Adde, Abdi Mohamed v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

[1998] FCA 1518

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

MIGRATION – application for judicial review of Refugee Review Tribunal decision refusing grant of a protection visa – applicant citizen of Somalia – whether acts of alleged persecution were by reason of the applicant’s membership of a minority clan – whether the Tribunal properly considered independent information on the position of minority clans in Somalia generally.

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 476

Abdullah Sheikh Mohamed Abdi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (unreported, Wilcox J, 23 October 1998)
Epeabaka vMinister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 150 ALR 397
Inderjit Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (unreported, Weinberg J, 29 October 1998)

ABDI MOHAMED ADDE v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

NG 591 OF 1998

MOORE J
30 NOVEMBER 1998
SYDNEY

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY	NG 591  of   1998

BETWEEN:	ABDI MOHAMED ADDE APPLICANT
AND:	MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS RESPONDENT
JUDGE:		MOORE J
DATE OF ORDER:		30 NOVEMBER 1998
WHERE MADE:		SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. The application is dismissed

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY	NG 591 of 1998

BETWEEN:	ABDI MOHAMED ADDE APPLICANT
AND:	MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS RESPONDENT

JUDGE:	MOORE J
DATE:	30 NOVEMBER 1998
PLACE:	SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

This is an application for judicial review by Abdi Mohamed Adde (“the applicant”) of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) of 22 May 1998. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (“the Minister”) refusing to grant the applicant a protection visa. The Tribunal also decided it was not satisfied that the applicant was a refugee. A criterion for the grant of such a visa is that the applicant is a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28 July 1951 as amended by the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees done at New York on 31 January 1967 (“the Convention”): see s 36 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”).

The applicant is a citizen of Somalia who arrived in Australia on 30 January 1998.  On 3 February 1998 he lodged an application for a protection visa with the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs.  On 25 February 1998 a delegate of the Minister refused to grant a protection visa and on 3 March 1998 the applicant sought review of that decision by the Tribunal.  After considering the circumstances of the applicant, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision that the applicant was not a refugee.  Art 1A(2) of the Convention contains, for present purposes, the definition of refugee.  It provides:

… the term ‘refugee’ shall apply to any person who;

…

(2)owing to a well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality in being outside the country of his former habitual residence is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

The Tribunal’s reasons

The case advanced to the Tribunal by the applicant was that he feared persecution if returned to Somalia because of his membership of a particular social group, the Wardey clan.  The following is the factual basis upon which the applicant advanced his case.  It is, in large measure, drawn from the Tribunal’s reasons in a section headed “Claims and evidence” based on Departmental interviews with the applicant, written statements he provided, and the oral evidence he gave to the Tribunal.  The Wardey clan, like other minority clans in Somalia, is singled out for discrimination and harassment by the larger clans.  The Wardey clan generally live with other larger clans in southern Somalia, such as the Ogaden and Majertein clans.  Members of the applicant’s clan are required to pay protection money to these larger clans in order to live and work in their communities.  If protection money is not paid, clan members rape the wives and kill the children of the Wardey clan.  The applicant has two wives and seven children who remain in Somalia, supported by other members of their families.  He told the Tribunal that he would rather commit suicide than be returned to Somalia. 

The Wardey clan are farmers and traders with little wealth or power.  They live in different parts of Somalia.  The applicant lived in Beladweyn until 1989, when the family moved to Mogadishu.  They stayed in Mogadishu until 1991 when civil war broke out, where they then moved to Kismayo, and later on to Afmadow.  In Afmadow the Darod clan came and attacked people, so the applicant’s family moved to Jilib where they stayed for approximately six months.  They left Jilib for Kismayo because Darod warlords were fighting in the area.    In 1992/93 the Hawiye clan began fighting the Darod in Kismayo and the family fled to Raskanboni, a town described by the applicant as a “village border town, near the sea”.  The family moved back to Kismayo in 1993 when the United Nations forces arrived.  In Kismayo the applicant began working as a trader, paying either the Ogaden or Majertein clans money to allow him to do so.

