Ackland and Ackland
[2007] FMCAfam 693
•21 June 2007
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| ACKLAND & ACKLAND | [2007] FMCAfam 693 |
| FAMILY LAW – Contravention – recent consent order not complied with – no reasonable excuse – penalty – make up time – costs. |
| Family Law Act 1975 |
| Gaunt & Gaunt (1978) FLC 90-468 |
| Applicant: | MR ACKLAND |
| Respondent: | MS ACKLAND |
| File Number: | NCC1647 of 2007 |
| Judgment of: | Kelly FM |
| Hearing date: | 19 June 2007 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 21 June 2007 |
| Delivered at: | Newcastle |
| Delivered on: | 21 June 2007 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr Brady |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Renfrew Solicitors |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Mr Bateman |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Winders Lawyers |
ORDERS
The respondent mother contravened paragraph 2 (i) the Orders made in the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia at Newcastle on 7 May 2007 by failing to make J available to spend time with the father without reasonable excuse.
Pursuant to s.70NEB(1)(d) the mother enter into a bond to be of good behaviour and to comply with orders of the Court for a period of 12 months, with a surety in the sum of $500.00.
a.Both parents within 7 days contact the program provider Unifam and arrange an appointment as soon as possible for an initial assessment as to suitability for the post separation parenting program called Parenting Orders Program.
b.Both parents must attend the appointment for the initial assessment at any reasonable time and place nominated by the provider.
c.If assessed as suitable for a program or part of a program and the program provider nominates a particular program for the parties to attend, they must each attend that program or part of the program (as the case may be) as soon as practicable.
The orders of 7 May 2007 are varied to the extent that J spend time with his father as follows:
a.from 10.00am on Saturday 23 June 2007 until 5.30pm on Saturday 23 June 2007.
b.from 10.00am on Saturday 30 June 2007 until 5.30pm on Sunday 1 July 2007.
c.from 10.00am on Friday 6 July 2007 until 5.30 on Sunday 8 July 2007.
d.from 10.00am on Thursday 13 July 2007 until 5.30pm Sunday 15 July 2007.
J spend compensatory time with the father in the October 2007 school holidays from 5.30pm Friday 28 September until 5.30pm on Saturday 13 October 2007.
The orders of 7 May 2007 otherwise resume in full force and effect with alternate weekends pursuant to paragraph 2 (i) to recommence on Friday 20 July 2007.
The mother is to pay the father’s costs in these proceedings of $2,500.00, to be paid to the father through his solicitors, Renfrew Solicitors, on or before 30 October 2007.
J’s time spent with the father pursuant to these orders and the orders of 7 May 2007 is subject to the following conditions;
a.The father ensures J has his own bed and sleeps in his bed each night.
b.J not shower or bathe with the father.
The parties participate in child inclusive family dispute resolution appointments pursuant to s.13C with a family consultant provided that J’s participation is subject to the recommendation of the family consultant.
The family consultant appointments be allocated upon the court being advised that the parents have completed their participation in the Parenting Orders Program.
The mother’s application filed 23 May 2007 is adjourned for a directions hearing at 9.30am on 17 September 2007
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Ackland & Ackland is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT NEWCASTLE |
NCC1647 of 2007
| MR ACKLAND |
Applicant
And
| MS ACKLAND |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
These reasons were delivered orally. They have been edited and corrected from transcript to correct any grammatical errors and for ease of reading.
Before the Court is the father's contravention application filed 25 May 2007. The father alleges that the mother failed to comply with the orders made by consent between the parties on 7 May 2007, specifically that she failed to present J at the nominated handover location and at the nominated time on 18 May 2007, in breach of paragraph 2(i) of the orders.
J has recently turned 5 years of age. I note this was the first weekend that he was to spend time with his father under the relevant orders. I note also the mother had filed her own initiating application seeking to vary the orders of 7 May 2007, but counsel both agree that the contravention proceedings should be dealt with before considering those other matters.
The mother has pleaded not guilty to the contravention application.
The father was sworn in and relied upon his affidavit filed 25 May 2007, portions of which were struck out as inadmissible. The father was not required for cross-examination and at the end of his case, counsel for the mother argued that the father's evidence had not established a case to answer in that his affidavit did not establish he had attended at the specified time and location for handover on 18 May 2007.
