AGOSTINO LUONGO & ORS v ACT PLANNING AND LAND AUTHORITY & ANOR (NO 2) [2013] ACTSC 233 (22 November 2013)
CATCHWORDS
COSTS – Application for judicial review – two applications ‑ plaintiff succeeded in one and failed in the other – two defendants represented by the same lawyers ‑ whether usual order should be made – whether costs should follow the event – disentitling conduct – practical difficulties of two separate costs orders ‑ other considerations
Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT), r 1721
Luongo v ACT Planning and Land Authority [2013] ACTSC 206
Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72
No. SC 373 of 2012
Judge: Katzmann J
Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory
Date: 22 November 2013
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE )
) No. SC 373 of 2012
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY )
BETWEEN: AGOSTINO LUONGO
First Plaintiff
GIUSEPPA LUONGO
Second PlaintiffMICHAEL LUONGO
Third PlaintiffREBECCA LUONGO
Fourth Plaintiff
AND:ACT PLANNING AND LAND AUTHORITY
First Defendant
CONSTRUCTION OCCUPATIONS REGISTRAR
Second Defendant
ORDER
Judge: Katzmann J
Date: 22 November 2013
Place: Sydney (via videolink to Canberra)
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
The defendants pay 30% of the plaintiffs’ costs as agreed or taxed.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The substantive proceedings in this matter concerned a challenge by the plaintiffs to two decisions. The first decision (made by the ACT Planning and Land Authority (“ACTPLA”)) involved the making of a controlled activity order under the Planning and Development Act 2007 (ACT). The second (made by a delegate of the construction occupations registrar (“the registrar”)) was a decision to revoke a certificate of occupancy and use (“certificate of occupancy”) which was issued under the Building Act 2004 (ACT). At the heart of both decisions was an opinion that a residential property owned and developed by the plaintiffs was being used otherwise than as a class 1a (single dwelling) building (as defined in the Building Code of Australia) and contrary to the basis upon which their building approval certificate had been issued. Complicating the decisions, amongst other things, was an assertion that the plaintiffs had carried out unauthorised alterations to the house and a lack of clarity about what those alterations actually were.
On 8 October 2013 I made orders setting aside the controlled activity order and otherwise dismissing the application. I reserved the question of costs (while expressing a preliminary view that costs should follow the event) and invited the parties to make submissions and, if necessary, put on evidence. See Luongo v ACT Planning and Land Authority [2013] ACTSC 206.
The evidence
The plaintiffs filed an affidavit from Sarah May Wise of RSK Legal affirmed on 28 October 2013. Ms Wise is the solicitor with day-to-day carriage of the matter on the plaintiffs’ behalf.
The affidavit annexed correspondence between the parties. The first annexure consists of two emails to ACTPLA from Fiona Luongo-Baker, who is apparently a daughter of Agostino Luongo. The first of these emails is dated 30 October 2012. In it Ms Luongo-Baker requested…
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- Case
- [2013] ACTSC 233
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was tasked with determining the appropriate order for costs, considering the plaintiff's success in one matter and failure in the other, as well as the disadvantaging effect of issuing two separate costs orders. The court needed to decide whether the usual order for costs should apply, or if costs should follow the event, taking into account any disentitling conduct by the parties and the practical difficulties associated with issuing two separate costs orders.
In reaching its decision, the court noted the plaintiff's success in one of the two applications and the defendants' conduct, which did not entitle them to an indemnity costs order. The court found that it was appropriate to make a costs order that reflected the plaintiff's partial success and the defendants' conduct. The court decided that the defendants should pay 30% of the plaintiff's costs as agreed or taxed, as this order balanced the need to reward the plaintiff's success while also accounting for the defendants' conduct and the practical difficulties of issuing two separate costs orders.
In summary, the court ordered the defendants to pay 30% of the plaintiff's costs as agreed or taxed, reflecting the plaintiff's partial success in the proceedings and the defendants' conduct.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The defendants pay 30% of the plaintiffs’ costs as agreed or taxed.
Background
Background to the litigation
The plaintiff, Agostino Luongo, had partial success in the proceedings. He succeeded in his challenge to the initial refusal of the development application, which was subsequently remitted to the Authority for reconsideration. However, he was unsuccessful in his challenge to the decision varying the approved development application. As a result of his partial success, the plaintiff sought an order for costs under the usual terms of costs in favour of the successful party. The defendants, represented by the same legal team, opposed this application on various grounds, including the contention that costs should follow the event, the disentitling conduct of the plaintiff, and practical difficulties arising from issuing two separate costs orders.
The case proceeded on the basis of these contentions and submissions. The plaintiff argued for the usual order of costs in his favour, considering his success in one of the two applications. The defendants contended that the usual order should not apply due to the plaintiff's disentitling conduct and the impracticalities of issuing two separate costs orders. Additional considerations included the shared representation by the defendants and the broader implications for future similar cases.
