Advanced Plumbing and Drains Pty Ltd T/A Advanced Plumbing and Drains

Case

[2015] FWCA 8740

18 DECEMBER 2015

No judgment structure available for this case.

[2015] FWCA 8740

The attached document replaces the document previously issued with the above code on 18 December 2015.

Page 11 is replaced in its entirety

Janet Hall

Associate to Deputy President Kovacic

Dated 18 December 2015

[2015] FWCA 8740
FAIR WORK COMMISSION

DECISION


Fair Work Act 2009

s.222—Enterprise agreement

Advanced Plumbing and Drains Pty Ltd T/A Advanced Plumbing and Drains
(AG2015/2706)

ADVANCED PLUMBING & DRAINS PTY LTD & CEPU ACT ENTERPRISE AGREEMENT 2013-2016

Australian Capital Territory

DEPUTY PRESIDENT KOVACIC

MELBOURNE, 18 DECEMBER 2015

Application for termination of the Advance Plumbing & Drains Pty Ltd & CEPU ACT Enterprise Agreement 2013-2016 - agreement terminated.

[1] On 14 May 2015 Advanced Plumbing and Drains Pty Ltd T/A Advanced Plumbing and Drains (APD – the Respondent) filed an application made under s.222 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act) seeking to terminate the Advanced Plumbing & Drains Pty Ltd & CEPU ACT Enterprise Agreement 2013-2016 1(the Agreement). The Agreement has a nominal expiry date of 30 May 2016.

[2] On 15 May 2015 the Fair Work Commission (the Commission) was advised by Mr John Nikolic of the Master Builders Association of the ACT, the Respondent’s representative, that a copy of the application had been served on a representative of the Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia - Plumbing Division - NSW Branch (the CEPU). The CEPU is covered by the Agreement.

[3] The Commission wrote to the CEPU on 18 May 2015 seeking its views on the application. On 20 May 2015, Mr Matt McCann of the CEPU wrote to the Commission advising that it did not support the application, setting out a number of concerns, and indicating they wished to be given an opportunity to meet with employees collectively at a paid company meeting without Mr Jason Hooper, the Director of APD, being present.

[4] Against that background, the matter was listed for hearing on 25 June 2015. At the hearing, Mr Nikolic appeared on behalf of APD, while Mr Oshie Fagir of Counsel appeared with permission for the CEPU. Mr Hooper and Mr Sheridan Godfrey, an employee of APD, both gave evidence on behalf of APD. The CEPU did not lead any witness evidence. Closing submissions were provided in writing, with APD’s further closing submissions filed with the Commission on 10 July 2015.

The Statutory framework

[5] Subdivision C of Part 2-4 of the Act deals with the termination of agreements which are yet to pass their nominal expiry date. Subdivision C provides as follows:

    Subdivision C—Termination of enterprise agreements by employers and employees

    219 Employers and employees may agree to terminate an enterprise agreement

      Termination by employers and employees
      (1) The following may jointly agree to terminate an enterprise agreement:

        (a) if the agreement covers a single employer—the employer and the employees covered by the agreement; or
        (b) if the agreement covers 2 or more employers—all of the employers and the employees covered by the agreement.

      Note: For when a termination of an enterprise agreement is agreed to, see section 221.

      Termination has no effect unless approved by the FWC
      (2) A termination of an enterprise agreement has no effect unless it is approved by the FWC under section 223

      Limitation—greenfields agreement
      (3) Subsection (1) applies to a greenfields agreement only if one or more of the persons who will be necessary for the normal conduct of the enterprise concerned and are covered by the agreement have been employed.

    220 Employers may request employees to approve a proposed termination of an enterprise agreement

      (1) An employer covered by an enterprise agreement may request the employees covered by the agreement to approve a proposed termination of the agreement by voting for it.
      (2) Before making the request, the employer must:

        (a) take all reasonable steps to notify the employees of the following:

          (i) the time and place at which the vote will occur;
          (ii) the voting method that will be used; and

        (b) give the employees a reasonable opportunity to decide whether they want to approve the proposed termination.

      (3) Without limiting subsection (1), the employer may request that the employees vote by ballot or by an electronic method.

    221 When termination of an enterprise agreement is agreed to

      Single-enterprise agreement
      (1) If the employees of an employer, or each employer, covered by a single-enterprise agreement have been asked to approve a proposed termination of the agreement under subsection 220(1), the termination is agreed to when a majority of the employees who cast a valid vote approve the termination.

