting orders in this jurisdiction.

7.The Department effectively supports the mother's position in that it advocates continuing supervised time for X with the father in the interim as is the current situation from the State Court orders. The basis and force of the Department submissions are that they also support the mother being the sole arbiter in respect of medical matters for X.

8.The nature of the orders sought by each of the parties and the Department implies that X shall remain living primarily with the mother in the interim.

9.The mother was represented in the application before me as was the Department by Mr Foo of Counsel.  The father represents himself and has apparently done so for much of the State Court proceedings. Mr Aitken is, however, a professional. Although by reason of current circumstances this hearing took place by global telephone link, my impression was that Mr Aitken had a good understanding of the relevant legal principles. He made his submissions in a proper and particularised form and was at all times courteous to the Court and Counsel.

Relevant Background

10.The Court file shows that X has been the subject of proceedings in this Court from an application filed as long ago as the 18 November 2013 when I calculate that X was just three months old. It seems that the parties separated only a week or so after X's birth or perhaps even before his birth?

11.The father is 47 years of age. He is a professional. He resides in inner suburban Melbourne. He has re-partnered and he and his partner are soon to enjoy the birth of their child.

12.The mother is 34 years to old. She has previously worked in administrative fields. She has also re-partnered. She lives in Town A in Region B, Victoria, which I understand to be roughly a five hour drive from Melbourne.

13.On 4 April 2014, and after a two day defended trial, I made orders in respect of X inter-alia that the parties have equal shared parental responsibility for X; that X live with the mother and that she be permitted to relocate his principal place of residence to Town A; and that X spend time with the father on a four week cycle involving two consecutive weekends in Melbourne on each of the Saturday and Sunday and short periods on the Mondays, Wednesdays and Thursdays between those weekends together with one weekend in the four week cycle to take place in Town A on each of the Saturday and Sunday. Notably, X was only about six months old when these proceedings were completed. It is my recollection that it was the mother’s application that she be permitted to relocate the infant X from Melbourne to Town A and that she offered time for X with the father in terms as above or similar and where the father opposed the relocation of X.

14.Our as soon as May 2015, the father commenced further proceedings in this Court seeking detailed orders for X's time with him upon X reaching milestones of three and four years of age. Mr Aitken then sought orders in the alternative that X live with him in Melbourne.

15.In respect of that application, a family report dated 30 May 2016 was authored by Ms C, Family Consultant.  That document has been referenced in the submissions in the current interim application. Ms C did not recommend an order for the mother and X to move back to suburban Melbourne in accordance with the father's application.

16.On 14 November 2016 her Honour Judge Baker made orders following a second trial between these parents and again over two days duration.  Her Honour, inter-alia, confirmed the order for equal shared parental responsibility and that X live with the mother.  Her Honour also made orders for X to continue to spend time with the father in both Melbourne and in Town A but graduated in its detail up until the commencement of school term one in 2019 and including block periods of time in school holidays.

17.The mother then brought to yet another substantive application some 11 months later in October 2017. She asked that previous parenting orders be discharged and specifically, on both an interim and final basis, that X's time with the father ‘be as agreed and subject to the advice of the child's treating neuro – psychologist’.  The rationale of the mother's application appears to have been X's diagnosis with a benign brain tumour but, more specifically, her assertion that the father had failed to cooperate in the necessary and urgent medical procedures and recommended therapies following those surgeries.

18.Whilst there may have been applications around that time to the State Court, the father filed a response in this Court on 14 November 2017 seeking final orders inter-alia that X ‘be relocated within 50 km of the city of Melbourne.’  He sought an interim order that X reside within ‘20 km of the D Hospital’ and that ‘the father be permitted time alone with X for a period of 3 on each of the following days: Monday, Wednesday, Thursday (including such time as for X's therapy), and either of Saturday or Sunday at the father's discretion.’

19.That application remains alive and both parties are asking me to allocate a final hearing date.

20.Material from the Department of Health and Human Services discloses that the Department has been frequently involved with this family from January 2016. Specifically in July, September and October 2017 the Department became involved due to ongoing conflict between the parents at a time that X had been hospitalised for surgery to remove the brain tumour. It was reported that the father was not adhering to doctor's directions and that his behaviour at the hospital was inappropriate in being argumentative, aggressive and allegedly not viewing X's health needs as seriously as did the medical practitioners. On 14 December 2017 child protection issued a Protection Application and obtained an Interim Accommodation Order including that X's contact with his father be supervised. That supervision condition has remained on foot to this date.  These orders served to remove the jurisdiction of this Court.

21.Various mentions and hearing dates were obtained in the State Courts and the matter was listed for hearing on 6-8 May 2019. The matter was settled by consent with a Family Preservation Order.  During the period of the intervention by Child Protection there have been numerous collateral applications for family violence/intervention orders by each of the parties and including in respect of third-party family members.

22.On 21 September 2017 Victoria Police made an application on behalf of the mother and X as asserted protected persons with Mr Aitken as the respondent. The application was contested. A five year limited order was made by the learned Magistrate. Mr Aitken appealed to the County Court and on 18 December 2018 the learned Judge left in place the IVO for a duration of five years with the conditions made by the Magistrate.

23.In March 2020 X was to undergo surgery for an eye condition resulting from his previous surgery. That subsequent surgery had not been possible due to X's course of chemotherapy. The mother was advised that a date was available in March. It eventuated that the father's consent was either not given or delayed. The parties are in dispute as to the sequence of events here and their communications or lack thereof. It eventuated that the appointment for the surgery was cancelled due to an apparent lack of consensus between the parents.

