Adam Eden v The Eden Trust

Case

[2023] ATMO 88

4 July 2023


TRADE MARKS ACT 1995



DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS

Re:Opposition by Adam Eden to an application under section 92 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) by The Eden Trust for removal of trade mark number 898717 (classes 35, 39, 40, 41, 42) – EDEN – in the name of Adam Eden

Delegate:

Nicholas Barbey

Representation:

Opponent: Samuel Hallahan of counsel instructed by Chrysiliou IP

Applicant: Andrew Sykes of counsel instructed by Adrian M Trioli Patent and Trade Mark Attorney

Decision:

2023 ATMO 88

Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) – application under section 92 – removal sought for entire registration – evidence does not establish use of the trade mark during the relevant period or obstacle to use – discretion not exercised – registration to be removed

Background

  1. Adam Eden (‘Opponent’) is the owner of the following Australian trade mark registration (‘Registration’):

    Trade mark:  EDEN     (‘Trade Mark’)

    Registration number:  898717

    Filing date:  20 December 2001

    Specification:[1]  Class 35: (including) advertising services; retail services; wholesale services; business management services

    Class 39: storage of photographs and images in physical forms

    Class 40: imaging; consultancy in the field of imaging; providing information on imaging

    Class 41: (including) education services; entertainment services; publication of books; movie studios; sporting and cultural activities; rental of video recordings

    Class 42: (including) photography, photographic reporting, video taping and computer internet services; computer programming; security consultancy; intellectual property consultancy; cosmetic research

    (‘Registered Services’)

    [1] An indicative specification is provided. The full specification of Australian trade mark registration number 898717 is reproduced in Annexure A to this decision.

  2. On 24 April 2020, The Eden Trust (‘Applicant’) filed a non-use application based on s 92(4)(b) of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) (‘Act’) seeking removal of the Trade Mark from the Australian Register of Trade Marks (‘Register’). The non-use application sought removal of all the Registered Services.

  3. The Opponent filed a notice of intention to oppose the non-use application followed by a statement of grounds and particulars. The Applicant responded by filing a notice of intention to defend the non-use application.

  4. Evidence in Support (‘EIS’) was filed by the Opponent and the Applicant filed Evidence in Answer (‘EIA’). An oral hearing was subsequently requested. Submissions were filed by the Opponent on 22 March 2023 (‘Opponent’s Submissions’) and by the Applicant on 28 March 2023 (‘Applicant’s Submissions’).

  5. As a delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks (‘Registrar’), I heard this matter by video conference on 5 April 2023. Samuel Hallahan of counsel presented submissions on behalf of the Opponent and Andrew Sykes of counsel presented submissions on the Applicant’s behalf.

Legal framework

  1. Section 92 of the Act relevantly provides:

Application for removal of trade mark from Register etc.

(4)An application under subsection (1) or (3) (non-use application) may be made on either or both of the following grounds, and on no other grounds:

(b) that the trade mark has remained registered for a continuous period of 3 years ending one month before the day on which the non-use application is filed, and, at no time during that period, the person who was then the registered owner:

(i) used the trade mark in Australia; or

(ii) used the trade mark in good faith in Australia;

in relation to the goods and/or services to which the application relates.

Relevant period and onus

  1. The non-use application was filed on 24 April 2020 and complies with s 93(2) of the Act.[2] Pursuant to s 92(4)(b) of the Act, the period in which the Opponent must establish use of the Trade Mark in Australia in good faith is the three year period ending on 24 March 2020 (‘Relevant Period’).

    [2] See Act s 93(2) prior to amendments to that section brought about by the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Productivity Commission Response Part 1 and Other Measures) Act 2018 (Cth) sch 1 pt 3. The amended s 93(2) applies to trade mark applications filed from 24 February 2019 onwards.

  2. The onus rests on the Opponent to rebut the non-use allegation.[3] The Registrar retains the discretion to remove the Trade Mark from the Register in respect of any, or all, of the services for which removal has been sought. If satisfied that it is reasonable to do so, the Registrar may decline to remove the Trade Mark from the Register even if the ground on which the

    [3] Act s 100(1)(c).

    [4] Ibid s 101(3).

    non-use application was made has been established.[4]
  3. I proceed on the basis that the standard of proof required is the ordinary civil standard based on the balance of probabilities.[5]

    [5] Telstra Corporation Limited v Phone Directories Company Pty Ltd [2015] FCAFC 156, [133] (Besanko, Jagot and Edelman JJ) in respect of oppositions under s 52 of the Act.

Evidence

  1. The following declarations were filed:

EIS

  • Declaration made on 6 January 2021 by Adam Eden (the Opponent) with Annexures AE-1 to AE-27 (‘Eden Declaration’).

EIA

  • Declaration made on 9 April 2021 by Charlene Nelson (Associate Chartered Trade Mark Attorney at Foot Anstey LLP, the Applicant’s representative in the United Kingdom) with Exhibit CN-1 (‘Nelson Declaration’).

EIS

  1. According to the Eden Declaration, the Trade Mark was first used in 1969 in respect of photography services. Since then, the services offered under the Trade Mark have expanded to include the provision of editing, sound design, visual and special effects as well as television production services. It is declared that the Trade Mark has been used during the Relevant Period by an authorised user, namely Eden Creative Media Pty Ltd (‘ECM’). The Opponent explains that he is the sole officer of ECM and ECM’s membership is comprised of himself and AEDEN Pty Ltd, a company of which the Opponent is the sole officer and sole shareholder.

  2. The Opponent claims that the Trade Mark has been displayed on the websites accessible at and Annexed to the Eden Declaration are screenshots of the website available at sourced from an internet archiving service, which are dated within the Relevant Period. It is further claimed that Trade Mark has been used in relation to the production of films and digital content and reference is made to numerous videos which have been uploaded to the sharing platform ‘Vimeo’.

  3. The Eden Declaration states that the Trade Mark has also been used in relation to the provision of production estimates, media storage and mastering services. Additionally, the Trade Mark has been promoted on physical signage outside the Opponent’s business premise as well as in various print and online mediums including on ECM’s Facebook page.

EIA

  1. Ms Nelson states that the Applicant has lodged the following trade mark application in Australia:

    Trade mark:  THE EDEN PROJECT (‘Applicant’s Mark’)

    Application number:  2003159

    Filing date:  14 April 2019

    Specification:[6]  Classes 35, 41, 42, 43

    [6] The full specification of Australian trade mark application number 2003159 is reproduced in Annexure B to this decision.

  2. Exhibit CN-1 to the Nelson Declaration contains a list of the Applicant’s registrations and pending applications for the Applicant’s Mark across various jurisdictions including China, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.

Discussion

  1. The central issue for determination is whether the Opponent (or an authorised user) has used the Trade Mark in Australia in relation to the Registered Services during the Relevant Period. If the evidence establishes that the Opponent (or an authorised user) has, then the non-use allegation is taken to have been rebutted and the Trade Mark will remain registered in respect of the Registered Services. If the evidence fails to establish use of the Trade Mark for all the Registered Services, then consideration will turn to whether it is reasonable to invoke the Registrar’s discretion to preserve the Trade Mark for any services for which it has not been used.

  2. The evidence must demonstrate ‘use as a trade mark’. That is, the Trade Mark must have been used as a badge of origin.[7] The extent of use required is not onerous and a ‘relatively small amount of use’ may be sufficient to rebut a non-use application.[8] Potentially, a single bona fide use of a trade mark during the relevant period may suffice to prevent removal.[9] However, if reliance is placed on a solitary example of use, it should be established by ‘overwhelmingly convincing proof’.[10]

Use of the Trade Mark during the Relevant Period

[7] See Coca-Cola Co v All-Fect Distributors Ltd [1999] FCA 1721, [19] (Black CJ, Sundberg and Finkelstein JJ) wherein it was observed that ‘[u]se “as a trade mark” is use of the mark as a “badge of origin” in the sense that it indicates a connection in the course of trade between goods and the person who applies the mark to the goods’.

[8] E & J Gallo Winery v Lion Nathan Australia Pty Ltd [2010] HCA 15, [64] (French CJ, Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ).

[9] Woolly Bull Enterprises Pty Ltd v Reynolds [2001] FCA 261, [17] (Drummond J).

[10] Nodoz Trade Mark [1962] RPC 1, 7 (Wilberforce J).

  1. As a preliminary matter, I note that the EIS primarily consists of invoices and production estimates issued by ECM during the Relevant Period. It was common ground between the parties that ECM was an authorised user of the Trade Mark and that the benefit of its use inured to the Opponent.[11] The evidence supports this. The Opponent is the sole director of ECM and he is the ultimate beneficial owner of its two issued shares. In this context, it can be readily inferred that ECM’s use of the Trade Mark was under the actual control of the Opponent. As such, I am satisfied that ECM was an authorised user within the meaning of the Act.[12]

    [11] Opponent’s Submissions, [27]–[29]; Applicant’s Submissions, [15] n 8.

    [12] Act ss 7(3), 8.

  2. The EIS fails to establish that the Trade Mark, as registered, was used during the Relevant Period. Instead, it shows the use of different trade marks incorporating the word ‘EDEN’ with the overwhelming majority of examples demonstrating use of the following (collectively ‘Eden Marks’):

EC Mark

EC Logo

Media Mark

Media Logo

Eden Creative

Eden Creative Media

  1. The EIS reveals that ECM has promoted itself as being an ‘end-to-end television and content production company’ and, consistent with this, the evidence demonstrates that the Eden Marks were primarily used in relation to television production services. It is plain from the evidence filed that the broad and diverse range of items listed in the Registered Services have not been offered. At the hearing, the Opponent made qualified concessions of non-use in relation to items in classes 35, 41 and 42 of the Registered Services. For example, non-use of copyright management services was conceded but use in relation to intellectual property consultancy services was maintained. Be that as it may, it is not necessary to summarise the concessions made in view of the discussion which follows.

  2. The Opponent contends that use of the Eden Marks constitutes use of the Trade Mark with ‘additions or alterations not substantially affecting its identity’.[13] In the Opponent’s opinion, ‘CREATIVE’ and ‘CREATIVE MEDIA’ are descriptive because the services offered involve ‘creating still and moving media for [the Opponent’s] clients, including television commercials, films and digital content’.[14] For this reason, it is alleged that the identity of each of the Eden Marks resides in the word ‘EDEN’ simpliciter. The consequence of this, so the argument goes, is that use of the Eden Marks should be construed as being use of the Trade Mark for the purposes of the Act.

    [13] Act s 100(3)(a).

    [14] Opponent’s Submissions, [24].

  3. In contrast, the Applicant submits that each of the Eden Marks contain additions or alterations which substantially affect the identity of the Trade Mark. The Applicant accepts that the words ‘CREATIVE’ and ‘CREATIVE MEDIA’ allude to some of the Registered Services. However, it points out that neither addition falls into the category of a mere descriptor. Moreover, the Applicant emphasises that the additional device element(s) present in the EC Logo and the Media Logo are further additions which substantially affect the identity of the Trade Mark. On this basis, it asserts that the use of the Eden Marks does not assist the Opponent.

  4. In my assessment, the Applicant’s position has merit. It is well established that determining whether ‘additions or alterations’[15] substantially affect the identity of a trade mark involves the same principles as those underpinning the test for substantial identity.[16] As Kenny J observed in Sports Warehouse Inc v Fry Consulting Pty Ltd:

    [W]hether a person has used the trade mark with additions or alterations that do not substantially affect the identity of the trade mark requires a side by side comparison of the trade mark with the alleged use, assessing the importance of their similarities and differences having regard to the essential features of the trade mark and the total impression of resemblance or dissimilarity that emerges from the comparison.[17]

    [15] This expression appears in ss 7 and 100 of the Act.

    [16] See, eg, Optical 88 Limited v Optical 88 Pty Limited (No 2) [2010] FCA 1380, [256] (Yates J); PDP Capital Pty Ltd v Grasshopper Ventures Pty Ltd [2021] FCAFC 128, [161] (Jagot, Nicholas and Burley JJ); Symphony Holdings Limited v Skins IP Limited [2022] FCA 1238, [20] (Raper J).

    [17] [2010] FCA 664, [154] (emphasis added).

  5. Turning to the EC Mark, it is true that ‘EDEN’ is present in both this mark and the Trade Mark. However, I do not believe that ‘CREATIVE’ would be perceived as an inessential feature of the EC Mark. The Opponent claimed that ‘CREATIVE’ is not an essential feature because, by definition, it describes a person who originates ideas or a department responsible for graphic design or copy writing. This argument is not persuasive when viewed in the context of the production and production related services for which use has been evidenced. I accept that ‘CREATIVE’ retains a descriptive quality insofar as the services could, for example, be characterised as a creative endeavour or utilising creative expression. However, it is not apparent how this word is merely descriptive. In my opinion, ‘CREATIVE’ simply does not fall within the merely descriptive ambit of, for example, ‘SERVICES’ for services[18] or ‘RADIOLOGY’ for radiological services.[19] Consequently, ‘CREATIVE’ forms an essential feature of the EC Mark and its presence results in a total impression of dissimilarity emerging from a side by side comparison of the marks. Thus, the inclusion of ‘CREATIVE’ constitutes a substantial addition to the Trade Mark and use of the EC Mark does not assist the Opponent.