At this time the applicant made a lot of money on a trading trip and his Majertein neighbours demanded that he give them some.  When he said that he had none, the Majertein kidnapped both of his wives and held them for ransom.  He approached an “elder Majertein” to help negotiate the family’s release.  During the negotiation the applicant’s brother was shot.  The applicant then gave the Majertein money and the rest of his family were released. 

In another incident, in 1994, the applicant had wanted to sell sugar to the Dhobley clan and he paid some Ogaden clan members to allow him to do this.  In the process he was stopped by some Majertein who stole his money and shot him in the face and leg.  Some people from a nearby village took him back to Kismayo for treatment.  In 1996 the applicant was involved in a car accident.  His car hit a Ogaden woman who became paralysed.  The Ogaden threatened him and were looking for him to pay compensation which the applicant said he was unable to pay.  The applicant fled with his family to Mogadishu where he sought protection from Sheekal clan traders who told him about a ship to Mozambique.  It was by this means that the applicant eventually came to Australia. 

When giving oral evidence before the Tribunal the applicant said, as to his financial circumstances, that he had worked as a teacher as part of his national service, but was not able to go on to higher education because of his clan membership.  After finishing teaching he worked as a trader, and claimed that the money he earned was only enough to pay for food.  The Tribunal put to the applicant that it appeared he had done well financially because he had two wives, and under Islamic law a man could only take a second wife if he could look after them.  The applicant said this was true and that he had done well enough from trading to be able to care for his two wives. 

The applicant also gave evidence to the Tribunal that if returned to Somalia, he feared problems not only associated with the car accident but also with the civil war.  He said that he was injured in his left leg some years ago and his brother was killed, and that if returned to Somalia he would not be equal and would be treated like a slave with no one to protect him.  The applicant also contended that he had problems with the Darod clan, and if sent back they would kill him because of his Wardey membership. 

After setting out this background, the Tribunal proceeded to evaluate the evidence and consider whether the applicant was a refugee.  It did so in a section of its reasons headed “Findings and Reasons”.  The Tribunal noted that the applicant was at times evasive and there were inconsistencies in his account.  However the Tribunal indicated it was prepared to accept that this was the result of nervousness and that he was not intentionally misleading the Tribunal.  The Tribunal said that it was prepared to accept the history given by the applicant as basically true, though it considered that he had exaggerated some aspects of his account (such as the position of the Wardey clan) in the hope of advancing his claims.

The Tribunal noted that it had found little information when it conducted its own research on the Wardey clan, other than a reference to the part of Somalia where they were from and that the clan was associated with the Ogaden.  The Tribunal stated that there was no information, other than that provided by the applicant and the Somali Community of NSW Association which referred to the Wardey as being in a “slave” like situation or having problems.  The Tribunal observed that the applicant’s evidence indicated that he had been able to lead a “successful family and trading life”, even though he had had to pay for protection and the right to trade.  This success, it was said, was evidenced by his ability to marry two women. 

In evaluating the applicant’s claims the Tribunal considered each of the incidents described by the applicant.  The focus of the Tribunal’s consideration was the possible motivation of the persecutor in each instance, so as to ascertain whether the applicant’s alleged persecution was “for reasons of” a Convention ground.  In relation to the incident where he was shot in the face and leg on a sugar trading trip, the Tribunal concluded that the motivation of the Majertein in attacking the applicant was to obtain money and robbery.  The incident involving the applicant’s two wives being taken hostage, during which his brother was shot and killed, was also viewed by the Tribunal as having been motivated by the desire to obtain money.  The third incident, when the applicant fled after the car crash which injured an Ogaden women, was one in which the Ogaden were motivated by a desire for revenge and the fact that the matter has not been resolved by negotiation or the payment of compensation.