24.Dr E, clinical and forensic psychologist, has had a frequent involvement with these parties since 2014 when he provided a single expert family report for the first proceedings.  Subsequently, Dr E has been engaged by the Department of Health and Human Services to provide reports dated 6 February and 28 April 2019 for the State Court proceedings and which come before the Court as exhibits to his affidavit of 25 February 2020 filed on behalf of the mother.

25.In his report of the 2014 Dr E opined as to the mother as follows:

(a)    As well functioning in the evaluation;

(b)There was a history of some depressive difficulties, however, the mother presented as well functioning, with high levels of sensitivity and empathy although with a sensitivity to be over accommodating in relationships in particular;

(c)The mother's ability to care for the child was high and presented with sound parenting skills, close attachment with the child and a sound intuitive of the child's development and in addition, appeared to have parental support;

(d)The mother presented as most likely to support the relationship with the father although responds negatively to the father's attempt to control the parenting circumstances;

(e)The mother's concerns regarding the father's care presented as genuine rather than feigned;

(f)Despite the mother's proposal regarding relocation, she presented as ambivalent concerning that factor at the time, possibly due to having relocated from her home town to Melbourne 10 years before, related to isolation and a need for stimulation;

(g)It was possible that the mother's proposal for relocation related to a psychological reaction to the end of the relationship and the confusion associated with the separation rather than a well-established desire to alter her life in that direction at the time.

26.In respect of the father and at page 7 Dr E opined in 2014:

(a)The father tended to hold positions regarding the world that do not necessarily accommodate the views of others;

(b)The father presented as a person who believes that he is right even when there is evidence otherwise;

(c)Personality evaluation identified a vulnerability to narcissistic personality functioning with a need for external approval and interpersonal control;

(d)the separation was challenging for the father and has made it difficult for him to adapt in the circumstances;

(e)The father's knowledge regarding the child X was low at the time;

(f)The father's parental skills were relatively low and his intuitive understanding of caring for children also appeared to be low;

(g)The father had little insight into those factors related to his parental skills and knowledge and assumed his attachment and parental skills were sound. Those views were incorrect and unrealistic at the time;

(h)It was predicted that the father's tendency would be to attempt to control the mother's life.  It was considered over time that he may establish a more workable relationship with the mother, however, that was dependent upon whether or not he could become less egocentric in the negotiation;

(i)The father's intentions regarding the child was sound although he presented with a rather rigid set of views about the child in the future, factors which may hamper cooperation between himself and the mother.

The Father's Case

27.The father relies on his affidavit affirmed 14 April 2020. He says that his relationship with X has been compromised since 2017 and that this has had a negative impact generally on X. He says that he wants to rebuild the relationship on a graduated basis and wishes to be involved with X's therapy in respect of his medical needs.

28.Mr Aitken says that he has enjoyed time with X for only approximately 70 hours in near the last year. Mr Aitken says that he and his partner are soon to enjoy the birth of a child into their home and that there is benefit to X in establishing a relationship with that child.

29.Mr Aitken says that the mother is non-communicative and non-cooperative in involving the father in the parenting of X. Whilst acknowledging X's diagnosis, surgery and ongoing difficulties with mobility and speech, Mr Aitken agrees with the mother’s affidavit that X is progressing well academically, physically and socially.

30.Mr Aitken says that the time he is seeking with X in Melbourne is limited at this interim stage but has collateral advantages for X in that he is familiar with the father's home and would have the opportunity to maintain his relationships with his extended paternal family.

31.Mr Aitken says that he is seeking day time only with X at this stage and, as such, this conservative application is indicative of his understanding of X's needs and his preparedness to place X's needs over his own.

32.Specifically Mr Aitken says that he will and can comply strictly with all recommendations of X's medical practitioners and therapists.

33.The tenor of Mr Aitken's affidavit material and his submissions is that the mother has an agenda to thwart his relationship with X. He cites the above-mentioned difficulties with surgery in March 2020 and where the mother seems to emphasise much of her argument that Mr Aitken’s time with X remain supervised.  Specifically he references the mother's affidavit sworn 30 March 2020 where she says at [5] and following:

X has recovered well from his surgery. He has recovered well too from the chemotherapy he underwent after the tumour re-grew. He has, however, been left with some residual disabilities and difficulties which require ongoing treatment and assistance. One of those things is that as a consequence of the surgery to the tumour at the base of X's brain, he suffered some difficulty to his cranial nerves. That has affected his ability to control his eyes and in particular, his eye movements. X's eyes roll around constantly. He struggles to control his eye movement. As a consequence of the ongoing movement of X's eyes, one eye has, we are informed, stopped working altogether. It does basically nothing while X's other eye has taken over.

The recommendation was that X undergo surgery. We were placed on a waiting list because it was not considered to be urgent, although any surgery which affects X's eyesight is something which is fairly important.

I then received a call on Wednesday 18 March 2020. I was told that a cancellation had occurred in the surgeon's list and that if we wish to, we could take advantage of that opportunity.

I indicated that I was prepared to bring X to Melbourne for that to occur. I was telephone (sic) again on Monday, 23 March.  I was told to pack up and be ready to take X for Melbourne for surgery the following morning, 24 March. I was told that it would be day surgery only and we would be able to return to Town A either that day if X was well enough, or the following day.

It was likely to be gruelling for both of us in terms of the travel but it was worthwhile persevering with so that X had the requisite treatment.

I had the car packed and I was about to leave when I received a call from the hospital to inform me that the surgery would not go ahead. The reason the surgery would not go ahead is I was informed that it had been stopped by Mr Aitken who had withdrawn his consent and that he did not agree. On that basis, and while the hospital gave consideration to applying to the Office of the Public Advocate to overrule Mr Aitken’s lack of consent, including I believe seeking a guardianship order or something of that nature, it didn't happen in time and the surgery was cancelled.

