ADC Centres Pty Ltd v Kilstream Pty Ltd

[1979] FCA 71

C A T C H W O R D S

Prade Practices - Covenant by lessor - Interlocutory

Injunction.

Trade Practices Act 1974 ss.45B, 47(4) and 52.

A. D. C. CENTRES PTY: LIMITED V. KILSTREAM

PTY. LIMITED

No. G 35 of 1979

Coram: Franki J.

Sydney

23 July 1979

I N THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

N E W SOUTH WALES D I S T R I C T REGISTRY No. G 35 of 1979

GENERAL D I V I S I O N

A.D.C. CENTRES PTY. LIMITET)

Applicant

AND :'. KILSTREAM PTY. LIMITED

Respondent

O R D E R

SUDGE MAKING ORDER: Franki J.

DATE O F ORDER	: Monday 23 July 1979
WHERE KADE	: Sydney

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. Application refused.

2. Liberty to either party to apply on two days notice to the other party to have the matter re-listed for directions or for any other application that either party may be advised to make.

3. Parties to have an opportunity to address on the question of costs.

4 . Matter to be listed for mention on 8 August 1979.

I N TEE FEDERAL COCTT OF AUSTRALIA)

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY I No.G 35 of 1979

GENERAL DIVISION 1

I

BETWEEN : A.D.C. CENTRES PTY. LIMITED

Applicant

AND : KILSTREAM PTY. LIMITED

Respondent

Coram: Franki J.

Sydney

23 Ju ly 1979

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

A.D.C. Centres Pty. Limited, t h e app l ican t , on 5 Ju ly

1979 commenced an a c t i o n by way of statement of claim aga ins t

-

Kilstream Pty. Limited, t h e respondent, seeking c e r t a i n

dec la ra t ions , in junct ions and o ther r e l i e f and claiming t h a t

t h e respondent had contravened o r attempted t o contravene

ss.45B, 46, 47(4) and 52 of t h e Trade P rac t i ce s Act 1974

( " the ~ c t " ) . On t h e same day t h e app3.tcant f i l e d a no t ice

of motion seeking c e r t a i n in te r locu tory r e l i e f and I now

give judgment i n t h a t appl ica t ion.

I n t h e proceedings f o r in te r locu tory r e l i e f , no

r e l i ance was placed on s.46 of t h e Act.

The co r r ec t approach which t h i s Court should take t o

app l ica t ions under s.80 of t h e Act f o r in te r locu tory r e l i e f

has been considered i n a number of cases and I mentioned some of them i n McDonaldls System of Aus t ra l i a Pty. Ltd.

v. I~IcWilliamls Wines Pty. Ltd. (1979) A.T.P.R. 40-108.

This app l ica t ion r a i s e s a number of d i f f i c u l t

quest ions of law but because these proceedings a r e

in te r locu tory and because of t h e complexity of some of

those quest ions, I have deemed it inappropriate t o express

any concluded views.

I n t h e sub jec t proceedings t he re was evidence before

me t h a t t h e app l ican t had leased t o t h e respondent, by

memorandum of l e a se dated 26 Apri l 1977, a p a r t of c e r t a i n

premises a t a shopping cen t re a t Dee Why and t h a t ltem 12

of t h e s a id memorandum of l e a s e provided:

"Permitted Use of Premises: Tennis and squash amusement and r ec rea t i ona l cen t re and

r e t a i l shop f o r t h e s a l e of

spor t ing goods, c lo thes and

refreshments including

c i g a r e t t e s , food, confectionary."

There was a l s o evidence t h a t c lause 12(h) or^ the s a ld

memorandum of l e a se contained t h e fo l lov~ing provision:

"The Lessor w i l l no t l e a se any

o ther adjacent premlses f o r the

purposes of any spo r t s amusements

o r rec rea t ion usage o r f o r t h e

r e t a i l s a l e of spor t ing goods o r

associa ted businesses Provided

t h a t t h e provisions of t h i s Clause

s h a l l no t apply i n r e l a t i o n t o l e a se s

o r tenancizs	ex i s t i ng a t the	da t e of
t h i s Lease.

