Agli & Segura
[2025] FedCFamC1A 133
•25 July 2025
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1) APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Agli & Segura [2025] FedCFamC1A 133
Appeal from: Orders of 24 March 2025 Appeal number: NAA 162 of 2025 File number: PAC 5209 of 2023 Judgment of: AUSTIN J Date of judgment: 25 July 2025 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – LEAVE TO APPEAL – Where the applicant wife requires leave to appeal from orders appointing a solicitor as her litigation guardian – Where the grounds of appeal do not competently allege any recognisable appealable error of law, fact or discretion – Where the litigation guardian applied to be joined as a party to the appeal – Where the proposed appeal lacks merit and does not need rebuttal by the litigation guardian – Application and Response thereto dismissed – Application for leave to appeal dismissed – Costs ordered in a fixed sum. Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) Pt VIII, s 48
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)
Cases cited: Medlow & Medlow (2016) FLC 93-692; [2016] FamCAFC 34 Number of paragraphs: 33 Date of hearing: 25 July 2025 Place: Newcastle (via Microsoft Teams) The Applicant: Litigant in person Counsel for the Respondent: Ms Wallace Solicitor for the Respondent: Parks Family Law Solicitor Advocate for the Litigation Guardian: Mr Beckman Solicitor for the Litigation Guardian: VRT Lawyers ORDERS
NAA 162 of 2025
PAC 5209 of 2023FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
DIVISION 1 APPELLATE JURISDICTIONBETWEEN: MS AGLI
Applicant
AND: MR SEGURA
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
AUSTIN J
DATE OF ORDER:
25 JULY 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The Application in an Appeal filed by the applicant’s litigation guardian on 16 June 2025 is dismissed.
2.The Response to an Application in an Appeal filed by the applicant on 9 July 2025 is dismissed.
3.Leave to appeal is refused and the Amended Notice of Appeal filed on 27 June 2025 is dismissed.
4.The applicant wife shall pay the respondent husband’s party/party costs of and incidental to the application for leave to appeal fixed in the sum of $7,500 pursuant to r 12.17(1)(a) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth), payment of which shall not fall due until finalisation of the financial cause between the parties.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Agli & Segura has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
EX TEMPORE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENTAUSTIN J:
These reasons explain the dismissal of an application for leave to appeal, brought by the wife from orders made by a judge of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) on 24 March 2025, appointing a solicitor as her litigation guardian.
Background
In October 2023, the husband filed a divorce application, alleging the parties separated in February 2022. The wife filed a Response, alleging they did not separate until July 2023, thereby putting in factual dispute the duration of their separation.
The divorce application was only competent if the parties had been separated for 12 months (s 48(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”).
To avoid the factual dispute, the husband was granted leave to discontinue his divorce application and bring a fresh application after 12 months had elapsed from the later date of separation alleged by the wife.
In July 2024, the husband filed his second divorce application, though he again alleged the parties separated in February 2022. The wife again filed a Response, but this time she alleged the parties did not separate until March 2024. Again, the husband declined to prosecute the divorce application to avoid dispute.
In November 2024, the husband filed his third divorce application, the timing of which was calculated to be more than 12 months after the wife was served with the first divorce application in October 2023, but he still alleged the parties separated in February 2022.
The third divorce application was listed before a judge on 4 November 2024. Evidently concerned by the wife’s abnormal behaviour in Court on that occasion, the judge ordered the registrar to correspond with the Attorney-General to appoint a manager of the wife’s affairs, whom it was expected would then also fulfil the function of the wife’s litigation guardian.
The registrar corresponded with the Attorney-General but, for reasons which remain unknown, no person was appointed by the Attorney-General. The following notation was made by a senior judicial registrar to some procedural orders made on 21 January 2025:
F.An Order was made for the appointment of a Litigation Guardian on 4 November 2024 and the Australian Attorney General’s Department has since not been able to source a Litigation Guardian.
Given the inaction, on 30 January 2025, the husband filed an Application in a Proceeding seeking the appointment of an independent solicitor as the wife’s litigation guardian, which application was listed for hearing before the primary judge on 24 March 2025.
The wife filed a Response on 13 February 2025, objecting to the two solicitors alternatively proposed by the husband for appointment as her litigation guardian.
The husband then filed an Initiating Application on 14 February 2025, seeking financial relief under the Act.
A flurry of litigious activity then ensued. In the few weeks before the hearing of the defended interlocutory application about the appointment of a litigation guardian for the wife, she filed two Amended Responses and no less than 11 affidavits. By the time of the appointed hearing, aside from objecting to the two solicitors proposed by the husband as litigation guardians, the wife wanted various other forms of interlocutory relief, including: an order referring the husband’s solicitor and the two solicitors proposed as litigation guardians to authorities to be prosecuted for perjury; the dismissal of the husband’s pending divorce application; and the permanent stay of the financial proceedings.