After hearing submissions from both counsel, I was satisfied the father had established a prima facie case to answer. The father’s evidence, not challenged in cross examination, was that he received two phone calls from the mother on 18 May and in each phone call she made it clear that she would not be making J available that day. In my view this evidence of itself was sufficient to justify the contravention proceeding to hearing.
The mother's actions were designed to create in the father a belief that J would not be available to be collected that day. In such circumstances she can hardly turn around and seek to avoid contravention proceedings on the grounds that the father then acted upon the belief that she actively created.
On that basis then, the matter proceeded before me. The mother concedes that she did not present J at the specified time. The question is whether the mother had a reasonable excuse in not complying with the order, as defined in s.70NAE(5) of the Family Law Act. Did she have reasonable grounds to believe that her actions were necessary to protect J's health and safety? The mother further argues that the period of contravention was not longer than necessary, by virtue of the fact that she has filed an application seeking to vary the orders.
The mother relied upon her affidavit filed 23 May 2007 in support of her parenting application, subject to certain portions struck out as inadmissible. She also relied upon the affidavit of Pastor R filed 6 June 2007. Given the limited time available, the father did not take up any objections to this affidavit, but indicated he would address the Court as to weight, given those aspects of the affidavit that were open to challenge as hearsay evidence.
I also allowed the mother to rely on matters that occurred prior to the orders of 7 May 2007, specifically the evidence in her affidavit regarding events that occurred in December 2006, as I considered that evidence was potentially relevant to her defence of reasonable excuse.
Both parties sought to rely upon specified entries in the DOCS records, which were tendered at the end of the hearing. The father also sought to rely upon one paragraph of the affidavit of the paternal grandmother relating to the last period of time J spent with the father in December 2006, but this did not assist my determinations any further.
I will set out some brief background. Obviously this information is known to the parties but it is useful for them to hear my summary of it, within my overall determinations today.
The parties obviously separated some time ago now. They entered into consent orders in June 2004 which provided for J to reside with his mother and to have contact with his father at specified times. While both parties may have had some complaints across the intervening years, by and large the orders proceeded without significant difficulty until December 2006.
In early December 2006, the mother raised concerns regarding inappropriate behaviour from the father towards J. She says that J made certain comments to her after a contact visit on 4 December 2006. She reported her concerns to the appropriate authorities and an investigation was undertaken by the Department of Community Services (DOCS) and the Joint Investigation Response Team (JIRT).
Their investigations concluded in late December 2006 with no further investigation ongoing at that time and with no finding of abuse confirmed. I will return to those events further in these reasons, given that the mother relies on those events of December 2006 as part of her case in establishing a reasonable defence to the contravention.
The father filed contravention proceedings in February 2007 alleging that the mother had failed to present J for time with the father since December 2006. Just prior to the hearing date, the mother filed an application to vary the existing parenting orders.
The hearing on 7 May 2007 resolved without evidence being taken. The parties entered into negotiations and Terms of Settlement were filed by consent. The consent orders were detailed and substantial. The mother now suggests that it was not her intention initially for those Terms of Settlement to resolve both the contravention proceedings and her parenting application, nonetheless that is what ultimately occurred.
Notwithstanding the consent orders on 7 May 2007, the mother failed to present J on 18 May 2007.
I must now consider whether the mother has established that she had a reasonable belief that J's safety and welfare was at risk if visits with the father resumed. And for the reasons which I now outline, I come to the conclusion that she has not.
The mother says that she believes the father has behaved in a sexually inappropriate manner towards J. She relies upon paragraphs 4 to 32 of her affidavit filed 20 May 2007, regarding the events that occurred on 3 and 4 December 2006. I will not repeat those matters in any detail in these reasons as the content is well known to the parties.
The mother refers to J having seen Dr E, who is the family GP although it is clear from the DOCS records that in fact it was another staff member, Ms N who spoke to J, not Dr E.
As noted above, there was a DOCS and JIRT investigation. It is clear from the DOCS records (and not disputed by the mother) that the DOCS/JIRT staff who investigated her concerns were unable to interview J. They attempted once in their office and tried again at J's home. Everyone in the Court acknowledges that J is a sensitive child and not necessarily at ease with strangers. In any event, no information was provided to them that gave those agencies any basis to continue their investigation and they closed their filed accordingly, with no finding of abuse.
