SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Ahwang v Torres Strait Island Regional Council [2021] QSC 147
PARTIES:
ALONZA AHWANG
(applicant)
v
TORRES STRAIT ISLAND REGIONAL COUNCIL
(respondent)
FILE NO/S:
SC 219 of 2020
DIVISION:
Trial
PROCEEDING:
Application
ORIGINATING COURT: Supreme Court at Cairns
DELIVERED ON:
21 June 2021
DELIVERED AT:
Cairns
HEARING DATE:
4 May 2021
JUDGE:
Henry J
ORDERS:
1. Application for leave to extend time within which to make application for statutory order of review granted.
2. The decision of the Torres Strait Island Regional Council, of 23 July 2019, to grant a 99 year lease of residential property at Lot 123 on SP256048 (123 Damascus Road, St Pauls) on Moa Island to Anthony Pilot subject to conditions, is set aside.
3. The expressions of interest of Alonza Ahwang and Anthony Pilot in being granted a lease of the aforesaid property are referred to the Torres Strait Island Regional Council for consideration afresh.
4. I will hear the parties as to costs, if costs are not agreed in the meantime, at 9.15 am 21 July 2021.
CATCHWORDS:
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – JUDICIAL REVIEW – GROUNDS OF REVIEW – FAILURE TO OBSERVE STATUTORY PROCEDURE – where the respondent is the trustee of a grant of land in fee simple at St Pauls on Moa Island – where as trustee the respondent is obliged to hold the land on trust for the benefit of the Islander inhabitants – where the applicant and another person submitted to the respondent expressions of interest in leasing the property – where the respondent granted the lease to the other person and not the applicant – where the applicant sought a statutory order of review of this decision – whether the decision to grant the lease was a decision as per s 4 Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) – whether the respondent’s decision making process had to be in compliance with s 135 Torres Strait Islander Land Act 1991 (Qld) – whether the decision was made in compliance with the requirements of s 135 Torres Strait Islander Land Act – whether the decision was actually made in compliance with the respondents adopted decision making process
PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – TIME, EXTENSION AND ABRIDGMENT – where the application was filed over seven months out of time – whether an extension of time in which to apply should be granted
Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld), s 4, s 5(d), s 20, s 26
Torres Strait Islander Land Act 1991 (Qld), s 6, s 85, s 135
COUNSEL: C J Ryall for the applicant
M A Jonsson QC, with C Crawford, for the respondent
SOLICITORS: Atherton Tablelands Law for the applicant
Preston Law for the respondent
HENRY J: On 23 July 2019 the Torres Strait Island Regional Council decided to grant a 99 year lease of residential property at St Pauls on Moa Island by passing this motion:
“That pursuant to the Torres…
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- Case
- [2021] QSC 147
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to determine whether the decision to grant the lease was subject to the statutory procedures outlined in the Torres Strait Islander Land Act, and whether the Council's decision-making process complied with those procedures. The court also had to consider whether the application was filed outside the statutory time limit, and whether an extension of time should be granted.
The court found that the Council's own evidence showed that it made its decision under the Torres Strait Islander Land Act and applied the decision-making process stipulated by s 135 of that Act. The court found that s 135 applied to the decision to grant the lease, and that the Council was required to have regard to any Island custom for decisions of that kind. The court also found that the Council's decision-making process was not in compliance with s 135, as it had not considered any relevant Island custom. The court granted the application for leave to extend time within which to make the application for review, and set aside the decision of the Council to grant the lease. The court referred the expressions of interest of both the applicant and Mr Pilot to the Council for consideration afresh. The court will hear the parties as to costs if they are not agreed in the meantime.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Application for leave to extend time within which to make application for statutory order of review granted.
2. The decision of the Torres Strait Island Regional Council, of 23 July 2019, to grant a 99 year lease of residential property at Lot 123 on SP256048 (123 Damascus Road, St Pauls) on Moa Island to Anthony Pilot subject to conditions, is set aside.
3. The expressions of interest of Alonza Ahwang and Anthony Pilot in being granted a lease of the aforesaid property are referred to the Torres Strait Island Regional Council for consideration afresh.
4. I will hear the parties as to costs, if costs are not agreed in the meantime, at 9.15 am 21 July 2021.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Mr Ahwang’s second complaint is that the decision-making process adopted was not a “decision-making process” as contemplated by s 135(2)(b).Consideration Mr Ahwang’s first complaint is that Council made no enquiry into whether there existed a relevant pre-existing Islander decision making process or custom of the kinds referred to in s 135(2)(a)(i) and (ii). A difficulty confronting this complaint is that Mr Levi deposed, without contradiction, that there is no pre-existing Islander decision making process or custom of the kind referred to in s 135(2)(a)(i) and (ii).[5] Mr Ahwang highlights Mr Levi only deposed to that effect to the best of his knowledge. It was submitted he had a duty to inquire as to the existence of a relevant decision making process or custom and there is no evidence of any such inquiry. [5]Council’s legal services manager Ms Maurus deposed similarly but the flaw in Mr Ahwang’s complaint can be adequately exposed by reference to the evidence of Mr Levi and the way it was dealt with in the application. It is not apparent why Mr Levi’s existing knowledge base would have been so poor that he was obliged to make inquiries into the existence of something which he believed did not exist. He has been a divisional councillor since 2016. He is a long-standing resident of St Pauls and both his parents were born there. It is not inherently implausible that his knowledge as to the existence or otherwise of the relevant process or custom was soundly based. It is important to appreciate that the decision-making process referred to in s 135(2)(a)(i) is one which “the Torres Strait Islanders for whom the trustee holds the land” have agreed on. If the beneficiaries of the trust had agreed on such a decision-making process for decisions whether to grant an interest in land the subject of the DOGIT it is reasonable to expect such an agreement would have been well known to Mr Levi. It is also important to bear in mind that the decision-making process or custom referred to respectively by s 135(2)(a)(i) and (ii) is, in each instance, qualified by the words, “for decisions of that kind”. In the present context, that kind of decision is a decision whether to grant a lease of part of the land to a particular person. It may be characterised as a decision about the matters listed in s 135(1)(b) and (d), a lease at once being a form of agreement about the land as well as involving a grant of an interest in the land. The wording of s 135(2)(a)(ii) in the present context therefore requires that regard be had to any Island custom “for decisions” to grant a lease of a particular lot of land on the Island. There may of course be Island customs which could assist the trustee in weighing the respective merits of each expression of interest as part of its decision making about whether and to whom it should grant a lease. However, it might be thought less likely that there exists an Island custom “for” a decision to grant a lease to an individual. Thus, while Island custom may be relevant to considerations relevant to the respective merits of the two expressions of interest in this case, it is by no means obvious that there would exist an Island custom “for” such a decision. There is therefore no basis to assume that there must so obviously have existed an Island custom for the decision that Mr Levi was wrong in thinking there was not.