Adams v Northern Plumbing (NQ) Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

ADAMS v NORTHERN PLUMBING (NQ) PTY LTD [2010] FMCA 224
BANKRUPTCY – Setting aside the bankruptcy notice – Building and Construction Industry Payments Act filed in the District Court – whether a sealed adjudication certificate is a judgment in form – whether an adjudication certificate constitutes a final judgment.
Bankruptcy Act1966 (Cth)
Building and Construction Industry Payments Act 2009 (Qld)
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)

Cavanah & Anor v Advance Earthmoving & Haulage Pty Ltd [2008] FMCA 427

Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Horvath [1999] 161 ALR 441
J Hutchinson Pty Ltd v Galform Pty Ltd & Ors [2008] QSC 205
Mango Boulevard Pty Ltd v Spencer & Ors [2009] QSC 389
Peekhurst Pty Ltd v Wallace & Anor [2007] QSC 159
Re Brink; Ex parte Commercial Banking Company of Sydney Ltd (1978 – 1980) 30 ALR 435
Re Todd, Ex Parte Pike (1924) 24 SR (NSW) 537
Reed Construction (Qld) Pty Ltd v Dellsun Pty Ltd [2009] QSC 263
Worchild v Drink Nightclub (Qld) Pty Ltd [2005] 224 ALR 339
Zen Ridgeway Pty Ltd v Adams Unrpt. QSC No 1377 of 2009 (3 April 09)
de Jersey CJ

Applicant: JOHN ADAMS
Respondent: NORTHERN PLUMBING (NQ) PTY LTD
File Number: BRG 180 of 2010
Judgment of: Burnett FM
Hearing date: 17 March 2010
Date of Last Submission: 17 March 2010
Delivered at: Brisbane
Delivered on: 29 March 2010

REPRESENTATION

Solicitors for the Applicant: Mills Oakley
Solicitors for the Respondent: Boulton Cleary & Kern

ORDERS

  1. Application dismissed.

  2. Unless application is made by either party within seven (7) days of today’s date order that the applicant pay the respondent’s cost of and incidental to this application to be assessed on the standard basis.

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AT BRISBANE

BRG 180 of 2010

JOHN ADAMS

Applicant

And

NORTHERN PLUMBING (NQ) PTY LTD

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. In this application John Adams (the applicant) seeks orders pursuant to section 33, 40 and 41 of the Bankruptcy Act (the Act) for orders to set aside a bankruptcy notice QN159/2009 dated 22 December 2009 and served upon him by Northern Plumbing (NQ) Pty Ltd (Northern Plumbing).  The basis for the bankruptcy notice was a certificate issued by an adjudicator pursuant to the Building and Construction Industry Payments Act 2009 (Qld) (BCIPA) which certificate was subsequently filed in the District Court of Townsville pursuant to the provisions of section 31 BCIPA.

  2. Four grounds were advanced in support of the application:

    a)The sealed adjudication certificate is not a judgment in form and accordingly its attachment to the bankruptcy notice does not satisfy the requirements of section 41(2) of the Act;

    b)The adjudication certificate does not constitute a “final judgment” for the purpose of section 40(1)(g) of the Act;

    c)The applicant has a set off, cross claim or cross demand equal to or exceeding the sum payable under the final order;

    d)No amount is owing by the applicant to the respondent but rather any sum owed is owed by the entity…

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Details
Case
[2010] FMCA 224
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Adams v Northern Plumbing (NQ) Pty Ltd involved an application to set aside a statutory demand pursuant to section 459H of the Corporations Act. The demand was addressed to Northern Plumbing (NQ) Pty Ltd and referred to the company’s debt to Adams. The particulars of the debt referred to an adjudicated amount issued under the Building and Construction Industry Payments Act 2000 (BCIPA) and said to have been filed as a judgment debt in the District Court. However, the judgment entered in the District Court named different parties to those noted in the adjudicator’s certificate, although its basis was said to be the adjudication certificate. The statutory demand was then issued on 16 January but did not attach the first erroneous judgment but instead the adjudication certificate. A short time later the judgment was amended to bring it in line with the adjudication certificate.

The legal issues before the court were whether the statutory demand could be considered as asserting a debt that was a judgment debt, given that the demand did not refer to a judgment involving the instant parties. The applicant argued that there must be some judgment instrument in existence before there could be said to be a “final judgment” and that the filing of an adjudication certificate and affidavit as required by section 31 BCIPA did not satisfy that requirement. The court had to determine whether the statutory demand was based on any relevant judgment and whether the adjudication certificate and affidavit could be considered as a judgment for the purposes of the statutory demand.

The court found that the applicant’s reliance on certain words in the judgment was selective and out of context. The court held that His Honour’s reference to “a judgment” was not intended to stand alone and was the subject of the sentence with the predicate being, “involving the instant parties…”. The court held that His Honour’s observations could not be reasonably construed in the manner advanced by the applicant. The court concluded that the statutory demand must be read as not based on any relevant judgment because it did not refer to a judgment involving the instant parties. The court dismissed the application and ordered that the applicant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to this application to be assessed on the standard basis.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

Application dismissed.

2.

Unless application is made by either party within seven (7) days of today’s date order that the applicant pay the respondent’s cost of and incidental to this application to be assessed on the standard basis.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Zen Ridgeway concerned an application to set aside a statutory demand pursuant to section 459H Corporations Act. The demand was addressed to the company and referred to the company’s debt to the creditor. The particulars of the debt referred to an adjudicated amount issued pursuant to the BCIPA and said to have been filed as a judgment debt in the District Court. In that instance the judgment entered in the District Court named different parties to those noted in the adjudicator’s certificate although its basis was said to be the adjudication certificate. The statutory demand was then issued on 16 January (but did not attach the first erroneous judgment but instead the adjudication certificate). A short time later the judgment was amended to bring it in line with the adjudication certificate. After detailing the history His Honour continued:“But because the statutory demand in question did not refer to a judgment involving the instant parties and those subject to the adjudication certificate it is not possible to regard the statutory demand as asserting a debt which is a judgment debt.” The applicant particularly relies upon the highlighted words. For the applicant it was contended that what His Honour was saying was that there must be in existence some judgment instrument before there could be said to be a “final judgment” and that the filing of an adjudication certificate and affidavit as required by section 31 BCIPA did not satisfy that requirement. In my view the applicant’s reliance upon the highlighted words is selective and out of context. First on a plain reading of the relevant passage of His Honour’s reasons, the reference to “a judgment” was not intended to stand alone. His Honour’s reference to “a judgment” was the subject of the sentence with the predicate being, “involving the instant parties…”. In my view His Honour’s observations cannot be reasonably construed in the manner advanced by the applicant. My construction of His Honour’s sentence is assisted by the context. That is in part informed by the debate which occurred before him. From the transcript of proceedings it is clear that there was an error in the identification of the parties in the original minute of judgment issued by the court. That judgment was not before me although it was clearly before His Honour and marked exhibit 1. The apparent difficulty with the statutory demand was that it identified, as parties, entities who were different from the entities identified in the original minute of judgment. The original minute of judgment was corrected and an amended judgment issued. However the damage was done. As His Honour observed:“…The statutory demand in question did not refer to a judgment involving the instant parties…” That is to say that the statutory demand identified different parties to those identified in the adjudication certificate and who were parties to the proceedings before His Honour. That matter appears to have been further addressed in His Honour’s judgment by his later observation:“The point is this statutory demand must be read as not based on any relevant judgment”.