ACN 115 722 248 Pty Ltd v Milligan

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil: Application)

ACN 115 722 248 PTY LTD v MILLIGAN

[2011] SASC 239

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Vanstone

22 December 2011

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - RIGHT OF APPEAL - WHEN APPEAL LIES - FROM INTERLOCUTORY DECISIONS - LEAVE TO APPEAL

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - WHEN APPEAL LIES - BY LEAVE OF COURT - INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS AND JUDGMENTS

Application for permission to appeal – a Master of the District Court ordered the applicant’s pleadings be struck out but gave permission for the plaintiff to re-plead its case – applicant unsuccessfully appealed to a judge of that Court – applicant sought permission to appeal to a single Judge of the Supreme Court – whether decision of judge attended by sufficient doubt to warrant re-consideration – whether substantial injustice would be effected if decision allowed to stand.

Held: application refused.

Supreme Court Rules 2006 (SA) r 280, r 288, r 292, r 50; Motor Vehicles Act 1959 (SA) s 19A; District Court Rules 2006 (SA) r 25, referred to.
Landmark Operations Ltd v J Tiver Nominees Pty Ltd [2009] SASC 185; Duke Group Ltd (In Liquidation) v Alamain Investments Pty Ltd [2006] SASC 209, applied.

ACN 115 722 248 PTY LTD v MILLIGAN
[2011] SASC 239

Civil

  1. VANSTONE J:     The applicant-plaintiff applies for permission to appeal against a decision made by a judge of the District Court dismissing an appeal against a decision of a Master of that court.  The Master ordered that the plaintiff’s statement of claim be struck out because it did not comply with the rules of the Court.  However, he gave leave for the claim to be re-pleaded.

  2. The application to this Court appears to be commenced substantially out of time and so the plaintiff also makes application for an extension of time in which to make the application.

    Background

  3. The genesis of the substantive action is in a motor vehicle accident occurring in November 2008.  The plaintiff’s motor vehicle was driven by a director of the plaintiff company, Mr Jordan.  The plaintiff filed originating process in the Magistrates Court in January 2009 seeking from the other driver damages arising from the accident in the amount of $20,475.  That action was transferred to the District Court in February 2010.

  4. The damages sought were for loss arising from injury to Mr Jordan and for property damage, and in some cases the statement of claim as filed seems to merge the two.  That led to representation of the defendant by two sets of legal advisers, because two insurance companies were involved.  One firm acts for the Transport Accident Commission of Victoria (TAC).  The motor vehicle driven by the defendant was registered in Victoria.

  5. In May 2010 the defendant applied to have the plaintiff’s amended statement of claim struck out on a variety of grounds.  That application was argued before Master Rice on 21 July 2010.  On 3…

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Details
Case
[2011] SASC 239
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

ACN 115 722 248 Pty Ltd (the plaintiff) sought permission to appeal from a decision of the District Court of South Australia, which dismissed an appeal by the plaintiff from an earlier interlocutory decision of a Master of that Court. The interlocutory decision had ordered the plaintiff’s pleadings be struck out, but allowed the plaintiff to re-plead. The plaintiff unsuccessfully appealed to a judge of the District Court, and now sought leave to appeal from the Supreme Court of South Australia. The plaintiff also sought an extension of time in which to lodge its application for leave to appeal, as the application appeared to be out of time. The plaintiff argued that the District Court’s decision should be reconsidered because it occasioned a substantial injustice, or because the decision was attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration. The Court found that the plaintiff had not established that the decision was attended by any doubt, or that the decision gave rise to any injustice. The Court was not satisfied that the application for leave to appeal was made within the requisite time and, accordingly, the plaintiff also sought an extension of time to file the application. The Court found that the plaintiff had not demonstrated any exceptional circumstances to justify an extension of time. The Court concluded that the plaintiff had not demonstrated that the decision of the District Court was attended by any doubt, or that the decision gave rise to any injustice. Accordingly, the application for leave to appeal was refused. The Court granted an extension of time within which to file the application for leave to appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

The application to this Court appears to be commenced substantially out of time and so the plaintiff also makes application for an extension of time in which to make the application.Background The genesis of the substantive action is in a motor vehicle accident occurring in November 2008. The plaintiff’s motor vehicle was driven by a director of the plaintiff company, Mr Jordan. The plaintiff filed originating process in the Magistrates Court in January 2009 seeking from the other driver damages arising from the accident in the amount of $20,475. That action was transferred to the District Court in February 2010. The damages sought were for loss arising from injury to Mr Jordan and for property damage, and in some cases the statement of claim as filed seems to merge the two. That led to representation of the defendant by two sets of legal advisers, because two insurance companies were involved. One firm acts for the Transport Accident Commission of Victoria (TAC). The motor vehicle driven by the defendant was registered in Victoria. In May 2010 the defendant applied to have the plaintiff’s amended statement of claim struck out on a variety of grounds. That application was argued before Master Rice on 21 July 2010. On 3 August 2010 the Master granted the application, ordering the statement of claim be struck out. He gave the plaintiff leave to re-plead its claim within 21 days. Rather than re-pleading the claim, the plaintiff appealed against the Master’s decision. That appeal went to a judge of the District Court and was argued on 19 January 2011. By decision of 7 February 2011 it was dismissed. By application accepted by the Registry on 13 October 2011 the appellant seeks permission to appeal against that decision. Pursuant to the exception under r 280(1)(b) Supreme Court Rules 2006 (SA) (SCR) an appeal from an interlocutory judgment of a District Court judge is to be heard by a single judge of this Court. A decision to dismiss an appeal against an interlocutory order is itself an interlocutory judgment: Duke Group Ltd (In Liquidation) v Alamain Investments Ltd [2006] SASC 209. Therefore the exception is applicable. The filed application asserts that an application for permission was initially lodged (but not filed) on 21 February 2011. It was accepted for the purpose of review by the Registrar (as is the Court’s practice for documents lodged by self‑represented litigants) and has been “awaiting further dealing since”. Pursuant to SCR 288(1)(a)(ii), this appeal requires permission as it challenges “a judgment given on appeal from an interlocutory judgment”. An application for permission is required to be filed within 14 days of the judgment under appeal: SCR 292(1)(b). Pursuant to SCR 50(1)(a) documents are taken to have been filed once they have been accepted by an officer of the Court at the Court Registry. It follows that the application was filed on 13 October 2011, when the documents were accepted at the Court Registry. Therefore it is made substantially out of time. Before me, Mr Jordan tendered an affidavit which sought to justify the delay. Although parts of the affidavit were subject to objection and were not admitted, the parts relevant to the delay were not the subject of objection and were admitted. It was suggested that the “Application for leave to appeal” ultimately accepted by the Registry was in all but identical terms to the one originally presented. Since there was no request to explore this matter by cross-examining Mr Jordan, it is appropriate to grant an extension of time within which to make the application, to 13 October 2011.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

The District Court judge considered the Master’s approach to these questions and agreed with it. It was open to him to take that view. These are, in the end, matters of practice. This is not an instance where the defects in the pleadings could be said to be at the margins. The matter has been considered by two judicial officers. Before me, no oral or written argument was put in support of the attack on the substantial decisions. In considering whether the decision occasions any injustice, it is to be emphasised that permission has been granted to the plaintiff to re-plead the claim. Conclusion The plaintiff has not persuaded me that the decision in the Court below is attended by any doubt, or that the decision gives rise to any injustice. I make the following orders:1.The time within which to file an application for permission to appeal is extended to 13 October 2011.2.Permission to appeal is refused.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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