ADG Digital Pty Ltd v Trigon Trading Pty Ltd (Administrators Appointed)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

ADG Digital Pty Ltd v Trigon Trading Pty Ltd (Administrators Appointed) [2023] FCA 232   

File number: VID 681 of 2022
Judgment of: BUTTON J
Date of judgment: 16 March 2023
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for stay of interlocutory order – stay of payment of funds out of court pursuant to court order – where funds were paid into court by company under voluntary administration – where orders made for payment out of funds in court before funds received in court and before the paying company went into administration – where party to which funds were to be paid out from funds in court claims funds paid into court were held on trust – Federal Court Rules 2011 r 41.03 – temporary stay granted

BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY – where court orders provide for the payment of funds into court by a company subsequently placed into voluntary administration – where court orders provide for the payment of funds out of court to a creditor – where party to which funds were to be paid out from funds in court claims funds paid into court were held on trust – where administrators consider payment out from funds in court would be contrary to statutory standstill – Corporations Act 2001 Pt 5.3A

Legislation:

Corporations Act2001 (Cth) pt 5.3A, pt 5.7B div 2, ss 435A, 439A, 439C, 440D, 446A, 447A, 459P, 468, 471B, 491, 500, 513A, 513C

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 41.03

Cases cited:

Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corporation Ltd (1985) 2 NSWLR 685

Buurabalayji Thalanyji Aboriginal Corp v Onslow Salt Pty Ltd (No 7) [2020] FCA 572; (2020) 144 ACSR 621

Chen v Blockchain [2022] VSC 93

Commercial Banking Company of Sydney Ltd v Colonial Financiers of Australia Pty Ltd [1972] VR 702

Commissioner for Consumer Protection v Unleash Solar(in Liq)Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 348

DSG Holdings Australia Pty Ltd v Helenic Pty Ltd (2014) 86 NSWLR 293

Dura (Australia) Constructions Pty Ltd v Hue Boutique Living Pty Ltd (2014) 49 VR 86

Dwight v Commissioner of Taxation (1992) 37 FCR 178

Flight Centre Limited v Australian Competition & Consumer Commission [2014] FCA 658

Foxcroft v Ink Group Pty Ltd (1994) 15 ACSR 203

Harmer v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1991) 173 CLR 264

Hur v Samsun Logix Corp (2015) 238 FCR 483

Larkden Pty Ltd v Lloyd Energy Systems Pty Ltd (2011) 285 ALR 207; [2011] NSWSC 1305

Re Antqip Hire Pty Ltd (in liq) [2021] NSWSC 1122

Re Carter (as liquidator of New Tel Ltd (in liq)) [2003] NSWSC 128; (2003) 44 ACSR 66

Re Lovering; Galladin Pty Ltdv Jackson (1994) 50 FCR 587

Rodgers v Radly; Re Capital General Corporation Ltd [2000] VSC 570; (2001) ACSR 158

Stefanovski v Digital Central Australia (Assets) Pty Ltd [2017] FCA 1121

WA Sherratt Ltd v John Bromley (Church Stretton) Ltd [1985] 1 QB 1038

Division: General Division
Registry: Victoria
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Commercial Contracts,…
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Details
Case
[2023] FCA 232
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, ADG Digital Pty Ltd sought to recover funds held in court by Trigon Trading Pty Ltd, which was under voluntary administration. The dispute centred on whether the funds paid into court by Trigon were held on trust for ADG, and whether the subsequent payment of those funds to ADG should be stayed pending resolution of this trust issue. The legal issues before the Court included whether the stay of the interlocutory order was warranted under Rule 41.03 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 and whether the statutory standstill provisions under the Corporations Act 2001 applied to prevent the payment of funds from the court registry to ADG.

The Court considered the principles governing the stay of interlocutory orders and the statutory regime concerning the administration of insolvent companies. It recognised the discretion of the Court to grant a stay if there was a real risk of prejudice to the applicant and balanced the competing rights of the parties. The Court also highlighted the statutory standstill provisions in the Corporations Act, which prevent proceedings against a company in administration and the disposition of its assets, to protect creditors and ensure equitable treatment.

