Abramsson & Abramsson (No 2)
[2024] FedCFamC1F 912
•6 December 2024
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1)
Abramsson & Abramsson (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC1F 912
File number(s): BRC 5917 of 2022 Judgment of: BAUMANN J Date of judgment: 6 December 2024 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – CHILDREN – Contested residence – Where each parent seeks the children live with them and spend little or no time with the other parent – Where the parties are entrenched in significant conflict – Where residency of the children was changed on an interim basis several months prior to the final hearing resulting in an expediated final hearing Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 60B, 60CC Cases cited: Abramsson & Abramsson [2024] FedCFamC1A 182
Abramsson & Abramsson [2024] FedCFamC1F 658
Browne & Dunn (1893) 6 R 67
Division: Division 1 First Instance Number of paragraphs: 126 Date of hearing: 25-27 and 29 November 2024 Place: Brisbane Solicitor for the Applicant: Finnigan Smith Counsel for the Respondent: Ms R Lyons Solicitor for the Respondent: Neilson Law Counsel for the Independent Children’s Lawyer: Dr M Sayers Independent Children’s Lawyer: Ms J Lilley, Legal Aid Queensland ORDERS
BRC 5917 of 2022 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN: MR ABRAMSSON
Applicant
AND: MS ABRAMSSON
Respondent
INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER
ORDER MADE BY:
BAUMANN J
DATE OF ORDER:
6 DECEMBER 2024
THE COURT ORDERS ON A FINAL BASIS:
1.That the father have sole decision making responsibility in respect of all major long term issues of the children, X born in 2018 (“X”) and Y born in 2021 (“Y”) (collectively “the children”), save that the father shall, prior to making the sole ultimate decision about any such issue:
(a)notify the mother in writing of the decision intended to be made;
(b)invite the mother to indicate her views in writing;
(c)seek the mother’s written response in relation thereto within seven (7) days;
(d)consider, by reference to the best interests of the children, any such response prior to making any such decision; and
(e)advise the mother in writing as soon as reasonably practicable of his ultimate decision.
Living arrangements
2.That the children shall live with the father.
3.That the children shall spend time with the mother as agreed between the parents in writing, but otherwise as follows:
(a)From 9.00am until 4.00pm on Wednesday, 11 December 2024;
(b)From 9.00am until 4.00pm on Wednesday, 18 December 2024;
(c)From 9.00am until 4.00pm on Tuesday, 24 December 2024;
(d)From 9.00am on Tuesday, 31 December 2024 until 4.00pm on Wednesday, 1 January 2025;
(e)From 9.00am on Wednesday, 8 January 2025 until 4.00pm on Thursday, 9 January 2025;
(f)From 9.00am on Wednesday, 15 January 2025 until 4.00pm on Friday, 17 January 2025;
(g)From 9.00am on Wednesday, 22 January 2025 until 4.00pm on Friday, 24 January 2025; and
(h)From after school Friday, 7 February 2025 until before school Monday, 10 February 2025, and each alternate weekend thereafter during school terms.
Electronic communication
4.That unless otherwise agreed in writing, the parent with whom the children are living at any given time shall facilitate telephone (or similar electronic communication) between the children and the other parent between 5.00pm and 5.30pm on Tuesdays, commencing 4 February 2025.
School holidays
5.That unless otherwise agreed between the parents in writing and subject to any Order providing for time on special occasions, the children spend time with:
(a)the father for the first half of the Easter, June/July and September/October school holiday periods in all even numbered years and the second half of the Easter, June/July and September/October school holiday periods in all odd numbered years;
(b)the mother for the first half of the Easter, June/July and September/October school holiday periods in all odd numbered years and the second half of the Easter, June/July and September/October school holiday periods in all even numbered years; and
(c)From the 2025 Christmas school period, with the parents during the Christmas school holiday period on a week about basis, with changeover to occur after school (or 5.00pm) on a Friday, with the children to spend time with the father in weeks one (1), three (3) and five (5) of the holidays in all even numbered years and weeks two (2), four (4), and six (6) in all odd numbered years, and with the father at all other times.
6.That for the purpose of these Orders, school holiday time shall commence and conclude as follows:
(a)With respect to the first half of the school holidays, the period shall commence with the conclusion of school on the last day of the school term and shall conclude at 5.00pm on the day calculated to be half of the holidays;
(b)With respect to the second half of the school holidays, the period shall commence at 5.00pm on the day calculated to be half of the holidays and shall conclude at 9.00am on the day school term commences; and
(c)the school holidays shall be deemed to commence with the conclusion of school on the last day the school term and conclude at 9.00am on the day school term commences and the number of nights in the school holiday period is used to calculate one half of the holiday period and if there is an uneven number of nights then the mother shall retain the additional night; and
(d)the usual arrangements pursuant to Order 3(h) hereof are suspended for the duration of the children’s school holiday time.
Special occasions
7.That the children shall spend time with each parent for Easter as follows:
(a)In odd numbered years with the father from 9.00am on Good Friday until 5.00pm on Easter Sunday;
(b)In even numbered years with the mother from 9.00am on Good Friday until 5.00pm on Easter Sunday; and
(c)And otherwise in the care of the parent they would ordinarily be spending time with pursuant to these Orders.
8.That the children shall spend time with each parent for Christmas in 2026 and each year thereafter as follows:
(a)In odd numbered years with the father from 9.00am on Christmas Eve until 5.00pm on Boxing Day; and
(b)In even numbered years with the mother from 9.00am on Christmas Eve until 5.00pm on Boxing Day.
9.That on Mother’s Day the children shall spend time with the mother from 5.00pm on the Saturday before Mother’s Day until before school or 9.00 am on the Monday after Mother’s Day.
10.That on Father’s Day the children shall spend time with the father from 5.00pm on Saturday before Father’s Day until before school or 9.00am on the Monday after Father’s Day.
Changeovers
11.That changeovers shall occur as follows:
(a)Before the commencement of the 2025 school year and during school holidays at K Counselling (“K Counselling”); and
(b)During school term at X’s school and Y’s childcare centre; and
(c)On a day when the children are not at school, the changeover shall be inside McDonalds at L Street, Suburb M, with a third party nominated by the mother and known to the children attending in lieu of the mother.
12.That both parents comply with all reasonable requests and directions of K Counselling as may be necessary to facilitate changeovers at K Counselling, with the parents to share equally the costs of their use of the K Counselling service.
13.That the parents be granted leave to provide a sealed copy of these Orders to K Counselling.
