Ademis & Beauman (No 2)
[2021] FCCA 245
•15 February 2021
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Ademis & Beauman (No 2) [2021] FCCA 245
File number(s): MLC 5968 of 2019 Judgment of: JUDGE BLAKE Date of judgment: 15 February 2021 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – property – composition of asset pool – adjustment to the wife for contributions – property pool to be divided 60% to the wife and 40% to the husband Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 75, 79 Cases cited: Bevan v Bevan [2013] FamCAFC 116
Dickons v Dickons [2012] FamCAFC 154
Eufrosin v Eufrosin [2014] FamCAFC 191
Lovine v Connor [2012] FamCAFC 168
Stanford v Stanford [2012] HCA 52
Number of paragraphs: 120 Date of hearing: 27-30 October 2020 Place: Melbourne Counsel for the First Applicant: Mr Hale Solicitor for the First Applicant: Peter Lynch Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr Carne Solicitor for the First Respondent: Kenna Teasdale Lawyers ORDERS
MLC 5968 of 2019 BETWEEN: MR ADEMIS
Applicant
AND: MS BEAUMAN
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE BLAKE
DATE OF ORDER:
15 FEBRUARY 2021
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Within sixty days of the date of these Orders ('due date'), the Respondent pay the Applicant the sum of $63,438 ('payment').
2.Contemporaneously with the payment:
(a)the Applicant do all acts and things and sign all documents necessary to discharge the mortgages and loans (‘F Street, Suburb G Mortgages’) secured against the title to the property at F Street, Suburb G in the State of Victoria (‘F Street, Suburb G Property’) and pay out or refinance the debts secured by the said F Street, Suburb G Mortgages into his sole name; and
(b)the Respondent do all acts and things and sign all documents necessary transfer to the Applicant, at the Applicant's expense, all of her right, title and interest in the F Street, Suburb G Property.
3.If the Applicant fails to comply with Order 2(a) herein, the F Street, Suburb G Property be sold forthwith, with the Respondent to have the conduct of the sale, and the sale proceeds be applied as follows:
(a)first, to pay the costs, commissions and expenses of the sale including conveyancing fees;
(b)second, to discharge the F Street, Suburb G Mortgages;
(c)third, to pay all outstanding rates, taxes, outgoings and other encumbrances owing in relation to the property;
(d)fourth, to pay any taxation payable as a consequence of the sale; and
(e)fifth, the balance then remaining be paid to the Applicant.
4.Pending compliance with Orders 2 and 3 herein:
(a)the Applicant pay and be responsible for all instalments due under the F Street, Suburb G Mortgages and all rates, taxes and insurances in relation to the F Street, Suburb G Property as and when they fall due;
(b)the Applicant shall have the sole right to occupy the F Street, Suburb G Property;
(c)neither party shall encumber or further encumber the F Street, Suburb G Property without the prior written consent of the other party; and
(d)the parties are to hold their interests in the F Street, Suburb G Property upon trust pursuant to these Orders.
5.The Applicant vacate the F Street, Suburb G Property not less than seven days prior to the settlement of any sale pursuant to Order 3.
6.Within seven days of the date of these Orders, the Applicant do all acts and things and sign all documents necessary, at his own expense, to withdraw Caveat no. ... secured against the Title to the property at H Street, Suburb J in the State of Victoria (‘the H Street, Suburb J Property’).
7.If the Respondent fails to comply with Order 1 herein, the H Street, Suburb J Property be sold forthwith, with the Respondent to have the conduct of the sale, and the sale proceeds be applied as follows:
(a)first, to pay the costs, commissions and expenses of the sale including conveyancing fees;
(b)second to discharge the mortgage secured against the H Street, Suburb J property;
(c)third, to pay all outstanding rates, taxes, outgoings and other encumbrances owing in relation to the property;
(d)fourth, to pay any taxation payable as a consequence of the sale;
(e)fifth, so much of the payment as is then outstanding together with interest thereon at the rate set out in r.17.03 of the Family Law Rules 2004 adjusted monthly from the date, be paid to the Applicant;
(f)sixth, the balance be paid to the Respondent.
8.Pending compliance with Orders 1 and 7 herein:
(a)the Respondent pay and be responsible for all instalments due under the H Street, Suburb J mortgage and all rates, taxes and insurances in relation to the H Street, Suburb J Property as and when they fall due;
(b)the Respondent shall have the sole right to occupy the H Street, Suburb J Property;
(c)neither party shall encumber or further encumber the H Street, Suburb J Property without the prior written consent of the other party; and
(d)the parties are to hold their interests in the H Street, Suburb J Property upon trust pursuant to these Orders.
9.The Respondent vacate the H Street, Suburb J Property not less than seven days prior to the settlement of any sale pursuant to Order 7.
10.In the event that either party is liable for the payment of taxation consequent upon the sale of the F Street, Suburb G Property or the H Street, Suburb J Property then such taxation as is the subject of an assessment shall be paid in accordance with Order 3(d) and 7(d) upon completion of the sale of the property but in the event that such liability is not the subject of an assessment at that time then:
(a)such amount as is necessary to meet the payment of any anticipated liability shall be retained in an account in the name of, or operated by, the Respondent's solicitors pending the issue of an assessment for such liability at which time it shall forthwith be paid and the balance (if any) of such funds then distributed between the parties so as to give effect to Orders 3(e), 7(e) and 7(f);
(b)in the event that there is no agreement as to the amount to be paid and/or retained pursuant to Orders 3(d) and 7(d) and this Order, the parties shall forthwith appoint an accountant as agreed by them in writing to calculate the taxation to be paid/retained acting as an expert and not as an arbitrator and shall both meet equally all costs incurred in such appointment and shall be bound by such calculations;
(c)if the accountant to be appointed pursuant to this Order cannot be agreed between the parties, then such accountant be nominated by the President of the Institute of Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand, with any costs of such appointment to be met equally by the parties;
(d)and each party shall forthwith do all things and sign all documents necessary to give effect to this Order, including to cause the issue of an assessment of any taxation liability arising from the sale of the F Street, Suburb G Property or H Street, Suburb J Property.