Their records raise the possibility that J's apparent disclosures to the mother could be accounted for by other explanations or context. It is clear from their discussions with the mother that she did not accept that interpretation of the situation. She was not reassured or relieved by the DOCS and JIRT intervention, nor could she accept the suggestion that there could be some other explanation for the comments that J made to her. It is clear that the mother struggles with this even now. When asked in the cross-examination about this issue, she made it clear that, to use her language, she ‘believes J’.
The mother was referred to an occasion when J was younger when he told her a story about the father's friend, and her son. The mother agreed that rather than accepting what J told her at face value, she rang the father to check J's story and was reassured to hear that nothing had happened to this person or to her son.
The mother pointed out that J was only 3 years old or so when this happened. However, it does indicate that on this earlier occasion she was prepared to ring the father and ask him about her concerns and yet when a much more serious matter arose regarding J's welfare, she chose not to do so.
When asked in cross-examination if a phone call to the father may have resolved the matter, the mother conceded "Maybe". Despite that, she holds fast to her belief that the father has behaved inappropriately to the child and she holds fast to that belief despite the views expressed to her by DOCS.
It is clear that at the time of the hearing on 7 May 2007 she was not convinced J would be safe in the father's care. She gave evidence that she felt pressured to agree to the orders on 7 May 2007, both in terms of the resolution to the contravention and in terms of her own application for parenting orders being dismissed. However, I can not look past the reality of the situation for the mother at that time. She had legal representation. She had a hearing date and a judicial officer available to hear and determine the contravention application. She did not take that opportunity.
I consider it likely that the mother received clear legal advice on that day regarding the likely options and her chances of successfully defending the application and my view is that she ultimately acted on that advice.
I appreciate it can be difficult for a parent when faced with legal advice that is in conflict with their own view of a situation. It is easy to feel pressured by the legal advice and likely outcomes presented to them. However at the end of the day, it is for the party in question to agree to orders, or not; or to ask the Court to rule on the issues, or not. It is difficult for the mother to now ask this Court to effectively set aside those orders, or to take a limited approach to enforcement of those orders, because she felt under pressure to agree to them.
Of course the present application relates only to the events on 18 May 2007. Nonetheless, the evidence about the December events is relevant to the mother's case in terms of establishing a context in which she may reasonably believe that J is at risk in the father's care, to paraphrase the legislation.
Between the consent orders of 7 May 2007 and 18 May 2007, there was the intervention of Pastor R. I am satisfied Pastor R clearly has some experience and qualification as a youth worker. He has qualifications as a special education teacher and he has significant Pastoral experience in his role within the church. I am also confident that Pastor R is endeavouring to support J's best interests in these proceedings. He is genuinely concerned by the conversations he apparently had with J.
Pastor R spoke with J on the weekend following the hearing on 7 May 2007. His notes of the conversations were initially provided to DOCS and are now attached to his affidavit. There was some disparity between the mother and Pastor R about how he came to be speaking to J but frankly not a lot turns on how the conversations took place.
I accept that Pastor R was not intending nor endeavoured to interview or question J, in terms of a forensic attempt at investigation. The notes provided by Pastor R are set out as a verbatim record with a “he said, I said” style, but it is clear from Pastor R’s evidence that the conversations were in the context of J playing in the playroom, going off to the toilet and so on; it was not a ‘linear’ conversation. The verbatim notes may not necessarily reflect the whole of the interaction in terms of J’s demeanour, what his body language may or may not have been communicating to the Pastor and so on.
The reality is that for all of Pastor R's experience, he is not trained in the forensic interviewing of children. Ultimately, the record of conversation provided by Pastor R was not given any significant evidentiary weight by DOCS, partly due to their previous interaction obviously with J himself, but also out of concern at the nature of the conversation and the unintentional result that J may have been lead towards certain answers and responses.
I accept that Pastor R disputes this occurred and I accept it was not his intention, but equally I conclude that the Court should be cautious about placing significant weight upon the comments attributed to J by Pastor R.
The mother argues that Pastor R’ conversation with J includes information not disclosed by J in December. To that extent, she asks the Court to accept that she is entitled to act upon this further information to justify her failure to comply with the orders of 7 May.