Notwithstanding the relief sought by the wife, significantly, she agreed she needed a litigation guardian to be appointed. She admitted so in at least one of her affidavits and to the primary judge at the hearing, yet she was unable to independently nominate any person to fulfil that role.
At the hearing on 24 March 2025, the primary judge was satisfied the wife needed a litigation guardian and was satisfied of the credentials of the husband’s two nominees. One was therefore chosen and appointed (Order 1). Additional orders of an entirely procedural nature were made (Orders 2–7) and the proceedings were re-listed several months ahead (Order 8).
On 14 April 2025, the wife purported to appeal from all orders, but without the aid of either the appointed litigation guardian or any legal representative. The litigation guardian later applied to be joined as a party to the appeal.
The wife filed an Amended Notice of Appeal on 27 June 2025.
Application in the appeal
On 16 June 2025, the wife’s litigation guardian applied to be joined as a party to the appeal, but there is no need. Granting the application would unnecessarily irritate the wife as she objects to the litigation guardian’s involvement. The proposed appeal lacks merit and does not need formal rebuttal by the litigation guardian. Accordingly, the wife’s Response to an Application in an Appeal filed on 9 July 2025, seeking that the litigation guardian “not be listed” as her litigation guardian, may also be dismissed.
The proposed appeal
The only order capable of appeal is Order 1, appointing the litigation guardian for the wife. All other orders are ancillary and either stand or fall with Order 1.
However, Order 1 is an interlocutory order, so the wife requires the grant of leave to appeal from it, which should be refused because the order is not evidently affected by error and the wife suffers no substantial injustice by being bound by it (Medlow & Medlow (2016) FLC 93-692 at [44]–[57]).
The residual 21 grounds of appeal (numbered Grounds 2 to 22) are pleaded as follows:
2. PRECEDENT
World Press covered a story on how on 19 June 2015, the court overturned an injunction granted by [the judge who made the November 2024 orders “the previous judge”], due to absence of expert evidence justifying it. [Another named judge] warned all federal judges to not mistake their own views for facts or expert evidence.
3. EXPERT EVIDENCE
My forensic psychiatrist [named] told me to submit to court that two random screenshots of a decade old report does not constitute a certificate of expert evidence, bound by expert’s code of conduct, persuant to section 177 of Evidence Act 1995, and to Federal Court Rules 2011, Division 23.
4. POLICE OPINION ON HAVING STANDING AND ON APPEAL
Police noted that [the husband’s solicitor] does not testify affidavits before lodging them for filing. Police found that my Contempt application says [the husband’s friend] is Respondent. Police found that [named registrar] misrepresented my husband as Respondent in court orders. Police found that after misrepresentation, [the husband’s solicitor] suborned a false affidavit, where my husband falsified that he is Respondent.
5.Police found that [the husband’s solicitor] made my husband sign in her place in Genuine Steps Certificate. [The husband’s solicitor] claimed it is unsafe for my husband to resolve financial disputes with me, but did not explain how, in the supporting affidavit.
6.Police noted that [the husband’s solicitor] served Notice of Address for Service on me, via email on 27 March 2025.
7.Police noted that by 27 March 2025 [the wife’s appointed litigation guardian] has not consented to appointment of guardian.
8.Police noted that Notice of Address for Service had a false statement that [the wife’s appointed litigation guardian] was appointed as my lawyer.
9.Police compared the signature appearing as [the wife’s appointed litigation guardian’s] signature in Notice of Address for Service with [the wife’s appointed litigation guardian’s] signature in her affidavits.
10.Police suspects [the husband’s solicitor] potentially forged [the wife’s appointed litigation guardian’s] signature in Notice of Address for Service and served it on me only to conduct financial proceedings on my behalf in the guide of [the wife’s appointed litigation guardian].
11.Police suspects potential forgery to commit financial fraud by my husband and his [solicitor].
12.So police advised me to appeal in order to avoid becoming a victim of financial fraud.
13.Police advised me to submit that [the primary judge] ignored the relevant facts that I sought referral to police to refer [the husband’s friend] for perjuring.
COMMUNITY LEGAL SERVICES FOR WOMEN
14.Women Community Legal Services gave parliamentary evidence in a Parliamentary inquiry that they seek some referral to prosecutions for perjuring by FCFCOA to set an example in order to deter widespread perjury in FCFCOA.
15.Inquiry found that the reason FCFCOA does not like to refer perjury to police is only because they do not like to punish parents.
