Agli & Segura (No 2)
[2025] FedCFamC1A 136
•25 July 2025
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1) APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Agli & Segura (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1A 136
Appeal from: Orders of 10 June 2025 Appeal number: NAA 291 of 2025 File number: PAC 5209 of 2023 Judgment of: AUSTIN J Date of judgment: 25 July 2025 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – Practice and Procedure – Show Cause – Where the applicant was invited to show cause why the appeal should not be summarily dismissed – Where the wife appeals the grant of the husband’s application for divorce – Where none of the grounds of appeal purport to explain any appealable error made by the primary judge – Appeal summarily dismissed. Legislation: Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) ss 32, 46 Cases cited: Commonwealth v Mullane (1961) 106 CLR 166; [1961] HCA 28 Number of paragraphs: 20 Date of hearing: 25 July 2025 Place: Newcastle The Applicant: Litigant in person Counsel for the Respondent: Ms Wallace Solicitor for the Respondent: Parks Family Law Solicitor Advocate for the Litigation Guardian: Mr Beckman Solicitor for the Litigation Guardian: VRT Lawyers ORDERS
NAA 291 of 2025
PAC 5209 of 2023FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
DIVISION 1 APPELLATE JURISDICTIONBETWEEN: MS AGLI
Appellant
AND: MR SEGURA
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
AUSTIN J
DATE OF ORDER:
25 JULY 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The Application in an Appeal filed on 24 June 2025 is dismissed.
2.The Amended Notice of Appeal filed on 21 July 2025 is summarily dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Agli & Segura has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
EX TEMPORE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENTAUSTIN J:
The wife’s application for leave to appeal from orders made on 24 March 2025 (in appeal suit number NAA 162/2025) has just been dismissed.
These reasons now explain the summary dismissal of the wife’s appeal and allied application for leave to appeal from other orders made by the same judge on 10 June 2025.
Background
The husband wants to divorce the wife.
Her aberrant responses to his multiple divorce applications filed in 2024 resulted in a litigation guardian being appointed for her on 24 March 2025.
The husband then filed his fourth divorce application on 10 April 2025.
On 19 May 2025, the wife filed an Amended Application in a Proceeding seeking various forms of relief, including:
(a)the stay of all underlying proceedings pending the determination of her application for leave to appeal from the orders made on 24 March 2025 (it being noteworthy this was an application to stay the whole of the underlying proceedings, not merely the orders which were the subject of the former appellate application);
(b)the referral of a witness to authorities for prosecution for perjury allegedly committed at some point in the proceedings prior to February 2025;
(c)the referral of the husband’s lawyer for prosecution for forgery and deception at times prior to the orders made on 24 March 2025; and
(d)the referral of her litigation guardian for prosecution for potential perjury.
The wife’s application and the husband’s divorce application were both entertained by the primary judge on 10 June 2025, at which time her application was dismissed (Order 1) and his divorce application was granted (Order 2). Otherwise, the financial cause pending between the parties was listed for compliance and readiness hearing in August 2025 (Order 3).
On 24 June 2025, the wife appealed from all orders made on 10 June 2025.
The wife was then notified this appeal proceeding was listed in conjunction with the first appeal proceeding to determine whether it should be summarily dismissed for showing no reasonable prospect of success (s 32(3)(b) and s 46(2) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth)).
In the meantime, the wife filed an Amended Notice of Appeal on 21 July 2025 and written submissions on 24 July 2025.
Disposition
No appeal lies from the order listing the pending financial proceedings for further directions (Order 3), as it was entirely procedural and does not affect the parties’ rights in any way (Commonwealth v Mullane (1961) 106 CLR 166 at 169).
The wife has an absolute right of appeal from the divorce order (Order 2). However, the wife needs leave to appeal from the order dismissing her application (Order 1), as it was only an interlocutory order and was not made in child-related proceedings.
The wife’s residual grounds of appeal (numbered 19 to 38) are pleaded as follows:
19.[The primary judge] committed international crimes against humanity, upon a foreign [Country D] citizen like me, by violating my human rights, by appointing a lawyer, sought by husband, for me. She made orders sought by her appointed lawyer and continued proceedings, despite appeal.
20. GROUNDS: SUBSTANTIAL INJUSTICE
[A previous judge] decided to seek a fake guardian for me, before Attorney General, in absence of expert evidence, certifying that I need one. I agreed with [the previous judge’s] decision from fear. He scandalized me before [previous counsel for the husband] by asking me, if I had sex with my husband after I was served, outraging the modesty of a woman. [The previous judge] threatened me with making of cost notice, if I objected to his fee waived application. He said to me that he does not care what evidence says. He said that he was considering of making an injunction to stop me from reporting my husband and his witness to [named Board] for perjuring and for suborning witness’s perjury. Press reported how he relied on Internet, for expert medico-legal evidence. He told press that he does not care, if he makes front page news. Press reported that [another named Judge] found that [the previous judge] is bizarre. So I was reasonably scared.
