Adcon Logistics Pty Ltd v Joannou Enterprises Pty Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Adcon Logistics Pty Ltd v Joannou Enterprises Pty Ltd  [2023] QSC 265

PARTIES:

ADCON LOGISTICS PTY LTD

(applicant)

v
JOANNOU ENTERPRISES PTY LTD

(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

9344 of 2023

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

29 November 2023

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

2 November 2023

JUDGE:

Sullivan J

ORDER:

The statutory demand is to be set aside pursuant to
s 459H of the Corporations Act.

CATCHWORDS:

CORPORATIONS – WINDING UP – WINDING UP IN INSOLVENCY – STATURORY DEMAND – APPLICATION TO SET ASIDE DEMAND – PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS – SERVICE OF APPLICATION – where the applicant seeks to set aside a statutory demand issued by the respondent – whether the application and its affidavit were served on the respondent within the statutory period after the statutory demand was served on the applicant – where the applicant contends that the application and affidavit were served on the respondent within the statutory period – where the respondent contends that the application is invalid

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s 29
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 109X, s 459G, s 459H

Derma Pharmaceuticals Pty Ltd v HSBC Bank Australia Ltd (2005) 188 FLR 373, cited
Falgat Constructions Pty Ltd v Equity Australia Corporation Pty Ltd [2006] NSWCA 259, considered
Jacobs v London County Council [1950] AC 361, cited
Polstar Pty Ltd v Agnew [2007] NSWSC 114, cited
Scope Data Systems Pty Ltd v Goman (as Representative of the Partnership of BDO Nelson Parkhill) [2007] NSWSC 278, considered

COUNSEL:

N M Cooke for the applicant
H G Trotter for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Irish Bentley Lawyers for the applicant
Barringer Leather Lawyers for the respondent

Introduction

  1. The applicant seeks to set aside a statutory demand dated 27 June 2023 issued by the respondent.  Both parties accept that if this application and its supporting affidavit were served within the relevant 21 day time limit, then the application should succeed as it is conceded that there is a genuine dispute in respect of the entirety of the debt, the subject of the demand.

  2. Section 459G of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (“Corporations Act”) relevantly provides:

    “…

    (2)  An application may only be made within the statutory period after the demand is so served.

    (3) An application is made in accordance with this section only if, within that period:

    (a)  an affidavit supporting the application is filed with the Court; and

    (b)  a copy of the application, and a copy of the supporting affidavit, are served on the person who served the demand on the company.”

  3. The statutory period is 21 days.

  4. It is trite law that there is no ability to extend the time limit contained in s 459G of the Corporations Act.

  5. Accordingly, the real issue in this application is whether the application and its affidavit were served on the respondent within 21 days after the statutory demand was served on the applicant.

  6. There is no dispute…

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Details
Case
[2023] QSC 265
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Adcon Logistics Pty Ltd brought an application to set aside a statutory demand issued by Joannou Enterprises Pty Ltd. The application hinged on whether the statutory demand was served on Adcon Logistics on 3 July 2023, as claimed by Joannou Enterprises, or on 6 July 2023, as argued by Adcon Logistics. The legal issues centred on the interpretation of statutory provisions and the application of the deemed service principle under the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth). The court had to determine whether the statutory demand was effectively served on 3 July 2023 or if there were grounds to believe that it was not received until 6 July 2023. Another key issue was whether the application and its accompanying affidavit were served on Joannou Enterprises within the statutory 21-day period required by s 459G of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).

The court considered the evidence provided by Mr Micale, who was responsible for overseeing mail processes for Adcon Logistics. The court found that the statutory demand was delivered to a post office box "owned" by a related company of Adcon Logistics, not to its registered office. The applicant did not redirect its mail to the post office box, and there was no evidence of acquiescence to such redirection. The court accepted Mr Micale's evidence that the statutory demand was picked up from the post office box on 6 July 2023 and taken to the registered office, establishing that service occurred on that date. The application and its affidavit were served on 27 July 2023, well within the 21-day period from the date of service. The court concluded that the application to set aside the statutory demand was valid and should be upheld.

