Ackrill v Hawley - [2000] WADC 55

JURISDICTION : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL

LOCATION: PERTH

CITATION: ACKRILL -v- HAWLEY [2000] WADC 55

CORAM: VIOL DCJ

HEARD: 22, 23 AND 24 NOVEMBER 1999

DELIVERED : 1 MARCH 2000

FILE NO/S: CIV 1789 of 1998

BETWEEN: DEBORAH DENISE ACKRILL
Plaintiff
AND
BRETT ALEXANDER HAWLEY
Defendant

Catchwords:

Motor vehicle - Assessment of damages - Injury to cervical spine - General damages - $33,800 - Other awards $22,814 - Turns on own facts.

Legislation:

Motor Vehicle (Third Party Insurance) Amendment Act 1994

Result:

Plaintiff awarded $66,614

Representation:

Counsel:

Plaintiff: Mr I L Marshall
Defendant: K N Allan

Solicitors:

Plaintiff: Paul O'Halloran
Defendant: K N Allan

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Nil

Case(s) also cited:

Nil

VIOL DCJ: The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident (the accident) on 22 September 1995. She was driving a Nissan Station Wagon and towing a trailer. Whilst stationary and waiting to turn right the defendant's vehicle struck the plaintiff's vehicle and trailer from behind.
The defendant has not denied that his negligent driving caused the accident. Indeed, on 24 November 1998 judgment was entered for the plaintiff with damages to be assessed.
The assessment of such damages follows.
The defendant effectively denies that the plaintiff suffered any damage as a result of the accident, and thus the various claims by the plaintiff as to injuries suffered in the accident and their sequelae are in issue.

