AIQ18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs
[2025] FedCFamC2G 215
•20 February 2025
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
AIQ18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 215
File number: MLG 176 of 2018 Judgment of: JUDGE FORBES Date of judgment: 20 February 2025 Catchwords: MIGRATION – protection visa – judicial review of decision of Immigration Assessment authority not to grant visa – whether applicant denied procedural fairness – scope of Part 7AA fast-track review considered – whether Authority should have accepted new information – whether applicants claims for protection properly considered – where applicant seeks impermissible merits review – no error established Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 5J, 36, 473DB, 473DD, 473GA, 473GB Cases cited: ABT17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2020) 269 CLR 439
AUS17 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection (2020) 269 CLR 494
CUZ17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2019] FCCA 3074
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 57 Date of hearing: 12 February 2025 Place: Melbourne Applicant: In person Solicitor for the Respondents: Mr McDonald; Clayton Utz ORDERS
MLG 176 of 2018 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: AIQ18
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE FORBES
DATE OF ORDER:
20 FEBRUARY 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The name of the First Respondent be amended to “Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs”.
2.Pursuant to Item 10 of Schedule 16 of the Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No. 1) Act 2024 (Cth), the “Administrative Review Tribunal” be substituted for “Immigration Assessment Authority” as the second respondent.
3.The Application be dismissed.
4.The Applicant pay the First Respondent’s costs fixed in the sum of $8,371.30.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE FORBES
INTRODUCTION
On 20 December 2017, the Immigration Assessment Authority (Authority) affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister not to grant the applicant a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa (SHEV). By an application dated 24 January 2018 the applicant seeks judicial review of the Authority’s decision.
The applicant is a citizen of Sri Lanka who first arrived in Australia on 3 October 2012 as an unauthorised maritime arrival. As discussed in more detail below, the applicant sought refugee protection under s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) or complementary protection under s 36(2)(aa) claiming that he would be subject to arrest, harm or persecution if returned to Sri Lanka by reason of his Tamil ethnicity, Catholic faith, imputed association with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and as a failed asylum seeker.
In its decision, the Authority rejected the applicant’s claims for protection and found that there was not a real chance of the applicant being targeted or harmed or subjected to persecution. The Authority found that the applicant did not meet the requirements for refugee protection or complementary protection.
The applicant seeks to impugn the decision and reasons of the Authority. He relies on the six grounds of review set out in his application, and further brief submissions made at the judicial review hearing on 12 February 2025. The applicant seeks an order that the Authority’s decision be quashed and that his application be remitted for redetermination.
For the reasons set out below, I am not persuaded that the Authority’s decision is affected by jurisdictional error. Accordingly, the application must be dismissed.
BACKGROUND
The applicant arrived in Australia by boat on 3 October 2012. He is a citizen of and formerly resided in Sri Lanka. He has a wife and three children who continue to live in Sri Lanka.
In December 2015, after the s 46A bar was lifted, the applicant was invited to apply for a temporary protection visa or a SHEV under the fast track assessment process. On 22 November 2016 the applicant applied for the SHEV with the assistance of the Asylum Seeker Resource Centre.