    [18] QH Tours Limited v The Mark Travel Corporation [1999] ATMO 31.

    [19] Pham Global Pty Ltd v Insight Clinical Imaging Pty Ltd [2017] FCAFC 83 (Greenwood, Jagot and Beach JJ).

  6. Similar considerations apply with respect to the remainder of the Eden Marks such that the individual use of these marks also does not constitute use of the Trade Mark with insubstantial additions or alterations. The EC Logo, Media Mark and Media Logo each contain additional elements which substantially alters their total impression further away from the Trade Mark’s identity of ‘EDEN’ simpliciter. Accordingly, the Opponent is not able to rely on the use made of the Eden Marks during the Relevant Period to rebut the non-use allegation.

  7. The Opponent also sought to rely on other sporadic examples of use appearing in the EIS. These examples demonstrated use of the following marks:

Eden Sign

EK Mark

EL Mark

Eden Kit

Eden Lighting

  1. As regards to the Eden Sign, the Opponent declares that he installed this ‘during the beginning of 2020’.[20] There was disagreement at the hearing as to whether this example fell within the Relevant Period. In short, the Opponent claimed that the ‘beginning of 2020’ reasonably indicates that installation occurred during the Relevant Period whereas the Applicant submitted that it did not because the statement was vague. In my view, the period captured by the phrase ‘beginning of 2020’ is ambiguous and does not provide a cogent basis to conclude that the Eden Sign was installed prior to 24 March 2020. Whilst I accept that the Opponent may not recall the exact installation date, identifying the date with greater precision was solely within his knowledge and control. Given the Opponent carries the onus, I cannot be satisfied that the Eden Sign was used during the Relevant Period due to the statement’s inherent ambiguity.

    [20] Eden Declaration, [22].

  2. In relation to the EK Mark and the EL Mark, these marks appear in the itemised description of four production estimates issued during the Relevant Period. The Opponent asserted that this constitutes use of the Trade Mark with additions or alterations that do not substantially affect its identity. The Applicant disagreed. It argued that the context in which the EK Mark and the EL Mark are presented, being in the description section of documents which are emblazoned with the EC Logo as a letterhead, means that neither mark is being used as a trade mark. The Applicant opined that it ‘is inconceivable that such a reader would see the fine text “Eden Kit” or “Eden Lighting” as a badge of origin. Those words are merely a short hand references to EDENCREATIVE’.[21]

    [21] Applicant’s Submissions, [28].

  3. I do not accept the Applicant’s characterisation. In my view, it is plausible that consumers would interpret the presentation of the EK Mark and the EL Mark as being used as trade marks notwithstanding the EC Logo letterhead. However, the fundamental difficulty faced by the Opponent is that it is not evident how ‘KIT’ is descriptive of services which are itemised as, for example, ‘Producer, [Director of Photography], Camera Assistant, Production Assistant, Runner’.[22] Whilst ‘KIT’ would be merely descriptive of goods that are provided as a kit (e.g., a first aid kit or a homebrew kit), there is nothing to indicate that ‘KIT’ retains the same descriptive meaning in relation to the supply of production services and the like. For example, the evidence does not establish that it is common for these services to be referred to as a kit or provided in the form of a kit. Therefore, on balance, I consider that the addition of ‘KIT’ constitutes an addition to the Trade Mark which substantially alters its overall identity. As such, use of the EK Mark does not assist in the Opponent in rebutting the non-use allegation.

    [22] Eden Declaration, Annexure AE-13.

  4. Turning to the EL Mark, a threshold issue is raised by this evidence. This is because the documents do not, on their face, demonstrate use of the EL Mark in relation to any of the Registered Services. One document displays the EL Mark in the following context: ‘Full Eden Lighting van and accessories’. Ostensibly, this demonstrates use in relation to the rental of vehicles or potentially the rental of lighting equipment. Meanwhile, the remaining documents use the EL Mark as follows: ‘Eden Lighting kit and accessories’. At its highest, this illustrates use in relation to the rental of lighting equipment or the provision of lighting technician services. However, the Registered Services do not include any of the aforementioned services. In the absence of supplementary examples or any explanation of what is entailed by a ‘Eden Lighting van’ or ‘Eden Lighting kit’, I am not satisfied from the outset that this evidence constitutes ‘overwhelmingly convincing proof’ that there has been use of the EL Mark in relation to any of the Registered Services.