The Evidence

The plaintiff is now 43 years of age, having been born on 4 August 1956. She has three children aged 9, 12 and 19. The basic history of this matter is set out in the chronology admitted into evidence as Exhibit A. The plaintiff confirmed that she left school in WA in 1972 and went to TAFE where she studied business education for about 12 months. She worked in a real estate office for about 12 months doing general clerical duties. She went to the AMP for about three years doing the same duties and married her husband in 1975. In 1980 she and her husband started a roof plumbing partnership. The partnership was known as "Independent Roofing". She and her husband own the partnership jointly. She did administration work and occasionally collected materials, fixtures and fittings. The clerical work done by the plaintiff involves filing, banking and making up the pays for the two employees. Sometimes the plaintiff orders some materials. The business changed its name from Independent Roofing to Kingsbridge Nominees Pty Ltd in 1997. Although the fetching and carrying work involved travelling away from home, the clerical duties were done by her at home.
She had no difficulties performing any of her work - that included typing and a degree of keyboarding.
She had a motor vehicle accident in 1990 which she said made her sore for a few days but resulted in no residual disability.
In the accident on 22 September 1995 the plaintiff was towing a trailer which was struck from behind by the defendant's vehicle after the plaintiff had stopped to turn right into Clarkson Avenue. It was quite a forceful impact but the plaintiff could not remember any parts of her body which were hit in the course of the accident. Both the vehicle and the trailer were written off. At the time the plaintiff did not think she had sustained any actual injuries in the accident but went to see her general practitioner, Dr Bock, at Whitfords the next day because she felt nauseous and had sore ribs, chest and shoulder. Her neck was very stiff and sore. She then saw a variety of general practitioners, including Drs Benson and Crawford. She had x‑rays of her cervical spine in 1996 and was reviewed by Mr Stewart Brash, orthopaedic surgeon on 28 May 1996 and Mr E R Griffiths, orthopaedic surgeon on 21 January 1997. In due course the plaintiff came under the care of Dr Tom Berrigan, pain specialist, and ultimately on 12 September 1997 had a C2/3 and C5/6 facet injection by Dr Berrigan.
The plaintiff went to physiotherapy and also to a chiropractor for some time.
Her current symptomatology involves constant headaches and pain in her right shoulder going down to her right arm, numbness, pins and needles through her right arm down to her hand. She said her right hand changes colour from a normal flesh colour to white to a blue-grey colour and then back to being a normal red flesh colour. She gets mood changes when her symptomatology is bad. She has medication but that makes her depressed on some occasions. The headaches are a constant drumming feeling in her head and she has a dull ache in the right hand side and down the left hand side of her skull, particularly down the right hand side.
The plaintiff told me that she takes between two and six Panadeine Forte in a day, Nurofen every four or five hours - about six or eight a day, and possibly Panadol. The problem with her right arm and hand occurs about three or four times a day. This occurs if she touches cold things or stretches to do household chores. If she is on the computer for any length of time her fingers go numb. The mood changes occur when she is in a lot of pain and cannot do regularly what she wishes to do. She said that over the past four or five years since the accident the symptoms have remained about the same.
Before the accident the plaintiff said she worked about 30 hours a week in the business. She attempted to do the same sort of work immediately after the accident, answering the phone etc, and slowly built up what she was doing. At the moment she is able to do about 10 to 15 hours a week, possibly more, in the business. She does the filing, banking, answering the phone, sending faxes and otherwise. She said she is unable do the accounts and does not use the computer. Her husband did none of the administrative duties before the accident. After the accident she and her husband managed as best they could. In 1996 the plaintiff's brother-in-law, Ian Parkinson, came home from overseas. He advised them that the business needed some administrative organisation and he began doing that. The plaintiff started working about eight to 10 hours a week and built up to 10 to 15, assisting Ian Parkinson. She is able to do the normal domestic activities but does it in sections. She is given some help by her children when she does the shopping.
Before the accident she used to do a lot of craft work, go bush walking and do a number of physical activities with the children. She still does some bush walking but nowhere near as much as she used to and does not play netball and football with the children. She does a little bit of gardening. She was going to assist her husband until his retirement. The accident has caused some tension in the marriage. The plaintiff has basically had to halve the amount of work she has done, she says, since the accident.
The plaintiff said she would continue to do the hours she is doing now for the foreseeable future but if at some stage in the future she could do something else she would do it. She felt that her ability to obtain a job in the open labour market was very limited and she could only do part-time work limited to filing, some typing and light office duties, possibly 10 to 15 hours a week.
Through the plaintiff Schedules relating to travelling expenses (Exhibit C) and medical expenses (Exhibit D) were tendered.