In support of his application the applicant provided a statutory declaration which set out his claims for protection. In summary, those claims were:
(a)that the applicant is of Tamil ethnicity;
(b)the applicant is a Roman Catholic;
(c)the applicant’s father died in a hospital in Jaffna in 1987, as a result of a shelling attack by the Sri Lankan army;
(d)the applicant has always been fearful of the Sri Lankan authorities since a young age;
(e)the applicant’s mother sent him to Taiwan to work as she was fearful for his safety due to the rising war and sporadic killings in Jaffna District;
(f)after returning to Sri Lanka in 1991, the applicant’s family relocated to Negombo to escape the war;
(g)that the authorities require any Tamils visiting Negombo to register with the police. In 1995, the applicant was visited by Tamil family members and he was then taken by the police for questioning. The police placed the applicant in a room in which they were beating other people who the police claimed to be Tamils. The applicant was fearful that he would be assaulted, but he was released and directed to bring his visitors to the police station the following day;
(h)the applicant avoided the attention of authorities until May 2009 towards the end of the Civil War. From that time he experienced verbal abuse for a number of days;
(i)in 2010, after the war, he invited his wife’s cousins to visit Negombo for one night. The cousins were rehabilitated members of the LTTE. The following day two Criminal Investigation Department (CID) officers came to the house looking for the visitors. The applicant claims that the officers threatened him with arrest if they found that the visitors were still involved with the LTTE;
(j)CID officers visited the applicant’s wife after he left Sri Lanka and told her that the applicant would be arrested if he returned to the country;
(k)the applicant fears being arrested or harmed if required to return to Sri Lanka;
(l)the applicant believes he will be denied state protection because he is a Tamil and the authorities believe that he is associated with the LTTE; and
(m)the applicant cannot relocate within Sri Lanka because the authorities control the whole of the country and he will be killed or otherwise harmed by the authorities.
On 27 March 2017, the applicant was invited to attend an interview. He attended an interview with a delegate on 13 April 2017 and was assisted by Tamil interpreter. An officer of the Department recorded the applicant’s responses to various questions in a “Protection visa interview pro forma”[1].
[1] Court Book (CB) 114
The delegate was also provided with additional information including a Sri Lanka (Tamil) country information package prepared by the Asylum Seeker Resource Centre and a letter from a Sri Lankan attorney who claimed to know the applicant. The attorney’s letter stated that the applicant had fled Sri Lanka because he felt there was an imminent threat to his life. The attorney also said that the applicant’s home had been visited in April and May 2013 by the CID who are looking for the applicant. The attorney stated that:
“[…] it might not be prudent for [the applicant] to return to the country. In the event of his returning, he will definitely face the prospect of immediate arrest, detention and incarceration for long periods without being brought to trial. Further he would also be subjected to the most cruel, inhuman, humiliating and degrading treatment”.
On 25 May 2017 a delegate of the Minister refused the SHEV application[2].
[2] CB 146-159
Referral to the Immigration Assessment Authority
On 30 May 2017, the Authority notified the applicant that the delegate’s decision had been referred to it for review. Correspondence from the Authority informed the applicant that the IAA had been provided with all documents the Department considered relevant to his case, including any material that the applicant had provided prior to the delegate’s decision. The applicant was informed that the Authority would make its decision on the basis of the information received from the Department, unless it decided to consider new information, which it would only do in limited circumstances. The circumstances in which the Authority might consider new information were explained in a Practice Direction which accompanied notification of the referral.
On 14 June 2017 the Asylum Seeker Resource Centre sent submissions to the Authority on behalf of the applicant. The applicant submitted:
(a)that the delegate had written a template decision record which did not individually or cumulatively assess his claims against the refugee criteria;
(b)that the delegate had considered irrelevant information in finding that it was “implausible the CID would have been actively searching for the applicant in 2013”. The applicant submitted that country information regarding the relaxation of Emergency Regulations regarding the registration of Tamil visitors in Colombo was irrelevant to an assessment of his claims. He submitted that an alternative explanation for his wife being visited by the CID was that they were searching for him as part of an investigation into his links to the LTTE;
(c)that the delegate had made an adverse finding that the applicant’s family did not in fact have ties to the LTTE based on the erroneous assumption that the applicant “did not know his cousin very well”;
(d)the delegate failed to consider country information which indicated that there is a credible risk that imputed LTTE supporters returning as failed asylum seekers will face persecution; and
(e)that he should be afforded an opportunity to appear at an oral hearing before the Authority in order to present his claims. The applicant submitted that without an oral hearing he would be unable to cure the legal and factual errors in the delegate’s decision.
The Authority conducted its review without inviting the applicant to an oral hearing.
The Authority’s decision
On 20 December 2017, the Authority notified the applicant of its decision to affirm the delegate’s decision to refuse to grant the SHEV[3].