The Tribunal noted that in each of these three incidents the applicant claimed that the motivation of his persecutors had been that he was a member of a minority clan.  The Tribunal rejected this contention:

The Tribunal has carefully considered this as a factor in what has occurred, however considers he was robbed and had money extorted from him because he was a trader with money.  This was the motivation of his robbers who wanted the money.  He is wanted by the Ogaden because compensation hasn’t been paid.  The applicant stated to the Tribunal that he had no one to negotiate for him, and had no money to pay in compensation.  The Tribunal does not accept these statements as being true, and notes that he has previously used persons from other clans to negotiate on his behalf, and that on his own account he was a successful trader.

The Tribunal noted that the political situation in Somalia remained unclear, and the applicant was no doubt fearful of the ongoing war like situation in that country.  It concluded however that it was insufficient for the purposes of the Convention that a person fear involvement in or the effects of “incidental violence as a result of civil or communal disturbances which by their nature are sporadic and unplanned”.  The Tribunal held that such concerns were not “for reasons of” a Convention ground, and that there was no real chance that the applicant would face harm for a Convention reason if returned to Somalia.

Submissions

The central submission of the applicant in these proceedings was that the Tribunal had erred by not properly considering evidence before it in relation to the position of minority clans in Somalia.  This evidence, it was submitted, corroborated the applicant’s assertion that he feared persecution for reasons of his membership of a particular social group, the Wardey clan.  In an amended application filed at the hearing, the grounds of judicial review were:

1.The Tribunal’s decision involved an error of law being an incorrect interpretation of the applicable law or an incorrect application of the law to the facts as found by the Tribunal [s.476(1)(e)]

Particulars

The Tribunal erred in failing to consider the effect of the information about minority clans and groups, which tended to corroborate important aspects of the Applicant’s case

2.Procedures that were required by the Migration Act 1958 to be observed in connection with the making of the Tribunal decision were not observed in that the Tribunal failed to produce a written statement in accordance with s.430 [s.476(1)(a)]

Particulars

The Tribunal erred in failing to address in its reasons the submissions and information about minority clans and groups and the relevance of that information to the Applicant’s case

3.Procedures that were required by the Migration Act 1958 to be observed in connection with the making of the Tribunal decision were not observed in that the Tribunal failed to rationally consider the probative evidence that was before it [s.475(1)(a)]

Particulars

The Tribunal failed to have regarded the information in respect of the discrimination and violence directed against minorities in Somalia.  This evidence was directly relevant to the only issue in dispute.  There was no rational basis for the Tribunal’s failure to consider this evidence.

Counsel for the applicant submitted that the Tribunal’s findings about the situation of the Wardey clan ignored information available to the Tribunal about the position of minority clans and social groups in Somalia more generally.  This more general information had been before the Tribunal and had been set out in submissions and in information used by the Minister’s delegate.  Counsel submitted that this information was clearly relevant given the Tribunal’s finding that the Wardey was a small clan.

Counsel for the applicant referred to the contents of two reports concerning the mistreatment of minority clans in Somalia generally which he submitted the Tribunal was obliged to consider but had failed to do so.  One report, a UNHCR background paper on refugees and asylum seekers from Somalia, quoted a “Human Rights Watch” statement that:

Discriminatory treatment shapes much of the human rights situation in Somalia’s divided society: an individual may be singled out for summary execution, rape or expulsion from a community solely by reason of clan affiliation

A United States State Department Report on Human Rights Practices in 1996 for Somalia before the Tribunal also noted that:

…In virtually all areas, the dominant clan excludes members of groups other than itself from effective participation in governing institutions and subjects them to discrimination in employment, judicial proceedings, and access to public services.  Members of minority groups are subjected to harassment, intimidation, and abuse by armed gunmen of all affiliations.

Counsel submitted that the information in these documents (“the independent information”) was from apparently reliable sources and had the potential to corroborate certain aspects of the applicant’s case.  Counsel further submitted that the Tribunal failed to consider the applicant’s submission that his situation was the same as that of people from other minority clans, thus making general information on minority clans probative.