      Multi-enterprise agreement
      (2) If the employees of each employer covered by a multi-enterprise agreement have been asked to approve a proposed termination of the agreement under subsection 220(1), the termination is agreed to when a majority of the employees of each individual employer who cast a valid vote have approved the termination.

    222 Application for the FWC’s approval of a termination of an enterprise agreement

      Application for approval
      (1) If a termination of an enterprise agreement has been agreed to, a person covered by the agreement must apply to the FWC for approval of the termination.

      Material to accompany the application
      (2) The application must be accompanied by any declarations that are required by the procedural rules to accompany the application.

      When the application must be made
      (3) The application must be made:

        (a) within 14 days after the termination is agreed to; or
        (b) if in all the circumstances the FWC considers it fair to extend that period—within such further period as the FWC allows.

    223 When the FWC must approve a termination of an enterprise agreement

      If an application for the approval of a termination of an enterprise agreement is made under section 222, the FWC must approve the termination if:

      (a) the FWC is satisfied that each employer covered by the agreement complied with subsection 220(2) (which deals with giving employees a reasonable opportunity to decide etc.) in relation to the agreement; and
      (b) the FWC is satisfied that the termination was agreed to in accordance with whichever of subsection 221(1) or (2) applies (those subsections deal with agreement to the termination of different kinds of enterprise agreements by employee vote); and
      (c) the FWC is satisfied that there are no other reasonable grounds for believing that the employees have not agreed to the termination; and
      (d) the FWC considers that it is appropriate to approve the termination taking into account the views of the employee organisation or employee organisations (if any) covered by the agreement.

    224 When termination comes into operation

      If a termination of an enterprise agreement is approved under section 223, the termination operates from the day specified in the decision to approve the termination.”

The Applicant’s case

[6] The Form 24A – Statutory declaration in support of termination of an enterprise agreement attached to the application states that APD employees were given written notice by email on 28 April 2015 that a vote on whether to terminate the Agreement would occur on 8 May 2015, with that vote to be conducted by a show of hands. The Form 24A further stated that 22 of the 23 employees who are covered by the Agreement had cast a valid vote with all 22 of those employees voting to terminate the Agreement. The statutory declaration was made by Mr Hooper.

[7] APD submitted that it had complied with ss.223(a) and (b) of the Act and that there were no other reasonable grounds for believing that employees had not agreed to the termination under s.223(c). Specifically, APD submitted that it had provided written notice of the proposed vote, including its time, place and method by way of email to all employees on 28 April 2015. APD further submitted that at a meeting with employees held on 1 May 2015, Mr Hooper explained the effect of the termination and invited all employees to approach either himself or Mr Capello, APD’s Operations Manager, with any questions.

[8] As to s.223(b) of the Act, APD indicated that all employees who were present at the meeting of 8 May 2015 voted in favour of the proposed termination by way of a show of hands. Further, APD submitted that there was no reason to believe that employees were oppressed by the voting method or by Mr Hooper being present at the vote.

[9] APD submitted, with regard to s.223(c), that it was not aware of any reasonable grounds for believing that employees had not agreed to the termination.

[10] Finally, in respect of s.223(d), APD submitted that the CEPU was provided with approximately six weeks’ notice prior to the hearing on 25 June 2015 and had ample opportunity to determine whether any members were concerned about the termination of the Agreement or the process leading up to it. Further, APD had offered to facilitate CEPU access to its employees during work breaks in accordance with the right of entry provisions of the Act but that offer was not taken up by the CEPU.

[11] In his witness statement 2, Mr Hooper reiterated the above chronology of events. In addition, he deposed that APD had since the termination vote entered into negotiations for an enterprise agreement (the replacement agreement), adding that on 19 June 2015 all employees who were present voted to approve that agreement. Mr Hooper further deposed that the replacement agreement provided for higher rates of pay than the Agreement3. Attached to Mr Hooper’s witness statement was a copy of the email he sent to employees on 28 April 2015. Among other things, the email dealt with the effect of terminating the Agreement. Specifically, the email stated that:

    “If the Enterprise Agreement is terminated, it will cease to apply to employees who will be covered instead by the National Employment Standards in the Fair Work Act and the Plumbing and Fire Sprinklers Award 2010.