34.Mr Aitken references these dates in his affidavit of 14 April 2020 from [47] as follows:

·On 19 March – I first learned about X's eyes surgery when DHHS emailed me.

·On 19 March – I telephoned the hospital to ask about the surgery and the receptionist refused to tell me anything because of court orders. I asked to speak to her manager but she refused. There are no court orders to that effect.

·On 19 March – I received no reply to my email to X’s mother…“Hi, why is X having eye surgery on 24 or 25 March? When was this decided. I cant get any information from the hospital. Please let me know asap. I don’t know anything about it. Thanks”.

·On 19 March I emailed Dhhs and said: “Please confirm by 12pm tomorrow that I can speak to my child’s doctors unimpeded and that the hospital have been comprehensively advised of this”.

·On 20 March I emailed D Hospital and said: “I do not know anything about the reasons for surgery. Until such time as I am fully informed by the hospital as to why he is having that surgery, the risks, and anticipated outcomes amongst other things I do not consent to the surgery proceeding”.

·On 20 March Dhhs emailed me saying: “You are correct in stating that there are no Children’s Court Orders preventing you from speaking with X’s medical practitioners. We have not, nor do we wish to, do anything to prevent you speaking with X’s medical practitioners”. That’s a statement and not a solution.

·On 20 March the D Hospital said: “Dear Mr Aitken Thank you for writing to us regarding your concern. I am looking into this and will be in touch with you on Monday morning regarding the status of this matter. Thank you for your patience”.  I did not receive a reply on Monday.

·I refer to the page 6 of the Dhhs Updated 67Z Report. Dhhs were in contact with D Hospital on 19 March 2020. All someone (Dhhs, D Hospital, or X’s mother) had to do was tell me what was going on: telephone me or email me or clear me to call reception or his doctor. No one did anything to assist. Instead, an application to the Office of the Public Advocate was considered even though Dhhs’ position was I could speak to his doctors. I never held up treatment and but for his mother’s attitude in relation to me attending medical appointments none of this would have occurred.

·23 March – Dhhs said: “Dear Mr Aitken, We have just been advised that all elective surgery at D Hospital has been cancelled, and this includes the planned eye surgery for X”.

·I have made a complaint to the Health Complaint Commissioner because what is occurring is just not working and no one is doing anything about it and it’s not that difficult nor my fault.

The Mother’s Case

35.The mother says she should have sole parental responsibility in respect of medical matters for X and she relies on her aforementioned affidavit of 30 March 2020. The implication of her affidavit and the submissions of her Counsel is that she is the victim of family violence and that she says that she and the father are unable to communicate and hence to cooperate in important matters regarding X's health.

36.The mother says that X's time with the father needs to be supervised to address the father acting outside of the advice of medical practitioners.  She says in her affidavit at [16] that she is concerned that the father is trying to engineer a situation to give him 'unfettered time' with X and argues generally that the father does not prioritise X's needs over and above his own.

37.Whilst the mother relies on her relatively short affidavit of 30 March 2020 she also urges the Court to consider the section 67ZW reports provided recently by the Department of Health and Human Services together with Dr E’s most recent reports and assessments. In this sense she relies on and adopts the submissions of Counsel for the Department.

38.Further, the mother says in circumstances where X has endured serious medical diagnoses, has just entered school, is not mobile, and has troubles with his eyesight then the father's time should be supervised.

39.I gleaned initially from the submissions of the mother's Counsel that the mother was also mounting an argument at this interim stage that any contact between X and the father which was not supervised would impact negatively on her parenting capacity in the sense of the well-known decision in Re Andrew[1]. However, when challenged in this respect as to the available evidence, the mother's Counsel retreated from any forceful submission although maintaining that the Court should have general concerns in the sense of the observations made by Dr E.

[1] (1996) FLC 92-692

40.In general, however, I understand the mother’s case to be that the father will not accept advice and direction from X's medical practitioner.  Secondly, she argues that she and the father have historically been uncooperative and non-communicative in respect of X's medical issues. Thirdly, she argues that she is the victim of family violence with reference to Dr E suggesting some controlling behaviour by the father. Fourthly, the mother also asks the Court to note that on the most recent period of time between X and the father on 29 February 2020 that X was reluctant and refusing to spend time with the father.

Position of the Department

41.The Department's involvement has resulted from X's medical vulnerabilities and concerns in the Department as to the father's behaviour whilst at the hospital together with what they say is his propensity for controlling family violence on the mother noting a State Court IVO made for a five year period and generally the poor and non-cooperative relationship between that the parents.

42.In a s.67ZW report of 5 March 2020 the Department notes an assessment of risk as follows:

Mr Aitken has been observed to be physically demanding of X during contact and attempt to work on improving X's physical strength.  Mr Aitken does continue to disregard the value and recommendations of X's care team.  Mr Aitken continues to demonstrate a lack of insight into the physical and emotional risk that his behaviours have on X.

…

It is the current assessment of Child Protection that Mr Aitken's time with X continues to require supervision to ensure X's physical safety and emotional well-being.

43.In helpful written submissions, Counsel for the Department advises:

The Department now wishes to consolidate all matters in the Federal Circuit Court and to withdraw the current application before the Children's Court of Xia to allow parenting Orders to be made for the child. The Department submits that this consolidation is in the child's best interests.

44.The Department submits in its Counsel's written submissions that the father ‘is not engaged with any clinical interventions found by Dr E and the Department draws the Court to the specific recommendations contained in Dr E's most recent report dated 28 April 2019.’

