AD/B737/329 Airworthiness Limitations and Inspections Fuel Systems (Cth)
AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE
For the reasons set out in the background section, the CASA delegate whose signature appears below issues the following Airworthiness Directive (AD) under subregulation 39.001(1) of CASR 1998. The AD requires that the action set out in the requirement section (being action that the delegate considers necessary to correct the unsafe condition) be taken in relation to the aircraft or aeronautical product mentioned in the applicability section: (a) in the circumstances mentioned in the requirement section; and (b) in accordance with the instructions set out in the requirement section; and (c) at the time mentioned in the compliance section.
Boeing 737 Series Aeroplanes
| AD/B737/329 | Airworthiness Limitations and Inspections - Fuel Systems | 7/2008 |
Applicability: | Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800 and -900 series aeroplanes, with an original certificate of airworthiness or original export certificate of airworthiness issued before 31 March 2006. |
| Note 1: Aeroplanes with a original certificate of airworthiness or original export certificate of airworthiness issued on or after 31 March 2006, must be already in compliance with the airworthiness limitations specified in this Directive because those limitations were applicable as part of the airworthiness certification of those aeroplanes. | |
Requirement: | 1. Revise the Airworthiness Limitations (AWL) section of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA) by incorporating into the Maintenance Planning Data (MPD) the information in the subsections specified below; except that the initial inspection specified in Requirement 2 must be done at the applicable compliance time specified in that Requirement. |
| a. Subsection E, "AIRWORTHINESS LIMITATIONS (AWLs)-FUEL SYSTEMS," of Revision March 2008 of the MPD. | |
| Note 2: The term "Revision March 2008 of the MPD," as used in this Directive, means Boeing Temporary Revision (TR) 09-020, dated March 2008. Boeing TR | |
| b. Subsection F, "PAGE FORMAT: FUEL SYSTEMS AIRWORTHINESS LIMITATIONS," of Revision March 2008 of the MPD. | |
| c. Subsection G, "AIRWORTHINESS LIMITATIONS-FUEL SYSTEM AWLs," AWLs No. 28-AWL-01 through No. 28-AWL-22 inclusive, of Revision March 2008 of the MPD. As an optional action, AWLs No. | |
| Note 3: The optional incorporation of AWLs No. 28-AWL-21, No. 28-AWL-22 and No. 28-AWL-24 into the AWLs section of the ICA in accordance with Requirement 1.c. terminates the action required by Requirement 3 of AD/B737/321 (FAA AD | |
| Accomplishing the revisions in accordance with a later revision of the MPD is an acceptable method of compliance if the revision is approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO) of the United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). | |
| 2. Carry out a special detailed inspection of the lightning shield to ground termination on the out-of-tank fuel quantity indication system (FQIS) wiring to verify functional integrity, in accordance with AWL No. 28-AWL-03 of Subsection G of Revision March 2008 of the MPD. | |
| Accomplishing the actions required by Requirement 2 in accordance with a later revision of the MPD is an acceptable method of compliance if the revision is approved by the Manager, Seattle ACO. | |
| Accomplishing AWL No. 28-AWL-03 as part of an FAA-approved maintenance program before the applicable compliance time specified for Requirement 2 constitutes compliance with this Requirement. | |
| Note 4: For the purposes of this Directive, a special detailed inspection is: "An intensive examination of a specific item, installation or assembly to detect damage, failure, or irregularity. The examination is likely to make extensive use of specialized inspection techniques and/or equipment. Intricate cleaning and substantial access or disassembly procedure may be required." | |
| 3. Repair any discrepancy found during any Requirement 2 inspection in accordance with AWL No. 28-AWL-03 of Subsection G of Revision March 2008 of the MPD. | |
| Accomplishing the actions required by Requirement 3 in accordance with a later revision of the MPD is an acceptable method of compliance if the revision is approved by the Manager, Seattle ACO. | |
| After accomplishing the applicable actions specified in Requirements 1 to 3 inclusive, no alternative inspections, inspection intervals or Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations (CDCCL) may be used unless the inspections, intervals or CDCCLs are part of a later revision of the Revision March 2008 of the MPD that is approved by the Manager, Seattle ACO; or unless the inspections, intervals or CDCCLs are approved as an alternate method of compliance (AMOC) to FAA AD 2008-10-10. | |
| Actions accomplished before the effective date of this Directive in accordance with the MPD Document Revisions listed in Table 1, are acceptable for compliance against the corresponding elements of Requirements 1, 2 and 3. |
| Table 1 | ||||
| Document | Section 9 of the Boeing 737-600/700/700C/700IGW/800/900 MPD Document, D626A001-CMR | |||
| Revision | March 2006 | October 2006 | November 2006 R1 | |
| Document | Section 9 of the Boeing 737-600/700/800/900 MPD Document, D626A001-CMR | |||
| Revision | March 2007 | March 2007 R2 | ||
| Note 5: FAA AD 2008-10-10 Amdt 39-15516 refers. | ||||
Compliance: | For Requirement 1 - Before 16 December 2008. | |||
| For Requirement 2 - At the later of the following times: | ||||
| a. Within 120 months since the date of issue of the original certificate of airworthiness or the date of issue of the original export certificate of airworthiness. | ||||
| b. Within 24 months after the effective date of this Directive. | ||||
| For Requirement 3 - Before further flight after the Requirement 2 inspections. | ||||
| This Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 3 July 2008. | ||||
Background: | This Directive results from a design review of the fuel tank systems. The Directive is issued to prevent the potential for ignition sources inside fuel tanks caused by latent failures, alterations, repairs or maintenance actions, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapours, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the aeroplane. | |||
James Coyne
Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority
22 May 2008
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