Agapis v A Deputy President of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal at Perth & Ors; Agapis v A Justice of the Federal Court of Australia at Perth & Ors

The applicant, Mr. Agapis, sought leave to issue applications for orders to show cause out of time against a Deputy President of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) and a Justice of the Federal Court of Australia. The proceedings also involved the Plumbers Licensing Board of Western Australia. Mr. Agapis's overarching grievance stemmed from the Plumbers Licensing Board's decision, which he contended led to a "downward spiral" preventing him from working and affording legal representation. He argued that compounding errors throughout the legal process, including in the AAT and Federal Court, suggested preferential treatment for the Plumbers Licensing Board.

The central legal issues before the High Court concerned the applicant's entitlement to an extension of time for his applications, the validity of decisions made by the AAT, and the proper interpretation and application of the *Mutual Recognition Act 1992* (Cth). Mr. Agapis contended that the AAT, in making decisions on his licensing matter, was exercising judicial power contrary to Chapter III of the Constitution, as he did not appear before a judicial member but rather "functionaries of the Executive." He also argued that the Plumbers Licensing Board and the AAT had failed to properly apply the *Mutual Recognition Act*, particularly concerning the imposition of local requirements and the commencement of the time limit for decisions.

The Court considered Mr. Agapis's arguments regarding the AAT's jurisdiction and the application of the *Mutual Recognition Act*. His Honour noted that the decision in *Drake* established that an administrative appeals tribunal could adjudicate administrative disputes of the kind that went before the AAT, a principle well-established in law. Regarding the *Mutual Recognition Act*, his Honour pointed out that section 17(1) expressly contemplates the imposition of local requirements, provided they apply equally to local and interstate persons, a position that prevailed over the applicant's interpretation of the second reading speech. The Court also acknowledged the significant delay in the applicant's proceedings as a substantial consideration.