45.Significantly the Department submits that due to Federal and State government directives in relation to Covid-19 the Department will not be able to facilitate supervised contact for the father and states specifically in those submissions:

Whilst the Department at this time believes that X needs to have safe supervised contact with the Father, the Department will not be able to provide supervision under the current Family Preservation Orders and submit that this Honourable Court should make parenting orders for the father to pay for professional supervision.  That said, given the current status of Covid-19, the Department is not even sure that it would be possible to make any arrangements for the child supervised time with the father until the state and Commonwealth government directives and lockdown procedures change.

46.The Department submits that it has concerns as to the viability of these parents exercising equal shared parental responsibility.

47.By way of explanation, Counsel for the Department advises a lengthy (at least 20 week) delay in hearing any application in the Children's Court although such proceedings have been the preserve of that Court now for some years.  In his written submissions, Counsel states:

The Department also respectfully submits that in relation to any application to extend the current Family Preservation Order ought bring an emergency application to the Children's Court of Victoria, the Department is the only party able to apply in the Children's Court of Victoria and the delays that the current Covid-19 crisis have necessitated in the Children's Court of Victoria make it much more in the child's best interest to have interim parenting Orders made at this time.

Relevant Law

48.These are interim proceedings and, as such, they are truncated and limited relative to a final hearing. Specifically, the Court and the parties do not have the advantage of the evidence being tested by cross-examination and the Court is therefore left with much controversial untested evidence with the benefit only of submissions speaking to that evidence. It follows that the Courts at interim stages are often unable to make determinations as to disputed fact and credit where such determinations are usually important in the final determinative exercise.

49.Nevertheless, and despite these limitations, Courts are still obliged to follow a course of statutory and intellectual consideration consistent with the well-known decision of the Full Court in Goode & Goode[2] with the child's best interests being the paramount consideration pursuant to s.60CA of the Act. In determining those best interests the Court is to reference the parties’ proposals and the probative evidence, such as it is in truncated proceedings, to the numerous considerations set out in s.60CC(2) and (3) of the Act against a basis of s.60B which provides the objects and principles of the Act as follows:

[2] [2006] FamCA 1346

(1)The objects of this Part are to ensure that the best interests of children are met by:

(a)ensuring that children have the benefit of both of their parents having a meaningful involvement in their lives, to the maximum extent consistent with the best interests of the child; and

(b)protecting children from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence; and

(c)ensuring that children receive adequate and proper   parenting to help them achieve their full potential; and

(d)ensuring that parents fulfil their duties, and meet their responsibilities, concerning the care, welfare and development of their children.

(2)The principles underlying these objects are that (except when it is or would be contrary to a child's best interests):

(a)children have the right to know and be cared for by both their parents, regardless of whether their parents are married, separated, have never married or have never lived together; and

(b)children have a right to spend time on a regular basis with, and communicate on a regular basis with, both their parents and other people significant to their care, welfare and development (such as grandparents and other relatives); and

(c)parents jointly share duties and responsibilities concerning the care, welfare and development of their children; and

(d)parents should agree about the future parenting of their children; and

(e)children have a right to enjoy their culture (including the right to enjoy that culture with other people who share that culture).

50.The more pragmatic considerations at s.60CC are divided into 'primary' considerations at subsection (2) and 'additional' considerations at subsection 3. In circumstances where no single consideration is determinative and where amendments to the Act oblige Courts to put ‘greater weight’ on the protective consideration, not unusually in interim matters, and, indeed, in the matter now before me, the focus for the Court and the parties submissions is on the balance between the two primary considerations which are:

(a)children have the right to know and be cared for by both their parents, regardless of whether their parents are married, separated, have never married or have never lived together.

(b)children have a right to spend time on a regular basis with, and communicate on a regular basis with, both their parents and other people significant to their care, welfare and development (such as grandparents and other relatives).

51.Other additional considerations which have focus in the submissions in this matter include the capacity of each of the parents to attend to X's physical, intellectual and emotional needs; the attitude of each of the parents to the responsibilities of parenthood; and the practical difficulties of the child spending time with the parents given X's age, recent medical history, and the five hour drive between Melbourne and Town A.

Expert Reports

52.The Department commissioned and rely heavily upon the reports of Dr E, dated 6 February and 28 April 2019. The brief for those reports appears in its title as 'Psychological & Parental Risk Evaluation'. For his first report Dr E was posed three important questions being:

(a)Mr Aitken’s willingness and capacity to change in relation to family violence behaviour and parenting skills;

(b)Mr Aitkens understanding of X's complex medical and developmental needs and capacity to prioritise these in the context of his conflictual relationships with the maternal family and child protection;

(c) to consider the significance of the meaning that X holds within the extended paternal family and any recommendations regarding ongoing management.

53.Leaving aside the presumptive connotations of (a) of the brief, Dr E found the father to remain highly negative regarding the mother. He saw Mr Aitken as remaining litigious and presenting a lack of empathy for the mother [13]. Further, Dr E noted a focus by the father on his time with X rather than the child's needs. [14].

54.Dr E considered the issue of the mother’s stressors as having an adverse effect on X. Specifically, Dr E notes that the mother's allegations of family violence towards her at the hospital and at handovers in the form of threats and verbal abuse together with the father’s aggressive behaviour. [56]. Dr E in February 2019 summarised his assessment of the mother at [72]–[73] as follows:

The mother presented with a tendency to portray herself positively and as relatively free of common shortcomings to which most individuals will admit and presents as somewhat reluctant to recognise minor faults in herself.  As such, this presents as a tendency to repress undesirable characteristics, however this tendency presents as non-effortful and as such there is no evidence to suggest intentional attempts to distort her profile. Despite the non-effortful positive distortion, there are some areas where she described problems of greater intensity and these may relate to physical signs of anxiety, impacts of traumatic events and a pre-occupation of physical functioning.