14.That the Independent Children’s Lawyer is hereby authorised to communicate with K Counselling about the children and the parents.
Education
15.That the father shall enrol X in M School for the 2025 school year and Y in a childcare centre local to him.
16.That the father be granted leave to provide a sealed copy of these Orders to X’s school and Y’s childcare centre.
Therapeutic support
17.That the parents shall maintain X’s attendance upon Psychologist, Ms D at appointments made by Ms D.
18.That the mother and father be granted leave to provide a sealed copy of these Orders and the Reasons for Judgment delivered 6 December 2024, once published by the Court, to:
(a)X’s Psychologist, Ms D; and
(b)their personal counsellor, therapist and/or psychiatrist.
Other
19.That the parents shall communicate with respect to the children only and via the “Our Family Wizard Parenting App”.
20.That both parents shall:
(a)respect the privacy of the other parent and not question the children about the personal life of the other parent;
(b)speak of the other parent respectfully;
(c)not denigrate or insult the other parent or any member of their family in the presence or hearing of the children and use their best endeavours to ensure that others do not denigrate or insult the other parent or any member of their family in the presence or hearing of the children; and
(d)refrain from discussing any matters with the children which are not appropriate for them to hear, or discussing such matters with any other person in the children’s presence or hearing, including but not limited to any conflict between the parents.
21.That the Independent Children’s Lawyer be granted leave to provide to the Director-General, Department of Families, Seniors, Disability Services and Child Safety a sealed copy of these Orders and a copy of the Reasons for Judgment delivered 6 December 2024, once published by the Court.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Abramsson & Abramsson has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Settled from the oral reasons delivered)BAUMANN J:
These parenting and property proceedings arise from the relationship between the Applicant father, Mr Abramsson (“the father”) and the Respondent mother, Ms Abramsson (“the mother”). The parenting proceedings relate to the two children, X who turns seven years old in 2025 and Y who is currently three years old.
The trial finished after four days, one week ago, and the need for a quick decision is obvious, necessitating the delivery of these Reasons orally on my last sitting day of the year.
Whilst property and spouse maintenance proceedings were also part of the trial, but on the evidence offered and cross-examination undertaken, where the parties at least agree that the pool of interest reveals debts over $1 million and virtually no significant assets or superannuation, the Court indicated that it would receive further written submissions on the property relief sought, and separate orders to that effect are made today as well.
The new legislative pathway as articulated in these Reasons identifies the need to consider what arrangements would promote the safety (including safety from family violence, abuse, neglect or other harm) of the children and each person who has care of the children.
The primary evidence of each party, being the father’s affidavit comprising 257 paragraphs and the mother’s affidavit comprising 893 paragraphs, both supplemented by many pages of annexures, reveals no real concession by either party of anything positive about the other.
When each party strenuously advances a case in this way and asserts risk, and where the father’s case outline seeking residence could not articulate any time arrangement for the children to spend with the mother, and where the mother’s case outline similarly – while seeking the children live with her and spend no time with the father – it was not surprising that the parents’ evidence-in-chief asserts numerous “relevant” events of importance.
Regrettably, perhaps, the fact that the rules of evidence do not apply in parenting cases under the Family Law Act1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) means that all affidavits are replete with hearsay, lay opinion, conclusions, and often simply irrelevant comment.
Accordingly, at the commencement of the hearing on 25 November 2024, I indicated to solicitor advocate Ms Smith for the father; Ms Lyons of Counsel for the mother; and Dr Sayers of Counsel for the Independent Children’s Lawyer (“ICL”), Ms Lilley, that I would not expect every allegation to be put to the other side in cross-examination and that I would, as a result, not be applying the principles of Browne & Dunn (1893) 6 R 67. The parties adopted that approach but in a way that the core issues of risk in each household, I am satisfied, was fully ventilated.
MATERIAL RELIED UPON
The father
The father relied upon his affidavit and Financial Statement both filed 18 November 2024. There are documents in the ICL’s tender bundle and experts called by the ICL which the father also relied upon.
The mother
The mother relied upon:
(a)her affidavit filed 7 November 2024;
(b)her financial statement filed 4 November 2024;
(c)a notice of child abuse filed 15 July 2022;
(d)an affidavit by Dr G filed 4 November 2024;
(e)an affidavit of Ms N filed 4 November 2024
(f)an affidavit of Ms O filed 4 November 2024;
(g)an affidavit of Ms Q filed 4 November 2024; and
(h)an affidavit of Ms P filed 4 November 2024.
The witnesses Ms N, Ms O and Ms Q were not required for cross-examination.
Independent Children’s Lawyer
The ICL relied upon:
(a)three affidavits and reports of family report writer, Ms E, filed 18 October 2022, 11 September 2024 and 4 November 2024 respectively;
(b)an affidavit of Dr R filed 2 August 2023;
(c)an affidavit of Mr S filed 23 January 2024;
(d)an affidavit of Ms T of 18 November 2024; and
(e)an affidavit of Ms D of 18 November 2024.
Ms T was not required for cross-examination. The ICL also called Ms U, the owner/operator of the contact centre V Family Services, to be called under subpoena. The relevance of her evidence arises from not only the extensive notes of supervised visits undertaken but also the strong criticisms raised by the mother in her affidavit about Ms U.
As is the practice, the ICL had amassed over 1200 pages in a tender bundle from subpoenaed records. There are approximately 38 subpoenas that have issued in this matter since 8 August 2022. However, as is my practice, only documents of relevance put to a witness or otherwise tendered were in evidence before me. The 30 exhibits were the additional material considered by the Court. Because of the allegations in this matter, the ICL tendered (as Exhibits 1 and 2) transcripts of three incidents recorded by the father on or about 1 January 2021; 20 February 2021; and 15 April 2022 (totalling approximately 83 minutes), and also a video taken by the father which was then the subject of a police cam recording of an incident showing the mother driving a car.
COMPETING PROPOSALS
When the evidence finished on Wednesday, 27 November 2024, the expert witnesses were still to be cross-examined. I appreciate, as should the parties, that the Court, Counsel and the experts were all available on Friday to complete the evidence in the case. Anticipating that it would not be possible to complete the evidence and submissions on Friday, 29 November 2024, I directed that by 4.00pm on 28 November 2024, each party was to file a minute of the interim order they sought to be made, as the issues required some clarity by Court order. The parties all complied with that direction. However, at the start of the trial again on 29 November 2024, I indicated that on reflection, we should try and finish the case (with submissions) at least on parenting so that I was in a position to deliver an oral Judgment by 6 December 2024. That timetable has been achieved.
