AD/B737/161 Amdt 2 Main Wheel Well Electrical Connectors (Cth)

AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE

On the effective date specified below, and for the reasons set out in the background section, the CASA delegate whose signature appears below revokes Airworthiness Directive (AD) AD/B737/161 Amdt 1 and issues the following AD under subregulation 39.001(1) of CASR 1998.  The AD requires that the action set out in the requirement section (being action that the delegate considers necessary to correct the unsafe condition) be taken in relation to the aircraft or aeronautical product mentioned in the applicability section: (a) in the circumstances mentioned in the requirement section; and (b) in accordance with the instructions set out in the requirement section; and (c) at the time mentioned in the compliance section.

Boeing 737 Series Aeroplanes

AD/B737/161 Amdt 2 Main Wheel Well Electrical Connectors 12/2005

Applicability:	All Model 737-300, -400 and -500 series aeroplanes.
Requirement:	1.    Perform a detailed visual inspection of electrical connectors D5162P, D5162J, D5164P and D5164J (connectors are linked to the fuel shut-off valves and outboard landing lights), located in the main wheel wells, to detect discrepancies (missing spare contacts and filler rods, improper plugs or filler rods, contamination or corrosion), as specified in Boeing Service Letter (SL) 737-SL-24-138 dated 24 May 1999.
Note 1:  For the purposes of this Directive, a detailed visual inspection is defined as: ”An intensive visual examination of a specific structural area, system, installation, or assembly to detect damage, failure, or irregularity.  Available lighting is normally supplemented with a direct source of good lighting at intensity deemed appropriate by the inspector.  Inspection aids such as mirror, magnifying lenses, etc., may be used.  Surface cleaning and elaborate access procedures may be required.”
2.    Repair any discrepancies found during the Requirement 1 inspection in accordance with SL 737-SL-24-138.
3.    Modify the electrical connectors located in the main wheel well in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 737-28-1196, Revision 3, dated 1 April 2004.
Modifications accomplished before the effective date of this Amendment in accordance with Boeing Special Attention SB 737-28- 1196, dated 5 December 2002; Revision 1, dated 13 March 2003; or Revision 2, dated 21 August 2003 are considered acceptable for compliance with this Requirement.
Note 2:  Accomplishment of Requirement 3 is terminating action for the Requirement 1 repetitive inspections
4.    Carry out any necessary corrective action identified during the Requirement 3 modification in accordance with the service bulletin.
Note 3:  FAA AD 2001-14-06 Amdt 39-12316 and AD 2005-10-11 Amdt 39-14088 refer.

Compliance:	For Requirement 1 - Within 12 months after the effective date of the original issue of this Directive and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 24 months until Requirement 3 is accomplished.
For Requirement 2 - Before further flight after the Requirement 1 inspection.
For Requirement 3:
a.     Aeroplanes on which the Requirement 1 inspection has not been accomplished - Within 12 months after the effective date of Amendment 1.
b.    Aeroplanes on which the Requirement 1 inspection has been accomplished - Either within 18 months after accomplishing the last inspection or within 6 months after the effective date of Amendment 1, whichever occurs later.
For Requirement 4 - Before further flight after the Requirement 3 modification.
This Amendment becomes effective on 24 November 2005.
Background:	The United States Federal Aviation Administration has been advised by Boeing of reports indicating engine shutdown during flight due to uncommanded movement of the engine shutoff valve.
The original issue of this Directive required repetitive inspections of certain connectors located in the main wheel wells to detect discrepancies and, if necessary, corrective action.  These actions were necessary to detect and correct discrepancies in electrical connectors located in the main wheel wells which could result in electrical arcing of the connectors, uncommanded closure of the engine fuel shut-off valves and consequent in-flight loss of thrust or engine shutdown from lack of fuel.
Amendment 1 provided terminating action to the repetitive inspections by way of a modification.
This Amendment corrected a typographic error in the title of the Directive, compliance remains unchanged.
Amendment 1 of this Airworthiness Directive became effective on 4 August 2005.
The original issue of this Airworthiness Directive became effective on 6 September 2001.

Jayaprakashan Ambali
Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority
13 October 2005