    However, employees rates of pay will be maintained as per the Enterprise Agreement and Advanced Plumbing & Drains would like to negotiate a new enterprise agreement directly with employees in due course.” 4

[12] Key aspects of Mr Hooper’s evidence under cross examination were that:

  • his driving motivation for seeking to terminate the Agreement was his desire to no longer be covered by an agreement which he believed he was coerced and bullied into signing and which he never wanted to sign in first place 5;


• he did not complete item 2.1 of the Form 24A which concerns the steps taken by the employer to ensure that the relevant employees were given a reasonable opportunity to decide whether they wanted to approve the termination – though in this regard Mr Hooper did refer to his email to all employees of 28 April 2015 6;

• senior tradesmen would be better off under the replacement agreement and that, in respect of other employees, he will “not drop anybody back” 7;

• he did not explain to employees that once the Agreement was terminated he was not bound to maintain the conditions provided in the Agreement, adding that he believed employees would trust him to keep his word as stated in his email of 28 April 2015 8;

• he did not explain in detail the practical effect of all of the changes proposed in the replacement agreement;

• under the replacement agreement most employees and no current employee would be worse off 9;

• reflecting his ideological view, he would not in future sign an agreement which covers any union 10;

• the rate of pay for newly qualified tradespeople was higher under the Agreement when compared to the replacement agreement;

• the replacement agreement will see APD able to afford to continue to employee newly qualified tradespeople 11; and

  • his desire to terminate the agreement had nothing to do with business conditions 12.


[13] Mr Godfrey in his witness statement 13 also set out the chronology of events leading to the vote to terminate the Agreement. In doing so, he deposed that he felt “like I had ample time to talk to the boys and talk to the boss.” With regard to the replacement agreement, Mr Godfrey deposed that “I feel like the new enterprise agreement fits the company a bit better than the CEPU EBA. I don’t feel like I am disadvantaged by the new enterprise agreement.”

[14] Under cross-examination Mr Godfrey demonstrated a reasonable, albeit not comprehensive, grasp of the detail of the differences between the replacement agreement and the Agreement. With regard to the disadvantages associated with the replacement agreement, Mr Godfrey attested that:

    “I don’t believe there are any because I believe the new agreement is more beneficial for us lads in the sense that it fits the company template that we want to be part of a lot better than say a union driven company … We know Hooper. We trust him, he’s written it down on paper for us to see exactly what he’s trying to do and the way he operates instead of – I’ve worked for union companies in the past which I’ve noticed a few things which Jason does differently is which he’ll take on jobs in which he may not make a profit over, just to keep the boys employed … In terms of particular conditions, I don’t think it matters even if we are going down a little bit. I still vote for it; I still back it.” 14

[15] Mr Godfrey also attested that:

  • he could not recall whether it had been suggested that the vote to terminate the Agreement be conducted by way of secret ballot or with Mr Hooper not in the room 15; and


  • at the time of the vote to terminate the Agreement, the replacement agreement was not available 16.


The Respondent’s case

[16] The CEPU opposed the application on the basis that:

    (a) the Commission could not be satisfied that relevant employees were given a reasonable opportunity to decide whether they wished to approve the termination because they were provided insufficient if not misleading information regarding the consequences of termination;

    (b) the Commission could not be satisfied that there are no other reasons for believing employees had not agreed to the termination, given that the vote was conducted by show of hands in the presence of the employer who made clear his powerful hostility toward the continuation of the Agreement; and

    (c) it would be inappropriate to terminate the agreement in the circumstances, given the employer’s motivation for the termination.

[17] In support of that view, the CEPU submitted that it was far from clear that employees would not be worse off under the replacement agreement, highlighting that junior trades persons, labourers and plant operators would be worse off under the replacement agreement when compared to the Agreement. Among other things, the CEPU highlighted that the termination provisions of the replacement agreement are inferior to those of the Agreement.

[18] Further, the CEPU submitted that the undertaking given by Mr Hooper that employees’ pay would not be reduced did not involve anything more substantial than a general indication that this would be the case and was not enforceable. While acknowledging that the fact that employees would be worse off as a result of termination of the Agreement was not a barrier to termination in the circumstances, the CEPU submitted that the quality of information given to employees on this issue was a matter relevant to the Commission’s satisfaction that employees gave free and informed consent to the termination. As such, the CEPU argued that cogent proof was required that the effect of termination of the Agreement was made clear to employees and that they consented to it notwithstanding its adverse effects on their income. The CEPU contended that in this case the information provided to employees was limited to generalities and that as a result the Commission could not be satisfied that employees were properly informed in relation to the consequences of termination. This the CEPU contended was demonstrated by Mr Godfrey’s evidence which demonstrated that he had little understanding of the effect of termination or the content of the replacement agreement.