Father’s proposal
The father departed slightly from his position set out in the case outline filed 19 November 2024 and broadly in accordance with his interim proposal marked Exhibit 30. The father’s ultimate proposal was that the children live with him and he have sole decision-making power; the children spend no time with the mother, but the mother be able to send gifts and cards to them, although in final submissions, Ms Smith for the father considered that some limited supervised time between the mother and the children was probably appropriate.
The ICL’s reply to such submission, that the father’s entrenched position after hearing all the evidence and the ICLs submissions raised some concerns to the ICL, was noted.
Mother’s proposal
The mother’s case outline filed 18 November 2024 identified four options but began with a proposition which was her preferred proposition that the children should live with her, and she should have sole decision-making power with the children spending no time with the father.
In final submissions delivered by her Counsel, Ms Lyons, the mother proposed the children spend time with the father unsupervised each alternate Sunday from 12.00pm noon until 6.00pm. I acknowledge the slight movement in position by the mother, but in exchanges between the bench and Ms Lyons, it was clear that the mother’s position and her view at the time was that there be no block holiday time or any contemplation as to how this limited time with the father could, in the future, increase.
I was left with the strong impression that the mother’s preferred view was a no time order.
ICL’s proposal
Dr Sayers of Counsel gave oral submissions first, and the order he proposed was tendered as Exhibit 28, which was the earlier interim order but with some amendments and provided essentially for:
(a)the children to live with the father, who should have sole decision-making power but with an obligation to consult the mother; and
(b)a slightly slower graduation of time using the school holidays which commence today as the opportunity to do so, mostly shaped by the evidence just given at that time by Ms E.
One of the reasons why expedition occurred in this matter is that the issue of schooling remained a serious issue in dispute.
The father now proposed that X be enrolled in Suburb M School, with Y to be enrolled in an early learning centre in the same catchment. The father points to where he lives and the lease he has to occupy a unit in Suburb M to September 2025 (Exhibit 8).
The mother proposes the children remain at B School and the associated early learning centre for Y – although, payment of school fees remains an issue.
The ICL contended for the children to live with the father and supports the father’s proposal for schooling.
CONTEXTUAL HISTORY
Statements of fact hereafter shall be construed as findings of fact. The history which follows does not deal with any property matters.
The father was born in 1980 and the mother in 1983 and are therefore 44 and 41 years respectively.
In 2011, the father was diagnosed with autism. By this stage, he was a medical professional at least. He commenced some form of ongoing therapy with Dr W.
The parties met in 2010 and married in 2013 and were blessed with the birth of their daughter X in 2018. She is, as a result, nearly seven years of age. In the description of family violence issues, I note that at least in around 2017, the father alleges the first “violent behaviour” to have occurred, and as I have already indicated, there are videos of events on 1 January 2021 and 20 March 2021.
In 2021, the child Y was born.
That the relationship between the parties was deteriorating by the birth of Y is fairly obvious from the overall evidence that I have heard.
In early 2022, the father was granted a Domestic Violence Order, but that was ultimately dismissed later in 2022.
It seems though, with all these things going on, the family moved to Queensland in or about early 2022. My view is it was a very unhappy relationship at that stage. That is again reflected by a video that the Court has heard of the incident occurring later in 2022. That incident was followed shortly thereafter by final separation on 21 April 2022.
Much has been said of that day, including an allegation by the father that the mother attempted to self-harm. Certainly, the mother was taken to hospital for assessment with the support of the Queensland Police Service and the Queensland Ambulance Service. I have details of their attendance on that day which are before me.
In early 2022, the father was the subject of an ouster order made by a Local Court and a Temporary Protection Order in favour of the mother was made shortly thereafter in early 2022. The father, not to be left behind, sought and received a Temporary Protection Order in early 2022. Accordingly, by 20 May 2022 on which being the date the father commenced proceedings, the parties’ positions were already in a highly conflicted state.
Relevantly, on 17 October 2022, a Senior Judicial Registrar made an order that enabled the mother to have the benefit of a spouse maintenance order and a child support departure order as well as a lump sum payment. Under cross-examination, the mother acknowledged that the effect of the Order was to provide her with, if the funds were available, receipt of approximately $4,000 a week.
The parties undertook, with the benefit of the ICL’s involvement, the first family report interviews with Ms E on 6 September 2022 which, it seems to me, must have shaped the Orders made by Senior Judicial Registrar Best on 20 December 2022, where it was ordered that the father who, by that stage, had had no time since separation eight months earlier – should spend time with the children in a supervised environment.
The exhibited notes from the V Family Services reveal that visits at the Centre commenced on 21 January 2023 but ceased on 12 August 2023. It is not in dispute that on or about 26 August 2023, the mother took the view that any further time with the father at that supervised environment would not be in their best interests. By this time, Dr R had been retained by the ICL to conduct an independent psychiatric assessment of the parties. His report is before the Court. Additionally, as if the father’s professional situation had not become difficult already, there is evidence that a newspaper article appeared about the father’s workplace about this same time.
Further interviews for a report, presumably for trial, in respect of the children and the family were conducted on 2 August 2024. By this time, I was well aware of the conflict between the parties and the difficulties in the children spending time with their father.
On 18 April 2024, the father appeared before me on his own behalf. The mother had a solicitor representing her and Ms Lilley, as the ICL, appeared. I can recall the day clearly. I indicated to the mother that I was very concerned that Orders made by a Senior Judicial Registrar 12 months earlier were not being complied with by her. The mother indicated that she tried to make arrangements with other contact centres to facilitate time between the father and children, as ordered, but to no avail.
I sent the parties outside. They returned with a consent order, again noting that the mother had legal representation, which indicated that time would recommence by replacing BB Contact Centre with CC Family Services at Suburb DD. Orders were made for the children to spend time with the father subject to the capacity of the service to facilitate time, and unusual Orders 5, 6 and 7 were made which reflected the financial stress the mother said she was under at that stage. The father agreed, for example, to contribute money to the mother for petrol costs to facilitate the mother’s return travel with the children to the service; the mother was to get a quote for the service of the motor vehicle she drove and for the cost of new tyres and repair of brakes, which the father was to pay.
It became fairly apparent not long after the Orders of 18 April 2024 that not only did the father not have, he says, the capacity to meet those payments, but that time was not occurring in those circumstances and, sadly, the Court was left with really no option but to list the matter for trial which it did for trial to commence in November 2024.
