AD/ERJ-190/12 Hydraulic Shutoff Valves (Cth)
AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE
For the reasons set out in the background section, the CASA delegate whose signature appears below issues the following Airworthiness Directive (AD) under subregulation 39.001(1) of CASR 1998. The AD requires that the action set out in the requirement section (being action that the delegate considers necessary to correct the unsafe condition) be taken in relation to the aircraft or aeronautical product mentioned in the applicability section: (a) in the circumstances mentioned in the requirement section; and (b) in accordance with the instructions set out in the requirement section; and (c) at the time mentioned in the compliance section.
Embraer ERJ-190 Series Aeroplanes
| AD/ERJ-190/12 | Hydraulic Shutoff Valves | 7/2008 |
Applicability: | Embraer ERJ-190( ) aircraft equipped with firewall hydraulic shutoff valves part numbers (P/N) 975287-3 or 975287-5. |
Requirement: | Perform an operational check for proper operation of the firewall hydraulic shutoff valves P/Ns 975287-3 or 975287-5, in accordance with Embraer Service Bulletin If necessary, replace the faulty hydraulic shutoff valve with another one bearing For the purpose of this AD, an operational check is: “A task to determine that an item is fulfilling its intended purpose. The check does not require quantitative tolerances. This is a failure finding task.” The instructions and procedures to accomplish this AD are detailed in Embraer Service Bulletin No. 190-29-0008 original issue, or further revisions approved by the ANAC. Note: AGÊNCIA NACIONAL DE AVIAÇÃO CIVIL - BRAZIL AD 2007-02-02R1 dated 27 August 2007 refers. |
Compliance: | Initial inspection within 600 flight hours from 27 August 2007, unless previously accomplished, thereafter at intervals not to exceed 600 flight hours. |
| This Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 3 July 2008. | |
Background: | Periodic operational check of the firewall hydraulic shutoff valves, made during routine maintenance, has revealed that the failure rate of that component is significantly higher than expected. Such a dormant failure, when combined with further possible failures, such as engine fire, may lead to an unacceptable reduction of safety margins. |
James Coyne
Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority
23 May 2008
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