16.Women Community Legal Services noted that my husband is not a parent.
17.Women Community Legal Services said that the reason they can’t lodge notice on my behalf, is only because appointment of a litigation guardian strictly limits them.
18.Women Community Legal Services said that they can represent me in perjury, divorce and property matter.
19.NO EXPERT EVIDENCE: I have worked as a junior [medical professional] in [specialised field]. From work I know what is the process of expert evidence. A lawyer seeks it to a psychiatrist, explaining why they want it. It is a formal certificate, formally certifying that in the expert’s opinion, a person needs a litigation guardian, owing to a specific disability. That certificate is bound by expert’s code of conduct. It has CV of the expert. It has to be a recent one to be relevant. The expert gives it to lawyer, who then presents it to court. There is no recent expert certificate, certifying that I need a guardian. There is no formal expert certificate either, certifying that I need one.
I did not seek the court from my own to appoint guardian for me. I only agreed when [the previous judge] said he feels a guardian is needed, because at that time I did not know that I will have to pay them.
20.CONVENIENCE FOR LAWYERS: On 28 October 2024, [the previous judge] agreed with [previous counsel for the husband] that it is wrong to appoint guardian without recent expert evidence. Then on 4 November 2024, [the previous judge] decided to write to AG to give me a guardian.
Despite objecting, my husband did not appeal on grounds that [the previous judge] himself already agreed in the beginning. My husband did not appeal because legal expenses of Appeal feels expensive to him. He only hired an expensive Doyle’s guide recommended Sydney’s leading lawyer, [husband’s solicitor named] only to show off before his Indian friend [named], who hire cheap Indian lawyers, to save money. AG refused guardians.
So team sought [the primary judge] to appoint a lawyer of their own choice, someone they fraternise with, someone closer to their ranks, and as expensive as they are, basically a fancy lawyer, for a poor woman like me, and wrongly label that expensive lawyer as “litigation guardian” for their convenience, which is for their chosen lawyer to conveniently do what they tell them to.
It is wrong to impose the convenience of expensive legal teams upon poor self representing litigant, it borders on oppression. It is wrong to appoint an expensive lawyer for a poor adult, someone chosen by the other party’s expensive legal team, only because husband don’t want to appeal what he objects to, only because appeal feels expensive for him.
[The primary judge] said that I agreed with [the previous judge] that guardian is needed. I agreed because Attorney General is unlikely to appoint expensive private solicitors for poor people, as it borders on oppression.
21.Press reported that on 19 June 2015 [a judge] warned all federal judges to not mistake their own views for facts or expert evidence. [The primary judge] is of the view that she should appoint expensive lawyers for poor adults. The fact remains that court appoints lawyers for children only. [The primary judge] mistook her view for a fact.
22.REFERRAL TO PROSECUTIONS [the primary judge] completely ignored the relevant fact that I sought someone to be referred to prosecutions.
My husband said that both [his friend] and he will plead guilty to perjury as they are both confident that both of them will get away with a section 10, which will be nothing more than a mere slap on the wrist to him. Then he will reapply for divorce with proper application.
On 28 October 2024 [the previous judge] told husband’s team to withdraw the perjured application and file a new one. He noted that I sought referral to prosecutions for perjury, via Contempt application. He even said that perjury is not Contempt.
But [solicitor for the husband’s friend] suborned the same perjury again in the new application. She was representing [the husband’s friend] in perjury matter, and [the husband’s solicitor] later argued that he did not perjure. On 4 November 2024 [the previous judge] refused to make divorce orders based on perjured applications. [The previous judge] previously worked for [government agency] who published in website that it is miscarriage of justice to make divorce orders based on perjured applications and so such orders should be cancelled.
Then [solicitor for the husband] suborned my husband’s perjury on 30 Jan 2025 that I made a Contempt application against my husband. She depended on subornation because she was required to explain in an affidavit, why she certified in Genuine Steps Certificate that it is unsafe for my husband to resolve disputes with me.
My local federal MP is new Attorney General post elections. She will be conducting inquiries into such things. I have told her about who has perjured and which private solicitors has suborned it. And that [the previous judge], who previously worked with [Government Agency] refused to make divorce orders based on perjured applications to stop justice for miscarrying, and won’t set dangerous precedents. [The primary judge] never worked for [Government Agency]. She ignored perjury.
(As per the original)
As can be seen, the pleaded grounds do not competently allege any recognisable appealable error of law, fact or discretion, so the application for leave to appeal must be dismissed as being misconceived.
The grounds make plenty of unverified allegations of impropriety by other persons, but such allegations must be seen in the context of the wife’s deteriorated mental health, verified by the following evidence she voluntarily adduced.