However, in terms of the comments made by J both in December and in May, I am not satisfied that sexual abuse or inappropriate behaviour of a sexual nature by the father is the only interpretation that can be given to the comments made by J. I am not satisfied, for example, that when J pressed his finger into the bottom area of a crocheted doll, this meant that he has done this to his father in the past, even when that action occurred in the context as described by Pastor R. I am not satisfied that sexual abuse is the only interpretation or indeed the most likely interpretation.
In considering this matter of course I have already referred briefly to s.70NAE(5). For the mother to successfully defend the application she must demonstrate that she believed on reasonable grounds that J was at risk. It must be more than a mere subjective belief on her behalf (Gaunt & Gaunt (1978) FLC 90-468).
Taking into account all of the evidence before me, while I consider the mother does hold genuine concerns about J's welfare, I am not satisfied that her belief in this regard is reasonably held.
There is no doubt that the intervention by Pastor R has further strengthened the mother's concerns such that she took the steps she did on 18 May 2007. However these conversations between J and Pastor R occurred six months after J last saw his father. The conversations relate to similar issues already investigated by DOCS or JIRT.
The mother accounts for the delay in this further “disclosure” by J and related it to the resumption of phone calls from the father, but I do not accept this. I do accept that J may have felt some uncertainty about not seeing his father for so long. This may account for some of J's conversation with Pastor R, not all of which was critical or hostile to the father, by any means.
In my view, J’s comments to Pastor R are not definitive. I accept they could be possibly interpreted as suggestive of abuse, but they could equally come up with many other explanations, be it J’s nearly 5 year old description of some other interaction with his father, playing games with his father, or simply other age appropriate childish curiosity about his body and about how it may differ from the adults in his life.
The mother declines to accept, or is possibly unable to accept that other interpretations are available, but that is her subjective belief. I am not satisfied she can reasonably hold onto that belief at this time and continue to prevent J from resuming his relationship with the father.
Her unwillingness to accept the feedback from Departmental staff and JIRT staff in December 2006 and to accept their assessment that there were no grounds for her to stop contact must affect my assessment of the reasonableness of her views held on 18 May 2007.
As discussed, DOCS formed the view in December that there were other possible explanations for J's comments to his mother. In light of the DOCS records tendered during the hearing, it is clear that the notes from Pastor R did not lead to any further investigation by the Department, as far as the Court is aware.
A question was raised towards the end of the hearing about whether the JIRT and DOCS investigation is complete and about whether there is a police investigation still on foot. The only evidence in relation to the possibility of ongoing police investigation comes from Pastor R. There is no documentation from the Police Department or any other government agency to confirm any ongoing investigation.
I would have thought that if there was any such ongoing investigation the mother would provided some evidence, by way of subpoena to police records or by calling an investigative officer or something of that regard. In the absence of such independent confirmation, I am not satisfied that any agency is pursuing an ongoing investigation.
Finally, counsel for the wife urged the Court to accept that at least on 18 May 2007, the day of the contravention, the wife still had reasonable grounds for concern and that the Department investigations through JIRT/ DOCS was not complete. In that regard, I sought submissions from counsel for the father regarding dates of “signing off”, for want of a better phrase, on the DOCS records, being the last entries on the records presented to the Court.
I take into account the DOCS record about a phone call to the father on 18 May 2007 when the father was informed by the Department or by JIRT that they had received new allegations, but had rejected them on the day prior. I accept the file memo also refers to the file being sent back to the local police station at [X], however I am not satisfied that the wife had any real grounds to believe that the file was sent for further investigation or that any agency charged with investigating such matters were pursuing the issue when she declined to present J on the afternoon of 18 May 2007.
Accordingly I find the mother has contravened the order of 7 May 2007 by failing to present J on 18 May 2007 and I am not satisfied that she has established a defence of reasonable excuse.
I should address the submission by counsel for the husband that the wife was not a witness of truth. I am not prepared to reach that conclusion. I am not satisfied that the mother has fabricated allegations or her conversation with J. However, her unwillingness to contemplate any other explanation is concerning and a matter that she herself may need to address with the assistance of a counsellor.
I would hope that a concerned parent, as the mother clearly is, would want to keep open the possibility that her child was not abused and I encourage her to look at other support mechanisms to deal with the reality of J resuming his relationship with his father.
