FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AIR15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1425
Appeal from: AIR15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 1808 File number: VID 897 of 2016 Judge: BEACH J Date of judgment: 29 November 2016 Catchwords: MIGRATION – Protection (Class XA) visa – refusal of visa application by delegate of Minister – decision of delegate upheld by Tribunal – dismissal of application for judicial review of Tribunal decision by Federal Circuit Court of Australia – no jurisdictional error established – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – application of SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 69 – appeal dismissed Cases cited: AIS15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 978
MZARJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1303
SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 69
Date of hearing: 25 November 2016 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 38 Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr N Wood Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice ORDERS
VID 897 of 2016 BETWEEN: AIR15
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
BEACH J
DATE OF ORDER:
29 NOVEMBER 2016
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of and incidental to the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BEACH J:
The appellant appeals from the judgment of the Federal Circuit Court on 18 July 2016. The Federal Circuit Court dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the second respondent (the Tribunal) on 28 February 2015 to affirm an earlier decision of a delegate of the first respondent (the Minister) to refuse to grant the appellant a Protection (Class XA) visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
The notice of appeal sets out 11 grounds of appeal. Many of the grounds are generic and unparticularised (grounds 3 and 6 to 11). Further, some of the remaining grounds are new. They do not appear to reflect or relate to the grounds that were advanced before the primary judge (grounds 4 and 5). Some of the remaining grounds misconceive the role of the Federal Circuit Court (grounds 2 and 5).
For the reasons that follow, I have determined to dismiss the appeal. Before elaborating on my reasons I would note the following three preliminary matters.
First, I note that at the request of the appellant, on 2 November 2016 I adjourned the hearing of the appeal based upon a medical certificate produced by the appellant that was less than satisfactory. On 11 November 2016, I further adjourned the matter to enable the appellant to obtain legal advice.
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- Case
- [2016] FCA 1425
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue in the appeal was whether the Tribunal made any jurisdictional error in dismissing the appellant's claims, or whether the Federal Circuit Court erred in upholding the Tribunal's decision. The appellant raised several grounds of appeal, though some were found to be generic and unparticularised. The Court considered whether the Tribunal's findings of inconsistency and lack of credibility were justified, and whether these justified the delegate's refusal to grant the visa.
The Court found that the appellant's claims were not credible due to the numerous inconsistencies identified by the Tribunal. For example, the appellant gave different accounts of when his mother advised him to leave his house and of when Sri Lankan Army officers visited his home. The Tribunal's findings were rational and based on the evidence presented. The Court held that the Tribunal did not make any jurisdictional error and that the Federal Circuit Court was correct in dismissing the appellant's judicial review application. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of and incidental to the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
For completeness, and also given the appellant’s unrepresented status before me, I will give him leave to advance before me to the extent necessary grounds that were not advanced before the primary judge.CONSIDERATION The appellant’s grounds of appeal 3 and 6 to 11 are generic and unparticularised. They are effectively devoid of content. It is not incumbent on the Court to independently consider for itself whether such generic grounds might be capable of being particularised so as to identify a specific error made by the primary judge or a jurisdictional error made by the Tribunal. The appellant was given an opportunity to adequately particularise these grounds in advance of the hearing. He has failed to do so. In my view, and in these circumstances, grounds 3 and 6 to 11 have no substance and I need say nothing further about them. It is appropriate to briefly deal with the other grounds (grounds 1, 2, 4 and 5).(a) Grounds 1 and 2 Grounds 1 and 2 are related. Ground 1 is that the primary judge erred by “failing to accept the grounds that the Tribunal used the [appellant’s] answer to a question which depended entirely upon the version of his mother’s explanation, to make a decision on the credibility of the [appellant]. The [appellant] was simply explaining what his mother told him.” By particulars, the appellant refers “to the incident where the mother refers to the number of people who attended the home to make inquiries when the [appellant] was not home”. Ground 2 is that the primary judge erred by “accepting that the Tribunal was correct in concluding the answers given by the [appellant] that related to what his mother told him inaccurately was a valid criteria to find that the [appellant] was not credible”. The particulars to this ground state: The [appellant] was asked by the mother to leave the house late the previous night. Again early in the morning, the mother asked that the [appellant] leave the house. This was wrongly concluded against the [appellant’s] credibility of inconsistency because the Tribunal assumed that the [appellant] left the house when she first asked him. In fact, the [appellant] left only on the second request. It is difficult to see how the appellant’s criticisms of the primary judge are warranted. The nature and basis of the first ground of review before the primary judge, and the appellant’s submissions to the primary judge in support of that ground, were unclear. In any event, no error is demonstrated in what the primary judge said at [39]. Moreover, the Tribunal did not make any jurisdictional error. Relevantly to grounds 1 and 2, the appellant has not demonstrated that the Tribunal engaged in irrational or illogical reasoning in concluding that the appellant gave inconsistent evidence, or more generally that he was not a witness of truth. There were various inconsistencies that the Tribunal identified, including the following:(a)One inconsistency related to the appellant’s account of when his mother told him to go to his aunt’s house on the relevant night in June 2012. Initially, the appellant said that his mother told him to go to his aunt’s place when he arrived home and told her what had had happened to him (at 2.00 am). Subsequently, the appellant said that it was only later when there was a knock at the door (at 5.00 am) that his mother told him to go to his aunt’s house.(b)Another and related inconsistency related to whether he knew that Sri Lankan Army officers were looking for him when he had left his house. In his protection visa application, the appellant said that he was at his neighbour’s house when the officers came to his house, and it was only later that he learnt that the officers had been looking for him. Subsequently, the appellant said that he left the house at 5.00 am when the officers came to his house.(c)There were also other inconsistencies as to the various versions that he gave of what his mother had said to him.