AD/Bell 222/31 Tail Rotor Blade (Cth)

AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE

For the reasons set out in the background section, the CASA delegate whose signature appears below issues the following Airworthiness Directive (AD) under subregulation 39.001(1) of CASR 1998.  The AD requires that the action set out in the requirement section (being action that the delegate considers necessary to correct the unsafe condition) be taken in relation to the aircraft or aeronautical product mentioned in the applicability section: (a) in the circumstances mentioned in the requirement section; and (b) in accordance with the instructions set out in the requirement section; and (c) at the time mentioned in the compliance section.

Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (BHTC) 222 Series Helicopters

AD/BELL 222/31 Tail Rotor Blade 8/2005 DM

Applicability:

Models 222, 222B, 222U, and 230 helicopters, equipped with tail rotor blades, part numbers 222-016-001-123 and 222-016-001-131.

Requirement:

1.    Inspect the tail rotor blades in accordance with Part I of Bell Helicopter Textron Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) 222U-04-71, or later Transport Canada approved revision.

2.    Inspect the tail rotor blades in accordance with Part II of ASB 222U-04-71, or later Transport Canada approved revision.

Note:  Transport Canada AD CF-2004-21 R1 refers. 

Compliance:

1.    Within 3 flight hours after 29 June 2005, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 3 flight hours.

2.    Within 50 flight hours after 29 June 2005, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 50 flight hours.

This Directive shall be entered on the Maintenance Release as maintenance required.  The Requirement 1 inspection may be performed and certified by the Pilot in Command who has been trained to do the inspection by an appropriately qualified person.  In this case, a copy of the Requirement document and this Directive is to be carried on the aircraft.

This Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 29 June 2005.

Background: Reports were received of three occurrences of cracked tail rotor blades which were discovered during scheduled inspection.  Two cracks initiated from the outboard bearing bore underneath the flanged sleeves.  The third crack initiated from the inboard bearing bore.  Corrosion and machining burrs are suspected as the crack initiators.

David Villiers
Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority

23 June 2005