In cross-examination as to Schedule C, the plaintiff agreed that she thought she had about 70 trips to the physiotherapist but did not check them against the accounts. The same related to the visits to the chiropractic clinic, and then her visits to her medical practitioner. She felt that she had told all her symptoms to the various medical practitioners she had seen. She was not able to quantify the costs of the prescriptions for her various drugs. She agreed that she had given a variety of estimates of the time she had spent helping her husband in the business before the accident. Although she had signed her Notice of Intention to Make a Claim (Exhibit 1) and specified her occupations as "home duties", she thought that she did her home duties and assisted in the office approximately on an equal basis. In that document she noted that she had assisted her husband as an administrator on a daily basis up to 15 hours per week. She did not read the document and was unsure of where the information came from. She said that in some weeks she could work 15 hours, some weeks it could be 30 and some weeks it could be 20, it varied from time to time. She felt the least she would have done was 15 hours a week. She was shown the answers to Further and Better Particulars dated 15 March 1999 and confirmed that that document pleaded that she worked 30 hours per week and earned $682 net per week. She agreed that she never took a wage from the business and similarly, did not take a wage of $341 for 15 hours per week after the accident. She thought that she had worked up to 30 hours per week before the accident. She agreed that she has worked at least 15 hours a week since the accident. She was referred to a report from Dr Crawford of 18 May 1997 in which she reported that the plaintiff had told her that she had been able to do 15 to 20 hours a week before the accident but no more than five hours per week afterwards. The plaintiff reiterated that she had worked 25 to 30 hours most weeks before the accident.
In 1997/1998 the plaintiff and her husband separated for about a year but she said that she was still doing the book work in the matrimonial home where the husband was still residing.
It appears that the plaintiff has given various medical practitioners a variety of details as to the hours she has worked and the work she has done before and after the accident.
She appears to have agreed that she did not work 30 hours per week but up to 30 hours per week; she appears only to be able to approximate the amount of hours that she was working at the moment.
The plaintiff agreed that the business did not suffer any economic loss as a result of her not being able to work as much as before. She did not agree with the opinions of both Mr Brash and Mr Vaughan (neurosurgeon) to the effect that she was able to work full-time. This, she said in re-examination, was because of the headaches and the pain she gets in her left arm and shoulder - they would stop her being able to work constantly.
Mr Ian Boyd Parkinson is the brother-in-law of the plaintiff. He was previously married to the plaintiff's sister. He has been involved with computing most of his working life. He is currently a contract manager for Independent Roofing - the business which is now known as Kingsbridge Nominees owned by the plaintiff and her husband. His evidence was led not to demonstrate any economic loss on the part of the business as the result of the accident but to demonstrate and to corroborate the amount of work done by the plaintiff in the business since the accident. He moved into their house in early 1996 after his own marriage broke up. He noticed that the administration side of the business was foundering - the accounts were in a mess and he took it upon himself to sort it out for them. He bought a computer package and computerised the system. He said that the plaintiff was unable to handle the situation as it was although she went to the bank and did the pays. Initially he did the work for nothing, working about a half to four hours a day. He began to work full-time for the business, apparently around 1997, and stayed there until he left for a six month period and went back to work for them again in June 1999. He is not paid a salary, he works as a sub-contractor. Mr Parkinson felt that since early 1997 the plaintiff has worked for about an hour a day ie, about four hours per week. This of course, should be contrasted to the evidence of the plaintiff, whose case it is that she works up to 15 hours per week at the moment.
Mr Parkinson did not have much to do with the plaintiff for the four years before the accident but felt that after the accident he noticed she had changed a lot and was basically depressed. He felt that she had changed from a person who was fun loving to someone who was irritable.
In cross-examination Mr Parkinson said that after he came to stay at the plaintiff's house and began working for the business, he set up the administration side of the business involving the computerising of the accounts system. The computer is involved in almost everything connected with the business, supplying orders, faxes etc - he does that sort of work. The reason why he began with the business was because it was growing and the actual management was getting out of control. He agreed that one could not run such a business with a part-time mother/part-time book-keeper running the accounts. He was unable to verify that the plaintiff worked 15 hours a week in the business. While he was not working for the business for the six months or so he went back on weekends etc. and continued to operate the computer system because the plaintiff and her husband were not computer literate.
It appeared from his evidence in re-examination that when he took over the business there was a back-log in the accounts work and he decided to attempt to rectify that situation.
Mr Lesley Ackrill is the plaintiff's husband. It was his evidence that before the accident the plaintiff worked between 40 to 70 hours per week, ie, a full-time job. He detailed the work the plaintiff did on p52 of the transcript - his estimate was obviously far greater than that of the plaintiff's. He noted that the social life of he and the plaintiff changed quite considerably after the accident. He said that after the accident the plaintiff was not able to handle the work in the business like she did before the accident. He thought that she reduced her hours to approximately 10 hours per week. It was then that he decided to employ Mr Parkinson. When Kingsbridge Nominees was formed he said that, "Deb (the plaintiff) pulled right out of the business completely and I became the sole director of Kingsbridge Nominees and Ian's employed with me now full-time". He said that she was still basically out of the business now and only works between about 0 and 10 hours per week. Once again, this showed a different picture than that shown by the plaintiff in her evidence-in-chief. It appears to be the case that once the business was computerised the plaintiff was unable to do the work, in fact Mr Ackrill said that the new computerised system "left Deb (the plaintiff) definitely behind". Despite this, Mr Ackrill felt that had there not been an accident there would have been a job for the plaintiff. He said that the plaintiff did the domestic chores around the house during the accident with his help "a fair bit" but has battled on after the accident but did not do a very good job. He and the plaintiff bought all their requirements, food and otherwise, from the business.