There was a l s o evidence t h a t a company, I Randall Eadie

Gartner Spor ts Centre Pty. Ltd. ("Randall") had been desirous

of obta in ing a l e a s e of a c e r t a i n p a r t of t h e app l i can t ' s

shopping cen t re a t Dee \ a y adjacent t o t h a t occupied by

t h e respondent f o r a l e i s u r e and spo r t s complex incorporat ing

a general gymnasium f l t t e d with c e r t a i n spec i a l equipment,

an exerc ise a r ea , two lndoor c r i c k e t p i t ches and n e t s , one

sauna, one swir lpool , f l v e o r s i x b a t b a l l o r racquetbal l

cour t s and male and female change rooms.

There was a l s o evidence t h a t negot ia t ions had taken

place between t h e respondent and Randall p r i o r t o and i n

June 1979 during which it appears t h a t t h e respondent sought

t o impose c e r t a i n condit ions before it would consent t o a

proposed l e a s e by t h e app l ican t t o Randall apparently upon

t h e bas i s t h a t i t s consent was necessary because of the

provisions of c lause 12(h) of t h e s a id memorandum of l e a se .

The app l ican t res ted i t s case f o r in te r locu tory

r e l l e f upon an a l leged contrava? t l o n f i r s t l y oZ s .47(4) ,

secondly of s.45B and t h i r d l y of s .52 of t h e Act. I w i l l

consider f irst t h e quest ion of t h e app l ica t ion of s .47(4) .

No r e l i ance was placed i n t h e in te r locu tory proceedlngs

before me upon t h e argument t h a t , s lnce t h e app l ics t ion of

t h e d e f i n i t i o n of se rv ices i n s . 4 ( 1 ) i s sub jec t t o any

contrary In ten t ion appearing, t h a t d e f i n i t i o n does not

apply t o t h e word "servicest1 i n s .47(4) , because t h e

sec t ion shows a contrary intention.

Since I am only requlred t o decide whether a prima

f a c i e case has been established and, i f it has , whether on t h e balance of convenience, o r f o r any o ther reason,

in te r locu tory r e l i e f should be refused I w i l l proceed

first upon the b a s i s , but without deciding, t h a t t h e

word "servicesn i n s .47(b) includes r i g h t s m r e l a t l o n t o ,

and i n t e r e s t s i n r e a l property.

The re levan t words of s.47(4) appear t o be "A

corporation ... engages i n t h e p r a c t i c e of exclusive deal ing

i f t h e corporat ion acquires ... services. . .on t h e condition

t h a t t h e person from whom t h e corporat ion acquires se rv ices

... w i l l no t supply se rv lces o r se rv ices of a p a r t i c u l a r

kind o r desc r ip t ion t o any person o r w i l l no t ... supply

s e rv i ce s . . . o r s e rv i ce s of a p a r t i c u l a r kind o r description

t o p a r t i c u l a r persons o r c l a s se s of persons. . .or i n

p a r t i c u l a r p laces o r c l a s se s of p laces ..."

So f a r a s i s re levan t t h i s sec t ion can only apply

t o an acqu i s i t i on of a se rv ice by the respondent. Assuming

t h a t t h e d e f i n i t i o n of "acquire" i s re levan t and t h a t t h e

word "acquiren is t o be read a s "acceptu because of t h e

d e f i n i t i o n of "acquiren i n s .4 (1) it may be t h a t t h e sectiofi

app l i e s t o t h e acceptance of r i g h t s t o and i n t e r e s t s i n r e a l

property under t h e terms of an ex i s t j ng l ease . No argument

was addressed t o me t h a t I shou1.d consider t h e pos i t i on

when t h e l e a s e was entered i n t o a t a time before tlie amendmen-L

introducing s .47(4) i n i ts present form had been made.	IT
it be assumed t h a t s.47(4) may be read a s appl icable t o a

l e a s e one has t o consider vrhether t h e r e s t r i c t i o n in c lause

12(h) of t h e s a id memorandum of l e a s e is a condit ion t h a t t h e

l e s s o r w i l l no t supply se rv ices of a p a r t i c u l a r kind o r

description t o any person. No d e t a i l e d argument was d i rec ted

t o t h e meaning of t h e vrords "of a p a r t i c u l a r kind o r desc r ip t io