Whilst the matter was tracking towards a trial, however, the report of Ms E became available. The nature of the report was, in the view of the ICL and then the Court, of serious concern.
On 11 September 2024, the Court ordered a change of residence on an interim basis. The Court published Reasons for doing so (see Abramsson & Abramsson [2024] FedCFamC1F 658), and that order for change of residence was the subject of an appeal by the mother which was dismissed (see Abramsson & Abramsson [2024] FedCFamC1A 182).
The effect of the Orders made 11 September 2024 is that the two children have been residing with the father and spending no time with the mother. Now, whilst I will examine the competing proposals for residence within the matrix of the statutory pathway, because both the mother and father assert this is a risk case, it is helpful to provide some context to this case by dealing with some of the evidence from other witnesses and in respect of family violence issues.
FAMILY VIOLENCE
Each parent asserts against the other that they have been the victim of family violence including physical violence perpetrated by one to the other. Additionally, each allege emotional abuse, and the mother strongly asserts that she has been the subject of controlling and coercive behaviour by the father including financial abuse. In this case, neither parent takes any responsibility themselves for any real level of abuse towards the other person.
At some stage in the journey of deterioration in the adult relationship, both parties began recording events, I find, solely as an evidence gathering exercise. I was told the father had around 100 recordings and the mother in excess of 20.
In the end, allegedly the most serious events, all prior to separation, were reduced to three audio recordings and one video. The audio recordings were transcribed accurately.
Courts should always be concerned about recordings made by one party generally without the knowledge of the other party for obvious reasons. I have, as I indicated I would, listened to the recordings and viewed the audio. In my assessment, whilst the audio recordings do little credit to either party, I make the following findings:
(a)The words spoken by the mother on each audio are aggressive and provocative. She seemed to escalate her attacks on the father to try and provoke a response from him. Her words alone demonstrate, at that time, she wanted the father out of her and the children’s lives and even was hoping he would die;
(b)The incident in April 2021 engaged X. The mother clearly tries to engage the child who, at that stage, was three years of age on her side against the father. The mother’s actions cannot be justified;
(c)An earlier incident in 2021 commenced with the mother expressing concerns about not feeling that she had felt any baby movement for the unborn child on the previous night and then said in a very distressed state “I cannot find a heartbeat”. The father said straightaway “stop hitting me”, and as the mother accused him of making a face at her, she says “somebody needs to kill you. You are the most horrible human being to ever walk this planet”. Curiously however, when the father (who is a medical professional) calmly, at least on the tape, says “let’s check the baby…”, the mother’s actions and words from the transcript and the recording reveal that she was more interested in engaging and abusing, without any let up, the father, which included threatening to call the police and threatening, as I interpret her words, the possibility of making a false accusation against the father. The transcript reveals nine occasions when the father offered to check the baby but rather than taking up that offer, the mother spends many minutes berating the father in a completely irrational and aggressive way before calling a friend, Ms EE, to ask her to take her to the hospital, rejecting the father’s offer to do so. The father was calm generally, but his calmness seemed to provoke the mother, and this escalated the mother’s behaviour on this occasion;
(d)At least during the recording titled by the ICL as “incident 1”, a remark made by the mother reveals she was aware the father was recording that incident. My conclusion on the videos – frankly, all the tapes demonstrate to me – is that:
(i)the father’s calmness seemed to greatly agitate the mother;
(ii)the mother showed she was quite prepared to engage the child X in a dispute at the time; and
(iii)the mother’s concerns about the lack of heartbeat for the unborn baby was less than her uncontrolled need to verbally and aggressively attack the father who, perhaps a little belatedly and maybe not genuinely, expressed concern and wanted to check the baby but, clearly, both parents showed through these three incidents little capacity to defuse a conflict – to walk away and not engage.
(e)They also showed, in my view, the innate capacity which occurs in relationships of knowing which buttons to push to provoke the other person either by tone or by word. The ferocity of the mother’s words, however – clear on the transcript – make it obvious to me that she saw the father, at least at that time, offered no value in the life of X and should simply die or get out of their lives.
In my view, as I explore, the mother’s views about the father have not changed; have intensified post separation; and I find, caused her to cease or interrupt the children’s time with the father, even when there are Court orders, she did so with not a skerrick of regret or insight about how her views about the father meant that she could not permit the children to engage with him.
As to the video, it does not, as the mother asserts, show the father jumping on her car. What it does depict, however, is the mother being very anxious, perhaps even in a state of panic, as the father approached her car, recording as he went. Again, it is not an event that does the father any credit.
I am not satisfied that the father’s comments for the purposes of the recording – that he was being abused by a heavily pregnant mother or that she had started hitting him – can be accepted as evidence of that event occurring. It was a highly emotional exchange for him, and I do not say some physical interaction did not occur, just that I am unable on this evidence and the parties’ own evidence to establish on the balance of probabilities what did occur.
What is clear is that, thankfully, since final separation, there have been few interactions physically between the parents.
The supervised visits which did take place between January and August 2023 occurred, in my view, with changeovers occurring safely.
I find these parties had, during their relationship, abused each other orally and probably at least in the presence of or with the awareness of X. Y was only 12 months old when the parties finally separated and as a result, he was likely not as aware of the intense conflict.
For completeness on the evidence, I am unable to be satisfied that the mother has “abused” the father on three occasions as he alleges. Essentially, the cause of reluctance to make such a finding arises from my ultimate assessment that the level of hatred each parent now holds for the other is at such a high and uncontrolled level that neither parent impressed me as a totally reliable historian. Their perception of the relationship now and their view of the other parent’s behaviour is a prism through which they give their evidence.
In my view, it has meant likely exaggeration and embellishment and an inability to take any responsibility for their own behaviour and little capacity for sensible reflection. This is extremely disappointing for two clearly highly intelligent, educated parents who are otherwise capable parents and presents as the greatest risk to X and Y of any future sharing of care operating for their benefit.
Finally, I acknowledge the early applications for Domestic Violence Orders and that at this time, the father’s Temporary Protection Order made in 2024 is being contested by the mother and is still before the Queensland Magistrates Court.
I make no findings in relation to that application.
SUPERVISED VISITS
Exhibit 21 is a set of very extensive notes prepared by the supervisors of the father’s time with the children between 28 January 2023 and 12 August 2023.