  5. With the above in mind, the Opponent has not established use of the Trade Mark in relation to the Registered Services during the Relevant Period.

Obstacles to use

  1. The Opponent did not submit that there were any obstacles to the use of the Trade Mark during the Relevant Period. For completeness, I confirm that there is nothing to suggest that an obstacle prevented use of the Trade Mark in relation to the Registered Services during the Relevant Period.

  2. Accordingly, the Opponent has not rebutted the s 92(4)(b) ground for removal in respect of the Registered Services.

Registrar’s discretion

  1. Pursuant to s 101 of the Act, the Registrar has a broad discretion not to remove an unused trade mark if it is satisfied that it is reasonable to do so. In PDP Capital Pty Ltd v Grasshopper Ventures Pty Ltd, the Full Federal Court made the following observations regarding the discretion under s 101(3) of the Act:

    The following propositions are relevant to the exercise of this discretion:

    (1) It is broad and is unfettered in the sense that there are no express limits on it. It is to be understood as limited only by the subject-matter, scope and purpose of the legislation and, in particular, by the subject-matter scope and purpose of Part 9 of the Trade Marks Act.

    (2) The scope and purpose of the Trade Marks Act strikes a balance between various disparate interests. On the one hand there is the interest of consumers in recognising a trade mark as a badge of origin of goods or services and in avoiding deception or confusion as to that origin. On the other is the interest of traders, both in protecting their goodwill through the creation of a statutory species of property protected by the action against infringement, and in turning the property to valuable account by licensing or assignment. …

    (3) The particular purpose of Part 9, within which s 101 falls, is to provide for the removal of unused trade marks from the Register. It is designed to protect the integrity of the Register and in that way the interests of consumers. At the same time, it seeks to accommodate, where reasonable to do so, the interests of registered trade mark owners. Accordingly, the Court must be positively satisfied that it is reasonable that the trade mark should not be removed. The onus in this respect lies on the trade mark owner to persuade the Court that it is reasonable to exercise the discretion in favour of the owner.

    (4) The discretion in s 101(3) is expressed in the present tense. It requires consideration of whether, at the time that the Court is called upon to make its decision, it is reasonable not to remove the mark.

    (5) The range of factors considered in the exercise of the discretion has included whether or not:

    (a) there has been abandonment of the mark;

    (b) the registered proprietor of the mark still has a residual reputation in the mark;

    (c) there have been sales by the registered owner of the mark of the goods for which removal was sought since the relevant period ended;

    (d) the applicant for removal had entered the market in knowledge of the registered mark;

    (e) the registered proprietors were aware of the applicant’s sales under the mark;

    (f) A further factor, explicitly noted in s 101(4), but which falls within the scope of the discretion in s 101(3), is whether or not the trade mark under consideration has been used by its registered owner in respect of similar goods or closely related services.[23]

    [23] [2021] FCAFC 128, [153] (Jagot, Nicholas and Burley JJ) (emphasis altered) (citations omitted).

  2. The Opponent claims that it is reasonable to exercise the discretion because ‘many of the registered services are closely related to one another’.[24] In its view, ‘it would be conducive to deception or confusion in the marketplace if removal of the Trade Mark for certain registered services were to open the way for the use and/or registration of substantially identical or deceptively similar trade marks in relation to similar services or closely related goods’.[25]

    [24] Opponent’s Submissions, [33].

    [25] Ibid.

  3. The Applicant contends that discretion should not be exercised. It points out that the EIS shows that the Opponent uses the EC Mark and not the Trade Mark. The Applicant further submits that the EIS does not reveal the existence of any reputation in the Trade Mark nor does it disclose any detriment that the Opponent would suffer if removal occurred. The Applicant posits that the public interest is served by removing the unused Trade Mark as this would maintain the integrity of the Register.

  4. In my assessment, it is not reasonable to exercise the discretion to preserve the Registration. At the date the non-use application was filed, the Registration had been on the Register for some 18 years. The evidence filed demonstrates that the Opponent has not used the Trade Mark, as registered, during the Relevant Period and there is no concrete indication of a future plan to do so. Rather, the evidence suggests that the Opponent intends to continue its use of the Eden Marks. Likewise, it is immediately apparent that many of the services encompassed by the Registered Services have not been provided by the Opponent despite the lengthy period the Trade Mark has been on the Register. This holds true irrespective of whether the evidence is considered before, during or after the Relevant Period.