11.The Applicant retain, to the exclusion of the Respondent, all of his right, title and interest in the following:
(a)subject to Orders 2, 3 and 6, the F Street, Suburb G Property;
(b)his Motor Vehicle 1;
(c)his interest in K Pty Ltd and L Pty Ltd;
(d)the funds owed to him, or already received by him, from K Pty Ltd;
(e)cash in any bank accounts in his sole name;
(f)his household chattels, furniture and personal effects; and
(g)his Super Fund M, Super Fund N and Super Fund O superannuation entitlements.
12.The Respondent retain, to the exclusion of the Applicant, all of her right, title and interest in the following:
(a)Subject to Orders 1 and 7, the H Street, Suburb J Property;
(b)her Motor Vehicle 2;
(c)the funds owed to her by Erskine Group;
(d)her interest in C Group Pty Ltd;
(e)her Sports Club membership;
(f)cash in any bank accounts in her sole name;
(g)the funds held in trust by Kenna Teasdale Lawyers; and
(h)her household chattels, furniture and personal effects.
13.The Applicant be responsible for and indemnify the Respondent in relation to:
(a)the F Street, Suburb G Mortgage in accordance with Order 2 herein;
(b)the car loan to Motor Vehicle 2 Finance associated with his Motor Vehicle 1;
(c)his credit card liabilities and personal loans in his sole or joint name;
(d)all past, present and future liabilities for L Pty Ltd, K Pty Ltd, P Pty Ltd, Q Pty Ltd, R Pty Ltd, S Pty Ltd, T Pty Ltd, U Pty Ltd, D Pty Ltd, W Pty Ltd and V Pty Ltd; and
(e)all other liabilities in his sole or joint name or encumbering any item of property to which he is entitled pursuant to these Orders.
14.The Respondent be responsible for and indemnify the Applicant in relation to:
(a)the mortgage secured against the title to the H Street, Suburb J Property;
(b)the car loan to X Car Finance associated with her Motor Vehicle 2;
(c)all past, present and future liabilities for C Group Pty Ltd and E Pty Ltd; and
(d)all other liabilities in her sole or joint name or encumbering any item of property to which she is entitled pursuant to these Orders.
15.Unless otherwise specified in these Orders and save for the purpose of enforcing any monies due under the terms of these Orders:
(a)the parties be solely entitled to the exclusion of the other to all other property (including choses-in-action) in the possession of such party as at the date of these Orders;
(b)each party forego any claims they may have to any superannuation entitlements belonging to or earned by the other, now or in the future;
(c)insurance policies remain the sole property of the owner of the policy;
(d)funds in any bank accounts are to be retained by the account holder;
(e)each party be solely liable for and indemnify the other against any liability encumbering any item of property to which that party is entitled pursuant to these Orders; and
(f)any joint tenancy of the parties in any real or personal estate is hereby expressly severed.
16.In the event that either party should fail, neglect or refuse to sign or execute any deed, document or instrument required by or to give effect to these Orders then pursuant to s.106A of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) that the Registrar of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, Melbourne Registry, shall be and is hereby authorised, empowered and directed to sign and execute such deed, document or instrument in the place and instead of such party and to thereafter do all things and acts as are necessary to give validity and operation to same.
17.The Applicant pay the Respondent's reserved costs pursuant to the Orders made by Senior Registrar Hoult on 3 September 2020 fixed in the sum of $5,500.
All extant applications are dismissed. Section 121 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Ademis & Beauman (No 2) is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE BLAKE:
INTRODUCTION
This matter concerns an application by the Husband for final parenting and property orders ('Application').
During the course of a four-day hearing, the parties were able to reach agreement as to the parenting orders to apply to their son. Final parenting orders were therefore made by consent during the trial. These reasons deal with the extant property issues between the parties.
For the reasons that follow, I have determined that it is just and equitable to make orders adjusting the property interests of the parties, and that the parties' interests in property should be divided 60/40 in favour of the Wife.
BACKGROUND
The Wife is presently 52 years old. The Husband is presently 47 years old. They met in 2004 and commenced living together in 2006. They married in 2006. The one child of the relationship, Y, was born in 2008. The parties separated on 10 June 2016 and were divorced on 28 December 2018.
The Husband is the sole director and shareholder of L Pty Ltd ('L Pty Ltd'). He describes himself as a 'small business owner'. As I understand it, he provides consulting services through L Pty Ltd. He currently derives an income through this business.
The Wife is the sole director of C Group Pty Ltd ('C Group'). She is also a Director at the Erskine Group. Companies within the Erskine Group undertake consulting in the construction and infrastructure industry. Erskine Group is owned and managed by the Wife's sister, Ms A Beauman, and her brother-in-law, Mr Erskine. The Wife has worked for Erskine Group throughout the marriage. In recent times, she has performed work for Erskine Group through C Group.
At the time of the hearing, the Wife was not presently working and was receiving JobKeeper payments.
In 2007, the parties purchased the property at Z Street, Suburb AA in Victoria ('Z Street, Suburb AA Property'). The Z Street, Suburb AA Property was registered in the Husband's sole name.
In 2008, the Wife received a $300,000 lump sum payment from BB insurance for loss of income. The income and net proceeds of the funds were applied toward the purchase of a property at F Street, Suburb G in Victoria ('F Street, Suburb G Property'). The F Street, Suburb G Property was registered in the Wife's sole name.
In 2010, the Z Street, Suburb AA Property was sold for $1,030,000.
In 2010, the parties purchased the property at CC Street, Suburb DD ('CC Street, Suburb DD Property') for $1,950,000. Sale proceeds from the Z Street, Suburb AA Property were applied toward the purchase of the CC Street, Suburb DD Property.
The CC Street, Suburb DD Property was transferred into the Wife's sole name in 2013.
In 2014, the parties purchased a property at F Street, Suburb G for $725,000. This property was registered in the Husband's sole name. It was subsequently sold in July 2015.
The parties carried out renovations on the properties that they owned during the marriage.
The Wife sold the CC Street, Suburb DD Property following separation in November 2017 for $3,600,000.
In 2017, the Wife purchased the property at H Street, Suburb J in Victoria ('H Street, Suburb J Property') for $1,389,960 plus stamp duty and costs.
The parties signed a document described as a 'Financial Agreement' in March 2018.
The Husband currently lives in the F Street, Suburb G Property and pays the mortgage on it.
The Husband has paid for X’s school fees following separation.
The Wife is responsible for the mortgage payments on the H Street, Suburb J Property since separation.
It is agreed that the Wife has advanced significant loans to the Erskine Group post-separation, and that Erskine Group has made repayments to the Wife. As will be seen, the amount of the loans and the repayments is a matter in dispute.
The Husband and Wife were joint directors and shareholders of a company known as D Pty Ltd (D Pty Ltd). The Wife was the sole director and shareholder of E Pty Ltd (E Pty Ltd). At the time of hearing, both of these companies had been deregistered.
In 2019, the Wife remarried to Mr EE.
ISSUES IN DISPUTE
The principal issues in dispute in this matter are as follows:
(a)the composition of the Asset Pool, and in particular:
(i)the amount of any loans made by the Wife to the Erskine Group;
(ii)the amount of any investments in Erskine Group, and the amount of cash or deferred income that the Wife has allegedly hidden or not disclosed;
(b)the weight to be attributed to the financial and non-financial contributions made by the parties;
(c)whether any adjustment is required under sub-s.75(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 ('Act').
RELEVANT PRINCIPLES
The power of the Court to alter the property interests of parties is contained within the Act.
Sub-section 79(1) of the Act empowers the Court to make such orders as it considers appropriate in altering the interests of the parties to the marriage. The power of the Court under sub-s.79(1) of the Act is a power to be exercised having regard to the sub-sections that follow, and in particular, sub-ss.79(2) and (4) and consequently, sub-s.75(2) of the Act.
The provisions set out above have been the subject of extensive consideration by both the High Court of Australia and the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia: see Stanford v Stanford [2012] HCA 52 at [35]-[40], [42]; Bevan v Bevan [2013] FamCAFC 116 at paragraphs [73] to [86], [89]. I am required to approach the matter consistently with the principles articulated in these authorities.
When it comes to the assessment of contributions and the approach to be taken, I have had regard to the comments of the Full Court in Dickons v Dickons [2012] FamCAFC 154 (especially paragraphs [23] and [24]), Eufrosin v Eufrosin [2014] FamCAFC 191, and Lovine v Connor [2012] FamCAFC 168 at [42].
I am satisfied that in this matter it is just and equitable to embark upon an exercise of determining how the assets between the parties are to be split. The parties have been separated since 2016. Divorce occurred in December 2018. The Wife has remarried. It is self-evident that the parties are no longer in a relationship and that there will no longer be any common property available for shared use by the parties.
THE WITNESSES
This is a matter which was marked by mutual allegations of non-disclosure. Both parties were cross-examined at length about their disclosure (or lack thereof), and the Court was invited to draw inferences adverse to each party on the basis of the alleged non-disclosure. The Husband's case in particular rested principally on what he alleged was either significant non-disclosure by the Wife, or alternatively, disclosure which gave rise to claimed inconsistencies in the financial evidence she put forward.
At the outset, it is appropriate to record that the disclosure of both parties was inadequate. Each was called upon to produce documents during cross-examination that ought to have been disclosed earlier. That is a matter that does neither party any credit, and made the job of the Court (and in fairness, the parties' respective Counsel) more difficult.
The Wife was, among other things, cross-examined about the contents of various letters written by her lawyers and about the content of her Financial Statement dated 21 August 2019. I am satisfied that the Wife included information in her Financial Statement of 21 August 2019 that was inaccurate. I am also satisfied that correspondence from the Wife's solicitors to the Husband in relation to financial matters was, at times, inaccurate. It is regrettable that the Wife made these errors. It seems to have fed in the Husband a suspicion about the true state of the Wife's finances.
While it is important to record the matters above and to express disapproval of them, it is equally important to record that the Wife actively sought to remedy accuracies and omissions in her material. For example, the Wife filed an updated Financial Statement. Her trial affidavit acknowledged errors in earlier material and sought to correct them. The cross-examination of the Wife did not reveal that she was hiding funds, or not disclosing assets. While she became confused at times, she appeared to me to be genuine and straightforward in her evidence. I found her to be a credible witness.
Regrettably, I formed a far less favourable impression of the Husband. In short, he was not a credible witness. I formed this view for the following reasons.
The Husband was cross-examined, among other things, about the true state of his income and his involvement with K Pty Ltd (K Pty Ltd). I do not here repeat my analysis of the evidence and findings in relation to this matter (set out later in these reasons), however I rely upon them insofar as they go to my assessment of the Husband's credit.
Cross-examination revealed that the Husband actively sought to hide or not disclose his income from L Pty Ltd. I do not here repeat my analysis of the evidence and findings in relation to this matter (set out later in these reasons), however I also rely on them insofar as they go to my assessment of the Husband's credit.
There is then the Husband's involvement in relation to subpoenas the Wife had issued to FF Group. Objections were taken by each of those organisations to the subpoenas. The correspondence received from each of them objecting to the subpoena was strikingly similar. The Husband was cross-examined about these similarities. Under cross-examination, he admitted that he had sent to each organisation a copy of a letter he had received from McMullan solicitors dated 20 May 2020 when he had sought to subpoena documents from Ms A Beauman and Mr Erskine, in order to assist them with their response. The Husband ultimately admitted that this was a stupid thing to have done.
That, however, is not the end of the matter. While the letters received from FF Group contain content that is similar to the content in the letter from McMullan solicitors, they also contain content that is nearly identical between them; and that is not to be found in the letter from McMullan solicitors. It was put to the Husband that he was the common author of both of the letters. He denied this. When asked about the coincidence, he sought to explain it by reference to his mother (a Director of K Pty Ltd) knowing the people at FF Group. I found the Husband's answer on this score entirely unconvincing and evasive.
Given the circumstances of the relationship between the Husband and K Pty Ltd, I am satisfied the Husband prepared the response that K Pty Ltd ultimately sent to the subpoena. I am satisfied that, at the very least, the Husband prepared a draft response ultimately used by FF Group.
In reaching the conclusions above about the credit and credibility of each of the principal witnesses, I considered whether, given that both parties had issues with their disclosure, I should treat them both equally when it comes to an assessment of their credibility. I decline to do so. In my view, it is appropriate to treat them differently, as I have noted above.
While the Wife made errors or omissions, I am satisfied that she endeavoured to cure those prior to trial. She did not enter the trial actively seeking to hide matters, and in my view, nothing occurred during her cross-examination which would cause me to come to the view that she was actively hiding information from the Court in the witness box.
Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for the Husband. His lack of honesty was revealed in the witness box and he sought to continue that lack of candour while in the witness box. Further, there was no prior attempt by him to correct the record prior to coming to trial.
THE ASSET POOL
The parties agreed that the items below were to be included in the pool of assets:
Assets Ownership Value H Street, Suburb J Property Wife $1,300,000 F Street, Suburb G Property Wife $720,000 C Group Wife $5,873 Motor Vehicle 2 Wife $6,000 Sports Club Membership Wife $15,000 Savings in CBA Account #...91 Wife $2,466 Savings in Westpac Choice Account #...28 Wife $48 L Pty Ltd Husband $39,399 Motor Vehicle 1 Husband $29,000 Savings in CBA Account #...13 Husband $2,356 Savings in NAB Account #...89 Husband $15 Paid Legal Fees Wife $130,659 Paid Legal Fees Husband $72,043 Funds Held In Trust by Kenna Teasdale Wife $44,948 Total Assets (excluding Superannuation) $2,367,807 Liabilities Loan against H Street, Suburb J Property Wife $949,478 Loan against F Street, Suburb G Property (Westpac) Wife $431,033 Second Loan against F Street, Suburb G Property (Westpac) Wife $70,180 X Car Finance Motor Vehicle 2 Wife $3,569 Finance against Motor Vehicle 1 (X) Husband $16,638 Total Liabilities $1,470,898 Net Assets (excluding Superannuation) $896,909 Superannuation Super Fund M Husband $11,863 Super Fund N Husband $3,754 Super Fund O Husband $23,989 Total Super $39,606 Total Assets $936,515
There was a dispute about a number of items and whether those items should be included in the Asset Pool. It is to those matters that I now turn.
For completeness, I note that the parties consented, at the hearing on 30 October 2020, to include their respective legal costs in the Asset Pool. The Husband's counsel emailed my chambers on 30 October 2020 stating that the Husband had withdrawn his consent to that inclusion in the Asset Pool. The Husband soon clarified by reply email that he would not be filing an Application in a Case to re-open the matter and clarified that he did consent to the legal fees being included in the sums above.
The $2.02m the Husband seeks to include in the Asset Pool
At the commencement of the Trial, the Husband contended that the following amounts needed to be added to the Asset Pool:
(a)$823,208 reflecting funds owed by the Erskine Group to the Wife under a loan;
(b)$393,000, reflecting an investment in the Erskine Group by D Pty Ltd;
(c)$379,619, reflecting cash in the bank accounts of D Pty Ltd;
(d)$273,347, reflecting deferred income or income in allegedly non-disclosed accounts of the Wife; and
(e)$160,721, reflecting cash in the Wife's allegedly undisclosed bank accounts.
The Wife conceded loans to the Erskine Group in the amount of $245,000 should be added to the asset pool. She otherwise contended that, inter alia, there was no evidence to support including any of the other amounts set out above in the Asset Pool.
A consideration of this issue must begin with an examination of the evidence of the Husband. The claims by the Husband in respect of the amounts above appear to arise from various correspondence passing between the parties and others in the pre-trial stage, including relevantly letters from the Wife's solicitors dated 1 October 2019, 5 December 2019 and 8 May 2020, and a letter from the solicitors of Erskine Group dated 4 December 2019. The Husband points to what he says are statements made within these letters, or inconsistencies between what is in these letters and other discovered material, upon which to mount a claim that the amounts identified exist, and ought to be added back to the Asset Pool.
Having examined the correspondence and the Wife's affidavit material, I accept that in some instances, the correspondence to which the Husband points contains errors. The fact is, however, that to the extent the correspondence contains errors, those are matters that were rectified and clarified by the Wife prior to trial. The Wife in her affidavit material has explained those errors and has produced documentation supporting what she says is the real position in relation to the funds the Husband seeks to have included in the Asset Pool.
I have considered carefully the Husband's case and evidence in relation to the amounts he says ought to be added back into the Asset Pool. The claims by the Husband are based almost entirely upon the correspondence between the parties and the Husband's claimed inconsistencies within it. The Husband has not produced any positive evidence that the amounts claimed actually exist. His case in respect of these matters is based on pointing to the information in the correspondence, taking issue with it, and then asking the Court to make a positive finding in his favour. Under cross-examination, the Husband conceded that he was seeking the inclusion of the above sums of money on the basis of earlier representations.
The Husband filed an extensive affidavit in the proceeding. It is not of great assistance in relation to this issue. It appears he prepared the affidavit personally. Objections were taken and upheld to large parts of that affidavit. Large portions of the affidavit are effectively submissions. The affidavit, insofar as it contains direct evidence, is sparse. That is particularly the case in respect of the Husband's claims in relation to the $2.02m (less the amount accepted by the Wife) that he seeks to have included into the Asset Pool.
Other evidence also does not support the Husband's claims:
(a)First, the uncontested evidence is, as noted above, that D Pty Ltd is now deregistered;
(b)Second, the bank statements of D Pty Ltd do not disclose an amount of $393,000 being withdrawn from any account; and
(c)Third, the Wife has disclosed documentation showing her income reconciliations. They do not support a finding that she earned, or had the capacity to earn, income said to be 'deferred income' by the Husband of $273,347.
There is then the evidence of Mr Erskine. Mr Erskine's evidence corroborated the evidence of the Wife in relation to the loan amounts. Further, Mr Erskine gave the following evidence:
(a)First, that there was no 'investment' in Erskine independent of the loan amounts made by the Wife;
(b)Second, there was no investment in the Erskine Group or C Group by either E Pty Ltd or D Pty Ltd; and
(c)Third, that amounts paid to D Pty Ltd were in fact sums being invoiced to E Pty Ltd.
I accept Mr Erskine's evidence.
One issue that arose as a subset of these matters concerns an amount of $85,000 that the Wife says she repaid to the Erskine Group in around October 2017 (as part of a broader payment she made of $150,000). The Husband contends that this amount was not a genuine liability of the Wife that she was required to repay, and also that the amount may well have been $70,000.
I am satisfied, having considered the evidence, that the amount in question was $85,000. I am further satisfied that the amount was genuinely an amount that the Wife was required to repay to the Erskine Group. I have come to this view for the following reasons:
(a)First, the debts were incurred on a card in the name of Mr Erskine. The Husband appeared to try to make something of the fact that the card was in Mr Erskine's personal name. I am frankly untroubled as to whether the card was in Mr Erskine's personal name or a company name. In the Court's experience, such distinctions are of little utility in dealing with businesses like Erskine Group where the owners of the business are directly involved in its running and operations;
(b)Second, the Wife has deposed to how the money was spent. She was not seriously challenged on this and I accept that the money was spent in respect of personal expenses incurred; and
(c)Third, a ledger produced by Mr Erskine records the amount owing by the Wife to the Erskine Group as being $85,000. Quite apart from the fact that the ledger confirms the amount, it is evidence of a proper accounting of the funds passing between the Wife and the Erskine Group.
The Husband sought generally to make much of the fact that the $85,000 (and perhaps the other transfers of funds) was part of a churn of funds between the Wife and the Erskine Group. Indeed, he sought to characterise the arrangements (especially the $85,000 loan) as part of a family 'piggy bank' which the Wife was not genuinely required to repay. I do not accept that submission. The evidence is that while monies have passed between the Erskine Group and the Wife, records are kept in relation to those amounts and repayments have been made. There is nothing in the evidence to suggest that the $85,000 (and indeed the other amounts advanced as loans) would not have to be genuinely repaid to the person loaning the funds. The evidence in its totality does not suggest that the Wife has attempted to hide or disburse funds.
The lack of evidence to support the Husband's claims in respect of the $2.02m was a matter I raised with his Counsel at the conclusion of his case and before the Wife opened her case. The Husband, nevertheless, persisted with the claims. Ultimately, his Counsel elected not to address the Court on any of the Husband's claims identified above in closing submissions.
In summary, the evidence does not support the making of the findings sought by the Husband. I accept the Wife's evidence in respect of these amounts. I find that the only amounts owed to the Wife, which ought to be included in the Asset Pool, is a loan she made to the Erskine Group in the amount of $245,000. I will include that amount in the Asset Pool.
Funds owed by K Pty Ltd to the Husband
The Wife contends that the Husband is owed an amount of $41,000 from K Pty Ltd. The Husband contends that the amount is not recoverable and should therefore not be included in the Asset Pool. He submits that the amount should not be included in the Asset Pool because the only evidence the Wife has to support her assertion in respect of the amount is that he told her about it, and he has since told her that the amount is now not recoverable.
A review of the evidence in relation to K Pty Ltd discloses the following:
(a)the name 'K Pty Ltd' is a combination of the Husband's initials and the street address of his mother;
(b)K Pty Ltd was registered in 2016. The current registered address for K Pty Ltd is an address in Suburb DD where the Husband resided as at July 2019; and
(c)The sole director and secretary of K Pty Ltd is the Husband's mother.
The Husband filed a Financial Statement in the Court on 31 July 2019. In that Financial Statement, K Pty Ltd was listed as the Husband's employer and the Husband's only source of income. The Husband stated in his Financial Statement that his occupation is 'Contracts Manager'. In his Financial Statement, the Husband disclosed that he earned income from K Pty Ltd in the sum of approximately $3,300 per week (equivalent to an amount of $171,600 per annum). He also disclosed that his weekly personal expenditure totalled $3,153 per week.
The position in his Financial Statement referred to above is to be contrasted with the following. On 22 May 2020, the Husband sent an email to the Wife's lawyers in relation to K Pty Ltd. In that email, the Husband indicated that he had been an employee of K Pty Ltd, that he had elected to defer his salary, that the amount of $41,000 remained outstanding to him, and that he would be willing to make reference to this unrecoverable debt in the matrimonial asset pool.
The Husband was cross-examined about the above matters. He did not explain how it was that he was able to meet his weekly expenses of $3,153 per week if he was not receiving an income from K Pty Ltd because it had been deferred. He was also unable to explain the inconsistency between the income said to be received in his Financial Statement filed on 31 July 2019, and his statement that his income from K Pty Ltd had been deferred at his election.
The Husband's answers to questions about K Pty Ltd under cross-examination became even more troubling when he was asked about what work he performed for K Pty Ltd. On any view, whatever his income was, the Husband might be expected to know what work he and K Pty Ltd were doing. Yet the Husband, despite being given various opportunities, was unable to say with any precision at all what work was being performed. In cross-examination, he sought to downplay the work of K Pty Ltd and his role in it, saying that (transcript of the hearing on 28 October 2020, page 145):
'…mum was doing it. My mum wanted to set up a company and she asked for my assistance. She was doing things with her paper round and other marketing and I helped her create some brochures, I helped her set it up. I helped her to a number of things for that company.'
Further, despite representing himself as the 'contracts manager' for K Pty Ltd, he stated under cross-examination that he was unable to name the clients of the business.
Finally, it is to be observed that the Husband's mother filed with the Court an affidavit for the final hearing. Ultimately, the Husband elected not to call her as a witness and she therefore could not be questioned in relation to any of the evidence that the Husband gave.
The Husband's evidence in relation to K Pty Ltd was entirely unconvincing. He was non-responsive and evasive. He was unable to answer the most basic of questions in relation to the company and what he did to earn income (whether deferred or otherwise). Given his serious failure to answer questions in a forthright manner about an entity that, on any view, paid or owed him a reasonable income (deferred or otherwise), I have very serious reservations about the credibility of the Husband's evidence overall. My concerns about his candour are only amplified when one takes into account his role in responding to the subpoena directed to K Pty Ltd, which I have discussed earlier. Given his failure to call his mother to give evidence, I infer that any evidence she might have been able to give would not have assisted his case.
In the circumstances, I find as follows. First, that K Pty Ltd was a company that the Husband was not only involved with, but that he used as a vehicle to perform work and earn income. Second, that while his mother may be the sole director and shareholder, it is the Husband that effectively controls K Pty Ltd. Third, that the Husband will be able to or has already recovered $41,000 in income from K Pty Ltd.
For the above reasons, I will include the $41,000 in the Asset Pool as an amount owed to or paid to the Husband.
Other items
At the commencement of the trial, there were a number of other items identified as being disputed items in the Joint Case Summary document prepared by the parties. These include the following: personal income tax liabilities of each of the parties, various pre-separation debts, related legal party cost liability and other items. I have excluded those items from the Asset Pool on the basis that in the case of the Wife, she did not press for the inclusion of the tax debts, and in respect of the Husband, his Counsel chose not to address me on the tax debts or the pre-separation debts identified in the Case Summary document, or alternatively indicated he was not pursuing them.