The notes reveal from a cautious beginning, a depth of warmth and happy engagement between the children and the father was observed. Sadly, the notes reveal that the happy exchanges began to alter “course” from around July 2023 when X began openly expressing reluctance to see her father; she said she hated him; she remarked he had all the money, and in the final visit on 12 August 2023, whilst acknowledging her “big feelings”, she would not engage with the father; said he was a mean man and that he was a no one – nothing. The mother ceased complying with the Court Orders shortly thereafter and no time occurred despite the Court making other orders before the interim change of residence occurred on 11 September 2024.
The notes reveal that at least by April 2023, the mother had formed a view that the Centre and particularly the owner/operator and often supervisor, Ms U, were biased against and overly supportive of the father. The intensity of the mother’s views at that time emerged from the notes but had hardly diminished when she swore her trial affidavit on 4 November 2024.
Almost without a sense of what the notes reveal, at paragraph 438 to 476, the mother deposes to a number of criticisms of the V Family Services in general and Ms U in particular, echoed by paragraph 466 where the mother says:
[Ms U]’s behaviours were completely disgusting, effectively mocking the domestic violence I had suffered. I felt dismissed and degraded by [Ms U]’s behaviour and did not feel that the children or I were safe engaging the service.
Quite properly, the ICL subpoenaed Ms U who was the subject of focused cross-examination by Counsel for the mother, Ms Lyons. Counsel put the mother’s evidence to Ms U. Almost every event was raised and Ms U, in my view on the evidence, both had a reasonable response and a clear rejection of those allegations. The transcript of the cross-examination speaks for itself. I regard the evidence of Ms U as honest and reliable and where it differs from the evidence of the mother, I prefer the evidence of Ms U.
On the basis of this evidence and the voluminous notes, I find they establish that the mother demonstrated she would not support the order for supervised time when the children were clearly enjoying the time, although she may not have got that message from them. She got upset with the centre when her demand that any ordered visits had to fit around X’s intense dance schedules and, I find, more likely than not this put X under pressure to change her happy engagement with the father to a point of making highly negative remarks about him. This behaviour of the mother is but one example of the most significant concern identified in all the material, namely the mother’s genuine capacity and willingness to support the children having a relationship with the father.
MR S
This highly qualified clinician and academic was engaged as a single expert to provide an opinion on whether the husband’s diagnosis of autism (made back in 2010) affected his capacity to parent.
The opinions expressed in his report, despite further cross-examination, did not materially change from:
(a)the father has a genuine awareness of his condition;
(b)the father should remain engaged in therapeutic support;
(c)the father needs to be aware of the potential for “autistic burnout” and how it can affect executive functioning; and
(d)answered both adequately and sensitively the mother’s criticisms deposed to at paragraphs 561 to 573 of the mother’s affidavit.
Sadly again, the mother’s criticisms reflect an inability to adopt – even to consider – a professional opinion she does not agree with.
My ultimate conclusion is that I accept the evidence of Mr S and his conclusion that he could see no reason why the father in this case could not exercise parental care of the children.
DR R
Highly experienced consultant psychiatrist, Dr R, who assessed both parties on the instructions of the ICL and funded by Legal Aid Queensland, was the subject of cross-examination on his report annexed to his affidavit. He did acknowledge that he had received significant further material from the ICL bringing him “up to date” since he saw the parties separately in November 2022.
Dr R did not escape criticism from the mother (see paragraphs 550 to 560 of the mother’s affidavit) and properly conceded that he was not required to determine, nor should he, disputed facts and that he relies upon generally the statements made by the parties and the other collateral material.
His report reveals a very comprehensive review of the material before coming to a final opinion which, in this case, expressed in summary form, is that:
(a)acknowledging the diagnosis of the father of both ASD and ADHD, he also felt the father had significant personality vulnerability with some indication of paranoid traits, obsessional traits and some passive-aggressive traits. He was also inclined to the view that the father has a primary disorder of mind best understood as constituting persistent depressive disorder (PDD);
(b)at the time of evaluation, Mr Abramsson was experiencing a dip into major depressive disorder (MDD) of moderate intensity, but it was not disabling. The fact that the father had personality vulnerabilities did not mean the father had no personality strengths;
(c)the mother’s principle clinical issue relates to personality. There are issues such as self‑esteem and self-worth which may be driving her accepting that the children can have a relationship with the father. Impulsivity is another feature of her personality but as with the father, the fact that there are personality vulnerabilities does not mean there are no personality strengths;
(d)the respective parenting issues – Dr R noted that a question arises as to whether either parent will undermine and/or promote the relationship the children have with the other parent, but Dr R did not form the opinion that the children could not spend substantial unsupervised time with either parent. Under cross-examination, some further evidence was given, inter alia, that:
(i)he would expect the father’s functioning to improve and noted the assessment took place in November 2022 when the father was not spending time with the children. The fact that they are now living with him and that he is working as a medical professional are good factors and indicators that are likely to be positive to his functioning and reducing his likely fall into depression;
(ii)after examining hospital records for the traumatic events of 2024 at Exhibit 12, Dr R opined, in the circumstance of that day, the mother’s reaction is best described as an “acute crisis response” – I agree;
(iii)he disagreed, as do I, that the mother poses a risk of serious physical harm to the children as alleged by the father. For clarity, I reject the father’s express view, which I felt was made more as a parent than a medical professional, that the mother would kill or otherwise hurt the children;
(iv)the mother, in his opinion on the data, does not suffer complex PTSD, although the mother's experience as a child and adolescent can be described as a compromised upbringing; and
(v)although, in his experience where people are assessed for family law matters, they all seek to present positively, he did not believe that the father was manipulating him or that, as put by the mother’s Counsel, because the father is a medical professional and a professional colleague, therefore, he, in a sense, went easy on him.
I do not have hesitation in accepting Dr R’s opinions and assessments in respect of both parents.
DR G
Dr G, a psychologist, conducted 29 joint relationship therapy sessions with the parties and then, after that, over 80 individual sessions with the mother. She did not seem to have any difficulties in moving from one form of therapy to another.
There is no doubt Dr G has provided significant support to the mother through a difficult period. She confirmed that like all therapists, she is unable to determine disputed facts and takes her patient’s views, as expressed, as true.
I have considered her last report dated 31 October 2024 (as well as earlier reports). Dr G, when asked about the event in early 2022, said the mother has expressed to her that she had little memory of the event at the time and so it is hard to assess, from the mother’s perspective, what was going through her mind, but Dr G took the view, in her opinion, that the event should not be construed as an attempt at self-harm.