The Court concluded that a temporary stay of the payment of funds to ADG was appropriate, given the potential for prejudice to the administrators and the broader group of creditors if the trust issue was not resolved. The stay was set to last until two weeks after the second creditors’ meeting, allowing time for creditors to decide on a proposed deed of company arrangement or to transition the company into liquidation. The Court ordered that the stay would end earlier if creditors voted to end the administration and return control to Trigon's director.

The Court's orders provided a temporary stay of the payment of funds from the court registry to ADG, with liberty to apply for further orders. It also addressed costs, directing that the administrators' costs would be costs in the administration of Trigon, unless otherwise paid by ADG.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Pursuant to r 41.03 of the Federal Court Rules 2011, order 1(b) of the orders made 1 December 2022 is stayed until the date that is two weeks after the date of the second creditors’ meeting under s 439A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) of Trigon Trading Pty Ltd (Administrators Appointed) (the Company) unless, at the second creditors’ meeting, the creditors vote to end the voluntary administration of the Company and return control of the Company to its director, in which case the stay of order 1(b) is to conclude on the date on which control of the Company is returned to its director.

2. Liberty to apply.

3. The costs of the Administrators of the Respondent of and incidental to their interlocutory application dated 15 February 2023, as amended on 15 March 2023, to the extent not paid by the Applicant pursuant to a costs order, be costs in the administration of the Respondent.