The court ordered that the statutory demand issued by Joannou Enterprises be set aside in accordance with s 459H of the Corporations Act. The court will hear submissions on costs at a later date. The decision hinged on the proper interpretation of statutory provisions and the application of the deemed service principle, leading to the conclusion that the statutory demand was not effectively served until 6 July 2023, and the application was timely.

Orders

Orders of the court

The statutory demand is to be set aside pursuant to

s 459H of the Corporations Act.

Background

Background to the litigation

I note that the part of the reasons of Hodgson JA in Falgat which White J disagreed with had also been expressly disagreed with by the other two members of the appellate bench in Falgat.Application of the law to the facts In this case, there was no redirection by the applicant of the mail addressed to the applicant’s registered office, to the post office box “owned” by the related company. At most, in the 12 months prior to July 2023, the applicant’s staff member in charge of mail was aware that some of its mail addressed to the registered office by the sender was being received at the post office box “owned” by the related company. Equally, in the same period, the same staff member was aware that some of its mail addressed to its registered office was being received at the registered office. That staff member did not know why this was happening during this period. I have found that on the balance of probabilities this was occurring during this period as a result of erroneous and unilateral actions of Australia Post worker(s) who were informally redirecting part of the relevant mail to the post office box. The applicant had done nothing to cause the erroneous and unilateral redirection of some of its mail addressed to its registered office, to the post office box. This is not a situation similar to that which existed in the Falgat decision. It is analogous to the situation which existed in the Scope Data Systems decision. As White J observed in Scope Data Systems, if a party seeks to use the post as its means of service, it does so with the relevant risks attached. One of those risks is that the applicant may be able to prove that the item was not delivered to it until a later date. In this case, there is actual proof of the delivery of the statutory demand by post to the post office box on 3 July 2023. Following the reasoning set out in the decision in Scope Data Systems, the post office box was not itself the registered office of the applicant. This was not a case where the applicant had done something positive, such as redirecting its mail from its registered office to that post office box, which would have estopped it from denying that the letter had in fact been received at the registered office in the ordinary course of the post. Nor is this a case where there was a fully informed acquiescence to a known universal and informal redirection of all mail addressed to the applicant at its registered office, to the post office box, which may have raised the possibility of an argument for an extension of the proposition which was identified in the decision of Falgat. Further, I reject that Mr Micale’s willingness during the August 2023 telephone call to accept the continuation of what was happening with the post office box supports some type of an acquiescence case in respect of the service of the statutory demand. Any decision which Mr Micale made once he had discussed what was happening with the Australia Post worker in August 2023 is irrelevant to what the position was on and before 6 July 2023. This case is not about the receipt of a document after the August 2023 telephone call. Further, subsequent steps were put in place in September 2023 for the post office box mail to be collected daily, in any event.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The applicant, on the other hand, contends that the service of the statutory demand did not occur until 6 July 2023. This was the date upon which it says a staff member of the applicant, a Mr Micale, picked up the envelope containing the statutory demand from the post office box and then physically took it to the registered office of the applicant.Evidence The important evidence in this case for the purpose of deciding the real issue is that of Mr Micale. He provided three affidavits and, with leave, was cross-examined at the hearing in relation to their contents and other identified issues. I accept the following uncontroversial evidence of Mr Micale:(a)the post office box in question, to which the postal item containing the statutory demand was delivered, was “owned” not by the applicant, but by its related company which shared the same sole director;(b)the applicant and a number of other related companies had, well before July 2023, put in place redirections with Australia Post for their mail which was addressed to specific Melbourne and Sydney addresses which they had formerly operated out of, so that those particular mail items addressed to the Melbourne or Sydney offices were redirected to the Brisbane post office box “owned” by the applicant’s related company; and(c)neither the applicant, nor anyone else to Mr Micale’s knowledge, had ever