Dr G says she is willing to monitor and maintain a therapeutic relationship with the mother and says the change of residence in late 2024 has been a very challenging change for the mother, which I entirely accept. Clarification of the current “uncertainty”, Dr G said, will help the mother. Although, if the mother (who maintains a hope of the children returning to her care) is not successful in achieving residence, the mother will need a lot of support to deal with that outcome.
Dr G said she has no data or evidence that the mother is a physical risk to the children. She did not believe that the mother would catastrophise whatever result the Court ultimately comes to.
MS D
Ms D is a registered psychologist and clinical registrar who has been treating X since early 2022. Her reports of 11 March 2023 and 1 November 2024 are before me, as well as some clinical notes (Exhibits 22, 23 and 24).
The father expressed some concerns about both the capacity for Ms D to treat X in the future and past treatment because of the mother’s engagement with Ms D in the absence of information from the father.
In my view, Ms D was an impressive witness, well aware of the toxic dispute between the parents and, I assess, able to professionally focus on the best interests of X with whom she has developed a trusted therapeutic relationship.
When the Court read to Ms D the note of the engagement with Ms E and the ICL on 4 November 2024, she expressed surprise at how positive it was but clearly not unhappy for X that it seemed she had adjusted so well and easily to living with the father and spending, at that time, no time with the mother for nearly two months. She did opine that although X had developed a level of resilience, she still felt the child exhibits a degree of “family avoidance”, which I took to mean that when she was with the mother, she avoided discussion of any positive relationship with the father, and that now she is living with the father, she seems to be avoiding any positive discussion about the mother and, perhaps, I infer, her previous interest in extracurricular activities.
I am strongly of the view that X will benefit from an ongoing relationship and a sense of support from Ms D into the future.
FAMILY REPORT WRITER
In the interest of oral brevity in this somewhat complex case, I incorporate in the published reasons the remarks I made in my aforementioned Judgment on 11 September 2024 (see Abramsson & Abramsson [2024] FedCFamC1F 658) at paragraphs 18 and 24, which was an analysis of the last family report, namely:
18.Earlier today, the most recent report of [Ms E] was produced to the parties. It was produced in circumstances where [Ms E] had identified in her report the need for the report to be given to the parties when they had the benefit of either legal advice and support or a health practitioner’s support (see paragraph 154). Ms Lilley, the highly experienced Independent Children’s Lawyer, provided a copy of the report to the parties earlier today. Thankfully, both have had a chance to read it and have the benefit of independent legal advice.
19.The report – much of which will be challenged by the mother through cross-examine or otherwise; some of which may be cross-examinable by the father – ultimately comes to the conclusion that the children should live with the father and that the children should have no contact with their mother for a period of three months “to provide for a period of adjustment.”
20.Such a recommendation was always going to be confronting for the mother, I accept. The fact that it would be confronting was apparent from the way in which she dealt with the stresses of the family report interviews and observations, at least on 2 August 2024. I have seen the mother distressed in my Court. She has explained, both to [Ms E], and to this Court in earlier affidavits, that her level of reaction is entirely associated with her treatment at the hands of the father during the relationship; and to the fact that she has been, in effect, financially coerced; controlled and abused by the father’s failure to support her and the children, not only in terms of the day-to-day living expenses, but also in supporting the children to maintain their education at [B School].
21.The mother has consistently and fiercely agitated that it is in both children’s best interests that they have no relationship with the father at all. Her comments to [Ms E] in the report, where she claims the father is a “sociopath” (see paragraph 60), where she says keeping the father away from the children and that would be the “greatest gift” she could give them (see paragraph 78), and similar comments, are capable of being accepted, in my view, and all the evidence, as her genuinely-held view.
22.[Ms E] had prepared an earlier report dated 17 October 2022, in which she identified the material available at that stage, including a substantiation of emotional risk by the Department of Children, Youth Justice and Multicultural Affairs (as it was then known) (“the Department”) of each parent, arising from the conflict, the damning result of any investigation by the Department, upon each parent.
23.However, the updated family report dated 9 September 2024, for the reasons clearly identified – which are challengeable, I accept – support her conclusion, which I may or may not accept at trial, that the children should live with the father, and that there should be a period of adjustment to returning to a relationship with their mother.
24.With a trial pending on 25 November 2024, it was open to the Court to receive the report and to take the view that it will all be sorted out at trial. Many judges would follow that approach. In fact, often I have followed that approach. However, [Ms E]’s report is the first independent, recent assessment where there has been a clear recommendation for a change of residence. More importantly, [Ms E] very clearly identifies why, in her view, the father does not present to her as a risk of harm to the children. Although I am not obliged to accept that view, on an interim basis, I did not ignore an experienced social worker, who has longitudinally assessed this family and the parents, who formed that view.
Clearly, the then untested opinions of Ms E did significantly influence the interim decision. Importantly, Ms E, accompanied by the ICL, Ms Lilley, had a meeting with the children on 4 November 2024, and a note of that meeting is before me and speaks for itself.
Before, of course, the mother had seen the notes of the meeting of 4 November 2024, which she does not accept as accurate because it does not meet with her narrative, she swore her trial affidavit and, in it, set out criticisms of Ms E and the family report at paragraphs 574 to 591. Those criticisms should be seen within the context just given. The mother’s conclusion at paragraph 591 was “the misrepresentations of the facts and the conduct of the family report interview process are deeply concerning when Ms E is making “expert” recommendations to the Court”. This represented, in my view, at the time, the mother’s express and firm belief.
That being the case, it was entirely proper that the detailed criticisms of Ms E by the mother were put to her which, I am satisfied, as the transcript would attest, occurred through Ms Lyons of Counsel.
In these Reasons delivered orally, I make a finding that the mother’s attempts to tarnish the professional opinions and processes adopted by Ms E completely fail. Again, however, I am bound to record that this is yet another attempt by the mother to attack a professional witness whose opinion she does not accept. That, as with other witnesses already identified, she does so in such a detailed way, in my view, reflects the depth of the mother’s conviction and in her belief that she is right and anyone who does not see the father as she sees him, namely as a significant risk (based on her asserted lived experience), is either biased against her, simply wrong, or does not care about the children. This of course includes the Court.
I see no real need to incorporate some of the answers given by Ms E to the mother’s criticisms. The transcript of that testimony just a week ago remains fresh in my mind and, no doubt, the parties who heard it.