[3] CB 181-197
In a written Outline of Submissions filed in the judicial review proceeding, the Minister summarised the Authority’s decision and its stated reasons. I have reviewed the Authority’s decision record and I am satisfied that the summary set out at [9] of the Minister’s Outline of Submissions accurately and fairly reflects the structure and content of the Authority’s decision. I have adopted that summary for the purposes of this judgement.
In its decision record, the Authority:
a.set out the relevant background: [1]-[2] (CB 186);
b.set out the information before the Authority, including the applicant’s submissions emailed to the Authority on 14 June 2017. In relation to those submissions, the Authority (CB 186):
i.stated that the majority of the submissions addresses the delegate’s decision and findings and was therefore ‘argument’ rather than ‘information’:[4];
ii. summarised the only ‘new information’ provided by the applicant was country information from Amnesty International (2014) and a June 2013 issues paper produced by the Australian Refugee Review Tribunal, and found that: [5]-[6]:
A.the new information is not credible personal information as it is general in nature;
B.given the new information predates the delegate’s decision by three and four years, the new information could have been provided at an earlier time; and
C.therefore, it was not satisfied in relation to either of the matters in s 473DD(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act), nor that there were exceptional circumstances to justify considering the information
c. summarised the applicant’s claims for protection: [7] (CB 186-187);
d. made factual findings that (CB 187-189):
i. the applicant’s identity is as claimed: [8];
ii. the applicant went to Taiwan to avoid conscription to the LTTE: [9];
iii.the applicant lived with his family in Negombo from 1991 to 2012: [10];
iv.the applicant’s mother’s relatives did visit in 1995 without being registered with the authorities and this caused the police to detain and question him and the visitors, but the applicant did not face any further problems with the police for 15 years: [11];
v.the applicant’s wife’s male cousin and his wife did not visit the family in 2010, and the cousin was not part of the LTTE and nor were he and his wife sent to a rehabilitation centre after the war: [12];
vi.the CID did not visit his home after their alleged visit to question him, because this fact was never raised at the arrival interview or subsequent questioning in relation to the Visa application: [12];
vii.the applicant’s wife was visited by the CID after the applicant came to Australia, but those visits were not for the reason that the applicant had perceived links to the LTTE: [13];
viii.the letter from the Attorney dated 20 May 2013 is not evidence that the applicant will be incarcerated for long periods, as it does nothing more than state what the applicant’s wife told the Attorney: [14];
ixthe applicant was not of any real interest to the CID, given the lack of severe consequences in relation to the threat that was allegedly made to his wife four and a half years ago: [14];
ix.based on the evidence, the only offence committed by the applicant was to depart the country illegally, and the only reason the CID were interested in or had threatened to arrest the applicant was because he had departed the country illegally and their questioning of the wife would have been simply to confirm their suspicions that the applicant had done so. Those threats ceased in 2013: [14]; and
x.the applicant was not of any interest to the Sri Lankan authorities when he departed Sri Lanka for Australia in September 2012 due to a perception that he has links with the LTTE: [15];
e. summarised the relevant law: [16]-[17], [29]-[30] (CB 190, 192-193);
f.found that, on the evidence, there is not a real chance the applicant will be targeted for any harm for reasons of him being a Tamil male and/or a perception of links to the LTTE: [22] (CB 191);
g.found that there is not a real chance of any harm to the applicant based on his Catholic faith: [23] (CB 191);
h.found that there is not a real chance the applicant will face persecution because of an imputed political opinion linking him to the LTTE, because he sought asylum in Australia: [24] (CB 191);
i.found that, based on DFAT advice and given that the applicant was a passenger on a boat and not a people smuggler, there is not a real chance that the applicant will be given a custodial sentence for the illegal departure: [25] (CB 192);
j.was not satisfied that the applicant faces a real chance of persecution in the reasonably foreseeable future for reasons of his Tamil ethnicity, imputed political opinion linking him to the LTTE, his Catholic faith, him being a failed asylum seeker or having departed illegally: [27] (CB 192);
k.found that the applicant does not meet the requirements of the definition of refugee in s. 5H(1) or the criteria in s 36(2)(a) of the Act: [28] (CB 192);
l.found that there are not substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed to Sri Lanka, there is a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm: [33]-[34] (CB 193); and
m. affirmed the decision not to grant the applicant a Visa: [34] (CB 193).
