AD/A320/182 Magnetic Fuel Level Indicator (Cth)
AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE
For the reasons set out in the background section, the CASA delegate whose signature appears below issues the following Airworthiness Directive (AD) under subregulation 39.001(1) of CASR 1998. The AD requires that the action set out in the requirement section (being action that the delegate considers necessary to correct the unsafe condition) be taken in relation to the aircraft or aeronautical product mentioned in the applicability section: (a) in the circumstances mentioned in the requirement section; and (b) in accordance with the instructions set out in the requirement section; and (c) at the time mentioned in the compliance section.
Airbus Industrie A319, A320 and A321 Series Aeroplanes
| AD/A320/182 | Magnetic Fuel Level Indicator | 9/2005 |
Applicability: | AIRBUS A318, A319, A320 and A321 aircraft, all serial numbers that are equipped with magnetic fuel level indicator (MFLI) with the following part numbers (P/N): | ||
| 3508802-24 | 3508802-28 | 3508802-75 | |
| Aircraft on which a replacement of MFLI has not been performed since embodiment of Airbus modification 27496 during production are not affected by the requirements of this Directive. | |||
Requirement: | Replace any MFLI with a P/N identified in the Applicability Statement in accordance with the instructions given in Airbus Service Bulletin (SB) A320-28-1138 or later revision approved by the Direction Générale de l’Aviation Civile (DGAC) of France. | ||
| Note 1: SB A320-28-1138 provides an inspection method to determine the type of MFLI that is installed on the aircraft if not recorded in the aircraft documentation. | |||
| Note 2: DGAC AD F-2005-108 (EASA approval A.AD.01004) refers. | |||
Compliance: | Before 31 December 2010 or within 6 500 hours time in service after the effective date of this Directive, whichever occurs first. | ||
| This Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 1 September 2005. | |||
Background: | The DGAC has received reports of detachment of the top-stops of the MFLI. Analysis has shown that the top-stop of MFLI is retained with S-shaped lock-wire that may degrade and fail. A detached top-stop, if in contact with a gauging probe, could constitute a potential source of ignition in the event of lightning strike. | ||
David Villiers
Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority
21 July 2005
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