He confirmed that the plaintiff was in fact out of the business for some 12 months after they separated. He said that if the marriage ceased he did not know what would happen as far as any employment of the plaintiff was concerned. He felt that the plaintiff would only be able to work two to three hours a day because of the restrictions he has noticed. He has noticed a difference in the plaintiff's personality since the accident. It appears from the cross-examination that the plaintiff had nothing to do with the business and did not work in the business for about 12 months from mid-1996 to mid-1997. Mr Ackrill was referred to the taxation records of the business and he confirmed that the business had a very big increase in income from 1991 to 1995, ie, double the total turnover, and that has continued with the computerised system. He has now employed people to operate the computer.
Dr Thomas Berrigan is a pain specialist. He basically saw the plaintiff for pain in her neck and shoulder and the base of the skull. She was also complaining of headaches and numbness in her hand. After the first greater occipital nerve block and a trigger point injection into the right trapezius muscle, the plaintiff thought she had had some relief, although her headaches remained the same. Dr Berrigan felt that the plaintiff had a typical whiplash or acute neck strain injury as a result of the accident. He felt that the numbness in her right hand was a referred sensation from her neck injury. In his report of 10 February 1998 Dr Berrigan thought that the plaintiff would be capable of performing some clerical work, about 10 to 15 hours a week. He felt that with the plaintiff's symptoms as described to him the pain would be exacerbated with housework. The plaintiff had reported to him that she had been able to reduce her medication from the beginning. The plaintiff had reported an improvement in her condition generally. He felt the plaintiff should avoid any work involving heavy or repetitive lifting, bending or working with her arms in an elevated position, ie, constant keyboard work without the chance of having a break, would cause her symptoms. She should be able to get up and move around when she wanted to and she should not do a lot of keyboarding work.
In cross-examination Dr Berrigan confirmed that he was not recommending further treatment for the plaintiff although if her condition worsened he might consider doing the facet rhizotomy or some trigger joint injections. As the accident was four years ago he doubted whether the plaintiff would be in that position. He did not note the same degree of medication taking as the plaintiff told me in evidence, although he thought it was possible that people would take that much medication. He did not think physiotherapy or chiropractic was indicated at this stage. In December 1997 Dr Berrigan thought the plaintiff should see a clinical psychologist.
Dr Berrigan was unable to arrive at any significant neurological cause for the plaintiff's complaints. He felt that although the plaintiff did not have any neurological findings capable of supporting the continued existence of pain, it was possible that was so, notwithstanding Mr Brash's opinion to the contrary. He said most injuries of a cervical nature similar to the plaintiff's arising in particular from the facet joints, disappear within a fairly short period of time, ie, within 12 months, but there was a hard core that would go on for about six years. He felt that the plaintiff would probably continue to require analgesics and anti-inflammatories and that there would be a need for about five consultations a year over the next 10 years.
Dr John Crawford is a general practitioner and the treatment of the plaintiff is set out in his various medical reports which also contain the complaints made by the plaintiff from time to time. Initially he thought that the plaintiff was totally incapacitated for work and would be so for about two to three months. He changed that because of the chronic nature of the symptomatology. The situation was static up to 1997 and he felt that it had remained unchanged since that time. He felt that in 1997 the plaintiff was only able to do approximately eight hours per week and later thought that she could handle five to 10 hours per week on light clerical duties. He felt that there was a likelihood of permanent disability and that she might be able to do light clerical duties up to 20 hours per week. He gave his opinion as to the future medical and other treatment which would be required by the plaintiff. He felt that the plaintiff would continue to need these various treatments for something in the region of 10 years. He agreed that his notes did not reflect any indication of the plaintiff complaining of muscle spasm but notwithstanding that he felt that the plaintiff did have that and that it was a significant symptom. In January 1997 he noted that the plaintiff had been able to return to work with respect to the clerical duties in helping her husband. In May 1997 he was told by the plaintiff that she had previously been able to do 15 to 20 hours a week and was then restricted to five hours per week. Dr Crawford thought that any symptoms from the plaintiff had nothing to do with the bulge shown on the CT scan although he felt it may cause some difficulty in the future. As to the plaintiff's suggested ingestion of medication, he was concerned about the amount of paracetamol the plaintiff reported to be taking. He thought the plaintiff may derive some potential benefit from further physiotherapy and psychiatric treatments.