There is no evidence to suggest negative impression management. It is not unusual that parents who have been coping with highly negative and traumatic aspects of a child's illness may cope by using non-effortful positive distortion in relation to themselves and other factors in their life.  The profile suggests no elevations that could be considered to indicate the presence of clinical psychopathology although taking into account that there is some evidence of personality based defensiveness. She may be reluctant to engage in treatment for the same reasons.

55.Mr Aitken’s summary appears at [48] of the February 29 report as:

Respondent is unlikely to have answered in a forthright manner and with respect to high levels of positive impression management, configural analysis showed it is likely that the positive distortion was largely non-effortful but there was a trend towards effortful positive distortion. There is no evidence formally to suggest intentional distortion of the profile, however it is clear that there is defensiveness that is personality based and it is likely that the client experiences problems of greater intensity than is typical of defensive respondents. This includes stress in the environment, hostility and bitterness. There is a tendency towards egocentricity and resentment on the substantive scales. 

56.At [82] of his February 2019 assessment Dr E concludes:

To conclude the findings of this and the previous evaluation:

a.The father presents with psychological and parenting issues that require assistance;

b.The child's illness has exacerbated these difficulties and the father's coping with the child and the mother post separation has been poor;

c.The reports of the father's behaviour in relation to the mother, particularly considering the circumstances of the child's illness and the fact that the mother has been a central caregiver and has effectively monitored his health over a significant period of time, appears problematic;

d.The father's understanding and insight into his own behaviour in these areas, particularly in relation to the mother but also in relation to his acceptance of the child's condition, is relatively poor.  This is in large part due to the personality issues identified in the initial family report;

e.The relocation of the mother has probably exacerbated the issues for the father but also between the parents in general;

f.The inevitable stress of the child's illness and the mother's care of the child over this critical period is likely to have exacerbated conflict between the parents;

g.Parental risk in this case for the mother was identified at Low and for the father at Moderate-High, and if there was a continuation of negative parental behaviour from the father to the mother, it is likely that this risk would increase over time;

h.Overall, this is a matter that should be able to be dealt with, with intervention.  It has been recognised that DHHS have attempted to have the father engage in intervention to address the issues outlined in this report, particularly his approach to the parenting and the mother.  It is unlikely that the father has sought appropriate sources of intervention and it is unlikely that this intervention has addressed the issues as outlined, in part as it is unlikely that the clinicians involved have had access to necessary materials to address these issues.

57.At [83] of the February report Dr E makes a number of recommendations including inter-alia:

a)the father to engage with a clinician;

b)the father to more fully engage in appropriate intervention that addresses family violence;

c)the parents to see a clinician with family law experience;

d)the father's time is aimed ultimately to be with the child and undertaken with another responsible adult in substantial attendance. It is appropriate that time is supervised initially and then in substantial attendance.  Initially, fortnightly time would be appropriate and then weekly time.  Due to the child's illness, it is likely to be required in Town A or a convenient location for the child;

e)That the matter be re-evaluated regularly, at least every six months by DHHS;

f)That interaction between the father and the child be supervised by a formal supervision agency for a period of time and a report provided to DHHS;

g)Eventually, it would be appropriate for a new parental regime to occur;

h)Assuming appropriate progress in this matter, more regular time between the father and the child should not be ruled out however, in part due to the child's age and stage and the nature of his rehabilitation, there needs to be some checks and balances in place.

i)It is appropriate that expectations regarding the father's and his family/friends’ behaviour in relation to the mother and her family/friends and X are outlined clearly by DHHS…;

j)There needs to be a priority on the protection of X and the mother's health and the mother's parenting.

58.For his second report Dr E viewed X with each of his mother and his father. In his report he says that he viewed an interaction between the father and X over a period of 2.25 hours at the father's residence at a local caravan park in Town A. Mr Aitken disputes the length of the observation and says that it occupied only a matter of minutes.

59.Dr E observed a degree of separation anxiety for X in moving from the mother to the father. He noted the father's verbal communications as being 'loud and boisterous' in contrast with X who was quiet or relatively silent. [12]. Dr E at [15] states:

The father's approach to X at times appeared to be insensitive and somewhat overwhelming to X.  For example when he cleaned X's face, he did so in a very rough way and it was clear that X did not want to have his face cleaned in that fashion and resisted.

60.At [21] Dr E observed the father's attitude to the DHHS worker as being 'dismissive and hostile, and clearly not neutral or positive.'  At [26] Dr E opines that:

His approach to X presents as enthusiastic, however, presents with parental skills that appear affected by his personality functioning.

61.He later describes the father as 'intense'; 'overwhelming'.

62.Dr E's findings in April 2019 differ little from his previous reports and assessments. [27]. He summarises those findings inter-alia as follows: –

a.The father presents with psychological and parenting issues that require assistance;

b.the child's illness has exacerbated these difficulties in the father's coping with the child and the mother post separation has been poor;

c.The reports of the father's behaviour in relation to the mother, particularly considering the circumstances of the child's illness and the fact that the mother has been a central caregiver and has effectively monitored his health over a significant period of time, appears problematic;

d.The father's understanding and insight into his own behaviour in these areas, particularly in relation to the mother but also in relation to his acceptance of the child's condition, is relatively poor.  This is in large part due to the personality issues identified in the initial family report.

63.At [28] Dr E makes ‘Recommendations’ including the following: –

a.The father to engage with the clinician who has access to this report and the family report of February 2014;

b.The father to more fully engage in appropriate intervention that addresses family violence;

c.       The parents to see a clinician with family law experience;

d.The father's time is aimed ultimately to be with the child and undertaken with another responsible adult insubstantial attendance but not the father's family.  It is appropriate that time is supervised. 

