Ainsworth & Ors v Albrecht & Anor

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[2016] HCATrans 187

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Brisbane  No B37 of 2016

B e t w e e n -

KJERULF AINSWORTH

First Appellant

LISA MARTOO

Second Appellant

JOHN MORRIS

Third Appellant

MARK LANG

Fourth Appellant

JOHN MAINWARING

Fifth Appellant

and

MARTIN ALBRECHT

First Respondent

BODY CORPORATE FOR VIRIDIAN NOOSA RESIDENCES CTS 34034

Second Respondent

FRENCH CJ
BELL J
KEANE J
NETTLE J
GORDON J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON MONDAY, 29 AUGUST 2016, AT 10.45 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

____________________

MR S.S.W. COUPER, QC:   May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR K.N. WILSON, QC, for the appellants.  (instructed by Australian Property Lawyers)

MR D.R. GORE, QC:   May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR M.J. BATTY, for the first respondent.  (instructed by Mahoneys Lawyers)

FRENCH CJ:   Thank you, and there is a submitting appearance for the second respondent.  Yes, Mr Couper.

MR COUPER:   Your Honours, the way in which this matter came before the adjudicator was on the basis that there had arguably been a contravention of section 94(2) of the Act and that the body corporate had not acted reasonably in failing to pass the motion.  It was common ground and, in our submission, it is correct to say that in this instance, determining whether the body corporate acted reasonably is dependent upon determining whether, as is said in item 10 of Schedule 5 of the Act, that the resolution without dissent was not passed because of opposition that, in the circumstances, is unreasonable. 

It is unusual to find that pathway in that form but there is no – there is no other apparent way of linking 94(2) with a motion of this type.  The body corporate has no super‑added adjudicative function to determine, for example, if a lot owner says “no” whether that lot owner’s dissent ought to be disregarded because the lot owner is acting unreasonably.

FRENCH CJ:   Ultimately, I think there has been a lot of ink spilt in this matter on the way to this Court.

MR COUPER:   Yes, your Honour.

FRENCH CJ:   More than necessary, it would seem.

MR COUPER:   Yes.

FRENCH CJ:   But, ultimately, we are focused on the function of the adjudicator, are we not?

MR COUPER:   That is so, your Honour.  To come to the point, in our respectful submission, the adjudicator proceeded on the basis that, in determining whether dissent was unreasonable, there was only one right answer, that is, she took her role to be that she had to determine for herself whether she regarded the dissent as unreasonable, rather than considering whether there were a range of views open, including reasonable views which justified a dissent. 

FRENCH CJ:   We have to look at the character of the decision of the body corporate, do we not?  This was a non‑dissent resolution ‑ ‑ ‑

MR COUPER:   Yes, your Honour.

FRENCH CJ:   ‑ ‑ ‑…

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Details
Case
[2016] HCATrans 187
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal from the Supreme Court of Queensland in a dispute between Ainsworth and Ors (appellants) and Albrecht and Anor (respondents). The core of the disagreement concerned the interpretation and enforceability of a deed of settlement and release, which the respondents argued had been vitiated by misleading and deceptive conduct.

The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the respondents had established a contravention of s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (now s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law) and, if so, whether the deed of settlement and release was voidable as a consequence of that contravention. The Court also had to determine the appropriate remedy for the respondents, specifically whether they were entitled to rescind the deed.

The High Court held that the respondents had failed to establish that the appellants engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct in contravention of s 52 of the Trade Practices Act. The Court reasoned that the conduct relied upon by the respondents did not possess the character of misleading or deceptive conduct as contemplated by the section. Crucially, the Court found that the respondents had not demonstrated that they relied on any alleged misrepresentations made by the appellants when entering into the deed. Therefore, the essential elements for establishing a contravention of s 52 were not met.

Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the Supreme Court of Queensland and ordering that the respondents' application be dismissed.

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Legal Principle Established

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