but it i s by no means c l e a r t h a t t h e provis ion of an i n t e r e s t

i n r e a l property under a l e a s e containing a covenant

r e s t r i c t i n g t h e use t o which t h e premises t h e sub jec t of

t h e l e a s e may be pu t const i tu-tes t h e provis ion of nservlces

of a p a r t i c u l a r kind o r desc r ip t ionu ' If such zn i n t e r e s t

a r i s i n g under a l e a se does not f a l l wi th in t h e words Ifservices

of a p a r t i c u l a r kind o r desc r ip t ionw it is then necessary

t o decide vrhether t h e add i t ion of t h e words llexcept t o a

p a r t i c u l a r extent1! o r " to p a r t i c u l a r persons o r c l a s se s of

persons o r t o persons o ther than p a r t i c u l a r persons o r

c l a s se s of personsn o r " in p a r t i c u l a r p laces" a l t e r s t h a t

conclusion. No de t a i l ed argument was addressed t o these

ques t ions . I am by no means s a t i s f i e d t h a t a prima f a c i e

case of t h e contravention of s .47(4) by t h e respondent has

been es tabl ished but assuming,for t h e sake of argument, t h a t

it has , then it is necessary t o consider s.47(10) and t o

decide whether t h e respondent by engaging i n t h e conduct a l leged i s engaging i n conduct t h a t Ifhas a purpose o r i s

l i k e l y t o have t h e e f f e c i of subs t an t i a l l y lessening

~ o r n p e t i t i o n ~ ~ . I n examining t h i s quest ion it is necessary

t o have regard t o t h e provisions of ss.4G and 47(13). Submissions were made t o me by t h e appl icant t h a t t h e

re levan t market was, broadly, e i t h e r t h e merket of l e a s ing

premises i n t h e re levan t a rea o r a l t e r n a t i v e l y the market

of providing t h e se rv ices which Randall was proposing t o

- 6 -

provide wi th in t h e re levan t a rea . It seems t h a t t h e conduct

r e f e r r ed t o i n s .47(13)(b) i s the conduct of t h e respondent

being t h e person vrho i s a l leged to be engaging i n t h e re levant

conduct o r "eny person whose business deal ings a r e r e s t r i c t e d ,

l imi ted o r o ther~v ise circumscribed" by t h a t conduct. It i s

by no means c l e a r t o me t h a t these words include t h e

business deal ings of t h e app l ican t o r t h a t the business

deal ings of Randall a r e " r e s t r i c t e d , limi-Led o r otherwise

c i r c ~ n i s c r i b e d ~ ~ by t h e conduct of t h e respondent i n accepting

any i n t e r e s t i n the premises. I emphasise t h a t no argument

was addressed t o me a s t o t h e pos l t i on a t t h e time t h e

l e a s e was entered i n t o which was before t h e amendments t o

t h e Act e f f e c t i v e f r o m 1 Ju ly 1977. For reasons which I

w i l l g i v e l a t e r I f i n d it unnecessary t o express a

concluded vlew upon whether a prima f a c i e case of contravention

of s .47(4) has been established. J I

I pass now t o consider t h e pos i t i on i n r e l a t i o n t o

s.45B. Section 45B(5) provides t h a t s.45B does ~ o t apply

t o o r i n r e l a t l o n t o engaging i n conduct i n r e l a t i o n t o a

covenant by way of conduct t h a t contravenes s .47 and it

was common grouxd before me t h a t i f s.47 applied s.45B did

not . I now assume t h a t s .47 does no t apply f o r t h e purposes

of examining 1.111ether a prima f a c i e case of a contravention

of s.45B has been made out .

Sect ion 45B(1) provides, so f a r a s is re levan t , t h a t

a covenant whether given before o r a f t e r 1 July 1977 i s

unenforceable i n so f a r a s it confers r i g h t s o r bene f i t s

o r irnposes d u t i e s o r ob1.igations on a corporat ion i f t h e

"covenanthas, o r i s l i k e l y t o have, t h e e f f e c t of subs t an t i a l l y

lessening competition i n any market i n which the corporation ...

suppl ies o r acquires, o r i s l i k e l y t o supply o r acquire , ...

se rv ices o r would, bu t f o r t h e covenant, supply o r acquire ,

o r be l i k e l y t o supply o r acquire , . . . se rv ices . "