21.On 28/10/24 [the previous judge] agreed with husband’s team. [Previous counsel for the husband named], that it is wrong to appoint a fake guardian in absence of expert evidence, certifying that I need one.
22.[The previous judge] argued with me that the day my husband filed for divorce is date of separation under one roof. I argued that there is no evidence. Then he argued that there is evidence of service of divorce. So that is date of separation under one roof in his view. I argued back that my husband has not affirmed it. He argued back that my husband will, if he waives the fee.
23.The [the previous judge] told my husband to withdraw his divorce application, file another one, whose fee he waived, and affirm date of service, as date of separation.
24.Since my husband did not affirm it, [the previous judge] decided to seek a fake guardian before Attorney General.
25.When Attorney General refused to comply, my husband unfairly sought [the primary judge] to appoint his lawyer from another firm, as my fake guardian.
26. GROUNDS: JUDGE DEMONSTRATES WRONG CONDUCT
On 24/3/25 [the primary judge] told me that it is wrong to give legal advice to a party. On 10/6/25, she wrongfully gave legal advice to [litigation guardian for the wife] to make application in an appeal, seeking listing. She can’t be trusted to do the right, she choses the wrong, after explaining what is wrong.
27. GROUNDS: FABRICATING CONDUCT OF [THE PRIMARY JUDGE]
[The primary judge] fabricated before Appeals court in para 5, Reasons of Judgment that she has as yet to deal with divorce application, and that I sought [solicitor for the husband’s] referral to prosecutions for perjury. She can’t be trusted to do the right, she choses to fabricate about herself as well as about me.
28. GROUNDS: INJUSTICE
[A magistrate] told my husband to sell our house and give me 50% in assets after 18 years of marriage. He texted me that he does not want to give me that much. He texted me that he will somehow appoint a lawyer for me, for his lawyer to make a joint divorce application on my behalf. That his lawyer will do an asset distribution of his choice but on my behalf. That his lawyer will receive her share of whatever he wants to give me. His notice of intention says that he wants to retain the sole ownership of our house. His application show that he wants to give me 30%. He wished me best of luck in bringing criminal charges against him. My husband’s lawyer, as my fake guardian then acted on those instructions, he already texted me about, and is continuing to do so.
29. GROUNDS: NO IRRETRIEVABLE BREAKDOWN OF MARRIAGE
My husband will not divorce me at the cost of selling our house, giving me 50% share, and at the cost of having to plead guilt to 6 counts of perjury and 2 counts of suborning witness’s perjury. Last year he sought a revocation of DVO, after seeking one. He goes back and forth his decision.
30.My husband told the court, that he won’t provide proof of separation by moving out. He told me that he told [a named Police Officer] from [suburb of police station] on 5 March 2024, that he separated for 3 days, from March 3, 2024 to 6, March 2024. He provided me with evidence to argue against his own application. It is his precaution to avoid divorce.
31.My husband and I will jointly apply for divorce, once he agrees on what [named Magistrate] told him to give me as a fair share after 18 years of marriage. I am 44 year old [Country D] woman. I have gone past my marriageable age. We shall jointly apply once he is ready to plead guilty for perjuring in 6 affidavits, and suborning witness’s perjury in 2 affidavits, as he has himself wished me all the best in bringing criminal charges against him, and expects me to act on it.
32.Our marriage is at a stage, where we, as family are helping US film maker [named], make a movie on how a Doyle’s guide recommended Sydney’s leading lawyer sought an Australian Judge of [Country E] origin to commit international crimes against humanity upon [a Country D] citizen by appointing a lawyer of Italian origin, for that [Country D] citizen, after Australia’s first Indigenous Judge sought Attorney General to give the [Country D] citizen, a fake guardian.
33.GROUNDS: UNFAIR REPRESENTATION
My husband threatened me with sending our dogs to RSPCA, and financial deprivation, so I fearfully affirmed misleading half truths that he separated on 3 March 2024, while I wanted to give evidence, that my husband has perjured, as he told me, that he told a police officer [named] from [suburb] police station on 5 March 2024, that he separated for 3 days from 3 March 2024 to 6 March 2024. At that time, I was not a Centerlink customer, I had no access to NSW legal aid. So I affirmed the misleading half truth from my coercive control via intimidation by a man. I couldn’t amend it at the earliest, in an Amended Response, due to lack of prompt legal advice as I rely on Community lawyers. So my husband’s lawyer, as my fake guardian relied on such coerced evidence, which I couldn’t withdraw in an Amended Response, in time. His lawyer, as my fake guardian ignored evidence of police report, of him saying that he separated for 3 days, for her to quickly seek divorce on my behalf, at his instructions. This is unfair representation.