[19] As to the vote on the termination, the CEPU contended that a vote by show of hands in circumstances where Mr Hooper was present was manifestly inappropriate and unlikely to capture employees’ true views. The result of the vote was therefore unreliable and warranted rejection of the application.

[20] Finally, in view of Mr Hooper’s stated motivation in seeking termination of the Agreement, the CEPU contended that the termination provisions of the Act are not appropriately engaged in pursuit of Mr Hooper’s anti-union agenda.

Consideration of the issues

[21] It was not disputed that the requirements set out in s.222 of the Act had been complied with, including that the application was made within 14 days after the termination was agreed to.

[22] Against that background, I now turn to s.223 of the Act which sets out when the Commission must approve a termination of an enterprise agreement. In doing so, I note that that the Commission must be satisfied as to each of the factors specified in s.223(a)-(c) of the Act and must consider it appropriate to terminate an agreement taking into account the views of any employee organisation(s) covered by the agreement as per s.223(d). In other words, if one of the factors is not met the Commission cannot approve the termination. I deal with each of the factors below.

(a) The FWC is satisfied that each employer covered by the agreement complied with s.220(2) (which deals with giving employees a reasonable opportunity to decide etc.) in relation to the agreement

[23] Section 220(2) has two components to it. They are that the employer must:

    (i) take all reasonable steps to notify the employees of the time and place at which the vote will occur and the voting method that will be used (s.220(a)); and
    (ii) give employees a reasonable opportunity to decide whether they want to approve the proposed termination (s.220(b)).

[24] As to s.220(a), APD submitted that it had provided written notice of the proposed vote, including its time place and method by way of email to all employees on 28 April 2015. This was not challenged by the CEPU. By way of background, Mr Hooper’s email of 28 April 2015 stated:

    “Advanced Plumbing & Drains Pty Ltd is going to hold a vote for employees on whether they wished to terminate the Advanced Plumbing & Drains & CEPU Enterprise Agreement 2013-2016.

    The vote will be held at Advanced Plumbing & Drains office – 2/9 Beaconsfield Street, Fyshwick, Friday 8th May 3pm. The vote will be conducted by a show of hands.” 17

[25] This supports a finding that the requirements of s.220(a) have been met.

[26] The requirements set out in s.220(b) of the Act were considered by Commissioner Lee in Barminco Limited 18 where he made the following observations:

    “[19]… The Explanatory Memorandum to theFair Work Bill at item 932, in reference to this provision notes: “This may, for example, involve the employer allowing employees sufficient time between making the request and the time of the vote to consider the effect of the termination on their terms and conditions.”

    [20] There are no particular prescribed steps to be taken to give effect to the reasonable opportunity, including no prescribed minimum time period between the making of the request and the time of the vote. However, irrespective of the lack of prescription in the legislation as to what is required of employers in providing a reasonable opportunity within the meaning of s 220(2)(b) of the Act the Explanatory Memorandum example lends support for the proposition that employees would, among other things, need to consider the effect on their terms and conditions as part of their reasonable opportunity to decide whether to approve the termination. In that context, while there is no express requirement for the employer to explain the effect on the employees’ terms and conditions of the termination, the lack of any explanation or misleading or incorrect explanations may well be a factor in a consideration as to whether there has been a reasonable opportunity.” (Underlining added)

[27] APD submitted in respect of this aspect that at the meeting of 1 May 2015 convened by Mr Hooper to discuss the proposal to terminate the Agreement, Mr Hooper explained the effect of the termination and invited all employees to approach either himself or Mr Capello, APD’s Operations Manager, with any questions. This was reiterated in Mr Hooper’s evidence, while Mr Godfrey’s evidence was that he felt “like I had ample time to talk to the boys and talk to the boss.”

[28] The CEPU submitted that the Commission could not be satisfied that relevant employees were given a reasonable opportunity to decide whether they wish to approve the termination because they were provided insufficient if not misleading information regarding the consequences of termination.

[29] Under cross examination, Mr Hooper attested that he did not explain in detail the practical effect of all of the changes proposed in the replacement agreement when compared to the Agreement. Further, Mr Hooper confirmed in his oral evidence that he did not mention to employees some of the key differences between the Agreement and the replacement agreement, as the latter was not available at the time of the vote. Some of the differences not mentioned concerned the removal of overtime crib break, changes to redundancy arrangements (moving from an industry specific redundancy scheme to the National Employment Standard (NES) regarding redundancy), removal of meal allowance, and the removal of the Agreement’s inclement weather provisions. Mr Hooper also attested that he told employees that if they voted to approve termination of the agreement that they would be covered by the Plumbing and Fire Sprinklers Award 2010 19(the Award) and reiterated the undertaking that he had given in his email of 28 April 2015 that no current employee will have their pay reduced20.