Also included in the pre-trial material was an amount of a loan from the Husband's father to the parties in the amount of $120,000. The Husband ultimately indicated he did not require that item to be included in the Asset Pool, and was content to have it taken into account as a sub-s.75(2) factor and/or contribution.
In view of the matters above, the Asset Pool available for distribution by the parties is as follows:
Assets Ownership Value H Street, Suburb J Property Wife $1,300,000 F Street, Suburb G Property Wife $720,000 C Group Wife $5,873 Motor Vehicle 2 Wife $6,000 Sports Club Membership Wife $15,000 Savings in CBA Account #...91 Wife $2,466 Savings in Westpac Choice Account #...28 Wife $48 L Pty Ltd Husband $39,399 Motor Vehicle 1 Husband $29,000 Savings in CBA Account #...13 Husband $2,356 Savings in NAB Account #...89 Husband $15 Paid Legal Fees Wife $130,659 Paid Legal Fees Husband $72,043 Funds Held In Trust by Kenna Teasdale Wife $44,948 Funds Owed by Erskine Group Wife $245,000 Deferred Salary or recovered from K Pty Ltd Husband $41,000 Total Assets (excl Superannuation) $2,653,807 Liabilities Loan against H Street, Suburb J Property Wife $949,478 Loan against F Street, Suburb G Property (Westpac) Wife $431,033 Second Loan against F Street, Suburb G Property (Westpac) Wife $70,180 Finance against Motor Vehicle 2 (X) Wife $3,569 Finance against Motor Vehicle 1 (X) Husband $16,638 Total Liabilities $1,470,898 Net Assets (excluding Superannuation) $1,182,909 Superannuation Super Fund M Husband $11,863 Super Fund N Husband $3,754 Super Fund O Husband $23,989 Total Super $39,606 Total Assets $1,222,515
CONTRIBUTIONS
The Husband concedes that the Wife contributed $230,000 at the commencement of the marriage. The Wife contends her contribution was greater. She says, inter alia, that she made a contribution of $470,000 to the Z Street, Suburb AA Property purchased in 2007. She says she obtained the funds from the sale of a previous property in Suburb GG.
The Husband was challenged in cross-examination about the Wife's evidence. He accepted that the mortgage on the Z Street, Suburb AA property would have been much larger. He also accepted that $140,000 was spent on renovations in a reasonably short period of time. In my view, when the evidence is considered in total, and given the credibility concerns I have about the Husband's evidence generally, it supports the Wife's position that she contributed $470,000 toward the property in Z Street, Suburb AA at or near the commencement of the marriage, and I make a finding to that effect.
The Husband contended that he contributed $70,000 at the commencement of the marriage and that such funds were obtained from the sale of two properties that he owned prior to the parties' marriage. The Husband also contended that he later contributed $25,000 from the sale of another property. The Husband has not produced any corroborating documentation to support these contributions.
I accept that the Husband contributed $25,000 from the sale of the Town HH property. However, I do not accept that he contributed funds as claimed from the Town JJ and Town KK properties he owned for the following reasons. First, these properties were sold in 2002 and 2004 respectively. This is well before the parties commenced cohabitation and married. Secondly, the Husband has produced no corroborating documentary evidence that he held those funds at the time cohabitation commenced, or that he used them for the benefit of the parties. Third, I have real concerns about the credibility of the Husband.
Any consideration of the contributions made by the parties during the marriage must start with a review of the Husband's own evidence. Two critical aspects emerge. First, the Husband recognises that 'the Respondent's financial contribution and access to resources via her family was significantly greater than mine during our relationship'. Second, the Husband states that the party's ability to purchase a home in Suburb DD, send the Respondent's daughters to LL School in Suburb DD and travel internationally 'has its roots in the initial contribution made by the Respondent and the resources made available by the Respondent's family'. These represent, in my view, significant concessions made by the Husband.
During the marriage, the Wife received a lump sum income insurance payment of $300,000. Both parties agree that these funds were used to purchase the F Street, Suburb G Property. The Husband contends, however, that the amount advanced after legal fees and tax was in the order of $118,000. On this issue, I prefer the evidence of the Wife. The F Street, Suburb G Property was purchased in her sole name. She was the one that received the payment. She was the more credible witness overall. The Husband also eventually conceded a substantial contribution by the Wife to the F Street, Suburb G Property. Further, the Husband failed to lead any evidence as to the credit card debts he said supported the purchase and the renovations. This was a significant contribution by the Wife.
As noted earlier, in 2010 the parties purchased the CC Street, Suburb DD Property. The CC Street, Suburb DD Property was eventually sold in 2016, by the Wife. Three issues of significance emerged in the hearing in relation to the CC Street, Suburb DD Property. The first issue was the extent to which the Husband renovated the CC Street, Suburb DD Property personally. The second issue is how the renovations were funded. The third issue related to treatment of the sale proceeds from the CC Street, Suburb DD Property in 2017.
In respect of the renovations, the Wife says that the parties engaged a registered builder to carry out the renovations and spent approximately $270,000 on the renovations. The Husband largely accepts the amount spent (he says $280,000 was spent). He says, however, that he undertook a large amount of the renovation works on the CC Street, Suburb DD Property (and also the Z Street, Suburb AA Property, and the F Street, Suburb G Property).
I am prepared to accept that the Husband undertook some work personally on the renovations. He was not significantly challenged on this aspect. The difficulty for the Husband, however, is that the amount is not able to be quantified. While I credit him with a contribution, I find it was not a significant one in circumstances where approximately $270,000-$280,000 was spent on registered tradespeople, where the Husband is unable to quantify the amount, where the Husband was, on his own evidence, employed full time with Erskine Group, and where I have doubts about the Husband's overall credibility.
There is then the question as to how the renovations to the CC Street, Suburb DD Property were funded. The Husband says that the funds for the renovations were from earnings, funds drawn from the property mortgages, and a loan from his father and grandmother. The Wife contends the renovations for CC Street, Suburb DD were paid for from drawdowns against the mortgage.