It i s t o be noted t h a t t h e only e f f e c t of s . 4 5 ~ ( 1 ) 1s t o

render a covenant unenforceable ( see s . 4 (3 ) ) which presumably

means l e g a l l y unenforceable. There was evidence before me

t h a t t h e app l ican t , on t h e day on which it commenced

proceedings i n t h i s Court, commenced proceedings i n

t h e Supreme Court of New South Wales seeking a dec la ra t ion

t h a t t h e s a id c lause 12(h) of t h e memorandum of l e a se was

void a s contravening t h e doc t r lne of r e s t r a i n t of t r ade o r

a s contravening t h e Res t r a in t of Trade Act - 1976 (N.S.W.)

and seeking c e r t a i n o ther r e l i e f i n t h a t Court. The

respondent has f i l e d a cross clalm i n t h e Supreme Court

asking t h a t t h e app l ican t be r e s t r a ined from granting any

l e a s e o f any p a r t of t h e shopping cen t re f o r t h e purpose of

any spo r t s , amusements o r rec rea t ion usage o r f o r t h e r e t a i l

s a l e of spor t ing goods o r associa ted businesses and a l s o

claiming c e r t a i n o ther r e l i e f . It was submitted by the

app l ican t t h a t t h i s cross claim by t h e respondent meant

t h a t it was i n breach of s . 4 5 ~ ( 2 ) ( c ) i n t h a t it was engaging

" in p a r t i c u l a r conduct by reason t h a t a person who, but

f o r sub-section (l), would be bound by a covenant has

f a i l e d t o comply, o r proposes o r t h r ea t ens t o f a i l t o

comply, with t h e terms of t h e c o ~ e n a n t . ~ ~ I f i n d it very

d i f f i c u l t t o conclude t h a t the conduct r e f e r r ed t o i n

s . b 5 ~ ( 2 ) ( c ) Includes the conduct of s e t t i n g up a c ross

- 8 -

ac t ion i n proceedings i n a Cowt but f o r reasons which I

w i l l s e t out l a t e r it i s unnecessary f o r me t o express

a concluded oplnlon on t h i s question. S e c t i ~ n 45E(I)

appears only t o make a ccvenant unenforceable. No

argumei~t was developed t h a t t h a t sec t ion was contraveced

by an a l l ega t ion t h a t such a covenant was enforceable.

I pass r?ow t o consider whe-cher a prima f a c i e case

has been es tabl ished i n r e l a t i o n t o an a l leged contravention

of s .52(1) of t h e Act. So f a r a s is re levan t t h a t sec t ion

provides t h a t :

"A corporat ion s h a l l no t , i n t r ade

o r commerce, engage i n conduct t h a t

i s misleading o r deceptive o r i s

l i k e l y t o mislead o r deceive."

The app l ican t pointed t o t h e width of t h e provisions of

s.52 and submitted t h a t any a l l e g a t i o n t h a t c lause 12(h)

of -the memorandum of l e a se was enforceable c o ~ s t i t u t e d

misleading o r deceptive conduct i n t r ade o r commerce.

Again 1 do no t viish t o express any concluded v i e ~ i 5 u t 1

have grave doubt whether t h e conduc-t r e f e r r ed t o i n s . 5 2 ( l j

(and a s defined i n s . h (2 ) ) includes representa t ions by a

l e s see t o a prospect ive l e s s e e of adjacent premises from

the same l e s s o r t h a t a term i n h i s l e a s e i s enfol.ccable

unless t h a t quss t ion has been t h e sub jec t of a de to rmina t~on

by a Court. Again f o r reasonsvihich I wi1.l s e t out l z t e r

it i s ur iecessary f o r me ta express a concluded v]-ew.

- 9 -

I have no t thought it necessary -to consider i n any

d e t a i l whether t h e conduct a l leged t o be i n co~iLravention

of s.47(4) has t h e purpose o r has o r i s l i k e l y t o have the

e f f e c t , of subs t an t i a l l y lessening re levan t competition or

whether t h e covenant i n c lause 12(h) has , o r i s l i k e l y t o

have, t h e e f f e c t of subs t an t i a l l y lessening re levan t

competition wi th in t h e meaning of S. LI~B(I ) .

The conclusion t o which I have u l t imate ly come i s

based upon t h e assumption, but without so deciding, t h a t

t h e requirement of subs t an t i a l l y lessening re levan t

competition has been made out so f a r a s i s necessary t o

e s t a b l i s h a prima f a c i e case.