Professor Andrew Harper is an occupational physician. He confirmed that the plaintiff suffered a variety of symptoms arising from the accident and referred to "Raynaud's Phenomenon" by which the hand undergoes colour changes. He thought that the plaintiff showed characteristics of a reflex sympathetic dystrophy and the Raynaud's Phenomenon would be part of that. He confirmed that he was told that the plaintiff had a capacity to work of 10 to 25 hours a week before the accident and that she had certain restrictions in her ability to perform work as a result of the accident. It was described as "a reduction in endurance". He expected that the plaintiff would ultimately return to her pre-accident level of activity and he said her work capacity was now better than it was when he saw her in 1997. He was not completely confident of saying that the plaintiff was going to recover from her symptoms totally. By November 1998 Professor Harper felt that the plaintiff was capable of 15 to 20 hours a week in a sedentary occupation with limitations. Some of these restrictions involved the postural difficulties connected with constant clerical work. He felt the plaintiff would be best suited for home employment in order that she could rest on occasions during the day. He felt that her capacity in the open labour market was limited because of these difficulties. He felt that the plaintiff would require some intermittent medication in the future but was very concerned about the amount of medication she reported to be taking. He felt that the plaintiff did need some psychiatric assessment and possible counselling to overcome panic attacks which she was suffering from on occasions. His assessment basically was that the plaintiff had a retained work capacity of 20 to 30 hours with the restrictions mentioned by him.
Professor Harper confirmed in cross-examination that the plaintiff had told him that before the accident she worked between 10 and 25 hours per week for her husband and that she felt that she was capable of doing 10 to 15 hours per week after the accident.
Professor Harper's current view is that the plaintiff is capable of working between 25 and 30 hours per week, that is, within the range that she was working before the accident. There appeared to be some doubt during cross-examination of the commencement of any panic attacks on the part of the plaintiff, particularly related to driving, although it does appear that there was some complaint to Professor Harper of it at some particular time.
Mr Stewart William Brash was called to give evidence on behalf of the defendant. Three reports were tendered of 30 May 1996 (3A), 18 March 1999 (3B) and 28 October 1999 (3C).
He said that on the three occasions he saw the plaintiff there was no objective evidence of pathology on either clinical examination or radiological examination to explain her symptoms. He felt that the fact that when he first saw the plaintiff there was a good range of movement in her cervical spine and both shoulders and that that had deteriorated when he saw her three years later, suggested that there were reasons other than of a physical nature for any symptoms suffered by the plaintiff. He felt that there was strong evidence that there were non-organic factors present in the total pain picture. In addition, he said that the fact that the plaintiff had not responded in the passage of time to any treatment, nor to any modification of her work, suggested also that there were non-physical matters involved in the plaintiff's stated symptomatology. He said that ultimately soft tissue injuries will improve with time. He said from an objective musculo-skeletal point of view it was his view the plaintiff was fit for the full activities of daily living. In cross-examination he said it was his view that the accident cannot be implicated in any on-going pain on the part of the plaintiff.