Application for judicial review
In his application for judicial review filed on 24 January 2018, the applicant asserts the following grounds of judicial error (verbatim):
1.The IAA applied the wrong legal test.
2.The IAA did not afford me procedural fairness.
3.The IAA erred in law by not correctly considering my claims for protection under s 5J(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
4.The IAA erred in law by not correctly considering claims under s 36(2A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
5.The IAA erred in law by not correctly considering claims for complementary protection under s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act (Cth).
6.The IAA did not consider all of my claims, correctly and accurately. I will provide all the relevant details.
The applicant has not particularised any of these grounds or provided the relevant details of the Authority’s failure to consider his claims correctly and accurately.
On 31 October 2018 the Court made orders by consent, including that the applicant file any amended application with proper particulars and a written Outline of Submissions not less than 28 days before the final hearing date. Despite being afforded the opportunity to do so, the applicant has not particularised his claim, nor has he filed written submissions.
Prior to the judicial review hearing on 12 February 2025, the Minister filed and served a court book and an Outline of Submissions. The Minister also filed and subsequently read an affidavit of Trent Berenger Jones dated 7 February 2025 which deposed to correspondence between the Minister’s solicitors and the applicant and confirmed service of the court book and the Minister’s written Outline of Submissions.
JUDICIAL REVIEW HEARING
At the judicial review hearing on 12 February 2025, the applicant appeared self represented. He was assisted by a Tamil interpreter. The Minister was represented by a solicitor, Mr McDonald.
The applicant confirmed he had received the court book, but not the Minister’s Outline of Submissions. The applicant accepted that he had received an email from the Minister’s solicitors in the days before the hearing but said he did not read it. Mr McDonald provided the applicant with another copy of the Outline and I adjourned the proceedings for 30 minutes for the applicant and the interpreter to look at the document.
Before inviting the applicant to address the Court, I provided him with an explanation about the Court’s role in a judicial review proceeding and provided guidance about the procedure the Court would adopt during the hearing. I explained to the applicant that the Court cannot review the merits of the Authority’s decision or grant the visa that he seeks. I informed him that the role of the Court was restricted to determining whether the Authority made a material error in arriving at its decision. I emphasised to him that he should endeavour to explain why the Authority made an error in its decision-making and what he believes the Authority did wrong, suggesting that he should use the grounds in his application for guidance. My explanation was interpreted and, based on the applicant’s responses, I am confident he properly comprehended the scope and purpose of the hearing.
The applicant did not address or develop the grounds in his application.
The applicant submitted that the Authority was wrong to find that he would not be in danger on his return. He said he will be in danger “anytime” and that the new government in Sri Lanka was doing the same things. He reiterated that his life will be in danger and that he needs some kind of visa so he can live in Australia safely. The applicant said that he had a wife and three children in Sri Lanka and that if he did not have a genuine fear there would be no reason for him to have been separated from them for 13 years. Relevantly, the applicant said that he had explained all these things at the interview and he does not know why the Authority thinks he does not have a problem.
In a brief reply submission, the applicant added that being a Tamil in Sri Lanka is a problem. He also said that being a Catholic in Sri Lanka is a problem.
Consideration
By reason of the applicant’s failure to particularise the alleged grounds of error, his application can be dealt with briefly. The grounds as expressed in his application for judicial review are in the form of a template and they do not engage in any substantive way with the Authority’s published reasons. The applicant displayed no real familiarity with the grounds in his application. Moreover, the applicant conceded that the matters he raised in his brief oral submission and reply were all matters which had been raised during the interview.
I will deal with each of the grounds and the Minister’s submissions.
Ground one
By this ground, the applicant asserts that the Authority applied the wrong legal test. The broad generality of this assertion and the applicant’s failure to point to any particular legal error is fatal.