[30] The CEPU acknowledged in its submissions that the fact that employees would be worse off as a result of termination of the Agreement was not a barrier to termination in the circumstances. At the hearing the CEPU’s questioning on this aspect centred on a comparison between the provisions of the Agreement and the replacement agreement. However, based on Mr Hooper’s evidence, the replacement agreement was not available at the time of the vote. The relevant comparator was therefore the Award, not the replacement agreement. In addition, Mr Hooper’s evidence was that he told employees on 1 May 2015 that if they voted to approve termination of the agreement the Award would apply. This is also clear from Mr Hooper’s email of 28 April 2015 to employees. Drawing on Commissioner Lee’s observations in Barminco, this does not support a finding that employees were provided an incorrect or misleading explanation of the consequences of voting to terminate the Agreement.

[31] It is noteworthy that most of the provisions which the CEPU highlighted as not having been outlined to employees are all Award provisions which would apply in circumstances where the Agreement was terminated prior to a replacement agreement being in place. The exception to this being the Agreement’s inclement weather provisions. Further, I note that the redundancy provisions in the Agreement reflect those in the Award.

[32] Beyond that, it is not disputed that employees had from the meeting of 1 May 2015 until the termination meeting of 8 May 2015 to consider whether or not they wished to support the termination of the Agreement. This period is the same as the access period specified in s.180 of the Act which relates to the approval of enterprise agreements. Further, the period 1-8 May 2015 would have provided employees with an opportunity to not only put any further questions that they had to either Mr Hooper or Mr Capello, but also to seek advice from other sources such as the CEPU and/or their co-workers. This supports a finding that employees were given a reasonable opportunity to decide whether they want to approve the proposed termination.

[33] For all these reasons, I am satisfied APD complied with s.220(2) of the Act in relation to the Agreement.

(b) The FWC is satisfied that the termination was agreed to in accordance with s.221(1)

[34] It was not disputed that the termination of the Agreement was agreed to by a majority of employees who cast a valid vote as required by s.221(1) of the Act.

[35] The issues in contention in respect of this factor go to whether the method of voting, i.e. a show of hands, together with Mr Hooper’s attendance at the vote may have influenced how employees voted. In this regard, the CEPU contended that a vote by show of hands in circumstances where Mr Hooper was present was manifestly inappropriate and unlikely to capture employees’ true views. As such, in the CEPU’s view, the result of the vote was unreliable and warranted rejection of the application.

[36] Mr Godfrey’s evidence was that he could not recall whether it had been suggested that the vote to terminate the Agreement be conducted by way of secret ballot or with Mr Hooper not in the room. However, nowhere in his evidence did Mr Godfrey suggest that he or his colleagues felt obliged to vote to terminate the Agreement as a result of the method of the vote or Mr Hooper’s attendance. To the contrary, Mr Godfrey’s evidence painted a picture of someone who understood what he was being asked to agree to, who had a reasonable appreciation of the implications of agreeing to the termination and a clear willingness to agree to the termination. This is arguably reflected in the fact that all employees in attendance at the termination meeting voted unanimously to terminate the agreement. This does not support a finding that the method of voting together with Mr Hooper’s attendance at the vote meant that the outcome did not capture employee’s true views.

[37] For these reasons, I am satisfied that the termination of the Agreement was agreed to in accordance with s.221(1) of the Act.

(c) The FWC is satisfied that there are no other reasonable grounds for believing that the employees have not agreed to the termination

[38] APD submitted that it was not aware of any reasonable grounds for believing that employees had not agreed to the termination.

[39] The CEPU contended that the Commission could not be satisfied that there are no other reasons for believing employees have not agreed to the termination, given that the vote was conducted by show of hands in the presence of the employer who made clear his powerful hostility toward the continuation of the Agreement. As noted at paragraph [36] above, the evidence in this case does not support a finding that the method of voting together with Mr Hooper’s attendance at the vote meant that the outcome did not capture employee’s true views. Further, I note that the CEPU did not lead any evidence in this case.

[40] In those circumstances, I am satisfied that there are no other reasonable grounds for believing that the employees have not agreed to the termination.