64.No expert report from Dr E later than April 2019 has been put to before the Court.  My understanding is that the state Court orders, obviously made with the benefit of Dr E’s reports, have caused X's time with the father to continue to be supervised with the assistance of the DHHS.

65.It is notable that Dr E's April report specifically recommends 'substantial attendance' but not with the father's family.  Annexed to Dr E's April report appears an email to Dr E dated 18 April 2019 from the paternal grandmother. The contents of that email are of concern to this Court and it is now exhibited marked ‘A1’ to these reasons.  I am unaware as to whether or not the letter from the paternal grandmother was conveyed with the imprimatur of Mr Aitken.  If so then it speaks volumes as to the lack of the insight by the author of the letter and the father as to the needs and vulnerability of young children and, in particular, X. The contents are offensive and threatening.  If the email was conveyed without the knowledge or consent of Mr Aitken then he would be wise to cause his mother to desist from such unhelpful, distasteful, and objectionable contributions.

Consideration

66.I emphasise that the consideration of X's best interests in the context of his parenting arrangements must be seen in this matter being an interim hearing with its inherent difficulties, not least being the lack of cross-examination and testing of the evidence, but where the balancing process inherent in s.60CC(2) and (3) must be followed. Again, at its simplest, the process is a balancing, albeit a difficult one, of the considerations of making orders which benefit X maintaining meaningful relationships with both of his parents and, on the other hand, making orders which protect him where necessary from physical and emotional harm. This is a matter that attracted the notion of ‘unacceptable risk’ in the submissions of the mother’s Counsel. Indeed, at its broadest, this is a consideration of risk for X. However, it is never the task or ambition of these Courts to eliminate all risk for a child. To do so would be presumptuous and unrealistic and inevitably leave children without the tools to be robust and self-protective in a real world replete with danger and risk. Rather, the task for this Court, in the context of each factual platform, is to consider and balance risks and interests and to understand that it is often a fine point which will turn an ‘unacceptable’ risk into an ‘acceptable’ risk.

67.It is proper to again note that this task has been delegated to this Court in circumstances where the Federal Circuit Court has already conducted two full trials in respect of X's parenting arrangement and his best interests but where the jurisdiction of this Court was removed by reason of an Application by the Victorian Department of Health and Human Services to the State Courts as long ago as 2017 but where that same Department now determines to leave the jurisdiction of the State Court and now bow to the jurisdiction of this Court.  My only comment is that this circumstance is generally unsatisfactory and one which is capable of confusing, if not compromising, a child's best interests and where those empowered with considering the conflict and/or marrying of relevant legislation might focus their minds and intent.

68.There are a number of factors that argue against the father's case for unsupervised time between X and himself in both Town A and in Melbourne.  Firstly, and most obviously, the child is young and has suffered serious medical conditions with ongoing residual difficulties. The travel between Town A and Melbourne is long and onerous. The father proposes that the mother undertake this travel. I maintain concerns as to the possible negative impact on X of such onerous travel albeit only once per month but where I have no specific medical evidence that X would be able to endure the travel.

69.The father's time with X has been supervised now for approximately three years.  The Department sought and obtained orders for supervision from the State Court. The Department maintain that continuing supervision is preferable as being in X's best interests.  My understanding of their position is that the father lacks insight into X's particular needs; he lacks parenting skills; that he poses a threat to the emotional health of X and/or the mother with a consequent impact on her parenting capacity.

70.It is clear that the Department and the mother place much store in the reports of Dr E.  I repeat that they remain untested.  The father challenges some of the factual findings of Dr E including such fundamentals as the time spent by Dr E observing X's time with the father.  Dr E's most recent report is now some 12 months old.  I read the tenor of Dr E's report as advocating a period of supervised time but not of any permanency.  Dr E makes collateral recommendations in respect of the father undertaking psychiatric/psychological assistance and completing various courses.  Oddly, the submissions of the Department suggest that the father might have ignored Dr E’s suggestions? The father's affidavit material discloses that he has completed the following courses:

·paediatric first aid – Royal Children's Hospital;

·'Tuning into Kids' – Relationships Australia;

·Parenting after Separation – Relationships Australia.

71.Further, and annexed to the father's affidavit is a letter from Mr F, consultant psychiatrist, dated 1 February 2020. That letter states:

This is to confirm that I am the treating psychiatrist of Mr Aitken since 28/8/2018. He has been attending sessions with me on a regular basis since then.

Mr Aitken's diagnosis is that of an Adjustment Disorder with Depressed Mood/Major Depressive Disorder. Based on the history given the adjustment disorder was triggered by the disruption of his contact with his ill son and the related stressful circumstances since December 2017. These are very significant factors in perpetrating his depression.

Mr Aitken's psychiatric condition has improved considerably with the treatment. In my opinion he is no risk to himself or to any other person, including his son.

Mr Aitken has been attending the sessions reliably and plans to continue the treatment; his next appointment is on 2 March 2020.

72.The father's affidavit also annexes letters from Ms G Consulting (Counselling/Psychosocial/Mental Health Practitioner) and 'The Talk Shop – Counselling and Psychology' albeit that both pre-date Dr E's most recent reports. It might be that the poor communication between Mr Aitken and the Department/Dr E resulted in the latter being unaware of these courses being undertaken by Mr Aitken?

73.The evidence suggests that Mr Aitken has been and remains combative in his dealings with the Department and his views of Dr E who, of course, was engaged by the Department. Whilst this might be an unfortunate personality trait of Mr Aitken and characterised by negativity and a lack of cooperation and openness in his dealings with the Department, it is not of itself determinative or prohibitive of him enjoying time with X.  Indeed, I repeat that it is unfortunate in the extreme that the paternal grandmother and perhaps Mr Aitken himself have seen fit to engage in the obtuse, threatening and offensive correspondence evidenced by the paternal grandmother's letter to Dr E referred to above.