The Authority was required to consider each of the applicant’s claims against the tests for refugee protection in s 36(2)(a) of the Act. It is clear that the Authority did so at [26]-[28] of its reasons. The applicant’s claims were also required to be tested against the criteria for complementary protection under s 36(2)(aa) of the Act. Again it is evident that the Authority did so at [32]-[34] of its reasons.
I am satisfied that the Authority properly reviewed the delegate’s decision and applied the correct legal test in doing so. There is no discernible legal error. Ground one must fail.
Ground two
The applicant contends that the Authority did not afford him procedural fairness.
The Minister speculates that in advancing this ground, the applicant may be referring either to the Authority’s decision not to conduct an oral hearing and/or its decision not to take into account “new information” in the form of country information from Amnesty International (2014) and a June 2013 issues paper produced by the Australian Refugee Review Tribunal (ARRT).
The Authority was required to perform its review pursuant to the fast track review process in Part 7AA of the Act. The practical role of the Authority under Part 7AA was helpfully explained by Judge Kelly in CUZ17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2019] FCCA 3074 at [24] - [25] where his Honour stated:
“[24]In contrast with a review under Pt 5 or Pt 7 of the Act, the fast track scheme provided by Pt 7AA is a mechanism of limited merits review. Division 3 of Part 7AA variously: provides an exhaustive statement of the natural justice hearing rule respecting a review conducted by the Authority; requires that the Authority should ordinarily conduct its review on the papers; provides for the exceptional, and strictly circumscribed, circumstances in which new information or documents may be sought or employed; and authorises and prescribes the manner in which the Authority may conduct an interview of the applicant or otherwise obtain further information.
[25]In general, the Authority must conduct its review without accepting or requesting new or additional information and without interviewing the applicant. The Authority may, but is under no duty to, get any documents or information that was not before the delegate. Section 473DD proscribes the Authority from considering any new information unless the conditions provided by that section are satisfied.”
[citations omitted]
Any assessment of the Authority’s obligation to afford procedural fairness to the applicant must be considered in the context of Part 7AA, in particular Division 3 which, together with ss 473GA and 473GB, is taken to be an “exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule in relation to reviews conducted by the [Authority]”.
Pursuant to s 473DB there is no duty on the Authority to conduct a hearing or to request new information from the applicant[4], although the Authority has the discretion to do both. Section 473DD provides that new information is only able to be considered in exceptional circumstances. If the Authority proposes to consider any new information, section 473DE requires the Authority to explain the relevance of the information to the applicant and to afford the applicant an opportunity to provide comments in writing or at an interview.
[4] See ABT17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2020) 269 CLR 439
The scheme of Part 7AA contemplates that the Authority will conduct its review “on the papers” and without interviewing the applicant. In so far as the applicant might contend that he was denied the opportunity of an oral hearing, there was no duty on the Authority to afford him that opportunity.
At [5]-[6] of its reasons the Authority acknowledged receipt of the applicant’s submissions which included the two sources of country information I referred to above. The Authority considered this to be “new information”. Under Part 7AA the Authority is required to conduct its review without accepting or requesting new information (s 473DB), other than in the limited circumstances set out in ss 473DC and 473DD.
In AUS17 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection (2020) 269 CLR 494 at [11]-[12] the High Court held that in considering whether new information should be received, the Authority is required to consider:
(a)first, whether the information is information that could not have been provided to the Minister: s 473DD(b)(i); and
(b)whether the information is credible personal information: s 473DD(b)(ii) and then
(c)whether there are exceptional circumstances to justify considering the new information: s 473DD(a).
The Minister submits, and I agree, that the Authority properly performed its statutory task in considering whether the new information should be received as part of the review. The reasons of the Authority at [5]-[6] reveal that it was aware of the “new information” and it proceeded to summarise the content of the Amnesty International report and the ARRT issues paper. The Authority then considered and found that the reports were not credible personal information because they were general in nature. The Authority also found that the information predated the delegate’s decision by a number of years and that the applicant had sufficient time to provide this information to the delegate. Having dealt with the relevant tests in ss 473DD(b)(i) and (ii), the Authority then considered and found that there were no exceptional circumstances to justify considering the new information.