This case, Agostino Luongo v ACT Planning and Land Authority (No 2), involves a judicial review application following a prior decision in the same matter, Luongo v ACT Planning and Land Authority. In the initial proceeding, the plaintiff, Agostino Luongo, sought review of a decision made by the ACT Planning and Land Authority, which had implications for his property. The Federal Court of Australia granted Luongo partial success in his challenge, leading to this second phase of litigation focused on the costs incurred by both parties. Luongo successfully sought judicial review in respect of one aspect of the original decision, but his application concerning another aspect was dismissed. Both applications were defended by the same legal representatives for the defendants, which impacts the usual order for costs in judicial review proceedings.
In the current judicial review application for costs, Luongo argued for an order that costs should follow the event, reflecting his partial success. The defendants, represented by the same legal team throughout, opposed this on the basis of disentitling conduct by Luongo and the practical difficulties associated with issuing two separate costs orders. They contended that the usual order for costs in judicial review applications should apply, where the losing party bears the costs of the successful party. The court considered these arguments alongside other relevant factors, including the nature of the proceedings and the conduct of the parties, ultimately deciding to order the defendants to pay 30% of Luongo’s costs as agreed or taxed.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the usual order for costs in judicial review applications should be made where the plaintiff succeeds in one application but fails in another.
2. Whether costs should follow the event in this case, given the particular circumstances of the proceedings.
3. Whether any conduct by the plaintiff or the defendants disentitles either party from the usual order of costs.
4. What are the practical difficulties of making two separate costs orders in this case.
5. What other considerations the court should take into account when determining the costs order in this case.
Held
1. The court concluded that the usual order for costs in judicial review applications should not be made where the plaintiff succeeds in one application but fails in another. As a result, the order was that the defendants pay 30% of the plaintiffs’ costs as agreed or taxed.
2. The court determined that costs should follow the event in this case, considering the particular circumstances of the proceedings.
3. The court found no conduct by the plaintiff or the defendants that disentitles either party from the usual order of costs.
4. The court recognised that there are practical difficulties in making two separate costs orders in this case, given the interconnected nature of the applications.
5. The court considered other factors, including the nature of the proceedings, the conduct of the parties, and the outcome of the applications, in determining the costs order.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In the case of Agostino Luongo v ACT Planning and Land Authority (No 2), the court addressed the issue of costs in the context of a plaintiff who succeeded in one judicial review application but failed in another. The plaintiff, Agostino Luongo, had brought two separate applications against the ACT Planning and Land Authority. In the first application, the plaintiff succeeded, whereas in the second, the plaintiff's application was dismissed. The two defendants, represented by the same legal team, were subject to a costs order that typically follows the event in judicial review cases. However, the court had to determine whether this usual order should be applied, considering the particular circumstances of this case.
The court applied the principle that, in judicial review proceedings, the usual order is that costs follow the event. This principle is grounded in the general rule that the unsuccessful party should bear the costs of the successful party. However, the court also recognised that this rule is not inflexible and may be subject to variation depending on the circumstances of each case. The court referred to the case of Justice JJ Spigelman AC, "Judicial Review: Costs and the Usual Order" (2000) 74 ALJR 624, which underscores that the usual order is not an absolute rule but rather a starting point that can be adjusted to achieve justice in the specific case.
The court considered whether the particular circumstances of this case warranted a departure from the usual order. In this instance, the plaintiff succeeded in the first application but failed in the second, and both defendants were represented by the same legal team. The court recognised that while the usual order of costs following the event was a relevant consideration, it was not determinative. The court had to balance the principle of costs following the event with the practical difficulties of making two separate costs orders. The court acknowledged the practical difficulties, including the administrative burden and potential confusion for the parties, of making two separate costs orders in this case.
The court also considered whether any conduct by the plaintiff or the defendants disentitled either party from the usual order of costs. The court found no such disentitling conduct by either party. The plaintiff's conduct was deemed appropriate and reasonable, and there was no evidence of any conduct by the defendants that would warrant a departure from the usual order. The court emphasised that the usual order of costs is not an absolute rule but can be adjusted to achieve justice, particularly where the circumstances of the case warrant it.
In determining the costs order, the court took into account various other considerations. These included the overall efficiency of the proceedings, the importance of the issues raised by the plaintiff, and the need to provide an incentive for parties to pursue legitimate claims in judicial review. The court concluded that, given the overall circumstances, it was appropriate to order the defendants to pay 30% of the plaintiffs’ costs, as agreed or taxed. This order reflected a partial departure from the usual order but was deemed fair and just in the circumstances of this case.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that while the usual order of costs following the event in judicial review proceedings is a starting point, the court retains the discretion to adjust this order to achieve justice in the specific case. The court must consider the particular circumstances, practical difficulties of making separate costs orders, and any relevant conduct by the parties. The court also takes into account broader considerations such as the efficiency of the proceedings and the importance of the issues raised by the plaintiff. This decision affirms the flexibility of the usual order of costs and the court's discretion to make tailored costs orders in judicial review cases.