Counsel for the Minister submitted that the Tribunal’s conclusions in relation to the applicant’s claims of past harassment did not flow from its assessment of the position of the Wardey clan.  Rather, they flowed from a careful consideration of those claims themselves.  Counsel submitted that in reaching its conclusion the Tribunal relied upon parts of the evidence given by the applicant which did not indicate that members of the Wardey clan occupied a position of disadvantage vis a vis other clans.  Counsel for the Minister further submitted that a failure by the Tribunal to refer in its reasons to all of the material before it that bore upon a factual conclusion it had made did not give rise to a ground of review. 

Counsel for the applicant referred to a number of authorities said to be supportive of the submissions he made, namely Sun Zhan Qui v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 151 ALR 505 and Epeabaka v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 150 ALR 397. Counsel for the Minister submitted that no authority, including Eshetu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 151 ALR 621, supported the proposition that findings or decisions can be reviewed because they are not “substantially just”: see Guo Wei Zhi (No. 2) v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (unreported, Davies J, [1998] 102 FCA); Awan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (unreported, Davies J, [1998] 435 FCA) and Jit v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (unreported, Davies J [1998] 511 FCA). 

Counsel for the applicant also referred to the judgment of Sackville J in Muralidharan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1996) 62 FCR 402 concerning the requirement in s 430 of the Act that relevant factual issues be addressed by the Tribunal in its reasons. Counsel for the Minister submitted that Muralidharan was not authority for the proposition that s 430 obliges the Tribunal to address every submission or piece of evidence that may be contrary to one of its factual findings. Rather, it is sufficient that the relevant factual question is addressed and answered.

Conclusion

Two of the grounds relied on by the applicant concern the evaluation of the evidence by the Tribunal. First it was said that by failing to consider the independent information concerning the position of minority clans in Somalia generally the Tribunal committed an error of law of the type identified in s 476(1)(e), namely an incorrect interpretation of the law: see Sun Zhan Qui (supra) at 550 per Wilcox J. However the relevant error identified in Qui involved, as I apprehend the judgment of Wilcox J, a failure to consider or recognize the cumulative effect of certain factors, being primary facts not in issue (in that case - the possession of the negatives by the applicant and the post traumatic stress disorder suffered by the applicant) from which inferences might have been drawn tending to support the veracity of the account given by the applicant.

However in the present case the independent information was not material which, if considered with the account of the applicant accepted by the Tribunal or otherwise not in issue, pointed to an inference which the Tribunal ought reasonably to have drawn concerning the experiences of the applicant that would support a conclusion that he was a refugee.  The independent information was in the most general terms and concerned clans and minority clans as broad social groups. It cannot, in my view, be said to be information from which the Tribunal should reasonably have inferred that the experiences of the applicant arose because of his clan membership rather than, as the Tribunal found, being the result of his comparative prosperity and the desire on the part of others to rob or extort money from him or, in relation to the car accident, to exact retribution and respond to the failure to pay compensation.

A further point should be noted in relation to the car accident.  The Tribunal did not reject the applicant’s evidence that he was at risk of being beaten at the time and was at risk in the absence of compensation being negotiated and paid.  The approach of the Tribunal was to consider the motivation of those who might injure the applicant as a result of the car accident.  In that context it accepted that that class was members of the Ogaden clan.  The Tribunal concluded, however, that the motivation would have been revenge and that compensation had not been paid and the matter thus not resolved. 

A similar issue has recently been considered by Wilcox J in Abdullah Sheikh Mohamed Abdi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, unreported, 23 October 1998.  His Honour was considering the position of another Somali national in respect of whom the Tribunal had concluded that the applicant feared revenge at the hands of members of another sub-clan who would seek to exact retribution against the applicant.  His Honour said:

The revenge claim
I have already set out the Tribunal’s treatment of the revenge claim.  The Tribunal relied on Magyari, in which O’Loughlin J held an applicant’s fear of being victimised by gypsies, concerned about his involvement in a motor vehicle accident, had no connection with a Convention reason.  The Tribunal correctly observed Mr Abdi “fears revenge from other sub-clan members over deaths that occurred when his father was killed” and, as in Magyari, “(t)hey are interested in revenge, and the exacting of retribution”; but it then fell into the error of treating all fears of revenge as falling outside the Convention.  O’Loughlin J did not say that.  He was referring to the facts of a particular case where the alleged threat of revenge concerned the applicant as an individual; he was targeted because he was the individual involved in the motor accident, not because of his race, religion, political opinion or whatever.  It is wrong to extrapolate from that decision a general rule that a fear of revenge can never be a fear covered by the Convention.  Assume that,  in retaliation for an act of violence by people of religion X, adherents of religion Y indiscriminately target adherents of religion X.  The latter are at risk of a revenge killing, not because of who they are as individuals but simply because of their religion; the feared persecution falls within the Convention.  It was not sufficient in this case for the Tribunal to instruct itself that Mr Abdi’s fear was that of being the victim of revenge arising out of deaths in the leadership or land dispute case; the Tribunal needed then to determine whether this fear arose out of his membership of a group of people identified in the Convention (for example, the Weitein sub-clan) or was purely personal (for example, his relationship with his father).  The Tribunal failed to address that issue.

I invited written submissions on the relevance of this judgment of Wilcox J, which was given after I reserved in this matter.  That gave rise to a further application by the applicant to amend the application for judicial review.  On reflection, however, there is at least one material difference (and probably more) between the circumstances considered by Wilcox J and the present in which the Tribunal made a finding the applicant could pay the compensation that might be sought by the Ogaden.  Thus whatever might be the basis on which revenge might be sought, the applicant in the present case on the findings of the Tribunal, had the means to avoid it.  That plainly would raise a doubt whether any alleged fear of persecution was by virtue of the accident and what might follow from it, a well founded one.  The application to further amend the application is refused and I determine the matter on the basis of the amended application filed at the hearing

The second ground concerning the evaluation of the evidence was that it was said the Tribunal failed to rationally consider the evidence before it concerning the position of minority clans in Somalia. The ground raises the issue of the combined operation of s 420 and s 476(1)(a). Reliance was placed on the judgment of Finkelstein J in Epeabaka v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 150 ALR 397. The scope of this ground was recently surveyed by Weinberg J in Inderjit Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, unreported, 29 October 1998.  His Honour said:

(b)      Mistaken findings of fact as a source of review
Giving full weight to the admonition that the Court must beware of turning a review of the reasons of the decision-maker upon proper principles into a reconsideration of the merits of the decision, there are, nonetheless, cases where certain types of mistaken findings of fact can give rise to reviewable error. Such cases must, of course, fit properly within one or more of the legislatively mandated grounds for review set out in s 476(1) of the Act, as explained by the majority in Eshetu. 

There are instances where the Tribunal has been found to have failed to act according to “substantial justice” by making findings which were of such a nature as to warrant the intervention of the Court.

In Kathiresan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (supra) Gray J set aside a decision of the Tribunal which had rejected the applicant’s claim to refugee status largely upon the basis that the approach taken by the Tribunal to the credibility of the applicant was not open to it on the material before it, was not based on rational grounds, and was not arrived at after consideration of matters that were logically probative on the issue of credibility.  His Honour observed:

“The question which arises is whether it is open to this Court to overturn the finding of the tribunal on credit on the basis that the tribunal relied in part on two findings which were not open to it. It cannot be said with any certainty that, had the tribunal not relied on its finding as to the applicant’s account of his education or on his suggested lack of knowledge of events during the time he was in Colombo, it would have come to the same conclusion as to his credit. There is much that resembles a house of cards in the tribunal’s reasoning; disbelief of one fact is used as a reason to disbelieve another, and so on. The findings as to the applicant’s educational history and unawareness of events whilst in Colombo were significant in the context of the tribunal’s overall reasoning. It can therefore truly be said that the person who made the decision based the decision on the existence of a particular fact, and that fact did not exist; see s 476(4)(b) of the Act. This is sufficient to make out the ground for review of a decision found in s 476(1)(g) of the Act, namely that there was no evidence or other material to justify the making of the decision.

I am also of the view that to make adverse findings as to credit on the basis of non-existent facts amounts to a failure to act according to substantial justice, within the meaning of s 420(2)(b) of the Act and therefore a failure to observe procedures that were required by the Act to be observed, within the meaning of s 476(1)(a) of the Act.”