I now turn to the question of penalty. Counsel for the father urged the Court to accept this is a serious contravention and should receive a significant penalty. He presented a Minute setting out the orders sought by the father. The father asks for the mother to be placed on a bond and costs. He also seeks that J spend a continuous block of three weeks in his care, commencing tomorrow and thereafter, if I am reading the Minute correctly, proposes that there be a week about care arrangement for J.
Counsel for the mother urges a substantially less interventionist approach. He proposes that the parties attend a post separation parenting program and acknowledged that make up time may be ordered.
In determining penalty in this matter, I take into account the timing of the contravention so soon after the consent orders on 7 May 2007. I take into account the consent orders arose out of earlier contravention proceedings, albeit no finding was made against the mother in that regard. To that extent, I am dealing with this matter as a first finding of contravention against the mother.
I take into account the intervention of Pastor R, which while well meaning, has clearly fuelled the mother's concerns in a way that is unfortunate in terms of J’s relationship with both of his parents.
Notwithstanding the breach occurring on the first relevant weekend after the orders of 7 May 2007, I consider it more appropriate to deal with this matter as a less serious contravention. Accordingly I rely upon s.70NEB of the Family Law Act.
In my view, a penalty that is punitive will not necessarily assist the situation. I assume, and would hope, that the father's goal is to resume spending time with J and to ensure that J's visits with him in the future take place without any incident or dispute between the parents.
I am satisfied that it is appropriate that the mother enter into a bond to be of good behaviour and to comply with orders of the Court for a period of 12 months. I will impose a surety in the sum of $500.
I am also satisfied that from J's point of view there is real benefit in his parents participating in a post-separation parenting program, pursuant also to s.70NEB(1)(a). I consider the mother in particular may need assistance and support in understanding her ongoing obligations to comply with Court orders and to ensure that her own emotional response does not impact upon J.
Regarding compensatory time, any order I make in this regard is a parenting order and therefore my primary consideration must always be J's best interests.
Likewise, if I vary the existing parenting order, as I am entitled to do under s.70NBA, I must ensure that J's best interests are my primary consideration.
I am not satisfied, nor was there any evidence before me that would lead me to conclude that the parenting orders sought by the father are in J's best interests. In terms of an ongoing week about parenting regime, there is simply no evidence that would lead me to conclude that is an appropriate outcome. It has not been a reality for J in the past and it is not an order I would make in a situation such as this.
I am also hesitant to put in place a block of make up time as proposed by the father. I understand the father feels aggrieved at having had his relationship with J disrupted over the last six months, but the father's justifiable sense of grievance is not a basis upon which I can or should make such an order. My obligation is to make orders that I consider to be in J's best interests. In my view, bearing in mind the amount of time that has passed, there is benefit to J in reintroducing his time with his father somewhat more cautiously.
J has not seen his father since December 2006. There is evidence before me, and it is agreed by both parents as well as commented upon in the DOCS record, that he is a sensitive child and it may be that he, more than other children, will find the change more difficult to process. As I understand the Court file, under the 2004 orders J would only have commenced longer school holiday visits after his fifth birthday.
That affects my response to the father’s proposal for J to spend three weeks in his care and also my view of the orders made on 7 May 2007. The July school holidays start very soon, at the end of next week. If J had resumed overnight visits on 18 May I would not be concerned with him spending a substantially longer block of time with his father during the school holidays.
The reality is J has not resumed overnight time with his father as yet. To do so by moving straight away to either three weeks, as the father seeks, or even to refer back to the orders of 7 May 2007 with a two week period coming up virtually immediately for J, is a matter of concern to me. J has not yet spent long blocks of holiday time in his father's care. That is not the father's fault, of course, but my focus must be on what is best for J, not what is fair towards the father.
I am concerned that a block of two or three weeks away from J's primary caregiver may in fact be too dramatic a change for this child, when there is the potential for only one lead-in weekend visit before the school holidays commence.
I am also concerned that the mother's emotional response to such an order may impact upon J in a way that is not only detrimental to his emotional welfare but may ultimately undermine his capacity to successfully resume a relationship with his father. J is entitled to enjoy a relationship with his father without hindrance from the mother, but in my view the Court’s orders should be structured in a way that minimises this potential risk.
