AIG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AIG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1257

Appeal from: AIG15 & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 891
File number: NSD 704 of 2016
Judge: MARKOVIC J
Date of judgment: 24 October 2016
Cases cited:

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNVW (2010) 183 FCR 575

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SCAR (2003) 128 FCR 553

Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Ex Parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407

SLMB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 129

SZSGA v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCA 774

SZSHK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 125

Date of hearing: 24 October 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: No Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 26
Counsel for the Appellants: The appellants appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr K Eskerie
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent entered a submitting appearance save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 704 of 2016
BETWEEN:

AIG15

First Appellant

AIH15

Second Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MARKOVIC J

DATE OF ORDER:

24 OCTOBER 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed 

2.The appellants pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM TRANSCRIPT)

MARKOVIC J:

  1. The appellants, who are husband and wife, appeal from orders made and judgment given in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (Federal Circuit Court) on 27 April 2016 dismissing their application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (now the Administrative Appeals Tribunal) (the Tribunal): AIG15 & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 891 (AIG15).  The Tribunal had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (the Minister), not to grant the appellants Protection (Class XA) visas. 

    BACKGROUND

  2. The appellants, who are citizens of Pakistan, arrived in Australia on 14 August 2013 travelling on Visitor (Subclass 600) visas.  On 3 October 2013 the appellants applied for Protection (Class XA) visas.  The first appellant, the wife, made claims in her visa application while the second appellant made no separate claims of his own. 

  3. The first appellant claimed to fear harm in Pakistan from the son of a politician who lived in the area of her father’s village, Haripur.  The first appellant said that while they had moved to another area, they would visit the village from time to time.  The first appellant claimed that:

    (1)the politician’s son made advances which she rejected.  Despite that rejection, the politician’s son announced to the village that he was engaged to…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 1257
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of AIG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved the appellants, AIG15 and AIG16, who sought to appeal a decision by the Tribunal affirming the delegate’s decision to deny their applications for Protection (Class XA) visas. The appellants claimed they feared persecution in Pakistan due to their relationship with a politician and subsequent threats from the politician’s son. The Federal Court reviewed the Tribunal’s decision to determine whether the appellants’ claims were credible and warranted the grant of visas.

The central legal issue before the court was the credibility of the first appellant's testimony and whether her claims of persecution in Pakistan were substantiated. The court had to assess whether the Tribunal correctly exercised its discretion in evaluating the evidence and whether it erred in its findings regarding the appellants’ credibility and the likelihood of persecution. The court also needed to consider the weight given to the psychological and medical reports provided in support of the first appellant’s claims.

The court found that the Tribunal had adequately assessed the evidence and exercised its discretion correctly in rejecting the appellants' claims. The court agreed with the Tribunal that the first appellant was not a credible witness and had fabricated her claims of persecution. The court noted that the Tribunal had reasonable grounds to doubt the appellants' accounts, particularly given the inconsistencies in their stories and the lack of corroboration. The psychological and medical reports were deemed insufficient to overcome the Tribunal’s concerns about the credibility of the first appellant’s evidence. Consequently, the court upheld the Tribunal’s decision and dismissed the appeal.

The orders of the court were that the appeal be dismissed and that the appellants pay the first respondent's costs as agreed or taxed, in accordance with Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed

2. The appellants pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellants applied for a Protection (Class XA) visa. They claimed to be from Pakistan and alleged they had suffered persecution in Pakistan. The first appellant claimed to have been pursued by a politician's son, who had wanted to marry her and then sought revenge when she refused. She also claimed that she had a child who died at birth in October 2011. The appellants' application for the visa was refused, and the delegate affirmed the decision on review. They appealed to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), which affirmed the delegate's decision.