In Epeabaka v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 150 ALR 397 Finkelstein J set aside a decision of the Tribunal in circumstances where his Honour found that the Tribunal had failed to consider rationally certain probative evidence. His Honour distinguished between a failure of that type, and the making of a simple mistake of fact. Section 420(2)(b) of the Act imposed a procedural obligation upon the Tribunal requiring it to act rationally and reasonably. The Tribunal would not be acting rationally and reasonably if it made a finding of fact upon which its decision was based but which was not supported by probative evidence. The Tribunal would also have failed to act rationally and reasonably if it failed to consider rationally the probative evidence that was before it. In the particular circumstances, his Honour found that the Tribunal had failed to comply with that obligation. Its decision was therefore set aside on the grounds set out in s 476(1)(a).

Finkelstein J based his decision that there was an obligation upon a Tribunal to consider rationally the evidence before it upon the views of Brennan J in Re Pochi and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 26 ALR 247, and of Deane J (with whom Evatt J agreed) on appeal in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Pochi (1980) 31 ALR 666. His Honour did not accept that Mason CJ in Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 at 357 had determined that these statements of principle did not represent the common law in this country – cf Roads Corporation v Dacakis [1995] 2 VR 508 at 520 per Batt J.

Whether a failure to consider rationally probative evidence is, as Finkelstein J held, clearly distinct from coming to a decision which is “irrational” (in the sense of so-called “Wednesbury unreasonableness”:  Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223) may be open to doubt – the principles seem to me to overlap, at least in some cases. Nonetheless there is some justification for saying, as his Honour did, that a decision which is not reached as a result of the rational consideration of probative evidence may be described as the product of such reasoning by a Tribunal as can fairly be said to amount to a breach of its obligation to act according to “substantial justice and the merits of the case”, and to fall outside the parameters of the exclusionary provisions of s 476(2)(b) of the Act.

In Kopalapillai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (supra) the Full Court referred to the judgment of Merkel J in Emiantor v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 48 ALD 635 in which his Honour had rejected an application to review the decision of the Tribunal upon the basis that it had erred when dealing with issues of credibility by noting that the approach of the Tribunal to the credibility issues “was open to it on the material, was based on rational grounds and was arrived at after consideration of matters that were logically probative of the issue of credibility”. The Full Court in Kopalapillai endorsed the approach adopted by Merkel J in Emiantor to the question whether the Tribunal, when assessing the credibility of the story told by the appellant, had erred in law within the meaning of s 476(1)(e) of the Act.

However for reasons already given in relation to the submission based on s 476(1)(e), there was nothing irrational in the way the Tribunal approached the matter and considered the material before it in this instance. Its focus was directed to the circumstances of the applicant and it was by reference to his experiences when living in Somalia that the Tribunal evaluated whether he had a well founded fear of persecution because of his membership of a particular social group. The Tribunal’s conclusion that he did not was unexceptionable.

I next deal with the contention that the Tribunal failed to provide a statement of its decision and reasons in conformity with the obligation imposed by s 430.

That obligation does not require lengthy reasons dealing with every aspect of the evidence: see Muralidham v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1996) 62 FCR 402 at 414. The Tribunal, in the present case, made findings concerning the likely future position of the applicant having regard to the fact that he was a member of the Wardey clan and his experiences and the life he led given that he was a member of that clan. It is true it makes no express reference in the section headed “Findings and Reasons” to the independent information set out earlier in this judgment. Nonetheless its explanation for its conclusion is, in my opinion, adequate.

The application for judicial review is dismissed with costs.

I certify that this and the preceding eleven (11) pages are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Moore

Associate:

Dated:             30 November 1998

Counsel for the Applicant:	Craig Colborne
Solicitor for the Applicant:	Kessels & Associates
Counsel for the Respondent:	Robert Beech-Jones
Solicitor for the Respondent:	Australian Government Solicitor
Date of Hearing:	31 August 1998
Date of Judgment:	30 November 1998