I have now d e a l t with t h e t h r ee sec t ions of t h e Act

which a r e a l leged t o provide t h e bas i s f o r r e l i e f i n these

proceedings. I have considerable doubt whe-ther t h e app l ican t

has es tabl ished a prima f a c i e case under any of those

sec t ions but I w i l l assume t h a t it has f o r t h e purpose of

considering where t h e balance of convenience l i e s . Whether

o r no t a prima f a c i e case has been es tabl ished I consider

t h a t , upon t h e balance of convenience, in te r locu tory r e l i e f

should be refused.

The app l ican t i n i t i a l l y sought orders i n substance

r e s t r a i n i n g t h e respondent i ts servants and agents , pendlng

f i n a l determination of these proceedings, from:

( a )	Enforcing o r seeking t o enforce c lause 12(h)
of t h e memorandum of l e a se and
( b )	Expressly o r impliediy represent ing t o Randall
o r any o ther t h l r d pa r ty t h a t c lause 12(h) i s
v a l i d and enforceable.

The app l ican t d id no t p ress t h e f i r s t order it had sought i n i t s no t i ce of motion and it should be pointed out t h a t it seemed t o be d i rec ted t o asking t h i s Court t o r e s t r a i n

t h e respondent i ts servants and agents from taking l e g a l

a c t i on t o enforce c lause 12(h) of t h e memorandum of l e a se .

I n regard t o t h e second order ssught t h e app l ican t indica ted

t h a t it d id no t wish t o prevent t h e respondent from

expressing a view a s t o t h e v a l i d i t y and enforceab i l i ty

of c lause l 2 ( h ) but u l t imate ly t h e respondent sought an

order i n t h e following terms:

"An order r e s t r a i n i n g t h e defendant

by i ts servants o r agents pending

f i n a l determination of these proceedings

from requiring Randall Eadie Gartner

Sports Centre Pty Limited t o

a ) obta in t h e defendant 's consent

t o a l e a se of premises i n PDee

Why S t r o l l 1 from p l a i n t i f f t o

Randall Eadie Gartner Sports

Centre Pty Limited

b) agree t o t h e terms s e t out i n t h e

l e t t e r dated 12 June 1979 from

Alexander and Peddley t o Gye and

Associates, a copy of which i s

- annexure B t o t h e a f l i d a v l t of

Gordon Harold Ward sworn on 4

Ju ly 1979 and f i l e d here in ."

I n substance, t h e f i n a l form of order sought would

r e t r a i n t h e defendant, u n t i l t h e f i n a l determination of

. the proceedings, from requ i r ing Randall t o ob t s in the

defendant ' s consent t o a l e a s e of premises i n the shopping

cen t r e and r e s t r a i n i n g t h e respondent from requ i r ing Randall

t o agree t o t h e terms s e t out i n t h e l e t t e r of 12 June 1979.

I cannot see ho;i t h e respondent can requ i re Randall t o

obta in i t s consent t o a l e a se of o ther p a r t s of the shopping

centre . If a l e a s e is granted i n breach of c lause 12(h)

and t h a t c lause t u r n s ou t t o be enforceable and no

re levan t breach of t h e Act i s involved, then t h e pos i t i on

would be determined i n accordance with ordinary p r inc ip l e s .

I n add i t ion I do no t s ee how t h e respondent can requ i re

Randall t o agree t o terms s e t out i n t h e l e t t e r dated

12 June 1979 which appears t o s e t out t h e terms and

conditions upon 7;:hich t h e respondent would not oppose t h e

grant ing of	t h e l e a s e then proposed	from	t h e app l ican t t o
Randall.

I n any event t h e r e i s evidence before me from M r .

Ward, a d i r e c t o r of t h e app l ican t t n a t Randall were

un l ike ly t o proceed with t h e proposed l ea se but t he re i s

much more s p e c l f i c evidence from M r . Andrews, the s o l i c i t o r

f o r t h e app l ican t , t h a t "Upon t h e morning of Tuesday 3rd

Ju ly 1979, M r . Gye of Gye and Associates telephoned me

saying words t o t h e e f f e c t 'My c l i e n t s Randall Eadie

Gartner Spor ts Cen-cre Pty. Limited resolved yesterday

evening no t t o proceed with t h e proposed lease"'. Gye

and Associates a r e t h e s o l i c i t o r s who acted f o r Randall

i n t h e	negot ia t ions .
I indicated t o t h e p a r t i e s t h a t t h e Court could