First, in an affidavit filed in November 2024, the wife deposed:
3.… Expert Psychiatric medicolegal evidence is that I was diagnosed with psychosis before first divorce hearing. I was experiencing psychosis and hence hearing voices, when [a named Deputy Registrar] asked me, what according to my imagination, should be date of separation under one roof. I heard voices, telling me to utter 15 July 2023 so I said it. [The Deputy Registrar] told me to give it in writing. I wrote it because I was delusional and paranoid from psychosis that she made a court order for me to give it in writing. …So I withdraw 15 July 2023, as date of separation under one roof, because it is inappropriately obtained evidence, it is coerced evidence, it is not independent evidence, it is medical evidence of irrational, erratic speech, spoken in a psychotic state and given in writing in a delusional state.
(Wife’s Affidavit filed on 2 November 2024) (As per the original)
Secondly, in an affidavit filed in February 2025, the wife deposed:
5.My contention about separation is unreliable on account of my reported diagnosis of mental illness, of psychotic and delusional nature. Currently I am on antipsychotic medications, called [Medication C].
(Wife’s Affidavit filed on 13 February 2025)
Thirdly, in an affidavit filed in March 2025, the wife deposed:
1.… I have experienced deterioration of mental state. …So my GP is sending me to a psychiatrist to increase my psychiatric medications.
(Wife’s affidavit filed on 10 March 2025)
Fourthly, in another affidavit filed in March 2025, the wife deposed:
1.… My husband refers to my psychiatric medicolegal report in his unsworn affidavits. As a [medical professional] he knows I need a litigation guardian.
(Wife’s affidavit filed on 20 March 2025)
It is unnecessary to recite any more of the rambling contents of the wife’s multiple affidavits which are suggestive of her unbalanced state. She should not be humiliated.
At the hearing, the wife had these candid exchanges with the primary judge:
HER HONOUR: I know that, but I’m asking you whether you agree that there should be a litigation guardian appointed for you.
[The wife]: Obvious, your Honour. I do agree.
HER HONOUR: Yes. Obviously.
[The wife]: Yes. I do agree.
…
HER HONOUR: So I am here to determine the application for the appointment of one of the two nominated people as your case guardian. So unless you can tell me what it is specifically that you object to in relation to either [named potential litigation guardian] or [named potential litigation guardian] – I need to hear from you to find out what it is about one or both of them that you personally object to.
[The wife]: Your Honour, I can’t make a decision at this moment because I’m not well. I’m seeing a psychiatrist on Thursday also.
HER HONOUR: Yes.
[The wife]: So I was thinking if you can give me an adjournment on health grounds, so that I can make – so that I can respond to this.
HER HONOUR: Yes. See, that’s the problem, why you need a litigation guardian. All right.
[The wife]: Yes.
…
HER HONOUR: Okay. Is there anything in particular about either [named potential litigation guardian] or [named potential litigation guardian] that you can tell me that concerns you?
[The wife]: Your Honour, I would like some adjournment to answer that question because I need to see my doctor on Thursday. I’m no – like, my mental health is getting worse with the passing day. And then I will get an appointment from the [named law firm] or [named law firm] in [Suburb B], and they will help me answer your question. At this stage, I’m not mentally competent to answer your question.
(Transcript 24 March 2025, p.2 lines 34–41; p.4 lines 10–27; p.5 lines 1–10)
(Emphasis added)
The wife evidently needed a legal guardian, which is why the primary judge appointed one. In this appeal, the wife contended she does not now need a litigation guardian, so she can apply at first instance to discharge the litigation guardian if she wishes, but her current belief does not invalidate the appealed order.
Leave to appeal is refused and the Amended Notice of Appeal filed on 27 June 2025 is dismissed.
Upon dismissal of the application for leave to appeal, the husband sought an order for payment of his party/party costs of the application against the wife on the premise the application was wholly unsuccessful and, in truth, ought never have been brought.
The wife resisted the application for costs due to her current poor financial circumstances. No evidence was adduced as to the parties’ respective financial circumstances, but the litigation guardian helpfully proposed that the payment of any costs be delayed until the finalisation of the pending financial cause between the parties. The husband was content with that course and consequently any contention advanced by the wife about her present impecuniosity is liable to alleviated upon the delivery of judgment in the financial cause.
Accordingly, costs are awarded to the husband, though not in the sum of nearly $13,400 he sought. Pursuant to the power reposing in rule 12.17(1)(a) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth), his party/party costs are fixed at $7,500, which represents a more accurate quantum of the costs necessarily incurred in the defence of the unmeritorious application for leave to appeal.
I certify that the preceding thirty-three (33) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Ex Tempore Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Austin. Associate:
Dated: 25 July 2025
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