74.The mother argues that X’s time with the father should be supervised inter-alia because of family violence allegedly perpetrated on her by the father. My understanding is that she particularises threatening and controlling behaviour by Mr Aitken.  The mother does, however, now have the benefit and protection of a State Court Intervention Order for five years.  My understanding is that it has never been the rationale of such orders to prohibit time for parents with children.  Indeed, arguably, such orders made intra-parents might be seen as allowing the continuation of a parent-child relationship which may not otherwise be possible where the safety of the other parent is compromised.  The parties live far apart.  The mother has the benefit of an order. I could permit the mother to utilize an agent for changeover if she feels the need.

75.Whilst much emphasis in this hearing is placed on Mr Aitken's abilities or lack thereof, it remains Mr Aitken's case, also untested, that the mother has developed an agenda and acted to thwart his time with and relationship with X.  He suggests that the mother has gained an ally in this quest in the Department who, of course, ultimately have a brief to protect children from physical, emotional or moral harm.

76.There is one part of the evidence before me at this interim stage which may give some credence to the father's argument. That is, the Department and the mother argue baldly that the father has been, not only non-cooperative, but at times actively obstructive of important medical procedures for X.  Indeed, the Department appear to place some emphasis on the proposed eye surgery for X in March 2020. I have deliberately transcribed the relevant parts of both the mother’s and the father's affidavits into these reasons above. I am concerned that the mother's affidavit omits the relevant email conversations between the parties and between the father and DHHS around 19 and 20 March.  The father argues only that he sought to be fully informed as to his three-year-old son's condition and surgery before giving his consent.  Ordinarily such a position might be considered a reasonable one.  The mother argues that the father was simply being obstructive.  At this stage I find some force in the father's argument given his more detailed exposé of the relevant history.  At the very least, the allocation of blame or fault in respect of this issue remains, in my view, open for proper testing.

77.Further, it is the mother who argues that X's time with the father should continue to be supervised.  Through her Counsel she offers no further particulars save and except leaving the obligation for the orders that she seeks on the father with the father to accept the financial responsibility.  She insists on a supervisor but does not nominate one.  The importance of the mother's position in this respect is that Counsel for the Department, quite properly in my view, did indicate to the Court that they could no longer assist in the provision of a professional supervisor and offered a view that the provision of a professional supervisor would be extremely difficult if not impossible.  The point I make, however, is that it is the mother that makes the assertion of fact that supervision is necessary yet offers no assistance in this respect whilst being armed with the Department’s evidence of a likelihood of there being no available supervisor.  As such, a strong likelihood on the evidence, and in particular on the evidence of the mother, is that should I make an order for supervision then the practical effect would be that there would be no actual time/contact for X with his father.  It is obvious that this is a significant consideration in the sense of the balancing process that I set out above.

78.In summary, I am of the view that it is in X's best interests for him to have a continuing direct relationship with his father.    

79.Two Courts have made findings and then orders confirming that relationship. X is young. The relationship between he and his father has already been disturbed to some degree.  The establishment, maintenance and resilience of that relationship for such a young child requires frequency of direct contact. Any other medium might assist but is not really a viable option to direction contact. As such I am easily satisfied that X’s best interests are served by a continuing, direct and frequent contact relationship between he and his father.  However, of course, the process is a balancing one and I must also consider and weigh the risks to X if such a relationship in whatever form and with whatever conditions and restraints?

80.Whilst noting the mother's position and that of the Department, I have a real concern in the current circumstances as to the availability of any professional supervisor.  I repeat, and in an evidentiary sense, I think it disingenuous to simply leave the finding of a supervisor to the father in circumstances where he does not seek an order in those terms and when the Department suggests no availability. X has had a continuing relationship with his father albeit one supervised now for almost 3 years. The cessation of such a relationship due to practicalities would, in my view, be contrary to X's best interests.

81.Further, I note again the recommendations in Dr E’s report from April 2019 in respect of the father engaging with a psychiatrist/psychologist and completing various courses. To the father's credit, he appears to have done so.  I find the comments of his psychiatrist, albeit brief and in a form only annexed to the father's own affidavit, to be positive in respect of Mr Aitken and in the process generally.  I do repeat, however, that Mr Aitken’s general attitude to the process and, in particular, the Department and Dr E should give him cause to reflect.  He seems also to have heeded Dr E’s advice and completed various parenting courses of a type that seem to be all too frequently ordered by these Courts.

82.I have continuing concerns as to X's ability to travel to Melbourne if only for one period per month.  He is young.  He has suffered serious medical interventions He carries a number of residual implications.  The trip is long and probably onerous. As such, I am of the view that X's time with the father should continue in the interim to take place at Town A.

83.After completing the difficult balancing process, I am not persuaded that X’s time with his father needs to be supervised in the interim.  Significantly, I have found importance for X in maintaining a relationship with his father.  I am not satisfied on the evidence that any supervisor, even if necessary, is available. Whilst the Court’s task is to focus holistically on the child’s best interests, in my view it remains for a party asserting a fact to prove that fact on a balance of probabilities.  In this sense, the obligation to show that supervision is both necessary and available sits here with the mother and the Department.  Further, whilst carefully taking into account Dr E’s conclusions and recommendations, I have evidence that the father has taken up at least some of those recommendations. This in itself is evidence contrary to the ‘attitude’ attributed to the father previously and relied upon by the mother.