  5. Overall, the public interest is not served by allowing the unused Trade Mark to remain registered in respect of a broad array of services for which the Opponent has no demonstrated intention of providing. The Applicant has directed me to its private interest in having the Trade Mark removed given its pending application for the Applicant’s Mark. By contrast, aside from a general reference to s 101(4) of the Act, the Opponent has not drawn my attention to any circumstance that would favour the discretion available under the Act being exercised to preserve the Registration. As such, I decline to exercise the discretion.

Decision

  1. The ground for removal under s 92(4)(b) of the Act has been established in respect of all the Registered Services. I direct that trade mark registration 898717 be removed from the Register one month from the date of this decision. In the event of an appeal from this decision, trade mark registration 898717 shall not be removed from the Register until the appeal has been discontinued or dismissed, or in the event of a decision from the court, the registration will be subject to that decision.

Costs

  1. The Applicant has sought an award of costs. Costs usually follow the event. Accordingly, I award costs against the Opponent per s 221 of the Act in the amounts set out in Schedule 8 of the Trade Marks Regulations 1995 (Cth).

Nicholas Barbey

Hearing Officer

Delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks

4 July 2023


Annexure A

Class 35: advertising services; marketing services; advertising agency services; rental of advertising space; dissemination of advertising matter; updating of advertising material; sales promotions for others; radio commercials; television commercials; marketing research services; marketing study services; publicity services; publicity agency services; public relations services; publication of publicity texts; distribution of samples; demonstration of goods; retail services; wholesale services; opinion polling; organisation of exhibitions; commercial information agency services; business management services; business consultancy services; business information services; compilation of information into computer databases; consultancy in the field of the Internet (being in the nature of business consultancy); distribution of photographs and distribution of images, including distribution of photographs and distribution of images by electronic means and the Internet, being in the nature of retail distribution

Class 39: storage of photographs and images in physical forms

Class 40: imaging; consultancy in the field of imaging; providing information on imaging

Class 41: education services; providing of training; entertainment services; film production; video tape production; dubbing; video tape editing; production of television programs; production of radio programs; production of videos; distribution of television programs; distribution of radio programs; distribution of videos; sound recording services; recording studio services; movie studios; publication of texts; publication of books; arranging and conducting of conferences, seminars and workshops; organisation of competitions; organisation of exhibits for cultural or educational purposes; sporting and cultural activities; educational information; entertainment information; television entertainment; radio entertainment; rental of video recordings; rental of sound recordings; rental of audio equipment; rental of video equipment; rental of video tapes

Class 42: photography, photographic reporting, video taping and computer Internet services; consultancy in the field of photography, computer hardware; consultancy in the field of the Internet (being in the nature of computer consultancy); storage of photographs and images in digital, magnetic and optical forms; providing access to on-line photograph and image sharing facilities, storage and archiving; providing information on photography and computers; providing access to a computerised database featuring photographs and images; printing, including lithographic printing and offset printing; creation, support, maintenance and design of web sites or Internet sites for other parties; providing access to on-line publications; leasing access time to a computer database; design, including industrial design, design of interior decor, packaging design services and graphic arts designing; intellectual property consultancy; licensing of intellectual property, including licensing intellectual property in images and photographs; professional non-business consultancy; security consultancy; computer programming; computer rental; maintenance of computer software; updating of computer software; computer software design; computer systems analysis; recovery of computer data; copyright management; editing of written texts; providing facilities for exhibitions; cosmetic research; providing on-line, global computer network and Internet links for promoting the goods and services of others

Annexure B

Class 35: retail services connected with the sale of printed matter, printed publications, clothing, footwear, headgear, games, toys, playthings, stationery, beauty products, food and drink products, plants, seeds, gardening accessories, horticulture equipment, homeware and pet products

Class 41: entertainment services; education services; arranging and conducting conferences, exhibitions, seminars, events, workshops, exhibitions and conferences; entertainment services; amusement park services; managing and operating visitor attractions; conducting guided tours; sporting and cultural activities; provision of leisure and recreational facilities

Class 42: research; research and development services; research and development services in connection with horticulture; research and development services in connection with the environment; software design and development; preparation of scientific reports; information, advisory and consultancy services relating to the aforesaid services

Class 43: provision of and services for providing food and drink; restaurant, bar, catering, canteen, cafeteria, coffee shop and snack bar services; preparation of food and drink; room hire, accommodation services


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