AD/A330/95 Air Data Inertial Reference Unit Operational Procedure (Cth)
AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE
For the reasons set out in the background section, the CASA delegate whose signature appears below issues the following Airworthiness Directive (AD) under subregulation 39.001(1) of CASR 1998. The AD requires that the action set out in the requirement section (being action that the delegate considers necessary to correct the unsafe condition) be taken in relation to the aircraft or aeronautical product mentioned in the applicability section: (a) in the circumstances mentioned in the requirement section; and (b) in accordance with the instructions set out in the requirement section; and (c) at the time mentioned in the compliance section.
Airbus Industrie A330 Series Aeroplanes
| AD/A330/95 | Air Data Inertial Reference Unit Operational Procedure | 1/2009 TX |
Applicability: | A330 aircraft, models -201, -202, -203, -223, -243, -301, -302, -303, -321, -322, -323, -341, -342 and -343, all serial numbers, equipped with Northrop-Grumman (formerly Litton) Air Data Inertial Reference Unit (ADIRU) Part Number (P/N) |
Requirement: | Apply the following operational procedure: |
| - NAV - IR 1 (2) (3) FAULT | |
| - NAV - IR 1+2 (2+3) (1+3) FAULT | |
| Note 1: This operational procedure is covered by Temporary Revision (TR) A330 AFM TR 4.02.00/46 (OEB N°74/2) of the Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM). | |
| Incorporation of the AFM TR or inserting the above operational procedure or a copy of this Directive into the AFM is acceptable to comply with the requirements of this Directive. | |
| Note 2: EASA Emergency AD 2008-0203-E refers. |
Compliance: | Before 22 November 2008. |
| This Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 20 November 2008. | |
Background: | An A330 aircraft experienced a sudden nose down order while in cruise. This order was preceded by an automatic autopilot disconnection and triggering of the “NAV IR1 FAULT” Electronic Centralised Aircraft Monitor (ECAM) Caution. Investigations highlighted that at time of the event the Air Data Reference 1 (ADR) part of ADIRU1 was providing erroneous and temporary wrong parameters in a random manner. This abnormal behaviour of the ADR1 led to several consequences such as unjustified stall and over speed warnings, loss of attitude information on Captain Primary Flight Display (PFD) and several ECAM warnings. Among the abnormal parameters, the provided Angle of Attack (AoA) value was such that the flight control computers commanded a sudden nose down aircraft movement, which constitutes an unsafe condition. At this stage of the investigation, the analysis of available data indicates ADIRU 1 abnormal behaviour is likely at the origin of the event. In order to prevent the ADR from providing erroneous data to other aircraft systems, this Directive requires, in case faulty Inertial Reference (IR) is detected, to isolate both the IR and ADR by accomplishment of the modified AFM operational procedure. |
James Coyne
Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority
20 November 2008
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