AD/F100/83 Fuel Tank Safety Fuel Airworthiness Limitations (Cth)

AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE

For the reasons set out in the background section, the CASA delegate whose signature appears below issues the following Airworthiness Directive (AD) under subregulation 39.001(1) of CASR 1998.  The AD requires that the action set out in the requirement section (being action that the delegate considers necessary to correct the unsafe condition) be taken in relation to the aircraft or aeronautical product mentioned in the applicability section: (a) in the circumstances mentioned in the requirement section; and (b) in accordance with the instructions set out in the requirement section; and (c) at the time mentioned in the compliance section.

Fokker F100 (F28 Mk 100) Series Aeroplanes

AD/F100/83 Fuel Tank Safety - Fuel
Airworthiness Limitations 12/2006

Applicability:

Fokker F28 Mk 0100 series aeroplanes, all serial numbers.

Requirement:

1.    Maintenance and Inspection Tasks - Fuel Airworthiness Limitations (FAL) items and Critical Design Control Configuration Limitations (CDCCL) requirements identified in Fokker FAL Document SE-672 Issue 1 dated
31 January 2006 or later EASA approved revision are to be completed as specified in the FAL document and at the intervals specified in the FAL document.

2.    Critical Design Control Configuration Limitations (CDCCL) - The operator shall ensure that their internal documentation is amended to reflect the data contained within Fokker FAL Document SE-672 Issue 1 or later EASA approved revision and to provide appropriate text to highlight the existence of each CDCCL.  The operator’s internal procedures and documentation ensuring management of control of CDCCL shall be fully implemented.

Note:  EASA AD 2006-0206 refers.

Compliance:

For Requirement 1 - Within three months after the effective date of this Directive.

For Requirement 2 - Before 1 July 2007.

This Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 23 November 2006.

Background:

Subsequent to accidents involving Fuel Tank System explosions in flight (Boeing 747-131 flight TWA800) and on the ground, the United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) published Special Federal Aviation Regulation 88 (SFAR88) in June 2001.  SFAR 88 required a safety review of the aircraft Fuel Tank System to determine that the design meets the requirements of FAR § 25.901 and § 25.981(a) and (b).

A similar regulation has been recommended by the European Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) to the European National Aviation Authorities in JAA letter 04/00/02/07/03-L024 of 3 February 2003.  The review was requested to be mandated by European National Airworthiness Authorities using JAR § 25.901(c), § 25.1309.

In August 2005 the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) published a policy statement on the process for developing instructions for maintenance and inspection of Fuel Tank System ignition source prevention (EASA D 2005/CPRO, that also included the EASA expectations with regard to compliance times of the corrective actions on the unsafe and the not unsafe part of the harmonised design review results.  On a global scale the Type certificate (TC) holders committed themselves to the EASA published compliance dates (see EASA policy statement).  The EASA policy statement was revised in March 2006 resetting the date of 31 December 2005 for the unsafe related actions to 1 July 2006.

Fuel Airworthiness Limitations are items arising from a systems safety analysis that have been shown to have failure mode(s) associated with an ‘unsafe condition’ as defined in FAA Memo 2003-112-15 ‘SFAR 88 - Mandatory Action Decision Criteria’.  These are identified in Failure Conditions for which an unacceptable probability of ignition risk could exist if specific tasks and/or practices are not performed in accordance with the manufacturers’ requirements.

This Directive mandates the Fuel System Airworthiness Limitations comprising maintenance/inspection tasks and critical design control configuration limitations for F28 Mk 0100 series aeroplanes, that resulted from the design reviews and the JAA recommendation and EASA policy statement mentioned above.

James Coyne
Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority

12 October 2006