Having considered this matter carefully, I conclude that there is a better chance of J's relationship with the father resuming successfully if J's time with the father begins more slowly, allowing J some time to adjust. Accordingly, I intend varying the orders of 7 May 2007 and I will indicate the orders I intend making in that regard shortly.
In reaching this conclusion I wish to make it clear to both parties, particularly the mother, that these orders and the variations I am making in terms of the parenting orders are in no way a criticism of the father or any reflection upon him as a parent. Rather I am taking into account J's age and his sensitivity. I am in effect requiring the father to exercise some patience and allow J time to settle back into their relationship.
I also want to make it clear to the mother that her obligation is to comply with these orders and ensure that she does so in a way that facilitates the visits and does not impede J's relationship with the father in the future. That is her obligation and it is an obligation that she needs to take seriously. No doubt I can rely upon counsel to explain to the mother the implications of failing to comply with a bond and the fact that this matter can then be reconsidered by the Court in terms of further penalty.
Perhaps before I pronounce my formal orders in this regard, I should indicate that while I am intending to vary the orders of 7 May 2007 regarding the forthcoming July school holidays, I will then allocate to the father the bulk of the October school holidays by way of make up time.
Finally, as to costs, the father has clearly been successful in his contravention application today and I am satisfied it is appropriate to make a costs order.
I note that that a costs order was made in favour of the father on the last hearing, in the sum of $1500. Today the father sought costs initially in the sum of $5000. He reduced that application based on legal advice regarding the Federal Magistrates Court Schedule of Costs, to the sum of about $3500. My interpretation of that Schedule comes to a figure of $2885 based on Stage 7 Costs Applicable to a Family Law location, recovery or enforcement of an order (in the sum of $635), an amount for a full day hearing appropriate to Tuesday's hearing (in the sum of $1500), and an amount appropriate for today's attendances by counsel equivalent to a half day hearing (in the sum of $750).
The mother has put limited submissions before the Court. She is clearly in straitened financial circumstances. She relies on Centrelink benefits and is not otherwise employed. I am informed her income is approximately $400 per week. She has other expenses, obviously, relating to the support of her son and education expenses are mentioned as well. It is clear that any costs order made by the Court today would be a significant imposition upon the mother and I take that into account.
I also note that I have not heard in any great detail submissions regarding the father's financial circumstances, but the reality is of course that, as I have already referred to, he has been successful in his application. Under s.117(2)(a) that is one of the factors I am required to have regard to, as well as the financial circumstances of each of the parties, but I accept the submission put to me by counsel or the solicitor assisting counsel that from the father's point of view, it is less about the money and more about wanting to resume his relationship with J.
In terms of the conduct of the parties, neither party has sought to delay or disrupt the smooth conduct of the proceedings. The matter has proceeded to final hearing reasonably promptly. However the proceedings were necessitated by the mother’s failure to comply with previous orders of the Court. The reality is the father has been put to significant expense in seeking to enforce orders of the Court and in seeking to protect J's right to have a relationship with both of his parents.
As I have said, any order I make will impose significant hardship upon the mother, but I am nonetheless satisfied that a costs order should be made. Otherwise the father bears the whole cost of having to enforce his entitlement under the order.
In terms of the amount, in light of my consideration of the costs schedule and taking into account the mother's financial circumstances I will make an order for slightly less than $2885, with time for the mother to pay.
In terms of whether the mother’s parenting application should be dismissed today, I have heard very limited submissions in that regard. I am reluctant to dismiss the application out of hand simply because the mother has been found to have contravened the existing orders.
If the mother proceeds with the parenting application, real issues regarding Rice v Asplund will arise. Again, looking at the matter from J's point of view, clearly his parents have been involved in intense conflict over the last few months. He is about to resume his relationship with his father and there could be some benefit in keeping some proceedings live before this Court at this time. The parties and J may benefit from there being some child inclusive approach to family dispute resolution or mediation which I have confidence could be provided by staff of this Court, perhaps at the end of the parenting programs and after J has settle back into his relationship with his father.
I am not going to order a report at this time because, of course, if ultimately there is an argument on Rice v Asplund issues and the mother is not successful, then that report writing time and effort and energy from the staff of the Court would be wasted.
I certify that the preceding eighty-two (82) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Kelly FM
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