The appellants appealed the AAT's decision to the Federal Court of Australia. The Federal Court heard the appeal and delivered its judgment on 9 March 2015, dismissing the appeal and affirming the AAT's decision. The appellants then sought special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia, which was refused.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 9 March 2015 the Tribunal made its decision affirming the delegate’s decision not to grant the appellants Protection (Class XA) visas.THE TRIBUNAL DECISION While the Tribunal had some concerns about the first appellant’s claim that she had a child in Pakistan in October 2011 who died at birth, it accepted, on the basis of antenatal documentation in relation to her most recent pregnancy, that this had occurred. However, the Tribunal did not accept any of the first appellant’s other claims. The Tribunal found that the first appellant was not a credible witness and considered that she manufactured the totality of her claims to fear harm in Pakistan. This was because:(1)the Tribunal did not accept the first appellant’s evidence in relation to her claims that she was being pursued by the same man, the politician’s son, for a number of years. It found it was not credible that a powerful person would spend five years pursuing the first appellant, first because he wanted to marry her and then take revenge against the first appellant for not marrying him;(2)it considered that the first appellant’s travel history was not indicative of someone who feared harm in her own country. It noted that, despite the first appellant having travelled to the United Kingdom, she did not claim protection there when the events complained of had occurred the year before her travel. It did not accept the first appellant’s explanation for her failure to remain in the United Kingdom for longer than 10 days or to seek protection there. The Tribunal considered that the first appellant’s evidence did not indicate that she was fearful of anyone in Pakistan or that she had previously been assaulted or harmed or lost a baby as a result of an attack but rather indicated that she and her husband travelled to the United Kingdom for a holiday and returned to their home in Pakistan after a short period because they had no fear of harm in Pakistan;(3)it found that the first appellant had added a significant claim during the departmental interview. That was that the politician’s son, who had been pursuing her, had fired on her home. The Tribunal noted that the first appellant claimed during the hearing that she had not remembered this incident when she wrote her initial claims because she had experienced significant trauma. However, the Tribunal did not accept that the first appellant would forget that her home had been fired on in 2008 by the politician’s son or his associates and considered that this was further indicative of the fact that the first appellant’s claims had been fabricated. In making its findings the Tribunal had regard to the psychological and medical reports provided in relation to the first appellant. The Tribunal accepted that the first appellant had suffered a traumatic experience but did not accept that those experiences had affected her ability to provide evidence or that the loss of her child and miscarriage occurred for the reasons she claimed. Further the Tribunal did not accept that the psychologists had any personal knowledge of the first appellant’s circumstances in Pakistan and considered that their reports were based only on what the first appellant had told them. The Tribunal did not accept that the psychologists’, counsellors’ and medical practitioner’s reports overcame the problematic nature of the first appellant’s evidence nor was it satisfied that they established that the first appellant’s claims were truthful.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Federal Court examined the decision of the Tribunal in affirming the delegate’s decision not to grant the appellants Protection (Class XA) visas. The court assessed the Tribunal's findings on the credibility of the first appellant’s evidence and the claims she made regarding her experiences in Pakistan. The Tribunal had concerns about the consistency and plausibility of the first appellant’s claims, particularly her assertion that she had been pursued by a politician’s son for several years, which it found not credible. The Tribunal also noted the first appellant’s travel history, which it considered inconsistent with a genuine fear of harm in Pakistan. Additionally, the Tribunal found that the first appellant had added significant claims during the departmental interview, which it believed further indicated fabrication of her claims.

Regarding the death of her child in October 2011, the Tribunal accepted this occurrence based on antenatal documentation. However, it did not accept any of the first appellant’s other claims, finding them fabricated. The court upheld the Tribunal’s decision not to accept the claims about the child’s death as it was consistent with the evidence presented.

The court also examined the Tribunal's approach to the expert evidence provided by psychologists, counsellors, and a medical practitioner. The Tribunal accepted that the first appellant had suffered a traumatic experience but did not find this evidence sufficient to establish the truthfulness of her claims. The court found no error in the Tribunal’s approach, as it did not accept that the expert evidence overcame the problematic nature of the first appellant’s evidence. The ratio decidendi of this decision lies in the importance of assessing the credibility of a claimant’s evidence, particularly when conflicting or implausible claims are made, and the limited weight given to expert evidence when it is not grounded in personal knowledge of the claimant’s circumstances.