4. Costs otherwise reserved.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Rule 41.03 of the Rules provides:41.03 Application for stay of judgment or order A party bound by a judgment or order may apply to the Court for an order that the judgment or order be stayed. Note: The party may rely on events occurring after the judgment or order takes effect. The authorities have set out a number of well-established principles in determining whether a Court should order the stay of a judgment or order pursuant to r 41.03. There are two, overlapping, lines of authority (see, eg, Stefanovski v Digital Central Australia (Assets) Pty Ltd [2017] FCA 1121 at [4] (Derrington J) and Flight Centre Limited v Australian Competition & Consumer Commission [2014] FCA 658 at [9] (Rangiah J)); however, both identify common principles and draw on the principles set out by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corporation Ltd (1985) 2 NSWLR 685 at 694–695 (Kirby P, Hope and McHugh JJA). These principles were developed in the context of applications to stay orders pending an appeal. However, with some necessary modifications, these principles are suitable to be applied to applications for staying interlocutory orders. The principles which are relevant to an application under r 41.03 to stay interlocutory orders include the following: (1)The onus is on the applicant to demonstrate a proper basis for a stay that will be fair to all parties. (2)The Court has a broad discretion whether to grant a stay, and it is not necessary for an applicant for a stay to demonstrate special or exceptional circumstances. It is sufficient that the applicant demonstrates a reason or an appropriate case to warrant the exercise of the discretion in its favour. (3)A stay will usually be granted if there is a real risk that the applicant will suffer prejudice or damage, if a stay is not granted. (4)In the exercise of its discretion, the Court will weigh considerations such as the balance of convenience and the competing rights of the parties before it.THE STATUTORY REGIME Section 440D of the Corporations Act imposes a statutory stay on beginning or proceeding with a proceeding against a company in administration, except with the administrators’ written consent or leave of the Court. This section forms part of the broader scheme in Pt 5.3A of the Corporations Act concerning the administration of the business, property and affairs of an insolvent company. The objects of Pt 5.3A are two-fold: to maximise the chances of the company, or as much of its business as is possible, continuing in existence; or if that is not possible, to provide for the business to be administered in a way that results in a better return to creditors and members than would result from the immediate winding up of the company: s 435A. In Foxcroft v Ink Group Pty Ltd (1994) 15 ACSR 203 at 204, Young J described the provisions in Pt 5.3A, including s 440D, as providing for a “complete freeze of proceedings against the company in administration” so that a creditor who continues proceedings is not given some advantage over other creditors or potential creditors. Further, in Rodgers v Radly; Re Capital General Corporation Ltd [2000] VSC 570; (2001) ACSR 158 at [20], Warren J held that the purpose of s 440D was to “prevent the creation of preferences and interferences in the disposition of the property of the subject company prior to the completion of the administration”. Her Honour observed (at [22]) that it was “the intention of the legislature to set in place a scheme such that while a company was subject to administration the property and affairs of the company were quarantined pending actions and decisions by the administrator and the creditors”. See, also, Chen v Blockchain [2022] VSC 93 at [14] (Attiwill J); Buurabalayji Thalanyji Aboriginal Corp v Onslow Salt Pty Ltd (No 7) [2020] FCA 572; (2020) 144 ACSR 621 at [77] (McKerracher J); Hur v Samsun Logix Corp (2015) 238 FCR 483 at [23] (Rares J); Larkden Pty Ltd v Lloyd Energy Systems Pty Ltd (2011) 285 ALR 207; [2011] NSWSC 1305 at [38] (Hammerschlag J).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In my view, the disposition of the Administrators’ application for a stay of order 1(b) should be approached having regard, not only to the statutory “standstill” applying while the Company is in administration, but also having regard to the fact that the Corporations Act imposes a statutory stay should the Company go into liquidation (by whichever route that may occur) and provides mechanisms by which dispositions of Company assets may be examined and recovered by a liquidator. As the Administrators observed, there is every prospect the Company will shortly go into liquidation, and the interests of the Company’s creditors at large are relevant.CONSIDERATION In my view, order 1(b) should be stayed until the date that is two weeks after the date of the second creditors’ meeting in respect of Trigon under s 439A of the Corporations Act unless, at that meeting, creditors vote to end the administration and control of Trigon is returned to its director, in which case the stay of order 1(b) should end when control of Trigon is returned to its director. Once the second creditors’ meeting has been held, the Company’s fate will be clearer. Either the DOCA proposed by Mr Salerno (Trigon’s sole director) will have been accepted, or the Company will have been placed into a creditors’ voluntary winding up. In theory, there is a chance (although it appears to be common ground that it is rather improbable) that the administration of the Company will end and control of the Company will return to its director. The DOCA proposes that all of the Court Fund be paid over to ADG, and will not form part of the Fund to be established pursuant to the DOCA. Accordingly, if the DOCA is accepted, ADG will have been made whole (to the extent of approximately $11 million), and issue concerning whether or not Trigon held the Transfer Amount as trustee for ADG (referred to as the trust issue) will not need to be determined, save to the extent that ADG wishes to pursue the case in relation to the FTX transfer. While it is obviously not for me to speculate on the fate of the DOCA, it is relevant to note that the Administrators’ estimate of the Company’s liabilities is in the order of $78 million, the known assets of the Company comprise the Court Fund (approximately $11 million), another fund of about $800,000 and a further account held with Signature Bank holding USD10,910,045.31 (which has yet to be verified by the Administrators), leaving a significant shortfall, even if related party creditors of about $27 million are discounted. The DOCA also proposes that the Court Fund and the amount in the Signature Bank account not form part of the DOCA Fund. If the Company enters into liquidation, it will be necessary (in order for the liquidators to undertake their statutory task) for the trust issue to be determined so that the assets of the Company, available for pari passu distribution to unsecured creditors, are known. ADG urged that the indefinite nature of the stay sought prejudices it, as no concrete proposal has been put forward by the Administrators for determination of the trust issue. From ADG’s point of view, the Transfer Amount constitutes trust funds, and, in any case, it has an order of the Court that the Balance Amount be paid to it from the Court Fund. ADG contended that the stay sought by the Administrators lacks utility because it fails to make any provision for bringing the trust issue to a head. Without clarity on whether or not the Court Fund (or the Balance Amount) are trust funds, or otherwise subject to equitable rights held by ADG, it says that the asset position of the Company will remain unclear. Until the asset position is resolved, ADG contends that the Company’s creditors cannot make informed decisions and the Administrators cannot make useful recommendations to the creditors.