AD/CL-600/111 Nose Landing Gear Selector Valve (Cth)
AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE
For the reasons set out in the background section, the CASA delegate whose signature appears below issues the following Airworthiness Directive (AD) under subregulation 39.001(1) of CASR 1998. The AD requires that the action set out in the requirement section (being action that the delegate considers necessary to correct the unsafe condition) be taken in relation to the aircraft or aeronautical product mentioned in the applicability section: (a) in the circumstances mentioned in the requirement section; and (b) in accordance with the instructions set out in the requirement section; and (c) at the time mentioned in the compliance section.
Bombardier (Canadair) CL-600 (Challenger) Series Aeroplanes
| AD/CL-600/111 | Nose Landing Gear Selector Valve | 8/2009 |
Applicability: | Bombardier Inc. Models: CL-600-1A11 - Serial Numbers 1004 through 1085 CL-600-2A12 - Serial Numbers 3001 through 3066 CL-600-2B16 - Serial Numbers 5001 through 5194 CL-600-2B16 - Serial Numbers 5301 through 5665 | |||||||||||||||
Requirement: | Check the nose landing gear (NLG) selector valve and NLG door selector valve that are installed on the aircraft and replace, rework, and/or identify the valves, as required, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of the applicable Service Bulletin (SB) listed below, or later revisions approved by the Chief, Continuing Airworthiness, Transport Canada.
- SB 600-0721 Revision 02, dated 16 June 2008, - SB 601-0558, Revision 02, dated 16 June 2008, or - SB 604-32-021, Revision 03, dated 16 June 2008, |
| Accomplishment in accordance with the original issuance of, or an earlier revision of, the SBs specified above DOES NOT satisfy the requirements of this AD. Note 1: The check is required whether or not an aircraft has previously been checked in accordance with AD/CL-600/86 (now superseded and cancelled by this AD). This is necessary since, following the issuance of AD/CL-600/86, it has been determined that the serial number (S/N) range of the affected valves requires expansion from the previous upper limit of S/N 0767 to S/N 2126 and the exact location of each of these additional valves is unknown. Note 2: Valves that have an S/N with suffix “T” have been manufactured by Tactair Fluid Controls Inc. and do not require any corrective action. Note 3: Valves manufactured by Kaiser Fluid Technologies, P/N 750006000, with S/N 0001 through 2126, and ink stamp “SB750006000-1”, have already been checked and reworked as necessary and do not require any additional corrective action. Note 4: The Illustrated Parts Catalogue, for each of the models covered in the Applicability section above, gives instructions not to install a valve manufactured by Kaiser Fluid Technologies, P/N 750006000, with S/N 0001 through 2126, if the marking “SB750006000-1” is not ink stamped on the valve. Note 5: CL-600-2B16 (CL-605) aircraft, S/Ns 5701 and subsequent, are not affected by this AD. They were delivered with valves, P/N 750006000, that have either an S/N with suffix “T” or have the ink stamp marking “SB750006000-1”. Note 6: Transport Canada AD CF-2009-21R1 dated 26 May 2009 refers. This AD supersedes TC AD CF-2006-16R1 which was referred to in CASA AD/CL-600/86 and corrects an error in TC AD CF-2009-21 dated 6 May 2009. | |
Compliance: | Within 250 flight hours or within 6 months after the effective date of this AD, whichever comes first. |
| This Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 30 July 2009. | |
Background: | A specific batch of NLG and NLG door selector valves, part number (P/N) 601R75146-1 (Kaiser Fluid Technologies P/N 750006000), may have had their end caps incorrectly lock-wired and/or incorrectly torqued during assembly. This condition can lead to the end cap backing off, with consequent damage to a seal and internal leakage within the valve. Subsequently, if electrical power is transferred or removed from the aircraft before the NLG safety pin is installed, any pressure, including residual pressure, in the No. 3 hydraulic system can result in an uncommanded NLG retraction. |
| Although there have been no such cases reported on the Challenger models covered by this AD, there have been six cases reported on the CRJ (CL600-2B19) aircraft, one of which resulted in the collapse of the NLG at the departure gate. This AD mandates a check of the NLG and NLG door selector valves installed on all aircraft in the Applicability section above. Depending on the results; replacement, rework and/or additional identification of the valves may be required. |
James Coyne
Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority
15 June 2009
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