requested or put in place with Australia Post a redirection of the applicant’s mail which was addressed to its registered office in Brisbane, to the post office box “owned” by its related company. I also accept Mr Micale’s evidence that, with one exception, he was the only person who oversaw mail processes for the applicant and certain other related companies, including arranging mail routes/redirections and post office boxes. The one exception was that Mr Micale did delegate, from time to time, the ad hoc task of mail collection from the post office box “owned” by the related company of the applicant. Next, I turn to the evidence which was controversial between the parties. The first evidential issue relevant to the real issue in this case concerned the delivery of the applicant’s mail to the registered office and to the post office box of the related company in the period leading up to and including 6 July 2023. At paragraph 7 of his second affidavit, Mr Micale deposed that “at its current registered office (Level 19, 239 George Street, Brisbane City, 4000), the Applicant has received mail by delivery to the concierge desk at the lobby of the building, and otherwise by delivery directly to the premises.” I note that paragraph 7 makes no mention of the applicant ever having received mail addressed to its registered office, at the post office box of the related company. Nowhere else in the applicant’s affidavits is such evidence given. This did give the impression that Mr Micale was saying, in effect, all such mail addressed to the registered office was usually received this way.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The result of that finding is that the relevant service of the statutory demand on the respondent took place on 6 July 2023. The application to set aside the statutory demand was then served within 21 days of that date of service. Consequently, the application is valid.Conclusion Given that I have concluded that the application is valid, and where the parties agree that the affidavit material before the Court otherwise supports a genuine dispute as to the existence of the entire debt the subject of the statutory demand, it is appropriate to order that the statutory demand be set aside pursuant to s 459H of the Corporations Act. I will hear the parties on costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Section 459G of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (“Corporations Act”) relevantly provides:“…(2) An application may only be made within the statutory period after the demand is so served.(3) An application is made in accordance with this section only if, within that period:(a) an affidavit supporting the application is filed with the Court; and(b) a copy of the application, and a copy of the supporting affidavit, are served on the person who served the demand on the company.” The statutory period is 21 days. It is trite law that there is no ability to extend the time limit contained in s 459G of the Corporations Act. Accordingly, the real issue in this application is whether the application and its affidavit were served on the respondent within 21 days after the statutory demand was served on the applicant. There is no dispute between the parties that the application to set aside the statutory demand and its accompanying affidavit were served on 27 July 2023. The applicant contends that it was first served with the statutory demand on 6 July 2023. If that contention were correct, then the application and its affidavit would have been served within 21 days of that date. The respondent contends that the applicant was served with the statutory demand on a date prior to 6 July 2023. If that contention were correct, then the application is invalid and will need to be dismissed. For the purposes of the respondent’s contention that the application and affidavit were served out of time, the respondent relies upon s 109X of the Corporations Act, which provides, inter alia:“(1)For the purposes of any law, a document may be served on a company by:(a)leaving it at, or posting it to, the company’s registered office…” Section 29 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) (“Acts Interpretation Act”) is also clearly relevant to the decision of the real issue. Section 29(1) of the Acts Interpretation Act provides as follows:“29 Meaning of service by post(1) Where an Act authorises or requires any document to be served by post, whether the expression “serve” or the expression “give” or “send” or any other expression is used, then the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, prepaying and posting the document as a letter and, unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post.…” It is this section which critically provides the prima facie deemed service. The section operates to reverse the evidentiary onus, so that the applicant then has to prove that the document was not actually delivered by post on the critical date. It is uncontentious that the respondent has established on the evidence that the statutory demand was: (a) properly addressed to the registered office of the applicant;(b) put into a prepaid envelope; and(c) posted as a letter. By reason of this evidence, s 29 of the Acts Interpretation Act is clearly engaged by the respondent.