Ms E confirmed her express view that although some of the recent material from the children’s school and the early learning centre raise concerns and that it is not clear why Y’s recent toileting episodes are occurring, she still is of the view that the children should live with the father. All the evidence available to her including the comments made to her by the mother about the father cause her to believe the mother is unwilling, maybe incapable, of facilitating and supporting the children having any relationship with the father at all. She acknowledges the father is untested as to his capacity to support the relationship but, on balance, she believes he has a stronger inclination to do so than the mother has demonstrated she can achieve to date.
Ms E said that it would be better for the children not to have the travel burden of travelling from the father’s home in Suburb M to B School, a distance of over an hour in the traffic. She accepted, ideally, it is in the children’s best interests, if living with the father, to have a relationship with their mother.
Ms E did not believe supervised time was necessary but, certainly, keeping the parents apart at least initially is recommended. The need for slow but persistent reintroduction of the children spending time with the mother is to give the children a chance to “recalibrate” their relationship with the mother.
In circumstances where the mother told Ms E she cannot “tolerate” the children even having time with the father, difficulties when time recommences as it should in some form can probably be expected.
The Court is not bound by the opinions of the family report writer. However, where the foundation for the report is solid and consistent with many of the findings the Court has made, then the Court is entitled to give significant weight to the views and opinions of the report writer. In this case, I do so.
LEGISLATIVE PATHWAY
Since 6 May 2024, the statutory pathway for parenting orders has altered. Now, there are just two objects in s 60B of the Act:
(a)s 60B(a) is to ensure the best interests of the children are met; and
(b)s 60B(b) is to give effect to the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
The very expansive s60CC(2) and (3) which had primary and additional considerations has been very much shortened. I note as well as the orders provided the presumption of equal share for responsibility no longer applies in parenting cases.
Section 60CC provides that when determining a child’s best interest certain things must be considered.
Determining child’s best interests
(1)Subject to subsection (4), in determining what is in the child’s best interests, the court must:
(a) consider the matters set out in subsection (2); and
(b)if the child is an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander child—also consider the matters set out in subsection (3).
The general considerations contained in section 60CC(2) prescribe that, for the purposes of the best interests consideration, the Court must consider the following matters:
(a)what arrangements would promote the safety (including safety from being subjected to, or exposed to, family violence, abuse, neglect, or other harm) of:
(i)the child; and
(ii)each person who has care of the child (whether or not a person has parental responsibility for the child);
(b)any views expressed by the child;
(c)the developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs of the child;
(d)the capacity of each person who has or is proposed to have parental responsibility for the child to provide for the child’s developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs ;
(e)the benefit to the child of being able to have a relationship with the child’s parents, and other people who are significant to the child, where it is safe to do so;
(f)anything else that is relevant to the particular circumstances of the child.
The additional consideration, which has a heading of the right to enjoy Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander culture is subsection (3) which is in these terms:
(3)For the purposes of paragraph (1)(b), the court must consider the following matters:
(a)the child’s right to enjoy the child’s Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander culture, by having the support, opportunity and encouragement necessary:
(i)to connect with, and maintain their connection with, members of their family and with their community, culture, country and language; and
(ii)to explore the full extent of that culture, consistent with the child’s age and developmental level and the child’s views; and
(iii)to develop a positive appreciation of that culture; and
(b)the likely impact any proposed parenting order under this Part will have on that right.
COMPETING PROPOSALS ASSESSED
Sadly, this is not a “no risk” case. Both parties raise concerns about the other parent.
When remarking at one stage during the trial that this case is finely balanced, this did not mean that there was little difference between the proposals. It meant that, in essence, the real primary proposal of both parents was similar but polarised with little give either way.
I rely upon but do not repeat earlier findings but now make these additional findings with an eye to the legislative pathway:
(a)I am satisfied that the relationship between the mother and father was volatile and shaped at times by family violence perpetrated by each party against the other. The evidence does not permit a finding to be made that there was only one victim as each parent asserts;
(b)It is clear that the relationship began to deteriorate when, at the same time, financial pressures escalated. The father had a good income as a medical professional (he said exceeding $500,000 per annum) but when his work began to evaporate, even a desperate attempt to create wealth by the father borrowing $500,000 to purchase shares did not work. The parties’ secure, well-resourced lifestyle in City AA began to falter and the move to Queensland in early 2022 was never likely, in my view in hindsight, to be positive for this family. At least that was because, as the audio recordings reflect, the relationship by early 2022 was in chaos;
(c)The child X was exposed to the conflict with the parents unable to shield her from their vitriol;
(d)I am not satisfied that the “car event” in 2022 was a serious attempt at self-harm by the mother, more likely bad driving under stress and accidental. However, it does seem more likely than not that it was merely the last event of their combined relationship as a couple;
(e)I find that despite Orders, the mother, who was in control of the children and their activities including X’s extracurricular activities, saw no value in the children having any relationship with their father. The mother felt that the father’s lack of financial support (including payment of child support and particularly school fees) should be seen as further “financial abuse” of her. It seems entirely lost on the mother that her actions had contributed to the falling into a state of depression that was occurring to the father which meant he was unable to work, notwithstanding other restrictions from the Agency;
(f)In making that finding, I do not ignore and I find that the father’s professional difficulties and suspension from practice to a large degree a result of his behaviour and seeking to blame the mother did him no credit at all. I do not find, for example, that the mother took steps to sabotage his career. He should take responsibility for his own failings in that regard. Perhaps, he is a person who should not be in private practice even if he can, as it seems he can practice as a medical professional in other environments;
(g)The mother was able, however, to briefly gain respite from her financial distress and lifestyle limitations that that would have brought, by accessing all of the available capital held in a trust including sale proceeds of shares totalling over $300,000 with the benefit of a Senior Judicial Registrar’s Order of October 2022 which allowed the mother to access what she said was approximately $4000 a week, although that is not what the order says. The then unrepresented father, without income and virtually living in poverty (relying on family support) not only saw all the capital go, but he still has a personal debt of $500,000 to the bank to deal with. All of this was happening when he was spending virtually no time with his children. I could hardly be surprised that he fell into some – call it a “dip” in his depressive condition as observed by Dr R;
(h)The event in 2024 has not been a “wake up” call to the mother in any way. In fact, her affidavit of evidence-in-chief suggests it only intensified her disgust for the father and any expert that did not accept completely her narrative;
(i)The wishes of X fluctuate depending on who she lives with at the time. Whilst I accept the evidence of Ms O that X demonstrated some aptitude and ability for sport and was strongly – the father asserts obsessively – supported by the mother, the best interests of X have more at stake than the potential career of this young girl being a professional sportsperson, as Ms O proudly had been herself. Y, at age three and a half now, seems to be a child of gentle yet easy personality who will, it seems to me, just go with the flow; and
(j)If possible, the Court should make orders which provide security and allow the children to have a safe opportunity to develop a relationship with both parents who, I am sure and have no doubt in this regard, love their children intensely. The facts of this case seriously challenge whether that can be achieved. The risks of further litigation cannot be ignored or underestimated.
