Re: GEOFFREY DAVID ADAMS
And: AMALGAMATED METALS FOUNDRY AND SHIPWRIGHTS UNION
No. NSW10 of 1984
Industrial Law
COURT
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
INDUSTRIAL DIVISION
Beaumont J.
CATCHWORDS
Industrial Law - Union rules - Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1904 s.133(1)(db)- Whether directory or mandatory - Whether any flexibility in statutory period - Whether court has discretion under s.140.
Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1904 s.133(1)(db), 140
Acts Interpretation Act, 1901, s.15AA
HEARING
SYDNEY
#DATE 21:3:1984
ORDER
1. I make orders in accordance with paras. 1 and 2 of the order to show cause.
JUDGE1
This is an application for declarations brought pursuant to s.140 of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1904 ("the Act") alleging a contravention by the respondent of the provisions of s.133 (1)(db) of the Act. The applicant, a member of the respondent which is an organisation registered under the Act, applies to the Court pursuant to s.140(2) for the following relief:
"1. An Order that Rule 2 Part F of the Rules of the Organisation:-
(a) is contrary to or fails to make a provision required by a provision of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1904, contrary to Section 140(1)(a) of the Act;
(b) prevents or hinders members of the Organisation from observing the law, contrary to Section 140(1)(b) of the Act; and/or
(c) imposes upon members of the Organisation conditions, obligations or restrictions which, having regard to the objects of the Act and the purposes of the registration of Organisations under the Act, are oppressive, unreasonable or unjust, contrary to Section 140(1)(c) of the Act.
A Declaration that the Applicant be and be deemed to be the holder of the office of State Secretary of the Tasmanian Branch of the Organisation on and from 10 February, 1984.
Such further or other Orders as to the Court seems fit."
Section 133(1)(db) of the Act provides, so far as is relevant, that the rules of an organisation "shall not permit a person to be elected to hold an office within the . . . organisation for a period exceeding 4 years without being re-elected". Robert Ridley, a member of the respondent, was declared elected unopposed to the office of State secretary of its Tasmanian branch in December 1979. The term of his office commenced on 10 February, 1980 for a period of four years, pursuant to the operation of sub-rule 6 of rule 2 of the respondent's rules as then in force. Pursuant to the operation of the sub-rule, the term of office expired on 9 February, 1984.
The applicant was declared elected to the position of State secretary of the respondent's Tasmanian branch on 20 December, 1983 in a ballot which concluded on 19 December, 1983. However, rule 2 part F of the rules as certified by the Industrial Registrar on 19 September, 1983, purportedly provides as follows:
"TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS
Notwithstanding -
(a) the provisions of the rules in force immediately before the commencement of operation of Rule 2, so far as…
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- Case
- [1984] FCA 55
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the court were whether the union rules were mandatory or directory and whether the court had any discretion to extend the statutory period for conciliation. The court also considered whether there was any flexibility in the statutory period for compliance with the Act. The central question was whether the court had the authority to grant an extension under section 140 of the Act.
The court found that the union rules were mandatory rather than directory, meaning strict compliance was required. It was held that the statutory period for conciliation could not be extended by the court, as the Act did not provide for any discretion in this regard. The court concluded that there was no flexibility in the statutory period and that the court's powers under section 140 did not extend to granting an extension of time. Consequently, the court determined that the union's decision was valid, and Adams's application for judicial review was dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. I make orders in accordance with paras. 1 and 2 of the order to show cause.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi