Agius v State of South Australia (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Agius v State of South Australia (No 2) [2013] FCA 417  

Citation: Agius v State of South Australia (No 2) [2013] FCA 417
Parties: GARTH AGIUS & OTHERS v STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
File number: SAD 6001 of 2000
Judge: MANSFIELD J
Date of judgment: 10 May 2013
Date of hearing: 8 October 2012
Date of last submissions: 8 November 2012
Place: Adelaide
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: No catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 21
Counsel for the Applicant: T Campbell
Solicitor for the Applicant: Campbell Law
Counsel for the State of South Australia: A Jantke
Solicitor for the State of South Australia: Crown Solicitor
Counsel for Mr Millison and Ms Millison: Mr Millison and Ms Millison appeared in person

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

SAD 6001 of 2000

BETWEEN:

GARTH AGIUS & OTHERS
Applicant

AND:

STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
Respondent

JUDGE:

MANSFIELD J

DATE OF ORDER:

10 MAY 2013

WHERE MADE:

ADELAIDE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Milan Millison and Linda Millison be removed as parties to this application.

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

SAD 6001 of 2000

BETWEEN:

GARTH AGIUS & OTHERS
Applicant

AND:

STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
Respondent

JUDGE:

MANSFIELD J

DATE:

10 MAY 2013

PLACE:

ADELAIDE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

  1. This application is for the determination of native title rights and interests over extensive areas of the Adelaide Plains and associated areas. It is not necessary to describe the claim area with any precision. The applicant brings the claim on behalf of the Kaurna Peoples.

  2. Milan Millison and Linda Millison became parties to this application on 25 March 2011. They claimed that status by virtue of their “interest” in Allotment 51, Town of St Kilda (Lot 51), in the claim area, because it is an area of land adjacent to an allotment owned by them. It is within the claim area. They said that their interests would be affected by any determination of native title in the application itself. The nature of their “interest” in Lot 51 is more fully explained in Agius v State of South Australia [2012] FCA 714 (Agius).

  3. By the decision in Agius, I refused an application by the Millisons for an order that s 47B of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) (the NT Act) applies to Lot 51. I rejected their contention that Lot 51 was subject to a resumption process as defined in s 47B(1)(b)(iii) and s 47(5)(b), so that any native title rights and interests in Lot 51 have been extinguished. If that proposition had been accepted, the Millisons could have continued to negotiate with the State to obtain a grant of part of the land in Lot 51.

  4. As that issue was resolved adversely to the Millisons, I also ordered that they should be removed as parties to the application unless they filed and…

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Details
Case
[2013] FCA 417
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The decision in Agius v State of South Australia (No 2) involved Milan and Linda Millison, who had been joined as parties in an application regarding native revegetation on Lot 51. The Millisons argued that they had a sufficient interest in the matter to warrant their inclusion as parties. The State of South Australia sought to have the Millisons removed as parties, contending that their interest was not legally recognised or substantial enough to meet the criteria for party status. The Federal Court was tasked with determining whether the Millisons had a genuine and ascertainable interest that would be affected by the determination of the application, as required by section 84(5) of the Northern Territory Act.

The court considered the definition of "interest" under section 253 of the Act, which includes legal or equitable estates, rights, charges, powers, privileges, or restrictions over land or waters. The court also examined the principles outlined in Byron Environment Centre Inc v The Arakwal People, which emphasised that the interest must be genuine, demonstrable, and not speculative or indirect. The Millisons' interest was based on their desire to support native revegetation, but the court found that this did not amount to a legally recognised interest under section 84(5). The Millisons' interest was no more than a common desire to restore native vegetation, which did not confer any special rights or privileges distinct from those of other citizens.

Based on the evidence and legal principles, the court concluded that the Millisons did not have a sufficient interest that would be affected by the determination of the application. Therefore, the court ordered that the Millisons be removed as parties to the application. This decision did not preclude the Millisons from engaging in native revegetation activities on Lot 51 in collaboration with the State or local government and with the support of the applicant. The court's ruling was grounded in the understanding that the Millisons' interest, while well-intentioned, did not meet the statutory criteria for party status under section 84(5) of the NT Act.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Milan Millison and Linda Millison be removed as parties to this application.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Finally, to the extent that the Millisons base their claimed party status on their particular concern about supporting native revegetation of the area which is, or includes, Lot 51, there is again no evidence which would convert that “interest” – even if it is not one commonly shared with other landowners in the vicinity – to one recognised by s 84(5) as sufficient to accord them continuing party status in the proceeding. It is no more, on the evidence, than their desire as good citizens to restore native vegetation to what is presently apparently unoccupied land. It is not based on any claimed especial right to undertake that project, different from that of other right-minded citizens.CONCLUSION For the reasons given, I now order that the Millisons be removed as parties to the application. That order does not prevent them from engaging in native revegetation of Lot 51, in conjunction with the State or local government and with the support of the applicant.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The letter referred to was very brief. On behalf of the Kaurna Yerta Aboriginal Corporation, which represents the Kaurna Peoples, it agrees to support the Millisons using Lot 51 for the purpose of native revegetation. It offers to write to the State in support, if required.CONSIDERATION Section 84(5) of the NT Act provides:The Federal Court may at any time join any person as a party to the proceedings, if the Court is satisfied that the person’s interests may be affected by a determination in the proceedings and it is in the interests of justice to do so. “Interest” is defined in s 253 of the Act as follows:“interest”, in relation to land or waters, means:(a) a legal or equitable estate or interest in the land or waters; or(b)any other right (including a right under an option and a right of redemption), charge, power or privilege over, or in connection with:(i) the land or waters; or(ii) an estate or interest in the land or waters; or(c)a restriction on the use of the land or waters, whether or not annexed to other land or waters. For reasons which appear below, I do not assume that the word “interests” in s 84(5) has the same meaning as “interest” as defined in s 253. Section 84(8) of the NT Act empowers the Court at any time to order that a person, other than the applicant, cease to be a party to the proceedings. Obviously, therefore, having regard to what was decided in Agius referred to in [3] above, the question to be addressed is whether the interests of the Millisons nevertheless may be affected in any relevant way by a determination in the application by reason of the claims set out in [8] above. In Byron Environment Centre Inc v The Arakwal People (1997) 78 FCR 1 at 7 (Byron), Black CJ said:I have already noted that the interests affected must be greater than those of a member of the general public. They must also be genuine and the affectation must be genuine, for the Parliament cannot have contemplated that the rights given to persons as parties would have other than a genuine foundation. Merkel J in the same case at 43 concluded:… that the following principles are applicable in determining standing under the Act:· the interest required to be a party in the NNTT under s 68(2) is not limited to an interest in relation to land or waters as defined by s 253· the interests of a person that may be affected by a determination for the purposes of s 68(2) are to be genuine, demonstrable, not indirect and not remote or so insubstantial that it will be mere speculation as to whether and, if so, how the interests may be actually affected by the determination· the requisite interest is one which can be defined with reasonable certainty and is in each case readily ascertainable as a matter of fact and law· intellectual, emotional, conscientious, ideological or representative interests are not sufficient or relevant interests for the purposes of s 68(2)· whether a person has the requisite or a sufficient interest involves questions of degree and fact in each case.