I find that the interim decision changing the residence of the children to the father has been accommodated by the children.
The father, I find, functions better now for the reasons discussed with Dr R.
In terms of the capacity to meet the physical needs of these children, I acknowledge the evidence from the school and the early learning centre as well as the evidence from the teacher called for by the mother about events post 2024, and they are concerning. In part, they may be attributable to the father’s lack of real preparation for the abrupt change in September; the lack of funds (now cured in part by obtaining employment from late 2024); and his quite different parenting style – for example, allowing X to decide how she keeps her hair which, I am sure, in the mother’s household, was dealt with completely differently.
CONCLUSION
I have concluded that it is in the best interests of the children that they should live with the father.
The issue of the mother’s demonstrated inability to support the children’s relationship with the father, when I have found that it is safe that it be done and there were orders to require the mother to do so, is a very significant factor in the balance of the two competing proposals.
I well understand the surprise of the ICL expressed in final submissions in reply to the father’s submissions. However, I have reached the conclusion from the totality of the evidence that the father does have a capacity to encourage and support the children’s relationship with the mother from the position of the primary carer.
I accept, as Ms Lyons strenuously asserted, that when you have a parent who thinks and gives evidence on oath that the other parent will harm the children, then the Court must be conscious of that comment and cautious about the effect of making an order that the children spend time with the mother. I accept that his final position preferably was no time but in all of this evidence, I have come to the conclusion that his final position as articulated by his solicitor, who, in my view, showed little flexibility, reflected more the hurt he feels for being unfairly excluded from the children’s lives for over two years than a real, although expressed, fear the mother will harm the children. As I have said, I do not accept his opinion.
The father will have sole decision-making with a need to consult the mother because the communication is so poor and unable to improve in the foreseeable future on the evidence, that is really the only practical option.
X can be enrolled in Suburb M School. This is not to ignore the benefits the children have obtained from the excellent B School where they had been for some time, but the travel cannot be justified from the father’s home to B School. Furthermore, these parents are unable to pay the school fees, and although the maternal grandmother, who gave evidence and was a delightful witness, was prepared to use her retirement savings to pay school fees, she gave no undertaking to do so and my impression was that if the children did not live with her daughter, her enthusiasm to pay school fees would quickly wane.
The only way that the Court might be satisfied that further proceedings can be avoided, having decided the children shall live with the father, would be in some ways to order the children spend no time at all with the mother.
However, to do so would be to rob the children of not only a chance of building on their relationship with their mother, developed as their primary carer during their lives until September 2024, but they would lose access to her unique skills and positive parenting attitudes which she has demonstrated to them, other than when it concerns the father.
The risk is, of course, that at some time, even quickly, the mother’s acute disappointment, even anger, with my decision could mean this mother takes the law into her own hands and, again, when the children are with her, she undermines the relationship with the father. As well, she could withhold them and challenge the Court’s authority.
Having expressed that view, I contemplated whether or not a further moratorium beyond what has been effectively the three months that has occurred to date would have any effect. In my view, moratoriums can only really have an effect if such time is likely, with usually therapeutic support, to cause a change in attitude by the parent who is denied time with their children. I am not satisfied any moratorium would achieve that. The other effect of the moratorium is to allow children to, in a sense, recalibrate, as Ms E described it, their relationship with the parent who was previously their primary carer.
I have decided not to order a further moratorium. However, this concern hangs heavily upon me in this matter but in my Judgment and the exercise of my discretion, I intend to make orders for the children to spend some day time over the next few weeks and then, from January 2025, some extended overnight time such that by the time of the second week of the new school term in 2025, the children are, as the ICL’s minute of order proposed, spending time with the mother from after school Friday to before school Monday.
Obviously, changeovers at Y’s day care centre will need to occur unless he is with the father on those days, in which case, the father would need to make arrangements with the mother.
I accept these parties should be kept apart. That should not be forever. They should be capable of actually acting like parents. However, initially, at least during the school holidays until school returns, changeovers will have to occur at a contact centre, and I adopt the ICL’s proposal that it be the K Counselling at Suburb FF.
I shall cause the final orders I have made today to be published with these Reasons but for the sake of clarity, upon adjournment of the Court, I will cause the orders to be sent by my associate to the parties’ lawyers.
What the orders do provide at least – that the first time that the mother shall spend with the children – as I say, with changeovers at K Counselling – shall be:
(a)from 9.00am until 4.00pm on Wednesday, 11 December 2024;
(b)followed by 9.00am until 4.00pm on Wednesday, 18 December 2024;
(c)followed by 9.00am until 4.00pm on Tuesday, 24 December 2024, being Christmas Eve;
(d)followed by an overnight time visit commencing on Tuesday, 31 December 2024 until 4.00pm on Wednesday, 1 January 2025;
(e)then a visit from Wednesday, 8 January 2025 until 4.00pm pm on 9 January 2025;
(f)then, from 9.00am on Wednesday, 15 January until 4.00pm on Friday, 17 January 2025;
(g)then, from 9.00am on Wednesday, 22 January 2025 until 4.00pm on Friday, 24 January 2025; and
(h)after school terms, the first alternate weekend from after school Friday to before school Monday shall occur on Friday, 7 February 2025.
I will adopt the proposals of the ICL in respect of holidays.
I make further other orders in relation to the father being entitled to enrol X into Suburb M School for the 2025 school year and Y in a childcare centre local to him.
I have made an order that the parents will maintain X’s attendance upon psychologist Ms D – both the mother and father who shall have a copy of my Reasons, as shall Dr G, if the mother chooses to provide them to her.
As was indicated during the course of the trial and with the agreement of the mother and, I infer, the father, the parties shall communicate in respect of children only and via the OurFamilyWizard parenting app. I make orders consistent with the mother’s proposal in respect of restraints.
I regarded the proposal by the father for s 68B orders including a right of imprisonment as excessive, and I choose not to make them.
As I say, the orders which I publish today are in the best interests of children.
I certify that the preceding one hundred and twenty-six (126) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the ex tempore Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Baumann. Associate:
Dated: 28 January 2025
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