(d) The FWC considers that it is appropriate to approve the termination taking into account the views of the employee organisation or employee organisations (if any) covered by the agreement

[41] APD submitted that the CEPU was provided with approximately six weeks’ notice prior to the hearing on 25 June 2015 and had ample opportunity to determine whether any members were concerned about the termination of the Agreement or the process leading up to it. Further, APD had offered to facilitate CEPU access to its employees during work breaks in accordance with the right of entry provisions of the Act but that offer was not taken up by the CEPU.

[42] The CEPU contended that it would be inappropriate to terminate the Agreement in the circumstances, given the employer’s motivation for the termination.

[43] The circumstances in this matter are highly unusual in that Mr Hooper’s stated motivation for wishing to terminate the Agreement is that he essentially no longer wished to be covered by an agreement which also covered the CEPU and which he did not wish to enter into in the first place. Against that background, I note that the Act does not explicitly deal with what constitutes an appropriate or inappropriate reason for the parties to an agreement wishing to terminate that agreement. As such, Mr Hooper’s motivation in this case is not of itself an impediment to termination of the Agreement despite that reason being highly unusual. While Mr Hooper’s motivation is highly unusual, the weight that must be attached to it needs to be balanced against the views of employees. In this case, all employees who cast a valid vote voted to approve the termination of the Agreement. Under the scheme of the Act, an agreement cannot be terminated unless a majority of employees who cast a valid vote approve the termination. As such, the weight attached to the views of employees in this case outweighs any weight that might be given to Mr Hooper’s motivation. Had the vote in this case not been virtually unanimous, I may have been persuaded to attach greater weight to Mr Hooper’s motivation.

[44] One of the benefits of bargaining under the Act is that it provides certainty for both the employer(s) and employees covered by an enterprise agreement as to their industrial arrangements/terms and conditions of employment for the life of that agreement. Nevertheless, the Act also provides for the termination of agreements prior to their nominal expiry date, subject to the requirements set out in the Act. However, unlike an application to terminate an agreement that has passed its nominal expiry date, Subdivision C of Part 2–4 of the Act does not require the Commission to have regard to the likely effect that termination will have on employees and others in respect of an enterprise agreement which is yet to expire. As previously noted, this was acknowledged by the CEPU in its submissions.

[45] With regard to the requirements of the Act, the material before the Commission in this case indicates that:

  • the procedural requirements set out the Act have been complied with;


  • employees were given a reasonable period to consider whether or not to support termination of the Agreement;


  • the period provided employees with an opportunity to seek further advice, either from APD, their co-workers and/or other sources such as the CEPU;


  • employees were not provided an incorrect or misleading explanation of the consequences of voting to terminate the Agreement;


  • employees almost unanimously endorsed the termination of the agreement;


  • the method of the vote to terminate the Agreement and Mr Hooper’s attendance at the termination meeting did not pollute the outcome of the vote; and


  • employees made an informed choice to support termination of the agreement despite the fact that termination may impact on some of their terms and conditions of employment.


[46] The above analysis supports a finding that it would be appropriate to approve the termination of the Agreement despite the views of the CEPU.

Conclusion

[47] Based on the material before the Commission and having taken into account the views of the CEPU, I am satisfied that the requirements of ss.223(a)-(c) of the Act have been met and consider it appropriate to approve the termination of the Agreement as per s.223(d). In those circumstances, the Commission must approve the termination of the Agreement. The termination will operate from the date of this decision.

Appearances:

J. Nikolic for Advanced Plumbing and Drains Pty Ltd T/A Advanced Plumbing and Drains.

O. Fagir of Counsel for the Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia.

Hearing details:

2015.

Canberra:

June 25.

 1   AE404723

 2   Exhibit N1

 3   A replacement agreement was approved by the Commission on 17 November 2015 – [2015] FWCA 7901

 4   Exhibit N1 at Attachment A

 5   Transcript at PN57

 6   Ibid at PN71-90

 7   Ibid PN118-120

 8   Ibid PN130

 9   Ibid at PN135

 10   Ibid at PN220-224

 11   Ibid at PN237-240

 12   Ibid at PN244

 13   Exhibit N2

 14   Transcript at PN374-375

 15   Ibid at PN403

 16   Ibid at PN417

 17   Exhibit N1 at Attachment A

 18   [2015] FWCA 219

 19   MA000036

 20   Transcript at PN99

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<Price code C, AE404723  PR575166>

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Cases Citing This Decision

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Cases Cited

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Statutory Material Cited

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Barminco Limited [2015] FWCA 219