AD/A320/193 Auxiliary Power Unit Starter and Air Intake System (Cth)

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AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE

For the reasons set out in the background section, the CASA delegate whose signature appears below issues the following Airworthiness Directive (AD) under subregulation 39.001(1) of CASR 1998.  The AD requires that the action set out in the requirement section (being action that the delegate considers necessary to correct the unsafe condition) be taken in relation to the aircraft or aeronautical product mentioned in the applicability section: (a) in the circumstances mentioned in the requirement section; and (b) in accordance with the instructions set out in the requirement section; and (c) at the time mentioned in the compliance section.

Airbus Industrie A319, A320 and A321 Series Aeroplanes

AD/A320/193 Auxiliary Power Unit Starter
and Air Intake System
8/2006

Applicability:

AIRBUS A318, A319, A320 and A321 aircraft.

Requirement:

1.    Inspect the APU starter motor, APU air inlet plenum and APU air intake and carry out any rectification as required in accordance with the instructions given in SB A320-49-1068 revision 1 or later DGAC approved revision.

2.    Repeat the inspection as detailed in requirement 1 of this AD.

3.    Clean the APU air intake in accordance with the instructions given in SB
A320-49-1068 revision 1 or later DGAC approved revision.

4.    Repeat the cleaning task as detailed in requirement 3 of this AD.

Note:  EASA AD 2006-0153 dated 30 May 2006 refers.

Compliance:

1.    Within the next 600 flight hours following the effective date of this AD.

2.    At intervals not exceeding 600 flight hours.

3.    Prior to the accumulation of 2400 flight hours since first flight of the aircraft or within the next 600 flight hours after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, unless already accomplished as per SB A320-49-1068 at original issue.

4.    At intervals not exceeding 2400 flight hours.

This Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 3 August 2006.

Background:

An operator reported black smoke at the rear of the fuselage during taxi after landing.  The smoke was caused by a fire in the APU air intake.

Analysis has demonstrated that following numerous unsuccessful APU start attempts in flight, there is a risk of reverse flow leading to flame propagation to the APU air inlet and air intake duct.


James Coyne
Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority

20 June 2006

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