give an ea r ly hear ing da t e f o r t h e f i n a l determination

of these proceedings and t h a t some time would be ava i lab le

a s ea r ly a s t h e middle of August 1979. The respondent

indica ted t h a t it might need a period of time considerably

longer than t h a t t o prepare any necessary evidence,

- 1 2 -

p a r t i c u l a r l y i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e i s sue of the a l leged

lessening of competition. I n f i x i n g a da t e f o r hearing

it may be necessary t o consider how f a r , i f a t a l l , it

i s re levan t t o have regard t o t h e proceedings which t h e

app l ican t has comenced i n t h e Supreme Court of New

South Wales.

I n looking a t t h e balance of convenience it i s

re levan t , a t l e a s t i n r e l a t i o n t o considering t h e

pos i t i on under s .52, t o have p a r t i c u l a r regard t o any

poss ib le damage t o llconsumersll i f in te r locu tory r e l i e f

is refused and it would a l so seem re levan t t o pay very

s u b s t a n t i a l regard t o t h e publ ic l n t e r e s t i f in te r locu tory

r e l i e f is refused i n r e l a t i o n t o any contravention of

s.45B o r s.47(4).

I n t h e case before me t h e r e i s some evidence t h a t

t h e r e would be difficulty i n obta in ing a s u i t a b l e a r ea

i n a re levan t loca t ion f o r a t l e a s t some of t h e activities

which Randall proposed t o conduct a t t h e shopplng cen t re

but I consider t h e balance of convenience i s i n favour

of my re fus ing any in junct ion, i n t e r a l i a , f o r t h e following

reasons :

1. That Randall appears t o be no longer i n t e r e s t ed ;

2. That it should be poss ib le t o dispose of t h e

ac t i on i n t h e reasonably near fu tu re ;
3.	That t h e p a r t i e s vo lun t a r i l y entered l n t o a
l e a se i n Apr i l 1977 and t h a t , although I have

re f ra ined from expressing a concluded view, it

is by no means c l e a r t h a t a prima f a c i e case

has been made out t h a t t h e in junc t ion sought

aga ins t t h e respondent would r e s t r a m it

I1from engaging i n conduct t h a t cons t i t u t e s

o r would c o n s t i t u t e a contravention of a

provis ion of P a r t I V o r V of t h e Act" o r any

o ther re levan t conductrefer red t o i n s .80(1) .

4. The purpose of t h e r e l i e f sought appears t o be

t o f a c i l i t a t e t h e grant ing by t h e app l ican t of a

l e a s e of p a r t of t h e shopping cen t re t o a

person o r persons who would conduct a business

which might well be detr imental t o t h e business

of t h e r e s p o n d e ~ t . Presumably any such l e a s e

would be f o r a s i g n i f i c a n t period and i f it

u l t imate ly were held t h a t no contravention of

t h e Trade Prac t ices Act was involved a very

unsa-t isfactory pos i t i on would a r i s e which might

be expected t o give r i s e t o f u r t h e r l i t i g a t i o n .

5 . I consider t h a t t h e delay before t h e matter can

be disposed of f i n a l l y i s no t such a s i s l i k e l y

t o cause	any	s i g n i f i c a n t disadvantage	t o t h e
publ ic .

I r e fuse t h e r e l i e f sought i n t h i s appl ica t ion. A s

I indicated when I reserved my judgment I consider t h a t

t h e matter should be f i n a l l y disposed of a t t h e e a r l i e s t

poss ib le date.

I w i l l g ive t h e p a r t i e s an opportunity t o address

me on t h e quest ion of cos t s . Leave i s a l so granted t o

e i t h e r p a r t y t o apply on two days no t ice t o t h e o ther

pa r ty t o have t h i s matter r e - l i s t ed f o r directions o r f o r

any o ther app l ica t ion t h a t e i t h e r p a r t y may be advised

t o make.

I

t - 7 , t i l ls :t::d. the t\\\-+er,

-	?::'L	ages ""c a true copy or' the
-

X ~ ~ s o l ~ s for Judgment hereln of hls l!onour

3-r . J u s t ~ c e F R A N W

&----Q- Q!-L

+r Assoclate