Assessment of Damages

The plaintiff's evidence and the medical evidence makes it clear that the plaintiff suffered a "cervical whiplash" and a "sprain to the right arm and right hand" as alleged in the Statement of Claim. The plaintiff also alleges that she suffered "nervous shock" in the accident. There is no psychiatric evidence available to me in relation to this and having heard the plaintiff and the other medical practitioners I am not satisfied that the plaintiff suffered nervous shock as it is known to the law. On the other hand, it is clear that after the accident and as the result thereof, the plaintiff suffered some personality changes which were described by the plaintiff, her husband and other witnesses, and in addition it is clear from the evidence that the plaintiff suffered "anxiety" and depression as a result of the accident.
Having seen and heard the plaintiff giving evidence and reviewing the medical evidence in particular, I am satisfied that the plaintiff has suffered headaches as a result of the accident. These are said to be "aggravated by any form of stress". No explanation was given of this allegation, however, it is consistent with the evidence to find that some activities will aggravate the accident caused headaches suffered by the plaintiff.
I am also satisfied that the plaintiff suffered the other symptoms of "pain and discomfort" alleged in the Statement of Claim, ie, chronic right shoulder pain radiating down her right arm and extending to her fingers, irritability, discolouration and numbness in the right hand and depression. The latter, I am satisfied, resulted to the plaintiff because of her injuries and also the change brought about by the accident of the plaintiff's routine and life generally. The same findings are made in relation to the "residual" disabilities alleged in the Statement of Claim.
The plaintiff has, I find, suffered a considerable diminution of her ability to enjoy life as a result of the accident. The plaintiff struck me as a person who enjoyed her life as a mother, wife and working assistant to her husband before the accident. Since then there has been a considerable detrimental effect on the plaintiff's life in the areas referred to above. The extent of the change to the plaintiff's life and personality is reflected in the stress placed on the marriage and its likely breakdown.
Whilst accepting that the plaintiff has suffered the various sequelae alleged by her, the real question is the present (and possibly) future longevity of such symptoms. Mr Brash was of the view that because there were no objective signs to explain the plaintiff's continuing symptoms, there must be other explanations for these, including non-organic reasons. His view as to the plaintiff's present future for work and daily living should not be disregarded. On the other hand, the plaintiff's evidence that she has continued to suffer symptoms (unabated) since the accident have some limited support from the other medical practitioners, although there is limited support for the plaintiff's suggestion that she is unable to work other than on a limited basis in the future.
Having reviewed the evidence, particularly that of the plaintiff and her demeanour, I have formed the view that the extent of the plaintiff's present symptoms are not as bad, and their likely longevity are not as lengthy as suggested by the plaintiff. The plaintiff, I have concluded, has dwelt on her symptoms and their repercussions on her pre-accident life with the result that her ability to overcome them has been affected. I find therefore, that although the plaintiff has suffered the symptoms and disabilities complained of by her they are in fact of less magnitude than complained of by her. Further, consistent with the medical evidence, such symptoms I consider, largely have resolved themselves within two years.
The plaintiff by then will have suffered a variety of sequelae for some six years with the effects already noted on her ability to enjoy life, her marriage and her work.
These various matters lead me to conclude that the award of damages for loss of enjoyment of life and amenities for the plaintiff should be based on a figure of 20 per cent of the "most extreme case" - see Motor Vehicle (Third Party Insurance) Amendment Act 1994. The relevant authorities are well known. Twenty per cent of $219,000 is $43,800. No deduction from that sum is necessary.
I turn now to the claim for compensation for loss of past income and future earning capacity. The plaintiff's case suffered as a result of differing estimates as to the hours worked by the plaintiff before and after the accident. These varying estimates were given by the plaintiff, her husband and by Mr Parkinson. Further, the plaintiff made a variety of estimates to medical practitioners. A precise finding as to the hours worked by the plaintiff before the accident and after is impossible to make. The evidence suggests, however, that because of the plaintiff's injuries and their effect on her, she was unable to work as long and as effectively in the business for several years after the accident. Further, for the two years already mentioned by me the plaintiff will continue to be affected but to a far more diminishing degree in her ability to earn an income. Counsel for the plaintiff suggested that the only basis on which any calculation of the plaintiff's loss of income in the past (and in the future) was to value her labour, by reference to the salary applicable to a Grade 1 clerk and of course, the appropriate award.
As to this claim, I am prepared to find that since the accident the plaintiff was unable to work to the degree she enjoyed before the accident - she was, as submitted by counsel, "devalued as an economic unit". The calculation suggested by the plaintiff's counsel for such past economic loss is based on a loss of earnings for four years and two months at $360 per week net, with a deduction of 50 per cent. The same basis is sought for future economic loss to the age of 65. As to these figures, I am unable, for the reasons previously given, to accept the claim put on behalf of the plaintiff. One of the few matters established by the evidence is that the plaintiff found it difficult to work effectively immediately after the accident and that such ability has slowly improved to the present time. In my view, the only appropriate basis for compensation for such loss is to arrive at a lump sum commensurate with the plaintiff's inability to earn an income for the past four years, that is, to the date of trial. The best I can do on the figures given to me is to conclude that the plaintiff lost the ability to work five hours per week in the past four years. Using a figure of $10 per hour (based on the figure of $300 per week net) gives a figure of $10,400. Interest will be awarded on this figure at four per cent (an amount of $1,664), making a total of $12,064.
As to the loss of future earning capacity, I accept that for a further two years the plaintiff will not be in the same position, vis à vis the open labour market, as she was before the accident. In the light of the circumstances which exist as to the symptoms she will suffer for a further two years, the matrimonial situation and her limited experience and qualifications, an allowance of $7,500 is appropriate for such loss. Such allowance will take into account the need for the plaintiff to retrain and to find new employment.
There is no basis upon which any allowance for loss of superannuation benefits can be made.
The special damages have been agreed between the parties and no award is necessary.
An allowance for travel was agreed at $1,750.
As for the claim for future medical and other expenses, these were claimed but there was a limited amount of evidence in relation to these matters. On the evidence generally, however, it is clear that the plaintiff will need some medication, medical consultation and possible treatment over the next two years. A global allowance of $1,500 is made for these amounts.
The plaintiff is thus awarded:
General damages  $43,800
Past earnings lost  10,400
Interest  1,664
Future loss of earnings  7,500
Travel allowance  1,750
Future medicals etc  1,500
$66,614