34. GROUNDS: PERJURY BY [LITIGATION GUARDIAN FOR THE WIFE]
Even before [litigation guardian for the wife] offered to act for me, my husband texted me about her involvement. Through text messages to me, my husband created evidence that he will somehow unfairly appoint a lawyer for me, for that lawyer to make a joint divorce application on my behalf, at his instructions, and then apply for an assets division, on my behalf, but of his liking. That he will give that lawyer, her costs, from my share, for acting on his instructions. So [litigation guardian for the wife] could only perjure that she can conduct proceedings fairly and competently for me, on my behalf, and that she has no adverse interest in proceedings. She knows that there is no expert evidence, certifying that I need a guardian. So she can only act like a lawyer, to seek legal costs, which is her adverse interest.
35.[Litigation guardian for the wife] emails [the appeal registrar] to give her unlawful access to my private appeal documents, but without letting me know.
36.[Litigation guardian for the wife] argues that I can’t be a party to a proceeding and seek stay. But she also argues, that I can’t appeal, because I did not seek leave, as a party to a proceeding. Only an incompetent lawyer will argue bothways. She argues whatever [solicitor for the husband] argue. [Solicitor for the husband] is free to argue both ways, unfairly and incompetently, as she has not given evidence that she will conduct proceedings fairly and competently.
37.GROUNDS: UNREASONABLE ARGUMENT
My husband’s legal team has lied before Appeals court that I did not apply for leave. Appeals court dealt with my leave application on 30 May 2025. They lied in case outline 24/3/25 that I sought [solicitor for the husband] referral for suborning perjury. Their argue before [the primary judge] that my husband’s lawyer can be a litigation guardian, without expert evidence certifying that I need one, after objecting to appointment of fake guardian, before [the previous judge], in absence of expert evidence, certifying that I need one. They argue both ways, that I did not become a party to a proceeding, in order to seek leave, and that I can’t become a party to a proceeding to seek stay. What they seek is as unreasonable, as their false and their contradicting arguments.
38. GROUNDS: MISCHIEF AND IN MALA-FIDE
My husband, a [Country D] immigrant texted me that unlike in [Country D], divorce is easy in Australia. So I texted back that divorce is easy for normal people, but difficult for mad people. Then [the previous judge] unsuccessfully sought a fake guardian, for me, before Attorney General. So my husband sought [the primary judge] to appoint one of his lawyer from another firm for me, as a fake guardian, just because I texted him that divorce is difficult for mad people. [The primary judge] acted in mischief and in mala-fide, by obliging him. Then she fabricated before Appeals court also.
(As per the original)
Two observations may be made about the grounds, which are insuperable impediments to the success of both the appeal and the application for leave to appeal.
First, none of the grounds challenge the divorce order. Since the divorce order is not vitiated by any asserted error, it must stand. The appeal from the divorce order exhibits no prospects of success. It is summarily dismissed.
Secondly, none of the grounds purport to explain any appealable error made by the primary judge in dismissing the wife’s interlocutory application, which is unsurprising because it had no ostensible merit.
In respect of her application to stay the whole of the underlying proceedings pending the determination of her application for leave to appeal from the appointment of her litigation guardian, there was no demonstrated premise for such a wide and unconditional stay order. She did not confine her application by seeking merely an order to stay the challenged orders appointing the litigation guardian. In any event, even if there were grounds for staying the whole of the proceedings pending the determination of her application for leave to appeal from the litigation guardian orders made on 24 March 2025, that application has now been dismissed and the point is otiose. The litigation guardian order stands.
In respect of the wife’s other applications, seeking the Court’s referral of numerous people to authorities for prosecution in respect of various forms of alleged misconduct, she made the same applications concerning the same people within the former appeal proceedings. As was observed then, the wife may lodge complaints about those people with the police and professional bodies if she remains inclined to do so. She does not need the Court’s consent or imprimatur. The dismissal of those applications was entirely proper.
The application for leave to appeal from the order dismissing the wife’s interlocutory application exhibits no reasonable prospects of success, so it is also summarily dismissed.
The summary dismissal of the appeal proceedings makes it unnecessary to consider, at any length, the Application in an Appeal filed by the wife on 24 June 2025. She sought an urgent hearing and got one. She sought the revocation of the orders made by the primary judge, but that result cannot follow when the appeal is summarily dismissed. She wanted the litigation guardian prevented from charging her fees, but the primary judge ordered such fees be ultimately paid from the wife’s share of the parties’ property, which order stands due to the dismissal of the former appeal proceedings. She wanted the same people referred to authorities for prosecution, but her fixation upon such a remedy can only be addressed by repeating how she is free to report any person for criminal or professional investigation any time she likes.
I certify that the preceding twenty (20) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Ex Tempore Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Austin. Associate:
Dated: 25 July 2025
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