AD/A320/195 Amdt 1 Fuel Tank Safety Fuel Airworthiness Limitations (Cth)

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AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE

On the effective date specified below, and for the reasons set out in the background section, the CASA delegate whose signature appears below revokes Airworthiness Directive (AD) AD/A320/195 and issues the following AD under subregulation 39.001(1) of CASR 1998.  The AD requires that the action set out in the requirement section (being action that the delegate considers necessary to correct the unsafe condition) be taken in relation to the aircraft or aeronautical product mentioned in the applicability section: (a) in the circumstances mentioned in the requirement section; and (b) in accordance with the instructions set out in the requirement section; and (c) at the time mentioned in the compliance section.

Airbus Industrie A319, A320 and A321 Series Aeroplanes

AD/A320/195 Amdt 1 Fuel Tank Safety - Fuel
Airworthiness Limitations
13/2006

Applicability:

Airbus A318, A319, A320 and A321 series aeroplanes as follows, all serial numbers.

A318-111
A318-112
A318-121
A318-122

A319-111
A319-112
A319-113
A319-114
A319-115
A319-131
A319-132
A319-133

A320-111
A320-211
A320-212
A320-214
A320-231
A320-232
A320-233

A321-111
A321-112
A321-131
A321-211
A321-212
A321-213
A321-231
A321-232

Requirement:

1.    Maintenance/Inspection Tasks - Maintenance and inspection tasks identified in Airbus ALS part 5, Fuel Airworthiness Limitations (FAL) Section 1 as defined in A318/A319/A320/A321 document 95A.1931/05 Issue 1 dated 19 December 2005 or later EASA approved revision are to be completed as specified in the FAL document and at the intervals specified in the FAL document.

Defined intervals specified in the FAL document are to start with effect from the effective date of the original issue of this Directive.

2.    Critical Design Control Configuration Limitations (CDCCL) - The operator shall ensure that their internal documentation is amended to reflect the data contained within Airbus ALS Part 5 Fuel Airworthiness Limitations Section 2 or later EASA approved revision and to provide appropriate text to highlight the existence of each CDCCL.  The operator’s internal procedures and documentation ensuring management of control of CDCCL shall be fully implemented.

Note:  EASA AD 2006-0203 refers.

Compliance:

For Requirement 1 - Remains unchanged as ‘Within three months after the effective date of the original issue of this Directive’.

For Requirement 2 - Before 1 July 2007.

This Amendment becomes effective on 21 December 2006.

Background:

Subsequent to accidents involving Fuel Tank System explosions in flight (Boeing 747-131 flight TWA800) and on the ground, the United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) published Special Federal Aviation Regulation 88 (SFAR88) in June 2001.  SFAR 88 required a safety review of the aircraft Fuel Tank System to determine that the design meets the requirements of FAR § 25.901 and § 25.981(a) and (b).

A similar regulation has been recommended by the European Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) to the European National Aviation Authorities in JAA letter 04/00/02/07/03-L024 of 3 February 2003.  The review was requested to be mandated by European National Airworthiness Authorities using JAR § 25.901(c), § 25.1309.

In August 2005 the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) published a policy statement on the process for developing instructions for maintenance and inspection of Fuel Tank System ignition source prevention (EASA D 2005/CPRO, that also included the EASA expectations with regard to compliance times of the corrective actions on the unsafe and the not unsafe part of the harmonised design review results.  On a global scale the Type certificate (TC) holders committed themselves to the EASA published compliance dates (see EASA policy statement).  The EASA policy statement was revised in March 2006 resetting the date of 31 December 2005 for the unsafe related actions to 1 July 2006.

Fuel Airworthiness Limitations are items arising from a systems safety analysis that have been shown to have failure mode(s) associated with an ‘unsafe condition’ as defined in FAA Memo 2003-112-15 ‘SFAR 88 - Mandatory Action Decision Criteria’.  These are identified in Failure Conditions for which an unacceptable probability of ignition risk could exist if specific tasks and/or practices are not performed in accordance with the manufacturers’ requirements.

This original issue of this Directive mandated the Fuel System Airworthiness Limitations comprising maintenance/inspection tasks and critical design control configuration limitations for A318, A319, A321 and A321 series aeroplanes, that resulted from the design reviews and the JAA recommendation and EASA policy statement mentioned above.

This Amendment corrects a minor typographic error in the FAL document number.

The original issue of this Directive became effective on 26 October 2006.


James Coyne
Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority

9 November 2006

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