I do not accept the Husband's evidence that his father loaned him $120,000 in respect of the CC Street, Suburb DD Property, or its renovations. The Husband's father was ultimately not called to give evidence (despite an indication that he would be) and I therefore infer that any evidence he would give would not be favourable to the Husband. Further, the $120,000 was advanced over a period of several years commencing in 2010. The unchallenged evidence of the Wife seems to indicate that renovations to the CC Street, Suburb DD Property occurred in a relatively short period of time after the purchase. The bulk of the funds advanced by the Husband's father did not occur at that time, but occurred in later years.
Accordingly, when the evidence is considered as a whole, I find that the renovations on the CC Street, Suburb DD Property were funded as contended for by the Wife.
The final issue in relation to the CC Street, Suburb DD Property concerned the sale proceeds. The Husband sought to emphasise that the Wife received an amount greater than, inter alia, $705,000 from the sale. There does not appear to me to be a significant dispute about this. The Wife has provided a full accounting of what happened to the sale proceeds from the CC Street, Suburb DD Property in her affidavit and I accept her evidence in respect of that.
While I have found above that the Husband's father did not loan the amount of $120,000 to the parties in connection with the CC Street, Suburb DD Property or its renovations, I am prepared to make a finding that $120,000 was given by the Husband's father to the Husband. The Wife does not deny the advances, and the Husband has produced some documentation in support of it. The issue is then whether the $120,000 may be regarded as a contribution by the husband to the marriage.
The Wife contends that while the advance of $120,000 was made, it was used by the Husband to establish a business known as ‘P Pty Ltd’. The Wife deposes that the Husband derived no income from this business during the period it was run. She also deposes that the business was closed in March 2016 because it could not sustain its losses. She further deposes that the property from which the business was run was sold for $1.24m in March 2016, and that she does not know how the proceeds of sale were applied.
The Husband's evidence-in-chief in relation to the business is scant to non-existent. I was not taken to any information about the amount of the investment, whether it was profitable, or whether he derived an income. He acknowledged under cross-examination that certain funds had been returned to his father, and that some was a gift to him and the Wife.
In the circumstances, I am unable to regard the $120,000 from the Husband's father as a contribution to the marriage. Having found that it was not advanced in respect of renovations to the CC Street, Suburb DD Property, there is no other evidence before me that enables me to make a finding that it was applied for the parties' benefit as a contribution during the marriage.
The Wife, in her affidavit, deposed that the Husband had various failed business ventures, including P Pty Ltd, R Pty Ltd and Q Pty Ltd. The Husband has not led any evidence in relation to these issues. His failure to adequately explain these matters leads me to the view that he likely incurred losses in relation to these businesses.
There is no significant dispute that both parties, at least in the initial years of the marriage, worked at Erskine Group. The evidence is that both parties earned an income of in excess of $200,000 per annum. The Wife stopped work shortly before X was born in 2008 but returned to work after eight weeks, working about three and a half days for two years, before returning to full-time work. During this period, the Husband made the greater financial contribution. After that time, and up to the Husband's dismissal from the Erskine Group, it would appear that their financial contributions were reasonably equal.
The Wife asserts that after the dismissal of the Husband from the Erskine Group, he did not earn an income until 2015. The Husband's evidence in relation to his income levels after 2013 is minimal, and the evidence, as I have noted above, is that his involvement in P Pty Ltd was not a financial success. Given the Husband's failure to lead any detailed evidence on these issues, I find that after November 2013, his income was not as great as it had been previously; at least up until the time of separation and the establishment of K Pty Ltd.
The Wife contended that she was the primary carer of Y throughout the relationship. The Husband contends that he and the Wife cared for Y on an equal basis. I am satisfied that both parties cared for Y and I note that the parties have substantially shared Y's care post-separation. I accept the Wife's evidence that she was primarily responsible for home duties and that the Husband was readily available to assist with those matters. I accept the Husband's evidence that when the Wife was unwell and unable to work, he assumed responsibility for home duties, including for a period of three months in 2014.
Both of the Wife's elder children attended LL School. The evidence suggests, and I find, that both parties contributed equally to the school fees payable by them (recognising that a portion of the total fees was also paid by the elder children's father). The fees were paid from joint funds.
Neither party made extensive submissions in respect of post-separation contributions.
The post separation period was marked by the parties signing a Financial Agreement ('Agreement') in order to resolve parenting and property matters. The Agreement was not made pursuant to the Act. Broadly speaking, under the Agreement, the Wife was to retain the CC Street, Suburb DD Property and associated mortgage, and the Husband was to retain the F Street, Suburb G Property. It appears that the parties have, to some extent, acted consistently with the Agreement. The Wife retained and ultimately sold the CC Street, Suburb DD Property in order to purchase the H Street, Suburb J Property. The Husband continues to reside at the F Street, Suburb G Property.
In respect of the Husband, I find that he made a number of contributions in the post-separation period. These include paying the Wife a total of $45,200 between August 2016 in June 2017, to enable the Wife to continue to live at the CC Street, Suburb DD Property, and pay the school fees for Y, as well as pay private school fees for one of her daughters.
The Husband contended that he had made post-separation contributions which include repaying amounts on a loan from BB Bank. I will not take that into account. I am satisfied on the evidence that this loan was entered into by the Husband without the consent or agreement of the Wife.
The CC Street, Suburb DD Property was sold by the Wife for $3.6m. Around $1.4m of that sum was available after sale costs and mortgage discharges. She used the money to, among other things, purchase the H Street, Suburb J Property, make a loan to the Erskine Group, meet living expenses, pay outstanding school fees, pay out the shortfall on a leased car and pay out credit card debts.
The Wife has remained on the mortgage of the F Street, Suburb G Property in order to assist the Husband to refinance. In the periods when the Husband has not lived in that property post-separation, the property has been rented and the rent has been paid to the Husband (who on the evidence, has directed that money, at times, toward his father).
Assessment of Contributions
The Court is required to assess contributions holistically. In my view, this is a case where the contributions clearly favour the Wife. The Husband has conceded as much in his affidavit. That concession is appropriate given the evidence. She made significant contributions with respect to the purchase of the Z Street, Suburb AA Property. With respect to the insurance monies that she received, the Wife made a further significant contribution in that those funds were used to purchase the F Street, Suburb G Property. While I accept that the Wife had periods off work (for example the birth of Y, and ill health), and while I accept that the Husband also cared for Y, I am satisfied that the Wife was his primary carer.