84.There are other inbuilt ‘protections’ for X.  Firstly, the time that the father asks to spend with X is constructive. He asks only for day time hours.  Secondly, both the mother and the Department have shown themselves to be vigilant in respect of Mr Aitken and his time with X.  I anticipate no change here.  The mother has the benefit herself of the State Court Intervention Order.

85.Consequently I intend to make orders for X’s time with the father to take place in Town A fortnightly at the times suggested by the father and that such time be unsupervised. There will, however, be supplementary orders for the father to abide by the directions of X’s medical practitioners. The mother should provide him with such directives which should be from the doctors as opposed to the mother herself. I will also order that the father himself speak to X’s treating doctors.

86.I will make a mutual non-denigration order as sought by the father himself. This should also offer some confidence to the mother. In this sense I am again mindful of the extraordinary letter from the paternal grandmother to Dr E such that Counsel asked me to consider making an order preventing any person other than the father attending for time with X. On reflection, however, I will not make such an order. Firstly, I have heard no argument on the point. Secondly, it is inherent and of emphasis in these reasons that the father himself must show insight and priority in his relationship with his young son. He must follow the directions of the medical practitioners and therapists. Similarly, he must ensure that any other person having contact with his son similarly acts responsibly. He cannot allow denigration of the mother to her son and is required to act protectively should any person show this propensity. Put simply, it is ultimately in X’s interests to develop a relationship with his extended families and others – but only in so far as such is not inconsistent with his best interests. It is here that Mr Aitken must prioritise the interests of his son! I further say only that it is the relationship between a child and a parent that is anticipated by s.60CC(s)(a) of the Act and where Mr Aitken argues before this Court that his relationship with X has been compromised then he might do well in the short term to focus on that relationship.

87.There also remains an issue of parental responsibility. At this stage, and without the testing of the evidence, I am unable to determine whether or not blame should be distributed between the mother and the father in respect of their non-communicative and non-cooperative relationship. I know only that they do not communicate, cooperate or trust each other. X continues to have serious medical needs. He lives primarily with his mother. At this interim stage I am of the view that any presumption at s.61DA of the Family Law Act 1975 should be rebutted (if indeed it applies) and that X's best interests are served by his mother having the responsibility for his medical issues but on condition that she prudently advise the father at all times. I stress that such orders will not prohibit the father from engaging with X's medical practitioners and therapists and indeed I will order him to do so but provided that he does so at all times in a civil and respectful fashion and at all times adheres strictly to the directions of those practitioners.

88.I note that a trial date is requested by both parties. Although not raised in submissions. I am very much of the view that this matter requires the assistance of an Independent Children’s Lawyer. I will make such an order and then list the matter for trial directions when (and if) such appointment is made. By way of procedural fairness I will give each of the parties leave to argue before me that such an order be set aside. Further, in circumstances where the father is self-represented and there is a current intervention order, then this is a matter that will attract consideration of s.102NA of the Act.

I certify that the preceding eighty-eight (88) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge McGuire

Date: 8 May 2020

“A”

Aitken Gladstone  Behaviour Work Group
Supplementary Report  Dr E PhD,MAPS
     Clinical & Forensic Psychologist

Page 26

2.  Email to Dr E 18.4.2019

Dr E

I’ve recently learnt that you called my son, a ‘bad father’, in your so-called ‘report’.  And you are a bad psychologist, and that is my report on you. You give psychology a bad name, not that I ever had any time for it, with your stats and little boxes to tick. I studied Philosophy and at least can engage in Critical Thinking whereas the likes of you think that Critical Thinking has something to do with scrutinising and criticising. Your ignorance shows in your work. If you had respect for your work you would use psychology to give people hope, not take it away. Need I say more. You use psychology to wound people more so when they are most vulnerable, like a parent of a sick child, a parent who adores his son and would do anything for him. Have you tried driving 12 hours to see your child whilst trying to maintain your demanding career? I condemn you and your friends at DHHS who cause immense pain and suffering to Mr Aitken and me and his father. I watch him on Mr Aitken’s mobile. I see him in his father’s arms all the time. They miss each other very much. His own father has not seen him at school or wearing eye glasses. Nor have I.

Then you were going to be sitting in to scrutinise father and son for two hours. I thought that it was the most bizarre and humiliating thing I’ve heard in a while and then I remembered all the despicable things done to people in this country, in the name of authority. Dreadful people. The dreadfulness known throughout the world. Your work shows that you are self-indulgent with cruel characterisation of a loving father besotted with his son, finding himself a victim of the cruelest of circumstances, from having his baby whisked away in the most clandestine manner to learning of his son being in a life threatening situation, all of it out of his control, your accusation of a bad father as if it was all his fault, and that of DHHs actions, all designed to deliver the maximum hurt and break him, and make him more conducive to punishment, real convict crap in the 21^st century Australia, you bunch of vampires !!!

All I have to say to the likes of your and DHHS, is that you are a danger to civilised society and frankly should be arrested, as you would be in another country. Mr Aitken is an exceptionally good father, even more so for having to overcome all the obstacles you et al place in front of him, hoping he’d trip so that you can point your grubby fingers. You should address parents in traumatic situations as human beings not tick you pathetic little boxes, observing father and son as if they were a couple of rats in a lab. WHAT PLANET DO YOU LIVE ON?

Fathers seem to be the easiest targets to harass, humiliate, belittle and disrespect in this Anglo-sphere of stupidity, vindictiveness and inanity of such proportions that the only place for all of you to go is the Integrity Commission for abusing your authority (I am waiting for their Terms of Reference and will make an official complaint) and High Court, for defamation. Stop using your authority to defame people; bunch of insolent cowards! Just piss off and out of our lives!!!

Ms H
X’s grandmother