The Authority performed its statutory task. The applicant has not pointed to a specific instance of error and I am satisfied that he was not denied procedural fairness. Ground two must be dismissed.
Grounds three to five
In their written and oral submissions, the Minister addressed these grounds as a group. These grounds, taken together, assert that the Authority erred in its application of ss 5J(1), 36(2)(aa) and 36(2A) by failing to correctly consider his claims for protection. These grounds seek to impugn the Authority’s application of the refugee and complementary protection criteria.
In his application for the SHEV the applicant advanced four principal claims for protection, namely his:
(a)Tamil ethnicity;
(b)imputed association with the LTTE;
(c)Catholic faith; and
(d)status as a failed asylum seeker.
The Minister submits, and again I agree, that the Authority did properly consider each of these claims. I am satisfied that on a fair and balanced reading of the Authority’s reasons, it is evident that the Authority considered the applicant’s claims in respect of the refugee criteria. The Authority considered the applicant’s Tamil ethnicity at [22], his connection to persons linked to the LTTE at [11]-[14] and [22], his Catholic faith at [23] and his status as an asylum seeker at [24]-[26].
The Authority concluded that on each claim for protection the applicant did not face a real chance of persecution pursuant to s 5J of the Act which therefore meant that the applicant also did not face a real risk of serious harm if returned to Sri Lanka for the purposes of s 36(2)(a) of the Act.
The Authority was also entitled to conclude that the applicant did not face a real chance of significant harm under the complementary protection criteria in s 36(2)(aa) for the same reasons.
At [29]-[30] the Authority set out the relevant law it was required to consider in respect of the complementary protection criteria. The Authority considered the applicant’s claims for protection and accepted that the applicant may be detained briefly as a failed asylum seeker if he returned, but found that detention for a short time did not rise to the threshold of significant harm prescribed in s 36(2A) which would in turn engage the complementary protection obligations under s s 36(2)(aa).
In his oral submissions to the Court, the applicant reiterated his concerns that he is a person of interest to Sri Lankan authorities and that he might be subjected to harm on his return. The applicant conceded that the matters he raised in oral submissions before me had been raised during the SHEV interview process. His real complaint is that he does not understand why the Authority did not accept them. He invites impermissible merits review.
The applicant also advanced in oral submission that the current government of Sri Lanka is the same as previous governments and that he continues to have fears for his safety. I accept the Minister’s submission that any claims relating to the current government were not before the Authority and cannot be the basis of judicial error.
There is no merit to the applicant’s complaint that the Authority failed to consider his claims for protection or that the Authority failed to do so in accordance with the statutory refugee or complementary protection criteria. The Authority properly performed its statutory task as required by the Act. Each of grounds three to five will be dismissed.
Ground six
Ground six is a further broad unparticularised claim which asserts a failure by the Authority to correctly and accurately consider each of the applicant’s claims. The stated ground anticipates that the applicant would provide further relevant details, but he has not.
The applicant’s claims were considered by the Authority in respect of the refugee criteria at [22]-[28] of its reasons. The applicant’s claims were also considered against the complementary protection criteria at [31]-[34]. The applicant has not pointed to how the Authority’s consideration of his claims in those paragraphs was either incorrect or inaccurate.
I take this ground to be a further iteration of grounds three to five. I have dismissed those grounds for the reasons set out above and for those reasons also dismiss ground six.
DISPOSITION
The application for judicial review is without merit. None of the grounds set out in the written application or the brief arguments raised orally by the applicant identify judicial error.
The application will be dismissed.
I will make the administrative orders identified at paragraphs 25(a) and (b) of the Minister’s Outline of Submissions, regarding the change of name of the first respondent and the substitution of the Administrative Review Tribunal as the second respondent. I will otherwise hear the parties on costs.
I certify that the preceding fifty-seven (57) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Forbes. Associate:
Dated: 20 February 2025
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