Both parties earned a good income in the early years of the marriage. Though the evidence is somewhat unclear, I find the Husband did make a greater financial contribution through his income at the time Y was born, and in his early years. He would also have made the greater income contribution during the period that the Wife was ill. The Husband says in his affidavit that he expended significant personal effort to make up for, what he felt, were the Wife's greater contributions. I accept this to be the case. He was clearly prepared to invest in businesses in an attempt to earn income. The difficulty for the Husband, however, is that his income earning capacity clearly diminished after 2013. His evidence about his income earning capacity after this time is scant to non-existent in the face of the Wife's evidence that he ran businesses which made losses.
In weighing all of these matters, it is appropriate to record that the Wife has diminished the asset pool somewhat, having used some of the proceeds of the CC Street, Suburb DD sale to fund living expenses, pay school fees and make payments on a leased car. The amount used is not quantified, however having regard to the overall amount she was left with ($138,016.40 from her Westpac Choice account) and the nature of the expenses, it would seem that the amounts she has dispersed would not be more than $100,000, and quite possibly less than that.
As I indicated earlier, when all of these matters are weighed, I am of the view that the Wife has made the greater contributions. The Wife has contended that contributions be assessed 60/40 in her favour. In my view that contention ought to be accepted given the evidence and for the reasons I have articulated above.
SUB-SECTION 75(2) FACTORS
Little time was spent by the parties on the issue of the factors under sub-s.75(2) of the Act.
The Wife is 52 years old. While still young, she is somewhat closer to the end of her working life than the Husband.
The Wife suffers from bipolar disorder. She also gave evidence that she has ongoing health issues and high medical expenses. In respect of these matters, she attached a Schedule from Medicare. I was not addressed on the Medicare Schedule nor on the expenses incurred by the Wife. A review of that Schedule discloses consultations with various doctors over a number of years and the costs involved in such consultations. The costs are not insubstantial.
I have considered what weight to give the health conditions claimed by the Wife and ultimately have given them little weight. The Wife did not adduce medical evidence from a medical professional as to the ongoing nature of any of the conditions and whether they would affect her capacity for work in the future. There is no evidence before me as to likely future costs associated with any medical condition suffered by the Wife. Further, whatever her medical state is, the evidence is that she has not been prevented from working and earning a reasonable income. In summary, while she may have a health conditions, I am satisfied that she manages them and that it does not impede her ability to earn an income.
In terms of her work opportunities, the Wife, like many others, has been affected by the COVID 19 pandemic. She has not performed any work for the Erskine Group, through her company C Group, since May 2020. At the time of the Hearing, her current income, such as it is, is sourced from Job Keeper at the rate of $750 per week.
The Wife is highly educated. She is the holder of bachelor degrees. She is also a former member of a professional institution.
In view of the above, I accept that the Wife, like many others in 2020, is having difficulty drawing a regular income as matters presently stand. In my view, however, that situation is unlikely to last. She has a range of formal qualifications, and has worked regularly. She also has the benefit of her family connections through the Erskine Group which have enabled her, at times, to generate a considerable income. In my view, while she has some difficulty working at the moment, I would not expect that to last for any lengthy period of time.
The Husband is 48 years of age. He may be expected, given his slightly younger age, to have a slightly longer working life ahead of him than that of the Wife.
The Husband, while having some health issues, appears to have them under control. There is not any evidence before me that he is unable to work to his full capacity.
The Husband deposed in his affidavit that he had just commenced a new business, that the business does not have any long-term contracts, that the clients are engaged on a month-to-month basis, and that his average weekly income is $1,356 per week (around $70,000 per year).
The Husband was cross-examined about his income levels. Evidence was put to him that his income exceeded $70,000 per annum, and was instead closer to $245,000 per annum. The Husband did not appear to accept that amount, notwithstanding that he produced invoices that totalled that amount.
I do not accept the Husband's evidence that he only earns $70,000 per year for the following reasons. That amount is not consistent with the invoices he produced, which show an income significantly greater than $70,000 per annum. Further, I have found that the Husband has not been forthcoming regarding his income, and have found that he was not a credible witness. In my view the Husband is clearly earning an income well in excess of $70,000 per year. I find that his income is around $245,000 per year.
Insofar as the care of children is concerned, Y will be cared for equally by both parents going forward. The Husband will pay Y's school fees because he wants Y to attend a private school. The Wife says she is unable to contribute financially, and that Y can attend a State school if need be. The Wife's two adult daughters live with her. The Husband included in his material a text message from a former partner who claims that she will shortly have a child of his. The former partner did not give evidence, and no evidence was put before me as to any paternity test. I give this matter no weight.
The Husband contended that the Wife enjoys the financial support of her new Husband. That is not borne out by the evidence. Mr EE’s evidence is that while the Wife has access to an NN Bank card to use in emergencies only, they are otherwise financially independent. The Husband chose not to cross-examine Mr EE and I accept his affidavit evidence.
When these matters are balanced, the Wife's current financial circumstances (reliant on Job Keeper), which I expect to pass, may be thought to warrant a small adjustment. In my view however, this is balanced out by the fact that the Husband will continue to pay private school fees for Y without assistance from the Wife. All of the other matters in my view balance out equally. Both parties have the experience or education to generate a good income. The Husband is presently doing so. The Wife has the opportunity to do so again, no doubt, with the support of her family connections.
From the above reasons, I will not make any adjustment with respect to the factors under sub-s .75(2) of the Act in this matter.
Accordingly, the property of the parties should be divided 60/40 in favour of the Wife. I have stepped back to consider whether the proposed orders are just and equitable. In my view they are. There is no basis to include the amounts the Husband seeks to include in the asset pool. Contributions clearly favour the Wife, a point admitted by the Husband. The sub-s.75(2) factors favour neither party, a point seemingly recognised by them given their limited submissions this point. I regard that order as just and equitable in circumstances where the Wife made the greater contributions to the marriage and no adjustment is called for under sub-s.75(2) of the Act. I make orders accordingly.
I certify that the preceding one hundred and twenty (120) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Blake. Associate:
Dated: 15 February 2021
Key Legal Topics
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Family Law
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Civil Procedure
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Remedies
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Jurisdiction
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Procedural Fairness
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